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
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TABLES.

PRICE OF BULLION per Ounce, in the London Market, during the Six Months ending 31st December 1811, being the average price of each Month.—N. B. Where there is no price mentioned, there has been none of that sort of Bullion in the Market.

Sorts of Bullion.	July.	August.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Portugal Gold Coin	0 0 0	4 17 6	4 16 6	4 17 9	4 19 0	4 19 0
Standard Gold in Bars	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	4 17 9	4 19 0	4 19 0
New Doubloons	4 12 6	4 14 4½	4 12 6	4 14 1	4 15 6	4 15 4½
New Dollars.....	0 5 10½	0 6 0	0 5 11½	0 6 0½	0 6 14	0 6 1½
Standard Silver in Bars.....	0 6 0½	0 6 2	0 6 1	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0

N. B. The MINT PRICE, per Ounce, of the Standard Gold and Silver Bullion is as follows: Standard Gold in Bars, £.3 17s. 10½d. Standard Silver in Bars; 5s. 2d. The other sorts of Bullion, except the Portugal Gold Coin, are below Standard Value. The Prices in the above table is the Market Price in Bank of England Notes.

Number of BANKRUPT-CIES as announced in the London Gazette; during the 29 Years, ending at 31 Dec. 1811.

1790...	583	1801...	884
1791...	612	1802...	947
1792...	625	1803...	920
1793...	1299	1804...	884
1794...	824	1805...	958
1795...	704	1806...	994
1796...	735	1807...	1067
1797...	866	1808...	1101
1798...	794	1809...	1110
1799...	557	1810...	1792
1800...	736	1811...	2044

Table of the Prices of MEAT, SUGAR, SALT, and COALS, in LONDON, from July to December 1811, inclusive.

	July	Aug	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	
Beef...	6 0	5 8	5 4	6 0	5 8	6 0	per Stone of 8lb. to sink the offal.
Mutton	6 0	6 0	5 6	6 4	6 0	6 4	
Pork...	6 8	6 8	6 8	7 0	6 0	6 8	
Sugar	33 9½	35 3½	32 9½	36 4½	42 4½	45 9½	Cwt.
Salt ...	20 0	20 0	20 0	20 0	20 0	20 0	Bushel
Coals...	54 6	55 6	54 3	54 6	55 0	55 0	Chald.

Price of the QUARTERN LOAF, according to the Assize of Bread in LONDON, for the Six Months ending with Dec., 1811, taking the average of the four Assizes in each Month.—N. B. The Weight of the Loaf, according to Law, is 4lb. 5oz. 8dr.

	s. d.
July.....	1 1½
August.....	1 2½
September	1 4
October	1 5
November	1 5½
December	1 5½

Average Price during the Six Months 1 3½ ½

Prices of the ENGLISH FUNDS, or STOCKS, as shown from the Prices here given of the Three per Cent. Consolidated Annuities, for the six Months, ending with Dec., 1811. — N. B. The Prices here given are the average Prices for each Month.

July	62½
August.....	63½
September	64½
October	63½
November.....	63½
December.....	63½

Number of CHRISTENINGS and BURIALS within the Bills of Mortality, from 26th June, to 24th Dec. 1811.

Months.	Christenings.		Burials.	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
To July 23	809	758	608	559
... August 20 ...	747	656	554	510
... September 24	1005	1000	742	713
... October 22...	743	667	606	562
... November 26	1320	1291	1077	930
... December 24	873	819	934	872
	5,497	5,191	4,521	4,146
Total Christenings...	10,688.		8,667	
Children under two years of age ...			2,779	

Total Burials 11,446

Average Prices of CORN, through all England and Wales, and of HAY, STRAW, and best FARNHAM HOPS, in London, from July to December 1811, both Months inclusive.

Corn per Quarter of 8 Winchester Bushels.					Hay per Load.	Straw per Load.	Hops per Cwt.
Wheat.	Rye.	Barley.	Oats.	Beans.			
s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
97 11	50 5	45 1	27 3	50 2	7 8 5	2 13 7	10 13 6

LIST OF HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTERS, 1811.

CABINET MINISTERS.

Earl Camden - - - - -	Lord President of the Council.
Lord Eldon - - - - -	Lord High Chancellor.
Earl of Westmorland - - - - -	Lord Privy Seal.
Earl Bathurst - - - - -	President of the Board of Trade.
Right Hon. Spencer Perceval - - - - -	{ First Lord of the Treasury (Prime Minister) Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of the Ex- chequer, also Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Right Hon. Charles Philip Yorke - - - - -	
Lord Mulgrave - - - - -	First Lord of the Admiralty.
Right Hon. Richard Ryder - - - - -	Master-General of the Ordnance.
Marquis Wellesley - - - - -	Secretary of State for the Home Department.
Earl of Liverpool - - - - -	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
	Secretary of State for the Department of War and the Colonies.

NOT OF THE CABINET.

Right Hon. Robert Saunders Dundas (now Lord Melville) - - - - -	{ President of the Board of Controul for the Af- fairs of India.
Right Hon. George Rose - - - - -	
Viscount Palmerston - - - - -	{ Vice-President of the Board of Trade, and Treasurer of the Navy.
Lord Charles Somerset - - - - -	
Right Hon. Charles Long - - - - -	Secretary at War.
Earl of Chichester - - - - -	{ Joint Paymaster-General of the Forces.
Earl of Sandwich - - - - -	
Richard Wharton, esq. - - - - -	{ Joint Postmaster-General.
Charles Arbuthnot, esq. - - - - -	
Sir William Grant - - - - -	{ Secretaries to the Treasury.
Sir Vicary Gibbs - - - - -	
Sir Thomas Plomer - - - - -	
	Master of the Rolls.
	Attorney-General.
	Solicitor-General.

PERSONS IN THE MINISTRY OF IRELAND.

Duke of Richmond - - - - -	Lord Lieutenant.
Lord Manners - - - - -	Lord High Chancellor.
Right Hon. W. Wellesley Pole - - - - -	{ Chief Secretary, and Chancellor of the Exchequer.

" Nothing is more certain than death, and nothing more uncertain than the time of dying : yet, we can always fix a period beyond which man cannot live, and within some moment of which he will die. We are enabled to do this, not by any spirit of prophecy, but by observation of what has happened in all cases of human or animal existence. If, then, any other subject, such, for instance, as a system of finance, exhibits, in its progress, a series of symptoms indicating decay, its final dissolution is certain, and, from those symptoms we may calculate the period of that dissolution." — PAINE. Decline and Fall of the British System of Finance, published in 1796.

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[2

PAPER AGAINST GOLD :

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee :

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS
IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XXV.

The Subject of Depreciation discussed — Lord Stanhope's Bill — Lord King's Notice to his Tenants.

GENTLEMEN,

THE foregoing Letter we began with proposing to discuss the question of *depreciation*, but were stopped by the desire of showing how childish, and, indeed, how unjust it was in our government to complain of the endeavours said to be used by the French for destroying our paper-money, seeing the endeavours which were used here to destroy the *Assignats* in France. We will now resume the subject of *depreciation*, and see whether the paper-money of England be, or be not, *actually depreciated*; and, if we find that it is, we will inquire whether it can be restored to its former value by any of the means, called *remedies*, that have been pointed out by any of those who are our rulers, or law-givers.

To *depreciate* means to *lower in value*; and the word *depreciation* is used to signify that state, in which any thing is, when it is *lowered*, or has *fallen*, from its former value. Hence the term *depreciation*, as applied to Bank Notes; and, when we thus apply it, accompanied with the affirmative of the proposition, we say, that Bank Notes

have *fallen in value*, and, of course, that any given sum in such notes is *not worth so much as it formerly was*.

Much puzzling has, upon this subject, arisen from a very natural cause; namely, that the note always retains its *nominal* value; that is to say, always goes by the *same name*; a *pound* note still is called a *pound* note, whether it be *worth* as much as it formerly was, or not. But, to this point we shall come more fully by-and-bye, after we have spoken of the way in which a depreciation of money, or the lowering of the value of money, takes place.

Money, of whatever sort, is, like every thing else, lowered in its value in proportion as it becomes *abundant* or *plenty*. As I said upon a former occasion, when apples are *plenty* apples are *cheap*; and cheap means *low in price*. The use of money is to serve men as a sign of the amount of the value of things that pass from man to man in the way of purchase and sale. It is *plenty*, or *scarce*, in proportion as its quantity is great or small compared with the quantity of things purchased and sold in the community; and, whenever it becomes, from any cause, *plenty*, it *depreciates*, or sinks in value. Suppose, for instance, that there is a community of *ten men*, who make amongst them 100 purchases in a year, each purchase amounting to 1 pound. The community, in that case, would possess, we will suppose, 10 pounds; and no more, because, the same money might, and naturally would, go backwards and forwards, and because, except under peculiar circumstances, men do not hoard. Now, suppose, that the money in possession of this community is doubled in quantity, without any other alteration taking place, the quantity of goods and chattels and the quantity of things, including services, purchased and the number of purchases all continuing

B

the same. Suppose this; and, we are here speaking of money, of *any sort*. No matter what sort. Suppose it to be gold, and that its quantity is thus doubled. The consequence would be, of course, that at each of the hundred purchases, *double the sum would be given that was given before*; because, if this were not the case, part of the money must be kept idle, which, upon a general scale, can never be, there being no motive for it. Suppose that one of the hundred purchases was that of a horse. The purchase, which was made with 1 pound before the doubling of the quantity of money, would require 2 pounds after that doubling took place; and so on through the whole; and, in such a state of things people would say, that *prices had risen*, that commodities had *doubled in price*, that every thing was *twice as dear* as it used to be. But, the fact would be, that *money* was become *plenty*, and, like every thing else, *cheap* in proportion to its abundance. It would be, that money had *fallen*, or had been depreciated, and not that things had *risen*; the *loaf*, for instance, having a *real* value in its utility in supporting man, and the money having only an *imaginary* value.

Prices in England have been *rising*, as it is commonly called, for hundreds of years; things have been getting *dearer* and *dearer*. The cause of which, until the bank note system began, was the increase of gold and silver in Europe, in consequence of the discovery of South America and the subsequent working of the mines. But the increase of the quantity of gold and silver was slow. "Nature," as PAINE observes, "gives those materials out with a sparing hand;" they came, as they still come, in regular annual quantities from the mines; and that portion of them which found its way to this country was obtained by the sale of things of real value, being the product of our soil or of our labour. Therefore, the quantity of money increased very slowly; it did increase, and prices gradually rose, but the increase and the rise were so slow as not to be strikingly perceptible. During the average life of man the rise in prices was so small as hardly to attract any thing like general attention. Curious men observed it, and some of them recorded the progress of prices; but, as there was no sensible difference in prices in the average life of man, the rise never became an object of general interest, as long as *gold* and *silver* were the only currency of the country.

But, when the *funding system* began, and paper became, in many cases, a substitute for gold and silver; when the increase of the quantity of money in the country was no longer dependent upon the mines; when the check which nature had provided was removed; then money, or its substitute, paper, increased at a rate much greater than before, and *prices* took a *proportionate rise*, as they naturally would. The nature of the FUNDING SYSTEM has been fully explained before; we have also seen how it would naturally cause the paper-money to go on increasing. We have seen, that the government, as soon as it began to make loans, was compelled to establish a Bank, of a something, in order to get the means of *paying the interest upon the loans*. The amount of the loans would naturally go on increasing in order to meet the rise in prices, and thus the increase of the paper would continue causing rise after rise in the prices, and the rise in the prices would continue causing addition upon addition to the quantity of the paper. This was the natural progress, and it was that which actually took place.

Still, however, the paper passed in company with the gold and silver. Money was more *plenty*; it was of *less value*; and, of course, any given quantity of it would purchase less bread, for instance, than formerly; but, still there was no difference in the *quality* of the two sorts of money; *metal* and *paper* both not only passed at the sums that they had usually passed at; but people liked the one just as well as the other; and, it was a matter of *perfect indifference* to any man, whether he took a hundred guineas in gold, or one hundred and five pounds in paper. And, the reason of this indifference was, that the holder of a bank note could, at any moment, go to the Bank, and there demand and receive payment in guineas. This was the reason why the paper passed in society with the gold. But, it was impossible that this society should long continue after the paper increased to a very great amount, and especially after the notes became so low in nominal value as 5 pounds; for, then, it was evident, that all the taxes would be paid in paper; that the government would receive nothing but paper; that the Bank could get nothing but paper from the government; that whatever gold went out of the Bank would never return to it; and, of course,

that the Bank would, in a short time, be unable to pay its notes in gold, if called on for that purpose to any great extent.

A call of this sort was made upon it in 1797; and, as we have seen, and now feel, the Bank was unable to pay. Its creditors, that is to say, the holders of its notes, demanded their money; the Bank flew to the minister Pitt for protection; the minister, by an Order of Council, authorized the Bank to refuse to pay its creditors; the Bank did refuse; the parliament passed an Act to shelter the Minister and the Bank Directors and all who had been guilty of this violation of law, and, at the same time enacted, that, for the future, the Bank should not be compellable to pay its notes in gold or silver. After this memorable transaction, the full and true history of which I have recorded in the foregoing Letters; after this, the whole concern assumed a new face and indeed a new nature. The holder of a bank note could no longer go and demand payment of it in guineas; it was impossible, therefore, that he should look upon 105 £. in notes as quite equal in value to 100 guineas. Still, however, in consequence of the Meetings and Combinations of the rich, and of the enormous influence of the government, to which may be added the dread in every man of being marked out as a Jacobin and Leveller; in consequence of all these, and of the necessity of having something to serve as money, the notes continued to circulate; and, as the alarm subsided, the guinea returned and circulated in company with them; but, not with that cordiality that it used to do. It became much less frequent in its appearance in company with the notes; it held itself aloof; seemed to demand a preference; but, not appearing to like to assume this superiority over an old and familiar associate, and yet unwilling to pass for so much less than its worth, it soon began to keep away altogether, retiring to the chests of the hoarders, or going upon its travels into foreign parts, until such time as it found itself duly estimated in England, which would naturally be when people began to make openly a *distinction* between paper and coin.

That time arrived about two years ago; but, no sooner was the distinction thus made, and acted upon, than the government began to prosecute the actors, and

commenced, I believe, in the well-known case of Dr YONGE, who, under laws passed about two hundred years before such things as bank notes were ever heard of, was convicted, about a year ago, of the crime of exchanging guineas for more than their nominal value in bank notes.* Dr YONGE moved for an *arrest of judgment*; the case has been since argued before the judges, and their decision thereon is shortly expected to be promulgated. Other persons have been prosecuted in the same way, and upon the same ground, the effect of which naturally has been to deter people from openly purchasing and selling guineas, and also from tendering them generally in payment for more than their nominal value in paper. But, it is very notorious, that the distinction is, nevertheless, made, and that, in payments, men do take gold at its *worth* in comparison with the paper. *Two prices* are not yet openly and generally made; but, they exist partially, and the extent of them is daily increasing.

To this point, then, we are now arrived, and here we see proof, not of a depreciation of money of *all sorts*, arising merely from that general *plenty* of money spoken of above; but arising from the abundance, or plenty, of *paper*, that is to say, the great quantity of the paper compared with that of the coin. Hence we say, that the bank notes have depreciated, or fallen in value; and, that there should be found any human being to assert the contrary, or to believe, or affect to believe, the contrary, is something that, were not the fact before our eyes, no man could think possible: but, we live in times when wonder no longer seems to form a feeling of the mind.

This state of things it was easy to foresee; but, the nation has been deluded by the specious argument of the *equal powers of gold and paper in purchases*. "Go to market," we have been told, "and see whether the pound note and a shilling will not bring you as much meat or cloth as a guinea." This was conclusive with unreflecting minds, and it quieted, or assisted to quiet, all those, who, though they were capable of discerning, dared not look the fearful truth in the face. I looked

* The report of this Trial, together with observations thereon, will be found in Vol. XVIII of the Political Register, page 161 and the following ones.

it in the face rather more than eight years ago, and strenuously laboured to prepare my countrymen for what has now come, and what is now coming, to pass. Upon one occasion, this standing delusive argument was made use of in answer to me: whereupon I made the following remarks;

—"The objection of my other correspondent has more plausibility. These are his words: "I think the argument, that "Bank paper is depreciated, drawn "from the difference between the sterling and the current value of a dollar, if "it prove any thing, proves too much. "That *guineas* are depreciated you will "hardly insist, yet I would sturdily "maintain, from your premises, that "they are, since a guinea will not purchase so many dollars as it formerly would."—Yes, but I do insist though, that *guineas are depreciated*: not in their intrinsic value, but in their value as *currency*, that is to say, in their power of purchasing commodities in this country. "When there is a depreciating paper in any country, the current coin of that country depreciates in its powers along with the paper, because it has a fixed nominal value, and it can pass currently for no more than an equal nominal value in paper, until the paper is at an open discount. The metal is degraded by the society of the paper; but, there comes a time when it will bear this degradation no longer; it then rises above its nominal value, or, in other words, the paper is at a discount."

This was published so long ago as the 14th April, 1804. "*There comes a time*." Aye, and that time is now come. But, let me not be guilty of robbery, and especially of the *Dead*, and more especially of one whose writings, and upon this very subject too, as well as other subjects, I formerly, through ignorance condemned. I allude to the writings of PAINÉ, the abused, the reprobated, the anathematized, TOM PAINÉ. In his work, from which I have taken the perspicuous and impressive passage that serves me as a *motto* to this Letter, and the equal of which has seldom dropped from the pen of any man; in that work, PAINÉ thus exposes the delusive argument of which I have just been speaking: "It is said in England, that the value of paper keeps *equal pace* with the value of gold and silver. But the case is not rightly stated: for, the fact is, that the paper has *pulled down* the

value of gold and silver to its own level. "Gold and silver will not purchase so much of any purchasable article at this day (March, 1796) as they would have purchased if no paper had appeared, nor so much as they will in any country of Europe, where there is no paper. "How long this *hanging together* of paper and money will continue makes a new case; because it daily exposes the system to sudden death, independent of the *natural death* it would otherwise suffer." Here he lays down the principle; and, if, instead of reviling his writings, the government of England had lent a patient ear to him, and taken a lesson from his superior understanding and experience, how different would have been our situation at this day! He proceeds thus: "I have just mentioned that paper in England has *pulled down* the value of gold and silver to level with itself; and that this *pulling down* of gold and silver money has created the appearance of paper money *keeping up*. The same thing, and the same mistake, took place in America and in France, and continued for a considerable time after the commencement of their system of paper; and the actual depreciation of money was hidden under that mistake. It was said in America, at that time, that every thing was becoming *dear*; but gold and silver could then buy those articles no cheaper than paper could; and therefore it was not called *depreciation*. The idea of *dearness* established itself for the idea of depreciation. The same was the case in France. Though every thing rose in price soon after *assignats* appeared, yet those dear articles could be purchased no cheaper with gold and silver, than with paper, and it was only said that things were *dear*. The same is still the language in England. They call it *dearness*. But they will soon find that it is an *actual depreciation*, and that this depreciation is the effect of the funding system; which by crowding such a continually-increasing mass of paper into circulation, carries down the value of gold and silver with it. But gold and silver will, in the long-run, revolt against depreciation, and separate from the value of paper; for the progress of all such systems appears to be, that the paper will take the command in the *beginning*, and gold and silver in the *end*."

How well is this expressed, and how

clearly the truth of it is now verified! Yes: we talk about *dearness*; we talk of *high prices*; we talk of things *rising in value*; but, the fact is, that the change has been in the *money* and not in the articles bought and sold; the articles remain the same in value, but the money, from its abundance, has *fallen in value*. This has till of late been imperceptible to the mass of the people, who were convinced of the non-depreciation by the argument built on the circumstance of the guinea and the paper being upon an equal footing at market. They did not perceive, that the paper had *pulled down* the gold and silver along with it; they did not perceive that the coin was sliding by degrees out of the society of the paper; they did not perceive that, in time, the coin would disappear altogether; they did not perceive that an open contest would, at last, take place between the guineas and the paper, and that, if the law came to the assistance of the paper, the coin would *quit the country*. Now, however, they do perceive this; the facts have all now been established in a way that seems, at last, to have produced conviction even in the minds of this "*most thinking people*;" but, there is reason to fear, that this conviction will have come *too late*. How happy would it have been for this nation, if the opinions of Mr. PAINE, touching this subject, had produced, at the time, their wished-for effect! No man in England dared to publish his work. Any man who had published or sold it would have been punished as a *seditious libeller*. Yet, in my opinion, does that work; that little work, in the space of *twenty-five pages*, convey more useful knowledge upon this subject, and discover infinitely greater depth of thought and general powers of mind, than are to be found in all the pamphlets of the *three score and two* financiers, who, in this country, have, since I came into this jail, favoured the world with their opinions upon the state of our money system. The writings of these people would make *twenty-five thick octavo volumes*; and in all of them there is not so much power of mind discovered as in Paine's *twenty-five pages*. Yet, no man would dare to publish this little work in England. By accident I possess a copy that I brought from America, but which I never read till after my return to England. In 1803, when there was much apprehension of invasion, and when great complaints were made of the *scarcity of change*, I began to read some books upon

the subject; and, after reading several without coming to any thing like a clear notion of the real state of our currency, I took up the little essay of PAINE. Here I saw to the bottom at once. Here was no bubble, no mud to obstruct my view: the stream was clear and strong: I saw the whole matter in its true light, and neither pamphleteers nor speech-makers were, after that, able to raise even a momentary puzzle in my mind. PAINE not only told me what would come to pass, but shewed me, gave me convincing reasons, *why it must come to pass*; and he convinced me also, that it was my duty to endeavour to open the eyes of my countrymen to the truths which I myself had learnt from him; because his reasoning taught me, that, the longer those truths remained hidden from their view, the more fatal must be the consequences. The occasion of this work of PAINE is worthy of notice. One of the motives of writing it was, as he says, at the close, to *retaliate* upon PITT, who, in speaking of the French Republic, had said, that she was "*on the verge, nay, even in the gulph of Bankruptcy*." Paine said, that England would soon be in a worse situation than France as to her finances; and, in less than twelve months after he wrote his work, the Bank became unable to pay its notes in cash.

To return to the subject of *depreciation*, the fact has now been established in all sorts of ways. Gold coin has been, and is, sold at a premium; a guinea will sell for 27 shillings, and the other coins of the realm in the same proportion; many persons in London have written upon their shop windows notifications that they will take the coin at a higher than the nominal value; in numerous cases a distinction is made in prices paid in coin and prices paid in paper. If these are not proofs of an *actual depreciation of the paper*, what, I should be glad to know will ever be admitted as proof of that fact? Indeed, there is no longer any doubt remaining upon the subject; and, therefore we will now proceed to take a view of the REMEDIES that have been proposed by our Rulers and Lawgivers, who, if they had followed the advice given in Paine's Second Part of the "*RIGHTS OF MAN*," instead of prosecuting the author, would not, I am convinced, have had to lament the present state of our finances.

As to REMEDIES, Gentlemen, I, in the

first of this series of Letters, stated to you, that the Bullion Committee had recommended to the House of Commons to pass a law to compel the Bank to pay their notes in gold and silver *at the end of two years*. This same proposition has been since made in the House; but the House have resolved, that *no such measure is necessary*. Those who *opposed* the proposition said, that the Bank had not the gold, and could not get it, and that, therefore, they could not pay in gold. This was a very sufficient reason; and, I must confess, that I was and am, as far as this goes, exactly of the opinion of these gentlemen. For, to what end pass such a law, if the gold was not to be had? There were several sensible men belonging to the Bullion Committee, and the gentleman who brought the measure forward in the House, is looked upon as a person of good understanding. It, therefore, appeared astonishing to me, that they should propose such a measure, seeing that I have never been able to discover any way whatever, by which gold could possibly return to the Bank and remain there in quantity sufficient to enable that Company to pay their notes in gold upon demand. To resume payments in gold would, indeed, be a *complete remedy*; but, to do that is, in my opinion, and, for many years past, has been, utterly impossible. By what means are the Bank Company to get the gold? We are told, that *there is gold enough* if the Bank Company will but purchase it. But, how are they to purchase it? What are they to give for it? Why *their paper*, to be sure; and, as it would require 27 shillings in their paper to purchase a guinea, this would be a most charming way of obtaining the means of paying off the paper with guineas. Let us take an instance. Suppose the Bank Company, by way preparing for cash payments, to be purchasing all the guineas they can find, and, in such case, they would, of course, apply to our old friend, MRS. DE YONGE, to whom, by the by, I here present my congratulations on the late decision of the judges in favour of her husband; the Bank Company would, I say, naturally apply to this good Lady, who, it being now decided that the old biting law does not forbid the buying and selling of bank notes and guineas, would drive with them as good a bargain as she could. Suppose them to buy 100 guineas of her at the present price, 27 shillings each, they would, of course, give her

for them 135 pounds in their notes. And, thus they must go on with other people. Having, at last, got a good lot of guineas together, they begin paying their notes in guineas. It is pretty evident that the vast increase of paper occasioned by the purchase of the guineas would have caused a new and great depreciation of the paper, and that, therefore, the moment the Bank was open to demands in coin, people could crowd to it in all directions. I can fancy the eager crowd now before me, pressing in from every quarter and corner; and, amongst the very foremost and most eager, I think I see our friend MRS. DE YONGE. "What do you do here, Madam," I think I hear a dejected Director say, "what do you do here, you who sold us 'guineas but the other day?'" "Aye, Sir," says the lady, "and for these very guineas I am come again, and mean to take them away too with 105 pounds of the '135 that you gave me for them.'"

Need I say any more upon this subject? Is it not something monstrous to suppose, that it would be possible for the Bank Company to *buy* gold in quantity sufficient to be able to pay their notes in it? "Well," say others, "but the Bank Company may *lessen the quantity of its paper by narrowing its discounts*." To be sure they might; and the only consequence of that would be, that *the taxes would not be paid*, and, of course, that the soldiers, the judges, and all the other persons paid by the public would have to go without pay. The *discounts* make a part of the system; and, if it be put a stop to, that is neither more nor less than one of the ways of totally destroying the system. To *lessen* the quantity of the paper is, therefore, impossible without producing ruin amongst all persons in trade, and without disabling the country to pay the taxes, at their present nominal amount.

But, suppose all other difficulties were got over, did these gentlemen of the Bullion Committee ever reflect upon the consequences of *raising* the value of money to what it was before the Bank Stoppage? Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, in his speech, during the Bullion Debate, told them of these consequences. He observed, and very justly, that, if money were, by any means, to be restored to the value it bore in the year 1796, the interest of the national Debt never could be paid by the people; that interest, he observed, was now

£. 35,000,000 a year; and, if the value of money was brought back to the standard of 1796, this interest would instantly swell to £. 43,000,000 of money at the present value. All the grants, pensions, fixed emoluments, pay of soldiers, judges, chancellors, clerks, commissioners, and the rest would be raised, in point of real amount, in the same proportion; so that, it would be utterly impossible for taxes to such an amount to be raised. And, if it were possible, it would be frequently unjust; for, observe, all the money (making nearly one half of the national Debt) that has been borrowed since the Bank Company stopped paying in gold and silver; all the money borrowed since that time; all the loans made in the name of the public since that time; all the money thus lent to the public, as it is called, has been lent in *depreciated paper*; and, that which has been so lent this year has, if guineas are at 27 shillings, been lent in paper 27 shillings of which are worth no more than a guinea. And, are the people to be called upon to pay interest upon this money in a currency of which 21 shillings are worth a guinea? This would be so abominably unjust, that I wonder how any man like Mr. HORNER ever came to think of it. He expressly stated, that the paper was now worth only 15s. 10d. in the pound; of course he must have known, that this was the sort of thing of which the loans, for some years past, consisted; and yet, he would have had a law passed, the effect of which would have been to make the people pay interest for this money at the rate of twenty shillings in the pound. This is what never could have been submitted to: not because the people would have resisted; that is not what I mean; but, it is what could not have been carried into effect, and for the same reason that the man could not have two skins from the carcass of the same cat. If the quantity of the Bank paper were diminished, its value would rise; and, if its value rose, the value of the interest upon the national Debt would rise also; therefore, to enable the people to continue to pay the interest upon the Debt, the amount of the interest must be lessened, and what would that be but a *partial sponge*. So that, turn and twist the thing whatever way you will, you still find it the same; you still find, that the system must go on in all its parts, or be put a stop to altogether.

In most other cases, when men talk of a remedy, they advert to the *cause of the evil*.

If I find that my health is injured by drinking brandy, the first thing I ought to do, in order to recover my health, would naturally be to leave off drinking brandy. What a fool, what worse than idiot, must that man be, who, feeling the fire burn his shins, still retains his seat. Yet, in this important national concern, never do you find any of our writers or legislators dwelling upon the *cause* of the evil, of which they appear so anxious to get rid. They tell us, indeed, that the *depreciation* of the paper is occasioned by its *excessive quantity*; but here they stop; they never go back to the *cause* of that excessive quantity of paper; or, if they do, they only speak of the *interests of the Bank Company*. If they did go back to the real cause, they would find it in the *increase of the national Debt*, to pay the interest of which, commonly called dividends, has required, has rendered *absolutely necessary*, the present quantity of paper. Indeed, one engenders the other. Every loan occasions a fresh batch of paper to pay the interest upon it; that fresh batch of paper causes a new depreciation and a new demand for paper again to make up in the quantity what has been lost in the quality. So that to talk of *lessening* the quantity of the paper, while the national Debt remains undiminished, does really seem to me something too absurd to be attributed to any man of sense. What, then, must it be to talk of *lessening* the quantity of paper, while the national Debt is *increasing* at an enormous rate, and while it is notorious that that Debt has been nearly doubled in amount during the last fourteen years; aye, while it is notorious, that, during the last fourteen years, that Debt has increased as much as the whole amount of it was before; or in other words, that, since 1796 as much money has been borrowed by the government as was borrowed in the whole *hundred years* preceding? What must it be, then, to talk of *lessening* the quantity of the paper, while the national Debt, which was, and is, the *cause of the paper*, keeps on in this manner increasing? One really would think that such a proposition could have originated only in Bedlam. In 1798, the next year after the stoppage, the amount of Bank of England notes in circulation was, £13,334,752; and the amount of the interest upon the national Debt, in that year, was, £17,750,402. In 1809, the amount of the Bank of England Notes in circulation was, £21,249,980; and the amount of the interest upon the na-

tional Debt in that year was, £30,093,447 (exclusive of Irish loans.) Now let this be tried by the Rule of Three, and you will see with what exactness the amount of the bank notes keeps pace with the amount of the interest upon the national Debt, commonly called the *Dividends*, which many poor creatures in the country look upon, or, rather, used to look upon, as something of a nature almost divine. Let us put this down a little more distinctly.

In 1798, the Dividends amounted to	£.17,750,402
The Bank Notes out in circulation	13,334,752

In 1809, the Dividends amounted to...	30,093,447
The Bank Notes in circulation	21,249,980

Here we have the real cause visibly before us. What folly, what madness, is it, then, to talk of *lessening* the amount of the notes while we are continually *augmenting* the amount of the Dividends, which are the *cause* of the notes? Here we have before our eyes proof that the Dividends (by the use of which word I mean to include all the annual charges upon the Debt) and the Bank Notes have *gone on increasing together for the last ten years*, and I had before shown that they had done so theretofore; and, with this fact before our eyes, we, the people of this "*most thinking nation*," hear some of our legislators propose to *lessen* the amount of the *paper*, while not a man of them seems to dream of lessening the amount of the *Debt*. We hear them propose to narrow the stream, while they say not a word about narrowing the spring whence it flows. They have seen, or, *you*, at least, have seen, Gentlemen, that the bank-paper arose out of the national Debt; you have seen that the Bank was created in a short time after the Debt began; you have seen the increase of the paper keep an exact pace with the increase of the Debt; and, is it not, then, to war against facts, against a century of experience, against the nature of things, to propose to narrow the issues of the paper without previously narrowing the bounds of the Debt and its Dividends? If the authors of this proposition had read the work of PAINE, they would never have offered such a proposition. Read his work they may, but they have not duly considered its arguments, or they have shut their eyes against the clear conviction that it is calculated to produce. He pointed out, in his Second Part of the

Rights of Man, the means of saving England in the way of finance. That work was written in 1791. So early as that he foresaw and foretold what we have now before our eyes, and what we have daily to expect. He there pointed out the sure and certain means of effectually putting a stop to the further increase of the Debt, of insuring a real diminution of it, and, at the same time, of doing ample justice to the fund-holders. For this pamphlet he was prosecuted, and, having gone out of the country, he was *outlawed*. A Royal Proclamation was issued principally for the purpose of suppressing his work, scores of pamphlets having been written in *answer* to him in vain. He was burnt in effigy in most parts of this his native country; and his works were suppressed by the arm of the law. Well, our government had its way; it followed its own counsel and rejected that of Paine; he was overcome by it, and driven from the country; those who endeavoured to cause his principles to have effect were punished or silenced, or both: and, *what is the result?* That result is now before us, and fast approaching us; and, in a short time, in all human probability, events will enable us to form a perfectly correct decision upon the respective merits and demerits of the then conflicting parties.

Now, Gentlemen, if you have attentively read the Letters, of which I now address to you the XXVth, you will have no doubt at all, that the cause of the influx of paper and of the consequent depreciation of all money first, and then of the paper itself alone as compared to the money; you will have no doubt that the real cause of all this, is, the increase of the national Debt; and, yet, in all the parliamentary debates upon the subject, you have heard of scarcely any man who ventured to mention this cause. It was a thing too tender to touch. It was what we call a *sore-place*; and, the old proverb about the galled horse applied too aptly. If the depreciation had been traced to the national Debt, as Mr. HORNE TOOKE once traced it while he was in parliament; for *he* then foresaw and foretold what has now come to pass, and told the House, that, if they continued the then expenditure, the fundholder would not get, in a few years, a *quartern loaf* for the Dividend upon a hundred pounds of stock; if the depreciation had thus been traced back to its real efficient cause, it would have awak-

ened reflections of an unpleasant tendency; it would have set men to consider what was the cause of the increase of the Debt; to look back and inquire whither the money was gone; for what purposes it had been borrowed; *who were the persons that had profited from that borrowing*; who, in short, it was that had swallowed all that money the interest of which the nation was paying, and had so long been paying. These reflections it was not the desire of either party to awaken; but, they belong to the subject, they naturally present themselves to every one who looks only a little beneath the surface, and I venture to say, that, in the end, they will become familiar to every man in the kingdom. If this *real cause* of the evil had been acknowledged, it would have saved a great deal of time; for, then, men would not have amused themselves with talking about such REMEDIES as that of Mr. HORNER; and all the talk about the *narrowing of discounts* and the *purchasing of gold* and the *improving of the exchange* would have been heard like the twice told tale of an idiot. The short and the only question would have been this: *can we, by any means, diminish the amount of the Dividends?* And, if that question had been answered in the negative, there was no course, for those who wished to support the Pitt system, to pursue but that of letting things take their own course, and aid the paper with their *wishes*.

So much for the REMEDY of the Bullion Committee; but, our attention is now called to another, founded on more important circumstances. I allude to the proposition of EARL STANHOPE, which was on the 27th of June, brought forward in the shape of a Bill, and which is, in that shape, now actually before the House of Lords, where it has undergone a second reading. Compared with this proposition, all that has been said and done before is mere child's play. This Bill brings the matter home to the public mind; it shows the most credulous that even those, on whose stoutness they rested their faith, begin to quiver. It cries, a truce with all *pretensions*. It puts the sense and the sincerity of every disputant to the test. The minister told us, that he wished the debate on the Bullion Report to come on, that the matter might be *set at rest*. Set at rest! Mercy on us! Set at rest! And so said OLD GEORGE ROSE too. But, what did

they mean by setting the matter at rest? Is it possible, that they could imagine, that this matter was to be set at rest; that this great question of paper-money; that this subject in which every human creature in the country is so deeply interested; is it possible that they thought this matter would be completely set at rest by a vote of their majority? No, no! This is one of the things that that House cannot do. They can do a great deal; they can do more than I dare to trust myself to describe; but, they cannot set this matter at rest, nor have they, and all the branches of the government united, the power to stay the progress of the paper money only for one single hour. The Minister and his people have now seen what *rest* they insured for the subject! I always said, that the "first man of landed property who openly made a distinction between paper and gold," would put the whole system to its trumps, and compel the Bank notes to sue for the power of the government for "their protection." This has now been verified, and the remainder of my prediction, which I need not here repeat, is not far from its accomplishment.

The grounds of LORD STANHOPE's proposition were stated by himself very explicitly, in moving, the 2nd instant, the second reading of his Bill. He said, that he had long thought upon the subject and had long entertained the opinion, that some legislative measure was necessary to preserve the bank notes system from total ruin; that a notice recently given by LORD KING to his tenants, signifying that he would no longer receive his rents but in gold or in a quantity of paper equivalent in powers of purchase to gold,* had convinced him

* "By Lease, dated 1802, you have contracted to pay the annual rent of £. 47. 5s. in good and lawful money of Great Britain. In consequence of the late great depreciation of paper-money, I can no longer accept any Bank-notes, at their nominal value, in payment or satisfaction of an *old contract*. I must therefore desire you to provide for the payment of your rent in the legal gold coin of the realm. At the same time, having no other object than to secure payment of the real intrinsic value of the sum stipulated by agreement, and being desirous to avoid giving you any unnecessary trouble, I shall be willing

that there was no time to be lost, and that the measure in contemplation ought to be adopted before the parliament rose. He said, that the Ministers having declared, that their only objection to the measure arose from an opinion, that they thought no measure of the kind necessary, being persuaded that nobody would be found to follow the example of Lord King, it was only necessary for him to shew them that there were others to follow that example, in order to convince the ministers, that the Bill was entitled to their support. Having made these preliminary observations, he said, that he had a bundle of instances of this sort, and he only wished that a great many other persons would declare their intentions at once, and then the House would proceed to prevent the evil. He then produced a number of letters, from which he read extracts. One person wrote, that his landlord had said, "what *one* landlord can do, *all* can do, and if *Lord King* succeed, I will do the same." Another letter related a recent transaction in Hampshire, where a man bought an estate for 400*l.* and paid down 100*l.* of the money, and afterwards laid out several hundreds of pounds upon the premises, and when the time of payment came, the seller insisted upon having payment in guineas, which the buyer could not obtain, the seller, however, would have it, or have his land back again, and the only consolation left to the buyer was an intimation from a friend of the seller that he could inform him where he might obtain the guineas at 27 shillings each. Another

"to receive payment in either of the manners following according to your option. —1st, By payment in Guineas;—2nd, If Guineas cannot be procured, by a payment in Portugal Gold coin, equal in weight to the numbers of Guineas requisite to discharge the rent;—3rd, By a payment in Bank-paper of a sum sufficient to purchase (at the present market price) the weight of standard Gold requisite to discharge the rent.—The alteration of the value of the Paper-money is estimated in this manner; the price of Gold in 1802, the year of your agreement, was £. 4. an ounce. The present market price is £. 4. 14*s.* arising from the diminished value of Paper; in that proportion an addition of £. 17. 10*s.* per cent. in Paper-money will be required as the equivalent, for the payment of rent in paper."

letter stated that a Lady, who was a Landowner, had insisted upon her rent in gold, and that the tenant apprehended a seizure of his goods, and was ready to verify the facts if called on. Another informed him, on the part of an Attorney, that the practice was become very common to sell guineas and then pay debts with the paper.

These were the grounds, stated by Lord STANHOPE, of the measure that he proposed; and, upon his stating these grounds, the Ministers, who had, at the first reading, said that they did not see any necessity for the measure, or any measure of the kind, allowed that there was such necessity, and supported the second reading accordingly.

Now, Gentlemen, before I offer you any observations upon this measure itself, or upon the conduct of *LD. KING*, whose notice to his tenants seems to have given rise to it, it may not be amiss for me to say, that, from all that has ever come to my knowledge, there is not a more disinterested man, or a truer friend to freedom and to his country, breathing, than *LORD STANHOPE*, whom I trace through the parliamentary proceedings of the last twenty years, always standing nobly forward in the cause of justice, liberty, and humanity, and, but too often standing forward *alone*. His protest against the Antijacobin war, which began in 1793, and which has finally led to our present calamities, will live when we shall all be in our graves. He there pointed out all, yea *all*, that has now come to pass. That protest, every sentence of which is full of wisdom and of just sentiment, has these remarkable words: "Be-
"cause war with France is, at present,
"most impolitic, *extremely dangerous to our*
"*allies the Dutch*, hazardous with respect
"to the internal peace and external power
"of this country, and is likely to be *highly*
"*injurious to our commerce* The
"war may, therefore, prove to be a war
"against our commerce and manufactures,
"against the proprietors of the funds, against
"our paper currency, and against every de-
"scription of property in this country." How completely has all this been verified! *LORD STANHOPE* was abused: he was called a jacobin and a leveller, and now the nation is tasting the bitter fruit of the spirit that dictated that abuse. Every where was he to be found, in those horrible days, where

liberty was assailed. Not an act, which he deemed injurious to the rights of Englishmen, escaped his strenuous opposition. In short, were I called upon to name the peer, whom I thought to have acted the best and truest part in those times, and for the whole course of the last twenty awful years, I should certainly name this very nobleman.

You will, therefore, Gentlemen, believe that, if I dissent from the measure which he has now proposed, that dissent proceeds from my conviction, that the measure itself is not calculated to produce that good, which I am certain its author wishes it to produce.

The detail of the Bill I will not attempt to discuss. Its principles are what have struck me, and these I gather from its chief provisions, which are, that, in future, the gold coins shall not be tendered or taken for *more* than their nominal value, and that the bank paper shall not be tendered or taken for *less* than its nominal value. This is LORD STANHOPE's REMEDY; and this he appears to think will prevent the possibility of a further depreciation of the paper. We have seen the cause and the progress of that depreciation; we have seen how the paper *pulled down* the coin along with it, 'till the coin could no longer endure the society; we have seen the time and the manner of their *separation*; but, LORD STANHOPE appears to think, that, by the means of this Bill, he shall be able not only to restore that harmony which formerly existed between them; but, that he shall be able to chain them together for ever after; to bind them as it were in the bonds of marriage, and to render the ties indissoluble. If he do this, he will do what never was done before in the world; he will destroy all the settled maxims of political œconomy as far as they relate to finance; his achievement will be a triumph not only over the opinions and experience of mankind, but over the very nature of man, which incessantly impels him to seek his own interest, and, at the very least, to use all the means in his power to provide for his own preservation.

After having said this I shall naturally be supposed to be convinced, that the Bill would be utterly inefficient for the purposes it contemplates. Indeed, such is my *decided* opinion, and the reasons for

that opinion, I will now proceed to submit to you. A guinea is not to pass for more than 21s. There must be some *penalty* to prevent the passing of it for more. Lord STANHOPE will propose nothing *cruel*; but, for arguments' sake, let the penalty be death. What, then? Why need any one risk any penalty; as far as a *ready money* transaction goes? One of you go to market with a pig for sale. "What do you ask for that pig, farmer?" Answer: "*Twenty seven shillings.*" "I'll give you a guinea." "You shall have him." Where is the possibility, then, of enforcing such a law? The parties, in any case, have only to settle, before they deal, in what sort of currency payment shall be made, and then they will, of course, make the price accordingly. As to *debts*, indeed, whether book debts, or debts arising from contract, in the payment of them, the gold and notes must, if this Bill pass, be taken at their nominal value; that is to say, the paper must; for, as to gold, who will be fool enough to tender gold in payment at its *nominal amount*, when it is notorious that it will fetch a premium of six shillings upon the guinea? If the Bill become a law, therefore, any tenant who has rent to pay, and who has guineas in his purse, will first go and purchase paper-money with his guineas, and with the paper-money, he will go and pay his rent. This rent, for instance, is 105*l.* a year, and he has a hundred guineas in his chest. But, he will not be fool enough to carry these to his landlord. He will go and buy 105 pounds worth of paper-money with *seventy eight* of his guineas; and will then go and pay his rent, and will return home with 28 of his guineas still in his pocket. So that, as far as the bill will have effect, it appears to me that it will bear almost exclusively upon landlords.

I shall be told, perhaps, that, though guineas may *now* be bought and sold, in consequence of the decision of the judges, which, in the case of *Dr YONGE*, has been promulgated since I began this Letter,*

* The following is the Report of this DECISION, as given by the Chief Judge, Lord Ellenbrough, in the Court of King's Bench, on the 3rd instant.—"THE KING *against* DR YONGE.—LORD ELLENBROUGH communicated the Judgment of "the Court in this case, which along with "another case, the King v. Wright, coming from the Assizes for the County of

yet, we are not to suppose, that the present Bill will not *provide against such traffic* by making it penal to be concerned in it. But, as I have shown above, men may go on with all *ready money* transactions, and with perfect safety, make a *distinction* between paper and coin, which amounts, to the same thing as *buying and selling* the coin or the paper. It will require but very little ingenuity to discover the means of so managing the matter that the landlord shall never see a shilling's worth of coin from the hands of the tenant.

But, suppose that the coin should not be permitted to be bought and sold; does any one believe, that any law will prevent a private traffic in the article? And, if

"Buckingham, had been reserved for the opinion of the 12 Judges, on a point of law. Both causes had been fully and ably argued before the Judges in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, and the argument had occupied a number of days. The question arising in the present case was, the Defendant having been convicted of purchasing 52 Guineas at the rate, in Bank Notes, of 22s. 6d. per Guinea, whether, in so doing he had been guilty of an offence punishable under the Act of the 5th and 6th of Edward VI. which prohibited the exchanging of coined gold for coined silver, or for gold and silver, the party giving or receiving more in value than the same was current for at the time? All the Judges, except three, were present at the whole of these arguments, and at the last of them the whole of the Judges were present. The Court had no opportunity of knowing what was the opinion of the absent Judges on that part of the case at the argument on which they were not present, but they had no reason to presume that they dissented from the opinion of the other Judges who were present, all of whom concurred in opinion that the Defendant in this case was not liable under the Act of the 5th and 6th of Edward VI. The Judgment, therefore, fell to be *rested*; and the Judgment was *arrested accordingly*." Thus, then, this case is decided as I always said it *must* be, unless all semblance of *law* was banished from the land. Many people thought and said, that the conviction would be confirmed; but, I never thought so for a moment. Oh, no! The Judges knew a great deal better than to do that!

that could be done, is any one mad enough to suppose, that the guinea will *still circulate at par with the paper*? Pass this Bill, or any Bill, that shall prevent men from passing the guinea for more than its nominal worth, and the consequence will be, that a guinea will *never again be seen in circulation*. Those who have them will keep them in their chests, waiting an occasion to export them, or more patiently waiting till circumstances have produced the repeal of the law which has driven the guinea into the hoard. The cause that we see no guineas now in *common circulation*, is, as I said before, that they cannot obtain their fair value. They would have been openly sold long enough ago, had there not been an opinion, that the traffic was punishable by law. Now that obstacle is removed; but, in all likelihood, another will be erected by the present Bill. In that case the guineas will all either be hoarded or sent out of the country, and paper must and will be made to supply their place. The Dollars, the new things of three shillings and eighteen pence, now coming out from the Bank, will also be hoarded, and to notes for shillings and sixpences we must come, I am convinced, in the course of the year, if this Bill pass; so that the Bill, while it will be wholly inefficient for the purpose of arresting the progress of depreciation, will be efficient enough in producing a contrary effect.

The Bill does not, the author of it says, make bank notes a *legal tender*. It does not do it in *words*, but it appears to me to do it in *effect*; and, that being once done, all the usual consequences of a *legal tender* must follow. It was easy to see that the system would come to this pitch; there is nothing in the state to which we are come that ought to *surprise* any one; what has happened was to be expected, and was, indeed, long ago *foretold*; but, what might reasonably surprise one, is, to hear this measure represented by the ministers as necessary to the *protection of the fund-holder*! Can they be serious! Is it possible, that they can be serious when they say this? If they are, nothing that they say or do can ever be a subject of wonder. Men, who are capable of believing, that the Bill of Lord Stanhope will operate as a *protection to the fund-holder*, are capable but, really, I want words to answer my purpose. Imagination can frame nothing

that such men are not capable of in the way of belief. That the paper would, at last, become a *legal tender*, or *forced circulation*, it was easy to see. I did, indeed, for my own part, expect this state of the paper to be apparent long ago. The faith of this "*most thinking people*" I knew to be almost passing conception; but, still I did not think it adequate to the supporting of this paper-money for 14 years after the issuers had ceased to pay in cash and after they were protected by law against the demands of their creditors. It was, however, certain, that the thing must come to this point at last? it was certain, that, if the national Debt and the taxes continued to increase, the time must come when landlords would see that they must either starve, or demand their rents in coin; and, whenever this time came, it was, as I have many times said, impossible to keep up the paper only for six months without making that paper a legal tender, which might eke out its existence, perhaps, for a year or two, but which, in the end, must ensure its total destruction. I have several times been asked, what reason there was why landlords should not demand their rents in gold and silver, or in bank notes to the amount of the gold and silver; and, my answer has always been, that there was no reason at all against it now, but that there soon would be; for that the moment such demand was made, Bank notes would be made a *legal tender*. This was natural, and, therefore, the ministers are now doing just what I always expected they would do, whenever any land-holder did what Lord King has now done; but, to hear them speak of it as a measure calculated to afford protection to the *fund-holder* is what I never could have expected. They will see what sort of *protection* it will give him; and he will *feel* it! What will be his fate I shall not pretend to say; but, I hope, there is *justice* enough yet in the country, *real justice* enough to prevent him from perishing, while there exist the means of such prevention. I trust, that his claims will meet with serious and patient consideration; that the question of *what is due* to him and *to whom he ought to look for payment* will be settled upon sound principles of equity. I am for giving real protection to the fund-holder; but, to hear the Ministers say, that he is to meet with protection from a measure such as that now before parliament, a measure that must inevitably accelerate the depre-

ciation of the paper, is, surely, sufficient to fill one with surprize and dismay, if, at this day, and after all that we have seen, any thing ought to produce such an effect in our minds.

On the 2d of July a protest was entered, in the House of Lords, against LORD STANHOPE's Bill, which protest I here insert. "Dissentient,—Because We think it the duty of this House to mark in the first instance with the most decided reprobation, a Bill, which in our judgment manifestly leads to the introduction of laws, imposing upon the country the compulsory circulation of a Paper Currency; a measure fraught with injustice, destructive of all confidence in the legal security of contracts, and, as invariable experience has shewn, necessarily productive of the most fatal calamities:

GRENVILLE,
ESSEX,
JERSEY,
GREY,
LANSDOWNE,
COWPER,
KING,
LAUDERDALE.

"For the reason assigned on the other side, and because the repeal of the law for suspending Bank Payments in Cash is in my judgment the only measure which can cure the inconveniences already felt, and avert the yet greater calamities which are impending from the present state of the circulation of the country.

VASSALL HOLLAND."

In the protest of the eight peers I heartily concur; but, I do not agree with LORD HOLLAND in his addition to it, if his lordship means to say, that it is possible to resume cash payments at the Bank. To pay the notes in gold upon demand, agreeably to the promise upon the face of the notes, is certainly the only cure for the inconveniences already felt and the calamities now impending; but that it is utterly impossible to adopt this cure is, to my mind, not less certain. His Lordship proceeds upon the notion of Mr. HORNER and the Bullion Committee, namely, that the cause of the depreciation consists in an excessive issue of paper, which is very true, if you compare the quantity of the paper with that of the gold, or of the real transactions of purchase and sale, between man and man; but, which is not true, if you compare the quantity of paper with the amount

of the *Dividends payable on the National Debt*; and, I would beg leave to put, with sincere respect, this question to LORD HOLLAND: "If cash payments were restored, and money, as must be the case, were restored to its former value, *where* does your Lordship think would be found the means of paying the *Dividends*?"

It is impossible! The thing never can go back; no, not an inch; nay, and it must keep *advancing*. This very measure, by hastening the depreciation, will cause a new addition and still larger than former additions, to the National Debt, and of course to the *Dividends*. Those additional *Dividends* must be paid in an additional quantity of bank notes; and thus the system must go on, as PAINE foretold, with an *accelerated velocity*, until it can go on no longer. Having this opinion so firmly fixed in my mind, I was quite surprised to see the Marquis of LANSDOWNE endeavoured to mend the Bill of LORD STANHOPE by the introduction of a clause for *prohibiting the Bank Company from augmenting the quantity of their paper after the passing of the Bill*. This shews, that his Lordship has what I deem to be, and which, I think, I have proved to be, a most erroneous view of the real cause of the depreciation. If he thought with me, that the cause is in the increase of the National Debt and of the *Dividends*, he would have proposed no such amendment as this.

As to the conduct of LORD KING nothing could be more fair or more laudable. He wished to take *no advantages* of his tenants; he only wanted a fulfilment of his contract with them; and, as the spirit of the contract was more favourable to them than the letter, he abandoned the letter and only required them to hold to the spirit. To hear him, therefore, charged with *oppression*, and by.....! But, it is as well to keep ourselves cool. Let others chafe and foam. And, if the House of Lords do choose thus to determine; why, all that I can say about the matter, is, that they are the best judges whether they stand in need of their rents, and, if they do not, I really do not see much harm in their giving them to their tenants; and, this act will be the more generous as they are about to do it by a *law*, so that the tenants will keep the rents without having to give the landlords even *thanks* in return. That such will be amongst the effects of the Bill, if it pass, there can be no doubt; and, as far as it

operates in this way, a most popular Bill it will be. It will act as a *distributor* of wealth; of money, lands, and tenements; for, to suppose, that, in many cases, the *tenants* will not soon become the *proprietors*, is to discover but very little *thought* on the subject, and that, I am sure, would be a shame in a body of HEREDITARY LEGISLATORS in the "*most thinking nation in the world*." What a change this will make! Happy is the man who is a *tenant*! Much better off is he than the man who tills his own land; because the former has given nothing at all for his, whereas the latter has paid, at some time or other, *purchase money* for what he possesses. The letting of *long leases* is out of fashion; but, in general, the lands of great proprietors are held upon lease, and these leases are not, upon an average, for less than *seven years* at the lowest. Some of these leases are nearly expired, of course, but, others will naturally be but just commenced. So that, the average time, for which the land is now let, I shall take at *three years and a half*. All the Duke of Bedford's estates, for instance, are let, then, *for three years and a half yet to come*. Now, if the paper depreciate three or four times as fast as it has hitherto done, the tenants of the Duke of Bedford will have a brave time of it for these three years and a half. But, if the Bill, which is now before parliament, should send down the paper to the state of the French assignats in 1794, *what will, in that case, be the situation of the Duke of Bedford*? There are many landlords, who cannot hold out for three years and a half, and who, therefore, must sell, in whole or in part; but, there will, indeed, be this convenience, that they will every where find a purchaser ready at hand in their tenant, and one, too, who will not only know the real value of the property, but who will have the money ready to pay for it. This is nothing in the way of a *joke*. I am in earnest; it is what I am convinced will take place, if the Bill of Lord Stanhope pass into a law; but, as I said before, if the Lords like it, nobody else can possibly have a right to interfere. They may, surely, do what they please with their own property. All that I wish to stipulate for is, that we Jacobins and Levellers shall never be accused of this act of distributing the lands and houses of the rich amongst those who are not rich; that we shall not be accused of this great act of *pulling down and raising up*. Hume remarked that the funding system, *in the space of 500 years*,

would cause the posterity of those now in the coaches, and of those upon the boxes, to change places; but, if this Bill of LORD STANHOPE pass, this change will be a thing of much quicker operation.

I shall be told, that *Lord King's example* would have operated even more quickly than this measure in *destroying the paper*. Granted. It would, there is no doubt, have produced, in a very short time, that which must have *totally destroyed the paper system, root and branch*, namely, **TWO PRICES**, against which, openly and generally adopted, no paper-money ever did, or ever can, stand for any length of time. That that *example* would have been generally, nay universally, followed there can be no doubt at all; for, no man voluntarily gives away his rents, or, rather, lets another withhold them from him. Some persons would have been a little shy at first; but, when they found that others did it, they would have got over their shyness, and the demand would have been universally made. Thus, then, the **TWO PRICES** would have been established; and the gold and silver, finding that they could pass current for their real worth, would have come forth from their hiding places, some, while the rest would have hastened back from abroad. "Surely!" say you: "why, then, are the government alarmed at the effect of Lord King's example, if it would bring back gold and silver into circulation?" Oh! there is a very good reason for their alarm; for, observe, **THE TAXES WOULD CONTINUE TO BE PAID IN PAPER!** When the tax-gatherer came to the door of one of you, for instance, you would, if you had only gold or silver in the house, beg him to call the next morning, or to sit down a bit, while you, with your gold, would go and purchase paper-money sufficient to pay him the amount of his demand! There needs no more to convince you that the government has *good reason for alarm* at the prospect of seeing Lord King's example followed, as it assuredly would be, if there were no law to prevent it. In short, that example would annihilate the paper system in a year.

The next Letter will close the series.
In the mean while,

I remain, Gentlemen,

Your friend,

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 5th July, 1811.

MERINO SHEEP.

To be sold, in the *Village of Bosley*, near Southampton, on Saturday next, the 13th of July, at 12 o'clock, a number of *Merino Rams and Ewes*, selected from the finest Flocks in Spain by the HONOURABLE COCHRANE JONSTONE, and lately imported into this Country.—The sale will begin precisely at 12 o'clock, and will close, if possible, on the same day. Some of the best judges have viewed these Sheep, and the proprietor is convinced, that, whether as to the frame or fineness of wool, the equal of them, in so large a number, have not before been seen in England. They were selected with the greatest care, and under every circumstance likely to insure success as to the object.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—*Report from Count Suchet, Commander in Chief of the Army of Arragon, to his Serene Highness Prince of Neuchatel, Major General.*

(Concluded from vol. xix. p. 1632.)

..... The Chief of the Squadron of Artillery, Duchamp, displayed his ardour and bravery in it. On the 29th, at eight at night, the firing of four cannon, loaded with grape shot, gave the signal for the assault. I appointed General Facatier to command it. The first column of attack, under the orders of the Chief of Battalion, Revel, of the 16th regiment of the line, composed of 300 men, preceded by the Captain of Engineers, and 20 sappers, furnished with ladders and hatchets, advanced to turn the work, and seize upon the gate, which they had much difficulty in forcing, with axes, &c. whilst a party of the columns applied their ladders, and scaled the works. Captain Papigny received a mortal wound whilst directing his miners.—The 2d column of attack, composed of three hundred chosen troops from the 7th regiment of the line, led by the chief of battalion, Mexque, and Captain Desaix, my Aid-de-camp, set out from the battery in breach, and threw themselves upon the part of the fort which had been battered in breach. One hundred ladders were thrown into the fosses; our voltigeurs precipitated themselves into them, under the fire of the enemy. The fosse was twenty feet, our ladders but fifteen. The Serjeant of Miners, Meuneers, having placed himself at the top of a ladder, made the Voltigeurs

climb over his shoulders to reach the breach—his example was followed, but the soldiers arrived too slowly to please their impatience—they at last discovered in the interior of the fosse part of an aqueduct, which facilitated the passage; a triple row of palisades defended it; the Italian Captain of Engineers, Vacane, ordered them to be cut, and afterwards the ladders to be carried from the first fosse into that of the redoubt, which was quickly scaled, as well as the cavalier. The Italian miners shewed on this occasion the greatest understanding, united with bravery; the greater resistance the enemy made the more were the efforts of our brave troops redoubled, amidst cries of "Vive Napoleon!"—In the mean time the enemy continued to fire some cannon loaded with grape shot at the extremity of the fort; the brave Mexque was wounded in the thigh; the Adjutant-General Commandant Mesclap, hastened with the first reserve of 500 Italians, and restored the battle; he penetrated into the redoubt, saved the lives of 8 officers and 100 Spanish soldiers in it, and thus ensured the conquest of the fort; the enemy in vain endeavoured to save themselves in the extremity of the works behind a third fosse, 200 artillery men were thus killed upon their guns, the remainder of the garrison surrendered at discretion; there was still 900 soldiers and 70 officers, the rest, to the number of 1500, perished by the bayonet.—During this terrible scene, a general huzza, given by an Italian brigade upon the left, and upon Francoles by the division of General Habert, augmented the terror of the enemy, who were obliged to support a brisk fire of musquetry upon the ramparts of the place.—The Chief of the battalion of engineers, Chulliot, quickly established our lodgments on the breaches.—In this brilliant affair, Monsieurs, the Italians, walked in order with their elder brethren in arms.—The whole of the army displayed the greatest valour.

[Here follow the eulogiums of particular officers and a statement of the stores taken in the place, among which are 40,000 rations of biscuits, 10,000 pounds weight of powder, and 47 pieces of artillery.]

Our loss in the twenty-four hours did not exceed 250 in killed and wounded.—The garrison of fort Olivia consisted of

eight battalions and 380 artillerymen or sappers, in all 2580 men at the moment of attack.—On the 30th, at nine in the morning, 3,000 men marched from the place and endeavoured to retake Fort Olivia; but the brave men who knew how to take it, have likewise well known how to defend it, they let the enemy approach to the gates, and then drove them back with vigour; all round the fort is strewn with their corpses.—The taking by assault of the fortress of Olivia, has enabled me to open the trenches against this town. In the night between the 1st and 2d of June, the first parallel was opened, at 100 toises distance from Canons Bastion, leading to the right of Francoles. The batteries are erecting, and the fire will commence, as soon as they are mounted. Our sea batteries have already caused the port to be evacuated.—I am with respect.

"Count SUCHET."

"Camp before Tarragona, June 3."

Paris, June 18.—His Majesty the King of Spain has set out on his return to his dominions.

PORTUGAL.—THE WAR. — *Dispatch from Lord Wellington, June 6th.*

Downing Street, June 25. A Dispatch, of which the following is a Copy, was this morning received at Lord Liverpool's Office, addressed to his Lordship by Lieut. General Lord Viscount Wellington, dated Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

My Lord;—We have continued the operations of the siege of Badajoz with the utmost activity since I addressed your Lordship on the 30th ultimo, and our fire commenced on the morning of the 2nd instant from four batteries on the right of the Guadiana, directed against the outwork of St. Christoval, and on the enemy's batteries in the Castle constructed to support that outwork; and from two batteries on the left of the Guadiana, directed against the eastern face of the Castle.

The fire from these batteries has continued ever since, and a breach has been made in the outworks of St. Christoval, which, however is not yet practicable for assault; and considerable progress has been made in effecting a breach on the eastern front of the Castle.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XX. No. 2.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 13, 1811.

[Price 1s.

"It is not that the money which the Public Creditor receives, as interest for his capital, is less than it used to be; it is that the quantity of goods he receives for his money is less; and he will be still receiving less and less, while your taxes will be rising more and more. If the next Administration" (Addington was just at this time coming into power in place of Pitt) "mean to go on like the last, it would be a good thing for the country if no man would lend them a groat. Let them take three-fourths of a man's interest, or property, from him, and take off the taxes, and the people would be doably gainers. If you reduce the National Debt, we may laugh and sing at home and bid defiance to all the world; if you do not reduce it, the consequence will be, that, instead of paying the National Creditor 120 *quartern* loaves for a year's interest of his £.100 you will go on, till you only pay him 2 or 3 *quartern* loaves. Depend upon it that will be the fate of the National Creditor."—Mr. Horne Tooke's Speech, in the House of Commons, 2nd March, 1801.

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TO THE READER.

With my next Number I shall publish an additional Sheet, containing the TABLES OF CONTENTS, INDEX, &c. to the last Volume.

PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS
IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XXVI.

Mr. Horne Tooke and the Reformers—Effect of Lord King's Example—Two Prices—How these would affect the Government, the Generals, the Judges, the Sinecure Placemen and Pensioners—Lord Mornington's Speech in 1794—Progress of the Assignats in France—Mr. Perceval's Speech in the House of Commons, 9th July, 1811.

GENTLEMEN,

Look at the motto! Look at the motto; and, especially, if any of you should unfortunately be *fund-holders*; in that case, let me beseech you to look at the motto. They are the words of a very wise man. They were spoken, you see, rather more than ten years ago. The speaker was laughed at by some, and *railed* at by others; but, I imagine, that, at this time, those, who then laughed, are more disposed to cry, though I by no means suppose, that

the *railers* have ceased, or ever will cease their railing, as long as they have tongues or pens wherewith to rail. The House of Commons, the Honourable House, ejected Mr. TOOKE from amongst them, soon after he made this speech. They did so upon the ground of his being a *clergyman in Holy Orders*! No matter: they got rid of him; but, they have not got rid of the *event* that he foretold. Oh, no! that is coming upon them in spite of all their triumphs over Mr. TOOKE and Mr. PAINE and Messrs. MUIR, PALMER, MARGAROT, GERALD, WINTERBOTTOM, GILBERT WAKEFIELD, and many others. The government beat all these reformers; they not only put them down; they not only ruined the greater part of them; but they succeeded in making the nation believe that such ruin was just. Well. The government and the nation will now, of course, not pretend, that the *present* events have sprung from the Jacobins and Reformers. Mr. Tooke told them to reduce the National Debt. They rejected his advice. They despised his warning. They turned him out of parliament. Well. Let them, then, not blame him for what has since happened, and what is now coming to pass.

I beg you, Gentlemen, to reflect well on these observations; for, such reflection will be very useful in preventing you from being deceived in future, and will enable you, when the utmost of the evil comes, to ascertain who are the men who have been THE AUTHORS OF THE EVIL, and to whom, accordingly, you ought to look for a just RESPONSIBILITY. But, upon this *vital* part of the subject I have some hints to offer to you hereafter: at present I must return, for a while, to the point where I broke off in

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my last Letter, namely, the *reason for the alarm of the Government* at the prospect of seeing Lord King's example followed.

I spoke of the TWO PRICES before; but, let me say a few more words upon that very interesting part of our subject. *Two Prices* have always proved the death of paper-money. In this case it would have been the same, and, in the *end*, it will still be the same; for, the Bill of Lord Stanhope can do no more than *retard* the event for six or nine months; and mind, I tell you this with as much confidence as I would venture to foretell the arrival of Christmas day. I do not say, that the event will come in six or nine months; but, I say, that *this Bill* will not keep it off for a greater length of time than that. If TWO PRICES were generally made, we should see the gold and silver back into circulation immediately; but, *none of it could get to the Bank*, because no man would pay his TAXES in gold and silver. Consequently the *fund-holder* and the *government* would be paid in paper, while gold and silver would be circulating amongst all the rest of the community. As soon as there are two prices, the paper must depreciate at an enormous rate; and, as the government would have to pay its contractors and others whose pay was not fixed, in this depreciated paper, it must have a *greater quantity of that paper*, and it must come from the Bank. It is so easy to see how this must work; how rapidly it must go on; how soon it must render the paper worth little more than its weight in rags; all this is so easy to see, that I will not suppose any one of you so very dull as not to perceive it.

The government, with nothing but paper at its command, would soon begin to feel somewhat like a person who has taken a powerful emetic. The big round drops of sweat would stand upon its forehead; its knees would knock together; it would look pale as a ghost; an universal feebleness would seize it. That is to say, all this would take place, if the government persevered in the Pitt system, and that it would do so, who can doubt after what we have seen during the last twenty years. If the TWO PRICES were openly made, and became general, as they, in all probability, would, in the course of six or eight months, the paper would fall so low as that 5, or, perhaps, 10 shillings would be required to

purchase a *quartern loaf*. How, then, would the government, who would get nothing but paper, make shift to pay its way? The Generals and Judges and others, having a *fixed* pay, would, indeed, still be paid as they were before, and, of course, the government would lose nothing by taking paper as far as this description of expence went; for, you will observe, that I hold it to be impossible, that the parties I have just mentioned, namely, the Generals, the Judges, the Tax-Commissioners, and the like; I hold it to be impossible, that these men should not all of them be excessively happy to take the paper-money, though at a hundred for one, seeing that the greater degree of depreciation, the finer the opportunity for them to give proofs of their devotion to public credit. But, though my Lords the Judges and Lord Arden and Lord Buckinghamshire and Lord Liverpool and Lord Bathurst and the Marquis of Buckingham and Lord Camden and Old George Rose and Mr. Canning and my neighbour the Apothecary General and Lord Kenyon and Lady Louisa Paget, and, indeed, the hundreds of those who have *fixed* sums paid them by the government out of money raised upon the people, whether in the shape of salary, sinecure, or pension; though all these persons would, I dare say, from motives of public spirit, cheerfully continue to take the paper till a pound of it would not purchase a pinch of snuff; still, there would be some things and some *services* that must be paid for in money, or they would not be obtained. Beef and Pork and Biscuit could not be bought without real money. These are commodities that do not move without an equivalent. Whether the *soldiers* would be paid, under such circumstances, in paper so much reduced in value, I shall not pretend to say, and will leave the point to be settled by those who have lately said so much about this useful and numerous class of active citizens. But, one thing is certain: that THEY must be paid in a kind of money that will purchase eatables. They have bargained to receive a certain sum *per day*; and, if the same should not purchase half so much beer or beef as it does now, the bargain will not be so good an one as it is now; though, observe, I am not supposing, that there would not be found public spirit enough amongst the soldiers to make them take the paper in preference to the gold. At any rate, this is a matter which belongs

exclusively to those who have the management of our affairs, and who are paid very well for such management.

It would be useless to extend our remarks here. It is as clear as day-light, that, whenever TWO PRICES shall be generally established, the death of the paper is at hand, and, indeed, *the death of the funding system*; because, owing to the rapidity of the depreciation, the fundholders, our poor friend GRIZZLE GREENHORN and all the rest of them, would soon be in the situation described by Mr. HORNE TOOKS, in the passage taken for my motto; that is to say, a hundred pounds of their stock would yield them a couple or three quatern loaves in the year; and, it is within the compass of *possibility*, that many persons, who now are enabled to ride in their coaches by incomes derived from the funds, may end their days as paupers or beggars. In short, it is quite impossible for any man of common sense not to perceive, that the establishment of TWO PRICES would put an end, in a short time, not only to the property of the fundholders, but to the *sinécures* and *pensions*, and also to *great numbers of other emoluments derived from the public revenue*. Put an end to all for a time at least, and subjecting them to an *after revision*.

If we are of opinion, that *this effect* would have been produced by the example of Lord King being followed, there is, I think, little room for wonder, that the ministers were *alarmed* at the prospect. I know it will be said, and with perfect truth, that the same effect will be produced by Lord Stanhope's Bill; but, supposing it to be produced *full as soon* by the Bill, it does not follow, that the ministers *perceive* that. On the contrary, it would seem, that they do not perceive it at all; and, it is evident, that they have a sort of vague notion, that the Bill will *stay* the depreciation. I am convinced that it will not; I am convinced, that it will hasten the depreciation, and though not quite so fast as the example of Lord King would, still that, in the end, the effect will be the same. But, the ministers could, in the one case, *see* the effect: in the other they appear not to have seen it; and, this is quite sufficient to account for their giving their support to the Bill.

I said before, Gentlemen, that this Bill

was the *first of a series* of measures, the object of which would be to keep up the paper by the *force of law*. This seems to be the opinion of all those who have opposed it in the House of Peers: that it is merely a step in the old beaten path of keeping up by the arm of power a depreciated paper-currency. This course has been before pursued, in other countries, and it has, in every part of the world, led to the same end: the total destruction of the paper. Each of the Colonies, now moulded into an united nation in America, had its *debt*, its *paper-money*, its *legal tenders*, and its *public bankruptcy*, before their separation from England, and even before the revolutionary quarrel began. But, it was in France, where the thing was performed upon a grand scale; and, by taking a view somewhat more close than we have hitherto done, of the progress of the measures in France, we shall be able more correctly to judge of the tendency of what is now going on here.

There are divers histories of what was done in France, relative to the *assignats*; but, I choose to take for my authority one of the present Ministers, the MARQUIS WELLESLEY, who, when he was LORD MORNINGTON, made a speech in the House of Commons, which was afterwards published in a pamphlet, or rather *book*, in which he gave an account of all the pranks played with the assignats in France, up to the time of his making the speech, which was on the 21st of January, 1794, just three years and a month before the then ministry, whom he supported, issued an Order in Council to protect the Bank of England against the demands of cash for their notes.

In this memorable speech, manifestly drawn up for the purpose of exciting horror in the people of England at the wickedness of the French Rulers relative to the assignats, and also to make the people believe, that the state of the assignats must prove the overthrow of France; in this memorable speech, not only facts are stated, but principles and maxims of finance are laid down. We will take a cursory view of them all; for *time*, which tries every thing, has now brought us into a state to judge correctly of those facts, principles, and maxims.

Lord Wellesley told the House of Commons, that the rulers of France were very
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wicked, but that they were not less foolish than wicked; that their ignorance was, at least, equal to their villainy, though the latter was surprizingly great. He said, that, "the French Revolutionary Government, in order to supply an extravagant expenditure, had recourse, at first, to increasing the mass of paper-money; and, that they declared, that they had no other means of sustaining the pressure of the war, than by the creation of an additional quantity of assignats." There is, then, nothing original in the declarations of Lord Liverpool and Perceval and Rose. Nothing new in their recent assertions, that it was the paper-money that enabled them to provide for the defence of the kingdom, to make such great exertions against the "enemy of the human race," to gain such victories in Spain and Portugal, and to add such glories to the English name! This was all very fine and full of comfort; but, as you now see, Gentlemen, there was nothing new in it. The same thing had been said before by the revolutionary rulers of France; the same thing had been said by Danton and Robespierre and their associates in praise of the revolutionary money of France.

The Ministers have frequently denied, that the coin of the country is, or ought to be, the standard of value. Rose and Lord Westmoreland and several others of them have denied, that the Bank notes ought to be looked upon as depreciated, merely because they would not go for the same quantity of gold as formerly; and the hireling writers have taken infinite pains to decry and run down the gold and silver coin. One of them calls guineas an encumbrance; another says that gold and silver are merely articles of traffick, and that the Bank notes are the only money fitting the country; another has said, that, were it not for the National Debt, the patronage, and the paper-money, the government could have no existence, and that the Bank notes offer to the government a most indestructible support, because they make the daily bread of every individual depend upon the government; and, another has said, that Bank paper is the best bond of individual and public security, and the only medium of currency to suit and exert the energies of an insular and commercial people!

What a similarity between this language and the language of the Rulers of France in favour of their assignats! They called

them, as Lord Wellesley said in his speech, revolutionary money; their Chancellor of the Exchequer said that it was a happy thing for the people to have *Republican assignats* instead of *pieces of metal bearing the effigy of tyrants*; that the whole nation despised the corrupting metals, and that he would soon find a way of driving back the vile dung into the bowels of the earth. In another part of his speech Lord Wellesley tells us, that people were imprisoned and punished for their contempt of assignats.

Nevertheless, the people of France had, it seems, still an unnatural hankering after gold and silver in preference to assignats; and, they did in fact, make TWO PRICES; the consequence of which was an enormous rise in the price of all the necessaries of life, the proprietors of which were reviled as enemies of the country, and, as such, many hundreds of them were put to death. This, however, was not sufficient to put a stop to the rise of prices, and, indeed, did not check it at all. Then came the law of MAXIMUM (as it will in England if the present course be pursued), fixing the highest price at which any of the necessaries of life should be sold, and at which men should work and render their services. This terrible law, lord Wellesley tells us, had nearly starved the whole nation; for the farmers would not bring their produce to market, and tradesmen kept their goods locked up. Then, he tells us, that these persons were pursued as monopolists; and thus, said lord Wellesley, "every farmer whose barns and granaries are not empty; every merchant and tradesman whose warehouse or shop is not entirely unprovided with goods, must be subject to the charge of monopoly. This crime is punished differently, according to the enormity of the case; but, most frequently the punishment is death." So that it is time for farmers and tradesmen to look about them, and especially the farmers; who, if they do not already see the danger of their landlord's property being withheld from him, will, perhaps, be more clear-sighted when their own natural fate is pointed out. They hear LORD KING accused of black malignity; they hear him charged with selfishness; they hear him classed along with pedlars and Jews. This was, as lord Wellesley tells us, precisely the language which Danton and Robespierre and their underlings made use of towards the people of property in France, who had a

"contempt for assignats." They were accused of *incivism*; they were called *egotists*, and were, in almost the very words in which LORD KING is now arraigned by the COURIER, told that they "committed a robbery against the RIGHTS OF SOCIETY"! And, this is what the people of England are told, observe, after eighteen years of war, after eighteen years of blood and taxation, in order, as they were promised, to preserve their country from what they saw going on in France!

"But, our paper is *at par*," say some of the PITTITES still; "Our paper is not *depreciated*." So they said in France. Yes, said lord WELLESLEY, "the French minister of Finance has boasted, that 'his assignats are *at par* ; but, the laws 'which have been passed for punishing 'with *long imprisonment* any person who 'takes, gives, or offers assignats *under par*, sufficiently account for this circumstance.'" Good God! It would really seem, that every saying is to come home to us; that upon our devoted heads are to be visited all that was felt, and, which is more, perhaps, all that was, by our rulers, said to be felt by the people of France; aye, it really would seem, that all, that *all*, to the very letter, is now to come home to the people of England, who were led to build their hopes of success and of safety upon the ruin of the people, or at least, the government, of France! This very bill now under discussion, will impose a *penalty*, whether of *imprisonment* or not I do not yet know, upon any person, who takes, or gives, or offers, bank notes, *under par*. The prohibition was made in the Lords, and the Minister has said, that he means to add the *penalty*!

Let us now look, then, at the *contrast*, which LORD WELLESLEY drew, upon that memorable occasion, between the situation of England and that of France. "From 'this disgusting scene,'" said he, "let us 'turn our eyes to *our own situation*. Here 'the contrast is striking in all its parts. 'Here we see nothing of the character 'and genius of *ARBITRARY FINANCE*; 'none of the bold frauds of bankrupt 'power; none of the wild struggles and 'plunges of despotism in distress; no looting off from the capital of the debt; no 'suspension of *interest*: no robbery under 'the name of loan, *NO RAISING THE VALUE*, no *DEBASING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE COIN*. Here we be-

"hold public credit, of every description, 'rising under all the disadvantages of a 'general war; an ample revenue, flowing 'freely and copiously from the opulence of 'a *contented people*."

Gentlemen, read this with attention; and, when you have so done, draw yourselves the contrast which the situation of England *now* presents with that of France! It is a fact perfectly notorious, that there is no such thing as paper-money in France; it is also notorious, that not only does France abound in gold coin, but that the coin of this country, the guineas of England, are now gone and are daily going to France; aye, to that same country, which was to be ruined and overcome and subdued by the failure of its finances! This speech of Lord Wellesley, and all the numerous other speeches of the same description, were intended for the purpose of gaining the people's concurrence to the prosecution of the *Anti-jacobin war*, which war, by adding *five hundred millions sterling to our Debt*, has produced the fruit of which we are now about to taste. Year after year the same means were made use of for the same purpose, and with similar success. At the opening of the Session of Parliament, in October, 1796, PITT himself told the Honourable House, that, *in his conscience*, he believed, that, with finances so dilapidated, the French would not be able to stand out another campaign! "This *DEPRECIATION* of the Assignats," said he, "is so severely felt, that it has been repeatedly admitted, that means must be found to employ resources less wasteful. This principle has been recognized by every financier or statesman. Even at the period when the depreciation was only one half, it was declared, that, unless some immediate remedy was applied, they would be unable to maintain their armies. Months have since elapsed, and no substitute has been employed. Resources thus strained to their utmost pitch, and incapable of any renovation, must have in themselves the seeds of decay, and the cause of inevitable dissolution."

This, Gentlemen, was PITT's reasoning as applied to France. Little did that presumptuous and shallow man dream, that, in less than four months from that very day, he was doomed to come into that same House of Commons, and from the same spot where he then stood, announce that the Bank of England was no longer able to

pay its notes in the coin of the realm, and that he had been guilty of a violation of the law in issuing an Order of Council to guarantee the Bank Company against the consequences of refusing to pay the debts due to their creditors! But, as if this were not enough, he must, in the speech just referred to, comment upon certain *metallic money* then, it was said, about to be issued in France. "Metallic pieces," said he, "are, it seems, to be put in circulation; but it is not said, whether these "are to be of the DENOMINATED "VALUE: if not so, they are only METALLIC ASSIGNATS!" Yet this same minister, who has been impudently called "the great Statesman now no more," had, in a short time afterwards, to propose to this same House of Commons, to sanction the issuing of Dollars at 4s. and 9d. the real value of which was 4s. 4½d.; he lived long enough to propose to the same House of Commons, to give its sanction to an issue of dollars at 5s.; if he had lived till now, (I always regret that he did not!) he would have seen the Dollar at 5s. 6d. And, what he would have seen it at, if he had lived till a few years hence, I must leave TIME, the trier of all things, the rewarder of all good deeds, and the avenger of all injuries, to say.

You will now be able to judge how far our situation, in respect to paper-money, resembles that of France at the time when the revolutionary rulers of that country were endeavouring to keep up the Assignats by the arm of the law, by the terrors of the jail and the guillotine. Mr. PERCEVAL says that there is *no resemblance whatever* between the bank notes and the assignats. I shall shew you, that Mr. Perceval is deceived; that he does not understand this matter; and that, if he had read the works of PAINE, at the time when his colleague Lord Eldon (then Attorney General) was prosecuting the author, he would not have hazarded any such assertion.

But, we must now take a look at the whole of this speech of Mr. Perceval. I mean his speech in the House of Commons, on Tuesday last, the 9th instant, upon the first reading of Lord Stanhope's Bill in the House of Commons. This Speech will be a memorable one. The child yet unborn will have cause to think of this speech, and of the series of measures, of which, as appears to me, it is the necessary forerunner.

Mr. Perceval (I have the report of his speech as given in the COURIER) began by stating his reasons for having come round to the support of Lord Stanhope's Bill, after having, at first, disapproved of it. He says, that he, at first, thought it *unnecessary*, because he did not think, that any body would follow the example of Lord King; but, that finding that it was likely, that the example would be followed, he then thought it necessary to support the bill. Thus, then, at any rate, it has been *one individual* who has caused this bill; the bill is made for the purpose of preventing that individual and others from obtaining in payment of rent what the law now authorizes them to demand; it is a bill, in fact, which, against the will of one of the parties at least, *alters contracts* made years ago. Yes, says Mr. Perceval, it does so; but, *the same was done in 1797!* That is the *answer*. Because the thing was done by Pitt, he may do it! He said, that, until now, this preference for coin before paper had been shown by none but *Pedlars, Jews, and Smugglers*; and, in speaking, afterwards, about the possibility of the Bill being inefficient, and a legal tender being necessary, he said, that he did, however, "*hope*, that the "ODIUM attaching to the conduct which "gave rise to this Bill, WOULD PREVENT OTHERS FROM FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE." These are memorable words, especially considering from whom they came. *Aye, aye!* I know well what workings of mind there must have been before they were uttered. I would not have such workings in my mind for ten times the worth of the *reversion* of Lord Arden's sinecure. Oh! a time is coming, when all these things will be seen and felt as they ought to be.

But, let us return to this memorable expression: "the ODIUM!" A man, then, is, it seems, to incur *odium* if he demand his *due*; his due in *equity* as well as in *law*! Gentlemen, you are, for the most part, *tenants*; but, take care how you suffer yourselves to be led to wish for any advantage from this Bill, which will most assuredly operate, in the end, to your injury, and perhaps, to your utter ruin. Let me explain to you, a little more fully than I have hitherto done, the nature of Lord King's demand upon his tenants. He let a farm, for instance, in 1802, to JOHN STILES for £100 a year, in *good and lawful money of the realm*. He has, until

now, continued to take the £.100 a year in bank notes; but now he finds, that those notes are so far from being good and lawful money of the realm, that they have sunk in value 20 per centum, and that, instead of £.100 he would, in effect, get only £.80. If, however, the thing was likely to stop where it is, he might possibly go on receiving paper to the end of the present leases, when he would take care to raise his rent of course; but, the thing is not likely to stop; it goes regularly on; gold is purchased up; a guinea sells for 27s. 6d. And is it not, then, time for Lord King to begin to protect himself against this depreciation? JOHN STILES, you see, suffers no hardship in this, because he raises the price of his corn and cattle to meet the effects of the depreciation. Suppose, for instance, that the paper has depreciated 20 per centum, or five pounds in every twenty, since 1802; and suppose, that wheat is now 25 pounds a load; consequently, it will require only four loads of wheat to pay £.100 now, but it must have required five loads to pay £.100 in 1802. But, is it not just and fair, that JOHN STILES should give Lord King as much wheat for his rent in 1811 as he contracted to, give him in 1802? If he does not do this, and if the paper go on depreciating, may it not come to pass, that JOHN STILES will not give Lord King more than a bushel of wheat in a year? Aye, may it; and a great deal sooner too than many persons seem to imagine. And, because Lord King wishes to avoid this ruin is he to be lumped along with jews, pedlars, and smugglers, and are we to be told of the odium attaching to his conduct? However, upon this head, I shall always say, for my part, that the Lords are the best judges of whether they or their tenants are likely to make the best use of the rents; and, if they like to give the rents to the tenants, I know of no one who has any right to find fault with them. They and the other great land-owners appear to have abundant confidence in Mr. Perceval; in the Bank, and in the East India Company; and the Clergy appear to have equal confidence in them. Well, then; I really see no good reason that we, the people in general, have to find fault with what is going on. The matter seems, I think, to lie wholly between the land-owners and this little sharp gentleman and his colleagues; and to them I will leave it, being quite satisfied, that the former are now about enjoy-

ing the just reward of their conduct for the last twenty-six years.

Mr. Perceval said, that those who supported the Bank Restriction Act in 1797 were inconsistent in not supporting this Bill; and he talked a great deal about the inconsistency of those who proposed, the other day, to continue the Restriction for two years longer. With these matters, Gentlemen, WE have nothing to do. The affair is all *their own*. THEY made the war that produced the loans that produced the paper that produced the run that produced the stoppage of cash payments that produced the depreciation that produced the sale of guineas and the hoarding and exportation of them. THEIR work the whole of it is, and which set of them were first at it, or which last, is of no consequence to us. They have it all amongst them. They chose the grounds of war, and the time for beginning; they put down all those who opposed them; they have been, for 26 years, the rulers of the country and the masters of all its resources. One set, therefore, is, and ought to be, just the same as the other in the eyes of the people. Let them settle the matter of precedence between them; let them bait one another as long as they please; but let not us be, by such baiting, amused and drawn away from the great points at issue.

The "object of the bill," Mr. Perceval said, "was to prevent the establishment of TWO PRICES, which must be the case "if Lord King's example were generally followed." Now, you will be so good as to bear in mind, Gentlemen, that this is, Mr. Perceval says, the object of the Bill; and, I beg you also to bear in mind, that I say, that in this object the Bill will fail. Here we are, then, I and the Minister, foot to foot in opposition. I say his scheme will not prevent the TWO PRICES. I say it will not: he says that such is its object: we shall see who is right. He ought to be; for, I am sure, he is paid money enough for thinking for this most thinking people in the world. He did, however, confess, that it was possible, that this bill might not be efficient; and, what was then to be done? Why, the bank notes, he said, must, in that case, be made a legal tender! Bravo! Come: to't again! Once more, and then comes the maximum! I always said, that it would be thus. I always said, that the moment any one put the paper-money to the test, the paper-

money would be made a legal tender. This Bill it was (but I do not believe it now is) believed would have the same effect; but, if it fail of that effect, then the legal tender is, it seems, to come.

Mr. Perceval says, that this may become necessary. For what, Mr. Perceval? What may it become necessary for? Necessary to do what, thou Minister of Finance? Why, you will say, I suppose, to prevent TWO PRICES, and to PROTECT THE FUNDHOLDER. And, dost thou really think; dost thou, a disciple of the great statesman now no more, think, in good earnest, that a legal tender law would prevent two prices and protect the fund-holder? Forgive me, but, it is impossible for me to refrain from laughing at the idea. You will say, I suppose, that it is "no laughing matter." Cry, then, if you like, but I will not; nor will any one belonging to me. But, how is the legal tender to prevent TWO PRICES being made? An act of parliament, making the bank notes a legal tender, would cause debts to be paid in paper; but, it could not make the Butcher or the Baker give their meat or bread for bank notes. They would and they must and they will have two prices; a money price and a paper price; and this will become general in spite of every thing that can be done to oppose it. What protection, then, will the fund-holder, or "public creditor," as he is called, to derive from measures like these? Mr. Perceval supposes a case (of which I will say more by-and-bye) in which the fundholder of 6,000*l.* capital rents a house of 300*l.* a year, and says that it would be extremely hard, if this man, who is obliged to receive his 300*l.* a year from the government in paper, were to be left exposed to the compulsion of paying his 300*l.* a year rent in gold. Where is the hardship, if bank notes are as good as gold? Where is the hardship, if the notes have not depreciated? And these assertions are daily and hourly made. But, to return to the Baker and Butcher, for these are the lads that it will be most difficult to manage; what will this fund-holder do with them? How will Mr. Perceval protect him against them? Why, to be sure, he will, and indeed, consistently, he must, have recourse to *maximum*. And, it may not be amiss here to explain to you farmers and tradesmen what a *maximum* means; for, you will find it a matter, in which you are very deeply interested.

They had a *maximum* in France, in the times of depreciated paper-money. The rulers of that day, finding the assignats depreciate very fast, passed a law to put a stop to the depreciation, which only made them depreciate the faster; and, as the assignats were bought and sold, as our bank paper now is, they passed another law to prevent the gold from passing for more than its nominal worth and to prevent the paper to pass for less than its nominal worth. This object, though attempted to be accomplished by the means of very severe penalties, was not accomplished. There was still a *money price* and a *paper price*; for, when a man went to market, he pulled out his paper, or his coin; and, the article was high or low priced accordingly. If the thing to be bought was a quarter of mutton, for instance, a *crown piece* in silver might be the price; but, if the payment was to be made with paper, then the price might be *ten pounds or fifty pounds*, perhaps. The next thing, therefore, was to prohibit the use of coin altogether. But, this did not answer the purpose. The assignats still kept depreciating, and the rate of depreciation kept on increasing, till at last, it required a *hundred pounds to purchase a pair of common shoes*; and, this was not at all wonderful; for, when once a paper-money is got into a state of acknowledged and notorious depreciation, it always goes on with *accelerated velocity*. Well, what was now to be done? If it took a hundred pounds to purchase a pair of common shoes, what was the use of collecting taxes in such money? And what was to become of those whose incomes, founded on former contracts, were paid them in such money? What was the government to do? Why, to fix a price upon all the necessities of life, and to compel people to sell their goods at those prices. This was done, and all Farmers, Bakers, Butchers, and others, were compelled to sell their commodities at the same price, in assignats, as they used to sell them at in money, before any assignats were made. The consequence of this was, that those who had corn or meat or other necessities, did not bring them to market; the shop-keepers shut up their shops, or hid their goods. To counteract this, a law was passed to punish monopolists, and every man who kept more corn, meat, or necessities of any sort, in his house, than was absolutely necessary for the use of his own family, became a monopolist, and, in many cases, such per-

sons were punished with *death*! This was the last of that series of measures, which was adopted in France during the reign of terror and blood. The guillotine was continually at work to enforce this last measure. The market place in every considerable town reeked with human blood. Hundreds of thousands of innocent country people and shop-keepers perished upon the scaffold and in prison in consequence of the laws made for the purpose of *sustaining a depreciated paper-money in France*; and, wherever a similar project is attempted to be forced into execution, similar consequences will follow.

At last, however, the people of France, unable to endure so hellish a system any longer, put an end to it and to its authors. The paper-money was *totally annihilated*, and, in a short time, gold and silver came back into circulation. But, in the mean while, what *protection* did any of these measures give to the man of *fixed income*, who might be compared to our fundholder? How did he get any *protection* from any of these measures? Yet, he got full as much as the fund-holder in England will get from this measure of Mr. Perceval, who, though he may, in part, ruin the land-owner, will not, thereby, do the fund-holder the smallest good. The *rent of the fund-holder's house* is the least article of his yearly expences. His servants, his upholsterer, his butcher, his baker, his haberdasher, his draper, his brewer, his wine-merchant, &c. &c. will all be paid in gold, or in paper upon the principle of TWO PRICES. There is, therefore, no means of protecting the fundholder against these gentlemen, except the *maximum*. It is useless to talk about it, and for people to attempt to buoy themselves up with a sort of vague notion of the impossibility that an English ministry should ever do what was done by Robespierre. I hope they never will, indeed; but, this I am sure of, that, without doing what was done by Robespierre, they cannot make the fund-holder's income equal in value to gold and silver. This is what Mr. Perceval wishes to do; this is what he calls *protecting* the fund-holder, and this would be protecting him; but this, I tell him, he cannot do, nor can all the powers on earth do it. To stop where we are is within the scope of *possibility*. By an immediate stop to the increase of the National Debt and the Dividends; by an immediate stop to all Loans and issues of Exchequer Bills; by an immediate reduction of the Taxes; by

such means, *immediately* adopted, we might stop where we are; but, to *restore* is impossible. To make the dividends worth their nominal amount in gold and silver is no more possible than it is to bring back yesterday.

When I closed my last Letter, I thought that, in this, I should have been able to conclude the discussion; but, the debate in the House of Commons has created new matter, and, as I wish to see the event of the Bill now before that House, before I take my leave of the subject, I must defer the conclusion till next week.

In the mean while,

I remain, Gentlemen,

Your friend,

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 12th July, 1811.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—THE WAR. — *Dispatch from Lord Wellington, June 6th.*

(Concluded from p. 32.)

Notwithstanding that these works have been carried on with great rapidity, I am happy to say they are themselves so complete, and the communication from one to the other so well assured, that our loss hitherto throughout the siege has been very small. I am sorry to say that Lieutenant Hawker of the Royal Artillery, an Officer who has distinguished himself in these operations, was killed this morning.

The enemy have hitherto made no movement to disturb our operations; but I understand that three battalions were moved from the blockade of Cadiz in the last days of May; and I have received a report, that the battalions of the 9th corps, destined to reinforce the Army of the South, were to arrive at Cordova on the 5th or 6th of this month.

The Army of Portugal likewise broke up from the Tormes on the 3d instant, and their first march was in the direction of the passage of the Tagus.

I have received a letter from Mr. Wellesley of the 1st instant, from which I learn that General Suchet had invested Tarragona.—I have, &c.

(Signed)

WELLINGTON.

SPAIN.—*Marshal Beresford to his Army.*—*Albuera, 31st May, 1811.*

His Excellency the Marshal, having on the 17th published an order, thanking the troops for their good conduct in defeating and repulsing the enemy in the battle of the 16th, could not help directing himself in particular to the British and Portuguese troops, who more immediately served under his orders on that day, which conferred such honour on all the troops that took part in it.—The Marshal almost finds himself necessitated to limit himself to generally thanking the officers and soldiers, seeing how difficult it is to make distinctions, when all, and each one in particular, well and nobly conducted himself. His Excellency can only applaud and give thanks to all the corps of Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, that were under his command in that battle, in which the honour of their respective countries was nobly maintained. Valour was seconded by discipline, and victory was the result.—The Marshal acknowledges his thanks to be especially due to Major-General Cole; and considers that Major-Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, by his very great services, contributed greatly to the fortunate success of that day; his Excellency begs him to accept his thanks.—The Marshal feels the misfortune which befel the first brigade of the 2nd division, it was gallantly engaged under its valourous Commandant, in using that truly British weapon the bayonet; but in that moment it was attacked in the rear by the enemy's cavalry, whose approach, in consequence of the heavy rain and bad state of the atmosphere, was not perceived, and all their efforts rendered abortive. His Excellency is satisfied with this brigade; the 2d and 3d brigades of the same division, particularly merit the thanks of the Marshal, who joins in the sentiments of sorrow, caused to all the officers and soldiers, by the loss which they have suffered in officers and soldiers, and particularly by the death of Major Gen. Houghton, and Lieut. Col. Duckworth: it will console them to know, that they rest in the tomb of honour, dying in the most noble of causes, and were fully revenged by the soldiers who survived them. Colonel Inglis, of the 57th, Lieut.-Col. Abercrombie, and Major L'Estrange, likewise deserve to be particularized in the Marshal's thanks. His Excellency laments with the Fusileer Brigade, the loss of its valiant Commander,

Lieut.-Col. Sir W. Myers, and thanks it for the share it had in the success of that day; he gives his particular thanks to Lieut.-Gen. Alten, and the light brigade of the King's German Legion, under his orders. The dispositions of the General, and the conduct of the officers and soldiers, were every thing his Excellency could wish. Major-General Hamilton and the Portuguese troops merit every praise; discipline was all that their natural valour required to place them on a level with the best troops, to which class they now actually belong. Great praise is due to Brigadier General Harvey, and the brigade under his command, for its conduct, and the firmness with which it repulsed the attack of the French cavalry. The Marshal also renders his thanks to the brigades of Brigadier General Tonseau, and Brigadier General Campbell, as also to the brigade of Colonel Collins; and he feels with the utmost regret the misfortune which befel the latter officer.—The Marshal likewise gives his thanks to Major-General the Honourable William Lumley; for the able manner in which he manœuvred the allied cavalry against the much superior number by which he was opposed, preventing the enemy from obtaining his object. The officers and soldiers of the cavalry have an equal right to the thanks of the Marshal for their firm deportment, which overawed the enemy, and prevented him, notwithstanding his superiority, from attempting any thing against it. The Marshal must also speak with praise of Brigadier-General Long, and the Hon. Colonel Gray, for the part which they took in directing the cavalry; as also of Colonel Otway, for the dispositions which he made to cover the left of the line. Major Hostaman, Major Dixon, and the officers and soldiers of the British, Germans, and Portuguese artillery, deserve the greatest praise, and the Marshal accordingly gives them his thanks.—The Marshal well knows that every officer and soldier deserves to be named in particular, the conduct of all has been most valiant and noble, and never were given greater proofs of brilliant British valour. The Portuguese also shewed, that in the field of battle they are capable of emulating the allies whom they love.—The Marshal gives his thanks to all the officers of his Staff, and particularly to Brigadier-General D'Urban, Quarter-master-general of the army, who so much contributed to the success of the

day; to Brigadier-General. Mozinbo, Lieutenant-Colonel Rook, Lieutenant-Colonel Harding, and to the officers of the Deputy and Adjutant-General and Quarter-Master-General. He likewise gives his thanks to Brig.-Gen. Leriens, and to the officers of the present Staff of his Excellency, for the aid which he received from them.—Soldiers, you have fought, *and reduced to shameful flight, a haughty and vain-glorious enemy, and covered yourselves with true glory.* The victories which the British troops have gained over the enemy are as many as the battles they have fought. (Signed) Rook, T. C. A. G.

SPAIN.—*The Duke of Dalmatia to his army, 9th June, 1811.*

"Fellow Soldiers!—A month has not elapsed since your arms were crowned with triumph on the plains of Albuera, and since the enemy trembled at the thunder of your artillery. Discomfited they fled, and left their cannon and their standards in your possession. Soon you shall have another opportunity of displaying your valour, if the English will venture to give it you, and, with another glorious and decisive victory, you shall terminate the war in the Peninsula—Badajoz, besieged on every side; bombarded without intermission during twelve successive days and nights, and surrounded by enemies for nearly two months, has bravely resisted every effort—still will the noble garrison disappoint the intentions of the foe, and reply to their summons from the mouth of the cannon, returning defiance for the empty threats of the assailants. Marshal Beresford and all his Portuguese were unequal to accomplish its fall. The aid of the British Commander in Chief will also be ineffectual, and if by delays, retreats, and manoeuvres of every kind, they may avert the blow for a time, yet it must and shall fall, and with such a weight as to crush our opponents.—Comrades, in this conflict the British are not the greatest sufferers?—No. It is the unhappy Portuguese nation that is borne down by the burden of affliction. A people whom the Emperor wishes to make truly happy—a people possessing within themselves all means of felicity—a people who wish to retain those blessings?—but a people deceived, betrayed, insulted, ruined, and trampled upon—not by us who are mis-called invaders, but by the English, the

real invaders of Portugal and Spain.—That people now see their error, but too late. They now know their friends, and would willingly stretch forth the hand of peace, but it is withered by the machinations of England.—Let us then, my countrymen, avenge their cause. Let us be the advocates of the oppressed, not by words but by deeds. Already we are in a situation to meet the English, if they dare to accept our defiance. They will not while they can avoid it; but it will soon be out of their power to refuse; and they shrink in vain from that blow, which they have neither the strength to meet, nor the resolution to oppose.

Marshal Duke of DALMATIA."

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.—*Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Viscount Talavera to the Earl of Liverpool, dated, Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811, giving an Account of the raising of the Siege of Badajoz; and inclosing a Copy of a Letter from General Spencer, giving an Account of his evacuation of Almeida.—Published in London, 6th July, 1811.*

In consequence of a report from the Chief Engineer, Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, that the fire from St. Christoval might occasion the loss of many lives in the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and the breach in that out-work having been apparently much improved by the fire throughout the 6th, I directed that an attempt might be made to carry St. Christoval by storm that night. Major-General Houstoun, who conducted the operations of the siege on the right of the Guadiana, accordingly ordered a detachment under Major Mackintosh, of the 85th regiment, to make the attempt. The men advanced under a very heavy fire of musketry and hand-grenades from the out-work, and of shot and shells from the town, with the utmost intrepidity, and in the best order, to the bottom of the breach; the advanced guard being led by Ensign Dyas, of the 51st regiment, who volunteered to perform this duty; but they found that the enemy had cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp; and notwithstanding that they were provided with ladders, it was impossible to mount it. They retired with some loss. The fire upon St. Christoval, as well as upon the place, continued on the 7th, 8th, and 9th, on which the breach in the wall of St. Christoval appeared practicable, and

I directed that a second attempt should be made on that night to obtain possession of that out-work. Major-General Houstoun ordered another detachment for this service, under the command of Major Macgeachy, of the 17th Portuguese regiment, who, with the officers destined to command the different parties composing the detachment, had been employed throughout the 8th and 9th in reconnoitering the breach, and the different approaches to it. They advanced at about nine at night in the best order, though opposed by the same means and with the same determination as had been opposed to the detachment which had made the attempt on the 6th. Ensign Dyas again led the advance, and the storming party arrived at the foot of the breach; but they found it impossible to mount it, the enemy having again cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp. The detachment suffered considerably, and Major Macgeachy, the commanding officer, was unfortunately killed, and others of the officers fell; but the troops continued to maintain their station till Major-General Houstoun ordered them to retire. When the reinforcements had arrived from the frontiers of Castile, after the battle of Albuera, I undertook the siege of Badajos, entertaining a belief that the means of which I had the command would reduce the place before the end of the second week in June; at which time I expected that the reinforcements for the enemy's southern army, detached from Castile, would join Marshal Soult. I was unfortunately mistaken in my estimate of the quality of those means. We had failed in two attempts to obtain possession of fort St. Christoval, and it was obvious to me that we could not obtain possession of that out-work, without performing a work which would have required the labour of several days to complete. On the morning of the 10th instant, I received the inclosed intercepted dispatch from the Duke of Dalmatia to the Duke of Ragusa, which pointed out clearly the enemy's design to collect in Estremadura their whole force; and I had reason to believe that Drouet's corps, which had marched from Toledo on the 28th and 29th of May, and was expected at Cordova on the 5th and 6th instant, would have joined the southern army by the 10th; and it was generally expected in the country, that the southern army would have moved by that time. The movement of this army alone would

have created a necessity for raising the siege; but on the same morning I received accounts from the frontiers of Castile, which left no doubt of the destination of the army of Portugal to the southward, and gave ground for belief that they would arrive at Merida on the 15th inst. I therefore ordered that the siege might be raised. I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the officers and troops employed at the siege of Badajoz, whose labours and exertions deserved a very different result. Major General Picton directed the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and Major-General Houstoun on the right; and I am much indebted to these officers, as well as to Major-General Hamilton, and the other General and Staff-officers, and the officers and troops under their commands respectively. Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, of the Royal Engineers, was the directing engineer, and immediately superintended the operations on the left of the Guadiana; and Captain Squires those on the right of that river; and those officers and the corps of Engineers have by their conduct on this occasion augmented their claims to my approbation. Lieut.-Colonel Framingham commanded the artillery, having under his orders Major Dickson attached to the Portuguese service, who during the absence of Lieut.-Colonel Framingham with the troops which were employed to cover the operations, conducted all the details of this important department. I had every reason to be satisfied with these officers, and most particularly with Major Dickson, from whose activity, zeal, and intelligence the public service has derived great advantages in the different operations against Badajoz. Captain Cleves, of the Hanoverian Artillery, conducted that department on the right of the Guadiana with great success. The service of the batteries was performed by detachments from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd regiments of Portuguese artillery, who conducted themselves remarkably well. They were aided by Captain Rainsford's company of the Royal Artillery, who were indefatigable; some of them having never quitted the batteries. I am much indebted to General Leite, the Governor of the Province of Alentejo and of Elvas, for the assistance which he again afforded me in this operation. I inclose a return of the killed and wounded throughout the siege, from which your Lordship will observe that, excepting in the attempts to obtain possession of

St. Christoval, our loss has not been severe. We still maintain the blockade of Badajoz. I have not yet heard that the enemy have moved from their position at Llerena, and I imagine that the arrival of the 9th corps has been delayed longer than was expected; and it is probable that Soult will be unwilling to move till he will hear of the movements of the army of Portugal. They broke up from the Tormes on the 3rd, and their advanced guard arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo on the evening of the 5th. They moved forward again on the 6th, and Lieut.-General Sir Brent Spencer withdrew the advanced guard of the troops under his command, first to the Nave d'Aver, and then to Alfayates. The enemy patrolled on the 6th into Fuentes de Honor and into Nave d'Aver. I enclose Sir Brent Spencer's report of these operations, from which it appears that the Royal Dragoons, under Lieut.-Colonel Clifton, and a troop of the 14th, the whole directed by Major-General Slade, distinguished themselves. I imagine that the enemy's march in this direction was intended as a reconnoissance, and to cover the march of a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo; as on the following day, the 7th, the whole moved from thence to Moras Verdes, in the direction of the pass of Banos, near which pass Gen. Regnier had been with two divisions of the army of Portugal, since the 5th. On the 8th, in the evening, one division of General Regnier's troops had come through Banos, and I expect that those divisions will have arrived at Placentia the 9th, and the whole army on the 10th.—P.S. Since writing this dispatch, I have received accounts that General Drouet's troops joined on the enemy's right at Berlunza and Azuga yesterday, and a report that their cavalry were in movement towards Los Santos this morning. The British cavalry, and the 2nd and 4th divisions, were about to march from Villa Franca and Almendralejo towards Albuera, and I have ordered there General Hamilton's division and shall proceed there this night myself, if I should find that report confirmed.

Total of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieut.-General Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. at the Siege of Badajoz, from the 30th of May to the 5th of June, both days inclusive.

Royal Artillery—1 Lieutenant killed; 2 rank and file wounded.

2d Batt. 5th Foot—1 Lieutenant, 3 rank and file, killed; 1 serjeant, 3 rank and file, wounded.

7th Fusileers—2 rank and file wounded.

2d Batt. 39th Foot—2 rank and file wounded.

1st Batt. 40th Foot—1 rank and file killed.

1st Batt. 45th Foot—3 rank and file wounded.

2d Batt. 48th Foot—1 rank and file wounded.

51st Foot—9 rank and file wounded.

1st Batt. 57th Foot—1 Ensign, 1 rank and file wounded.

2d Batt. 66th Foot—2 rank and file killed.

74th Foot—2 rank and file killed; 1 serjeant, 6 rank and file wounded.

2d Batt. 83d Foot—1 serjeant, 3 rank and file, wounded.

85th Foot—1 rank and file killed; 3 rank and file wounded.

1st Batt. 88th Foot—1 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.

94th Foot—2 rank and file wounded.

Chasseurs Britanniques—3 rank and file killed; 5 rank and file wounded; 2 rank and file missing.

Detachments 1st and 2d Light Battalions of the King's German Legion—1 rank and file wounded.

Brunswick Oels—4 rank and file wounded.

Total British Loss—2 Lieutenants, 13 rank and file, killed; 1 ensign, 3 serjeants, 48 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file, missing.

Total Portuguese Loss—1 Lieutenant, 20 rank and file, killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 1 Major, 1 Lieutenant, 2 ensigns, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 63 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file, missing.

Total Loss—3 Lieutenants, 33 rank and file, killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 1 Major, 1 Lieutenant, 3 ensigns, 4 serjeants, 1 drummer, 111 rank and file, wounded; 4 rank and file, missing.

(Signed) CHARLES STEWART.

Major-Gen. and Adj. Gen.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, at the Siege of Badajoz, from the 30th of May to the 5th of June, inclusive.

Killed.

Royal British Foot Artillery—Lieutenant Edmund Hawker.

2d Batt. 5th Foot—Lieutenant Sedgwick.

2d Portuguese Regiment of the Line—
Lieutenant Rodrigo de Mello.

Wounded.

1st Batt. 57th Foot—Ensign Leslie.

Portuguese Artillery—Lieutenant Joze Baptista de Silva Lopez.

14th Portuguese Regiment—Lieutenant Colonel Oliver, severely.

21st Ditto—Major Gomes, Ensign Joze Vicente.

Total of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant General Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. at the Siege of Badajoz, from the 6th to the 11th of June, 1811.

Royal Engineers—1 Lieutenant killed; 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, wounded.

Royal Staff Corps—1 Lieutenant wounded.

2d Batt. 5th Foot—2 rank and file, killed; 1 serjeant, 1 rank and file, wounded.

7th Fusileers—2 rank and file wounded.

29th Foot—1 rank and file wounded.

1st Batt. 45th Foot—1 rank and file killed; 4 rank and file wounded.

51st Foot—1 Lieutenant, 26 rank and file, killed; 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 3 serjeants, 63 rank and file, wounded; 4 rank and file missing.

1st Batt. 57th Foot—1 Ensign missing.

74th Foot—2 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file wounded.

2d Batt. 83d Foot—1 serjeant, 3 rank and file, wounded.

85th Foot—1 Lieutenant, 6 rank and file, killed; 3 Lieutenants, 3 serjeants, 13 rank and file, wounded; 1 Captain missing.

1st Batt. 88th Foot—5 rank and file wounded.

94th Foot—1 rank and file killed; 6 rank and file wounded.

Chasseurs Britanniques—1 serjeant, 8 rank and file, killed; 1 Lieutenant, 17 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file missing.

Detachments 1st and 2d Light Batt. King's German Legion—1 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.

Duke of Brunswick's Corps—1 rank and file killed; 1 Lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 7 rank and file, wounded.

British Artillery—2 rank and file wounded.

Portuguese Artillery—6 rank and file, killed; 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 28 rank and file, wounded.

Total British Loss—3 lieutenants, 1 serjeant, 48 rank and file, killed; 2 captains,

9 lieutenants, 9 serjeants, 127 rank and file, wounded; 1 captain, 1 ensign, 6 rank and file, missing.

Total Portuguese Loss—1 major, 2 lieutenants, 2 serjeants, 25 rank and file killed; 2 captains, 2 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 4 serjeants, 76 rank and file, wounded; captain missing.

General Total—1 major, 3 lieutenants, 3 serjeants, 73 rank and file killed; 4 captains, 11 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 13 serjeants, 203 rank and file, wounded; 2 captains, 1 ensign, 6 rank and file, missing.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, at the Siege of Badajoz, from the 6th to the 11th of June, 1811, inclusive.

Killed.

Royal Engineers—Lieutenant Hunt.

51st Foot—Lieutenant Westropp.

85th Foot—Lieutenant Hogg.

7th Portuguese Regiment of the Line—Lieutenant Joze Pereira.

17th Ditto—Major M'Geachy (11th British regiment.)

19th Ditto—Lieutenant Joze D'Meana.

Wounded.

Royal Engineers—Captain Patton, severely; Lieut. Forster, severely, since dead.

Royal Staff Corps—Lieut. Westmacott, severely.

51st Foot—Captain Smellie, Lieutenants Beardsley and Hicks, all severely.

85th Foot—Lieutenants Gammell, Grant and Morton, all slightly.

Chasseurs Britanniques—Lieutenant Dufief, severely.

Duke of Brunswick's Light Infantry—Lieutenant Lysznowsky, slightly.

17th Portuguese Regiment of the Line—Captain Maxwell, severely; Lieut. Jose Fortio, slightly; Ensign J. Antonio Boqueuse, severely.

3d Portuguese Regiment of Artillery—Captain Velez Barreiros, slightly; Lieut. Baptista Lopez, severely.

Missing.

1st Batt. 57th Foot—Ensign Leslie.

85th Foot—Captain Nixon.

19th Portuguese Regiment of the Line—Captain Budd.

Soito, June 7, 1811:

My Lord.—In my letter of the 5th instant from Villa Formosa, I did myself the honour of acquainting your Lordships that I had just returned from the heights

in front of Gallegos, from whence I discovered a body of the enemy of about 8,000 men, consisting of 500 cavalry and 2,500 infantry, with artillery, entering Ciudad Rodrigo from the Salamanca road. I requested Col. Waters to remain on the heights until sunset, to notice whether any more of the enemy followed those which I have mentioned, and he reported to me that they were succeeded by another column; but I have strong reason to think, from what I shall relate to your Lordship, that they must have marched large bodies of infantry and cavalry into Ciudad Rodrigo in the course of the night. According to your Lordship's instructions I concentrated the troops rather more in their cantonments, upon hearing a few days before, that the enemy were moving in the direction of Ciudad Rodrigo, and took the other necessary precautions for falling back. The enemy advanced, as I thought it probable, at day-break on the morning of the 6th, in two columns; one taking the direction of Gallegos, and the other that of Carpio and Espeja. The former was a heavy column of cavalry and infantry, with several guns, and the latter consisted of about 6,000 infantry; but in saying this, I should observe, that, from the nature of the country, the rear of these columns could not be discovered. They had also upwards of 2,000 cavalry and 10 guns, which moved across the plain in front of Fuentes de Honor. From the nature of the country being so perfectly open, and the probability of the enemy bringing a large portion of his cavalry upon this point, I deemed it most prudent to withdraw the light division under Brigadier General Craufurd, which accordingly fell back from Gallegos and Espeja, at two o'clock in the morning, upon Nave d'Aver. Observing the rapidity of the enemy's advance, and the superior number of his cavalry, the light division, with the horse artillery attached to them, was directed to retire farther back upon Alfayates, the first and fifth divisions gradually falling back from Aldea de Ponte and Nave d'Aver to the heights just behind Sorto, and the sixth division from Mealbada de Sordo to Rendo, the cavalry remaining in front of Alfayates.—It is with great pleasure I have to mention the very admirable conduct of the Royals, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Clifton, and one troop of the 14th Light Dragoons, which being all that were employed in covering the front from Villa de Egua

to Espeja, were assembled at Gallegos, and retreated from thence agreeably to my directions. The force to which they were opposed your Lordship is in possession of in this letter; and notwithstanding all the efforts of General Montbrun, who commanded the French cavalry, to outflank the British, pressing them at the same time in front with eight pieces of cannon, their retiring to Nave d'Aver merits the highest admiration. In offering my sense of their conduct, and of the very stubborn manner in which they retired, I derive very great satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship, that Major-General Slade directed in person the whole of the affair, and by his movements foiled the designs of the enemy, and the British cavalry maintained as usual their high character. The Major-General in his report to me speaks in much praise of Major Dorville, of the Royal Dragoons, of Captain Purvis, of the same regiment, and of Captain Dowson, of the 14th Light Dragoons, who had opportunities of distinguishing themselves much.—I am not able to judge exactly of the designs of the enemy, but I know that they left Salamanca with 18,000 infantry, and with upwards of 3,000 cavalry, and 34 pieces of artillery, on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. In concluding my statement of the movements of yesterday, I beg leave to add my acknowledgments for the choice made by your Lordship, of the Hon. Colonel Pakenham, and of Lieutenant Colonel Delancey, at the head of their respective departments, with this portion of the army; their zeal and good judgment is already known to your Lordship. The loss of the cavalry upon this occasion, I am happy to say, amounted to no more than ten rank and file wounded, and nine missing; and six horses killed, ten wounded and four missing.—I have the honour to be, &c. B. SPENCER, Lieut.-Gen.

FRANCE.—*Exposition of the State of the Empire, presented to the Legislative Body at its sitting of June 29, by his Excellency Count Montalivet, Minister for the Interior.*

GENTLEMEN,—Since your last Session, the Empire has received an addition of sixteen departments, five millions of people, a territory yielding a revenue of one hundred millions, three hundred leagues of coast, with all their maritime means. The mouths of the Rhine, the Meuse, and

the Scheldt, were not then French : the circulation of the interior of the Empire was circumscribed ; the productions of its central departments could not reach the sea unless they were submitted to the inspection of foreign custom houses. These inconveniencies have for ever disappeared. The maritime arsenal of the Scheldt, whereon so many hopes are founded, has thereby received all the development which it needed. The mouths of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, place in our hands all the wood which Germany furnishes. The frontiers of the Empire are supported on the Baltic ; and thus, having a direct communication with the North, it will be easy for us thence to draw masts, hemp, iron, and such other naval stores as we may want. We at this moment unite all that France, Germany, and Italy produce, as materials for the construction of ships.—The Simplon, become part of France, secures us a new communication with Italy.—The union of Rome has removed that troublesome intermediacy which subsisted between our armies in the north and in the south of Italy, and has given us new coasts on the Mediterranean, as useful and necessary to Toulon, as those of the Adriatic are to Venice. This union also brings with it this double advantage—that the Popes are no longer sovereign Princes, and in the relation of strangers to France. To bring to our recollection all the evils which religion has sustained, by the confounding of temporal with spiritual power, we have only to look into history. The Popes have invariably sacrificed eternal things to temporal ones.—The divorce of Henry VIII. was not the cause of England's separation from the Church of Rome. The *pence* of St. Peter occasioned that event.—If it be advantageous to the State and to Religion that the Pope should not continue to be a Sovereign Prince, it is equally desirable that the Bishop of Rome, the head of our Church, should not be a stranger to us ; but that he should unite in his heart, with the love of religion, that love for this country which characterises elevated minds. Besides, it is the only means whereby that proper influence which the Pope ought to possess over spiritual concerns can be rendered compatible with the principles of the Empire, which cannot suffer any foreign Bishop to exercise an authority therein.

Religion.

The Emperor is satisfied with the spirit which animates all his clergy.—The cares of administration have been directed to the wants of the dioceses.—The establishment of secondary ecclesiastical schools, commonly called *small schools* ; the founding of many large seminaries for higher studies ; the re-establishment of churches wherever they had been destroyed ; and the purchase of several grand cathedrals, of which the revolution had intercepted the construction ; are manifest proofs of the interest which the government takes in the splendour of religious worship, and the prosperity of religion.—Religious dissensions, the effect of our political troubles, have entirely disappeared ; there are no longer in France any priests but those in communion with their bishops, and as united in their religious principles as in their attachment to Government.—Twenty-seven bishopricks having been for a long time vacant, and the Pope having refused at two different periods, from 1805 to 1807, and from 1808 up to the present moment, to execute the clauses of the Concordat which bind him to institute the Bishops nominated by the Emperor ; this refusal has nullified the Concordat—it no longer exists. The Emperor has been, therefore obliged to convoke all the Bishops of the Empire, in order that they may deliberate about the means of supplying the vacant sees, and of nominating to those that may become vacant in future, conformably to what was done under Charlemagne, under St. Louis, and in all the ages which preceded the Concordat of Francis I. and Leo X. ; for it is of the essence of the Catholic religion not to be able to dispense with the ministry and the mission of Bishops.—Thus has ceased to exist that famous transaction between Francis I. and Leo X. against which the Church, the University, and the Supreme Courts, so long protested, and which made the Publicists and Magistrates of that period say, that the King and the Pope had mutually ceded that which belonged neither to the one nor the other. Henceforward it is to the deliberations of the Council of Paris, that the fate of episcopacy is attached, which will have so much influence upon that of religion itself.—The Council will decide whether France, like Germany, shall be without episcopacy.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XX. No. 3.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 20, 1811.

[Price 1s.

"I maintain, that all Europe is contemplating the payment in specie at the Bank as the criterion of the credit of the country. If the Bank continue to issue paper *without controul*, the Country Banks will do the same. They will pour out their notes upon us without mercy; and we are now BEGINNING A COURSE OF ASSIGNATS.....Loud cries of *Order! Order! Question! Question! Question!* from every part of the House."—MR. ROBSON'S Speech, in the Honourable House, 2nd April, 1802.

"By these WISE and provident measures (the measures relating to the Bank Stoppage) all the apprehensions that were entertained are vanished: the credit of the Bank is as high, both at home and abroad, as it ever was; and, *not the slightest inconvenience possible* is, or has been, experienced from its not paying in cash."—OLD GEORGE ROSE. Brief Examination of the Finances, published first in 1799, and republished in 1806.

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TO THE READERS.

The Extra Sheet, containing the TABLE OF CONTENTS and the INDEXES to the last Volume, has not been quite finished in time for publication this week; but, it will certainly be published with the next Number.

PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS
IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XXVII.

Mr. Robson's Proposition—George Rose's "blessed Comforts"—The Nature and Extent of these Comforts—Great use of ascertaining them—Necessity of discovering who has got the Money that has been borrowed on account of the Public—Case of De Yonge.

GENTLEMEN,

BEFORE I resume the thread of our discussion, which was rather abruptly broken off at the close of my last Letter, give me leave to beg your attention to the two passages, which I have, upon this occasion, taken as MOTTO'S.

You see, that MR. ROBSON was called to Order; that he was run down by all parts

of the Honourable House; that he was booted out of countenance, and, you may see in the history of that day's proceedings, that he was obliged to *sit down and to hold his tongue*. And yet, what did he say? What was the *folly* he was guilty of? Why, foretelling precisely what has now come to pass. And, I beg you to observe, that he recommended upon the occasion here referred to a *controul* as to the quantity of paper to be issued by the Bank, a measure now recommended by the *whole of one party* in the Honourable House and by *part of the other party*; and, though I am not one of those who think that it would have been possible to save the paper by the means of any such controul; still, the proposition is now put forward as the *only* one that can restore the paper to its former value. Yet did the members of the Honourable House hoot Mr. Robson down; they coughed and laughed and hallooed him off his legs. Ah! but those times were very different from the present. The enemies of truth were then strong. They had not as yet seen the guinea at a premium, and the bank note at a discount. Faith! they have a great deal more to see yet: what they have to see they can scarcely guess at. Much good may it do them. They hooted down Mr. Robson; they had their own way; and, therefore, let them not complain when the days of their humiliation shall arrive.

The second motto calls to our minds the means that were, and that, all along, have been made use of to deceive the people as to the finances in general, and especially as to the state of the paper-money, in which work this GEORGE ROSE has borne a principal part. He was, for many years, Secretary of the Treasury under PITT, by whose authority this publication was made

D

in the name of Rose. In short, he has been a great actor in the drama, which is now drawing to a close; and he is one of the men, of whose past conduct it will, hereafter, be necessary, absolutely necessary, to give the history. "*Not the slightest inconvenience.*" No, not to George Rose, perhaps; but, could the rest of the nation say so? Could they say so, out of whose taxes George Rose was getting about *ten thousand pounds a year*? But, there is another passage in this same publication of GEORGE ROSE, to which I must beg leave to solicit your attention, of which it is well worthy.

"There is a time for all things," and now is the time for reminding the people of England of the means by which they have been deluded. It was in vain to endeavour to open their eyes before; but, now, perhaps, they may be induced to make use of their senses. The following is a specimen of the means employed to delude them, at once to wheedle and to scare them into a *quiet surrender of their money*. I beg you to read it with *attention*; and you will, I hope, be ashamed at having been deceived by lies and hypocrisy so glaring. "As the *amount of the debt*, which will be incurred, in this and every subsequent year of the war, will be so reduced by the application of the money coming in from the tax on income (after ten millions shall have been raised for the service of each current year), as that the permanent debt, which will be left as an addition to the antecedent one, will not exceed the annual amount of the whole produce of the sinking fund. This is A TRUTH so important, that it cannot be too often or in too many shapes exhibited for the *satisfaction of our country*, for the *conviction of our enemies*, and for the information of Europe. If France has built hopes (founded on *ignorant or visionary calculations*), on the expected overthrow of our financial system, and has trusted to the failure of our resources, she may now perceive what means, after so many years of this arduous struggle, Great Britain still possesses for maintaining it: It would be a slander to the sense and virtue of the people, to suppose an *abatement of that spirit which has enabled government to call forth those resources*. The prosperous state of the empire which affords the power, furnishes all the motive, for continuing the contest; a contest, the support

of which to a successful issue is to *secure us in the enjoyment of every national advantage*, and to protect us from *the infliction of every national calamity*. The imperious and awful necessity of the present crisis unavoidably subjects us to heavy burdens. It has been said that they ought to be considered as a SALVAGE for the remaining part of our property. In the consideration of property, to which it was applied, the figure is sufficiently striking; but, in other respects, the metaphor, though just, is *inadequate*. What Tariff shall settle the difference between *national independence* and *inexorable tyranny*? between *personal liberty* and *requisitions, prisons, and murder*? between the BLESSED COMFORTS OF RELIGION and the gloomy despair of Atheism?"

Well said, Old GEORGE ROSE! This was the sort of language by which the nation was led on in the former war. The cant does, indeed, no longer take. It has not the powers that it possessed ten years ago; but, still there is cant in the nation, and we ought to be constantly upon our guard against it. "Between the *blessed comforts of religion* and the *gloomy despair of Atheism*." Why this, Gentlemen? What had the blessed comforts of religion to do with the matter? How, if any of you had had the spirit to put the question to him; how were the blessed comforts of religion to be *taken from* you by the French Republicans? How were those blessed comforts to be *secured to you* by a bloody war against those republicans? In short, what had religion or atheism to do with the matter? What an impudent thing to tell you, that, if you did not part freely with your money, you would be plunged into the gloomy despair of atheism! What an impudent thing was this! But, let us see what GEORGE ROSE really meant, when he was talking about the *blessed comforts of religion* and the *salvage* upon your property. He says "*salvage upon OUR property*;" but, we shall soon see what sort of salvage he paid. You were to pay *salvage*, but he did not tell you to *whom*. He did not tell the "*thinking people*," that *he himself* was one of the great receivers and pocketers of the said salvage. Yet, at the time when he wrote he and his sons were, and they *now are*, in the receipt annually of public money to the following amount:

Old GEORGE ROSE, as Treasurer of the Navy..... £. 4,324

OLD GEORGE ROSE, as Clerk of the Parliaments, which is a Sinecure, and is for his life, and is granted also for the life of his eldest son YOUNG GEORGE ROSE..... 3,278

OLD GEORGE ROSE.—Keeper of Records in the Exchequer, another sinecure place..... 400

WILLIAM STEWART ROSE, second son of Old George Rose, as Clerk of the Exchequer Pleas, which is also a sinecure place..... 2,137

£. 10,139

Such was the sum which "the blessed comforts of religion" yielded to this man: no wonder, then, that he felt an uncommon degree of horror at the thought of seeing those blessings supplanted by the "gloomy despair of atheism," which, of course, being interpreted, meant the loss of this ten thousand pounds a year! So you, the people of England, yea, "this most thinking people in Europe," as LORD STORMONT (who, by the by, had a fat sinecure) called them, were to pay George Rose and his sons ten thousand pounds a year in part of the means of preserving themselves from the gloomy despair of atheism! But, observe, Gentlemen, OLD GEORGE ROSE has been for nearly thirty years in the receipt of large sums annually of the people's money. His salary as Secretary of the Treasury he had before he was Treasurer of the Navy, and that was £. 4,000 a year. It is sixteen years, at least, since he got the grant of the office of Clerk of the Parliaments, at £. 3,278 a year, which is just so much money for doing nothing at all, the office being what is called a sinecure. How long he has possessed the £. 400 a year as keeper of the Exchequer Records I do not know; but, I believe, twenty years if not more. So that, I think, we shall not be far from the mark, if we suppose him to have possessed the whole for twenty years past. What other emoluments he may have had, how much more of the public money he may have received, I do not know. His son GEORGE is, I believe, to have a large pension for life for his trip to America; where he did not remain a year, I believe, altogether. But, these will be matters for another day's reckoning. For the present let us see what the above sum amounts to in the course of twenty years. The principal money is £. 202,780. In words, two hundred and two thousand, seven hundred

and eighty pounds; and, if we add the interest, the amount is about £. 323,000, in words, THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY THREE THOUSAND POUNDS, nearly two thirds of which has been received for sinecure places, that is to say, for doing nothing.

Here, are "blessed comforts of religion!" The thinking people, "the most thinking people in the world" were desired to believe, that unless they paid this and other such sums, they would lose all the "blessed comforts of religion," and would be plunged into the gloomy despair of atheism; that, in short, if they did not continue to pay these sums of money, they would all go to hell as sure as they were born. Oh, "most thinking people!"

But, Gentlemen, now let us apply what has here been seen to the subject before us. I observed to you before, and, indeed, proved to you, that the measure of Lord KING was rendered necessary by the difference between the value of paper and that of coin, that that difference has arisen from the depreciation of the paper, that that depreciation has arisen from the abundance of the paper compared with the quantity of gold in circulation, that that abundance has arisen from the stoppage of the payments of cash at the Bank, that that stoppage arose from the vast increase in the amount of the National Debt and the Dividends: all this I have before proved to you, and in a manner, I trust, that you clearly understand; but, there is still one stage further to go back, and that is, to the CAUSE of the increase of the National Debt! Mark well what I say here, Gentlemen. Mark this well; for this is now, or, at least, it very soon must be, the great and indeed, the only object, connected with the paper system, worthy of our attention.

In the common concerns of life, in the affairs of individuals, where interest induces men to do the best they can for the prosperity of the concern, we always find, that, in the case of embarrassment, arising from debt, the cause of such debt is looked well into by those who wish to retrieve the affairs of the concern; and, if they find, that the debt has been incurred by this or by that species of extravagance, they set to work to put a stop to such extravagance, and, in cases calling for it, they inquire who it is that has derived gain from the creation of the Debt. And,

why should not we do this? Why should not we, in our present state, inquire who have, if any persons have, gained by this increase of debt; or, in other words, whether there be any persons, who have been receiving, for the last twenty or thirty years (we may stop there,) large sums of money out of the loans, which loans have added to the Debt? Why, in short, should not we look with this sort of eye into our affairs? The nation, this "most thinking" nation, seems here again to be deluded. The public were getting into motion: it was impossible to keep them quite quiet any longer: but, it was easy to throw them off upon a *wrong scent*; and, for this purpose, the halloo against Lord KING was set up. But, "*steady*" men of England! "*Solid*" men of England! Thinking, "*most thinking* people" of England! Do not, thus, to the last, expose yourselves to the ridicule and contempt of the world! Let me beseech you not to be dupes and gulls to the last moment!

What, considering us as rational men; considering us as intellectual beings; considering us as creatures having souls in our bodies; considering us as something superior to the beasts that perish: considering ourselves in this light, what, I ask, have we to do with the manner in which Lord KING, one of the land-owners, wishes to settle with his tenants for their rent? Let him, in the name of common sense, manage his affairs in any way that he likes best; and let us endeavour to retrieve our affairs. With this laudable determination in our minds, and being convinced that all our embarrassments arise from our Debts, let us look back into our books for the last twenty or thirty years, and see how we have got rid of our money. We have always had a *large income*, and yet our AGENT, for the time being, has been *borrowing money for us*. This may possibly have been necessary; but, at least, let us not act the part of careless men in common life, who, in spite of circumstances enough to awaken suspicion in credulity itself, still confide in a plundering sharper. Let us look into our *books*; let us look back into our *old accounts*, and see what our AGENTS, in succession, have done with our money. Our income they have expended, they have made prodigious loans in our name, and have charged us with interest upon them: let us see, then, to *whom* and for *what* they have paid away all this money; for, if we should find, that they

have taken any part of the money to themselves or given it away, that opens to us a most interesting view of the matter.

Well, then, in looking over the account books of the nation for the last twenty or thirty years, I find several large sums paid to OLD GEORGE ROSE and his sons, and I find, too, that the far greater part of it has been paid them for *stancure* offices, that is to say *nothing-to-do* Offices. I put these sums together, I calculate the interest upon them, and I find them, together with the interest, amount to 323,000*l.* or thereabouts. So! say I, here I have, then, discovered the *cause*, in part, of this embarrassment in our affairs. If this money had not been given to the ROSES, the nation would not, of course, have been so much in Debt, the Dividends upon the interest of the Debt would not have been so large, the Bank Company need not have made so much paper to pay the Dividends with, the run upon the Bank would not have taken place so soon, the stoppage of cash payments would not have been called for at so early a period, the depreciation would not have come on so fast, the gold would have been longer in arriving at a premium, and Lord KING would not as yet, at least, have given the notice, which has led to the Bill now before parliament.

I shall be asked, perhaps, what signifies 323,000*l.* when the Debt amounts to 800,000,000*l.* My answer is, that *millions* are composed of *ones*; and that no sums are so large as those which grow out of many small ones. But, is this a *small* sum? Look at it! *It is a 2,500th part of the whole of the National Debt.* Think of that! I may have made an error in my estimate; the ROSES may not have had this income for so long a time; and I may have committed an error in computing the amount of the interest; but, if I am right, as I think I am, under the mark instead of over the mark, then have these persons, this one family, and, indeed, one member of it chiefly, received, from the nation, in principal and interest, a 2,500th part of the whole of the National Debt even at this day in existence.

Here we are upon the TRUE SCENT, Gentlemen; and, I am quite satisfied, that all the hallooing and hooting and doubling and luring in the world will never, in the end, prevent us from having success in the chase. A 2,500th part of the *whole* Debt

mind; but, of the Debt created within the last twenty or thirty years, it will make about 1-800th part. So that, if my calculations be correct, George Rose and his Son (without including the value of the *reversionary grant* or of the *Envoy's pension*) have, during the last twenty or thirty years, received, in principal and interest, a sum of money from the people *equal to a 1,800th part of all that portion of the National Debt, which has been created during the last thirty years!*

When sinecures and pensions have been talked of, you have observed certain persons set up an affected, horse laugh, as if the amount was a mere *trifle*, a thing to *laugh at*; but, you see, Gentlemen, that these are not trifles; that they are things worth looking into; and there are few persons, I believe, who have ever had to do with embarrassed pecuniary affairs, who will not think with me, that *the sooner we look into these things the better*. For, if we were, for instance, to find out, in searching the Nation's old accounts, 1,800 persons, each of whom has received of the public money, in the last thirty years, a sum in amount equal to that received by George Rose, then the thing is made clear at once. There is no more difficulty. We, at once, see the cause of the increase of the national Debt; or, at least, we see the means that might have been employed to prevent such increase, and, of course, to prevent the stoppage of the Bank cash payments, and the consequent depreciation of the paper-money.

I shall be told, may be, by some persons, that I forget the *services* which George Rose has rendered to the country. That is a point upon which men may differ in opinion; but, then, that claim has been satisfied by the *Salaries* as Secretary of the Treasury and Treasurer of the Navy; so that, at any rate, there are more than *six tenths* of the whole sum to be kept to the *sinecure* amount; and, as I said before, there may have been many and large emoluments of which I have, and can have, no knowledge. There is, indeed, the other claim, mentioned in the early part of this letter, namely, the preserving to us, the "*most thinking people in the world*," the "*BLESSED COMFORTS of religion*;" and, really, I must confess, that, against those who thought that paying taxes and creating national Debts were necessary to prevent them from being

made Atheists by the French Republicans, this claim is good. Those who could be made believe that must be of so stupid and so base a nature as to make them wholly unworthy of the attention of him, whose object is happy and free; because such people must have been fashioned by nature to be slaves. What a degrading idea! Pay money to prevent myself from being made an Atheist! Pay taxes; suffer in silence my estate to be taken from me piece-meal, and sit quiet while I am told, that this is necessary in order that the French may not take from me "the "*BLESSED COMFORTS of religion!*" Talk of credulity, indeed! Talk of the pilgrims who used to go and make their offerings at the shrine of Thomas à Becket! Talk of the Priest-craft and gullibility of three centuries back! I defy any man to produce me, from the annals of superstition, from any of the records of human credulity or human cowardice, any thing which to the character of man is so degrading as this.

Yet, this was the sort of language made use of by the partizans of Pitt, during the whole course of the Anti-jacobin war. There were many tricks played off; but the grand, the master trick, the never failing fraud, was the alarm at the danger of seeing *atheism* introduced instead of the *Christian Religion*; the "gloomy despair of Atheism," says GEORGE ROSE, instead of "the BLESSED COMFORTS of religion!" What would I give to have seen George just at the moment of his finishing that sentence! I should like to have watched his looks, and, if possible, to have heard his soliloquy! "*BLESSED COMFORTS of religion!*" He seems totally to have forgotten the *ten thousand pound a year*; but, I trust, that the time is not far distant, when that and all other matters of the kind will be well and scrupulously attended to.

Upon a future occasion, Gentlemen, I intend entering more at large into an enquiry as to *what has become of the money borrowed* during the last twenty or thirty years; but, this I must defer till another opportunity. In my next I intend closing this series of letters, when I shall have seen the discussions upon the Bill, now before the Parliament, brought to an end. That will be a natural point for me and you, Gentlemen, to rest at, until something new and important shall arise, and that that will

soon be the case I am pretty certain. In the mean while I beg leave to subjoin a few remarks on the case of DE YONGE, together with a Letter from himself to LORD VISCOUNT FOLKESTONE,* and remain,

Gentlemen,

Your friend,

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Thursday, 18th July, 1811.*

* The Case of DE YONGE, the Jew, who, in the month of August, last year, was tried for selling Guineas for more than their nominal value in Bank Notes, has proved what I then said it would be, "one of the most important that had taken place for many years."—I said, and published, at the time, my opinion, that, notwithstanding the prosecution had been ordered and carried on by the *Attorney General* (Gibbs,) and though the man had been found guilty by a *Special Jury* and in coincidence with the direction of the *Judge* (Ellenborough;) notwithstanding all this, I gave it as my decided opinion, and maintained that opinion by argument, that the Jew had been guilty of *no crime* in the eye of the law of England. The case, as we have before seen, has since been argued before the *Twelve Judges*, and they have pronounced, that what the man was charged with was *not a crime*.—It is a long time since this man's prosecution began. Notice will be found of it in the Register a year and a half ago. It was manifest, that the poor man must have greatly suffered in purse as well as in mind; and, when the Judges had declared him guilty of *no crime*, LORD FOLKESTONE, who had before interested himself greatly in the man's fate, and had given notice, that if the case was not speedily decided upon by the Judges, *he would bring it before parliament*; when the Judges had decided, his lordship complained, in the House of Commons, that the poor man had suffered greatly, and *ought to have compensation made him*. The ATTORNEY GENERAL answered, that *every man* was liable to the same sort of inconvenience and injury. To be sure, said his lordship, every man is liable to have a false accusation preferred against him; every man is liable to be prosecuted with sufficient grounds; but, this was a singular case: the prosecution was ordered by the King's own *Attorney-General*; and, what is more, the *crime*, as it was called, was, by the government Solicitor, *procured to be committed*; so that the man

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALAVERA'S WARS.—In former Volumes I have put the title of *Spain*, or *Portugal*, to the articles relating to the war in those countries; but, now neither name is quite proper, for the same armies are carrying on war in both countries at one and the same time. I shall, therefore, give to all the articles that I, in future,

was prevailed upon by the prosecutors to commit what they deemed a great crime; they tempted him to commit the crime; they, in fact, *made* the crime, or the supposed crime, that they intended to prosecute, and that they actually did prosecute. This is by no means a common case: it is by no means one of those vexatious and groundless prosecutions to which any man is liable from the malice or mistake of others. This was a prosecution by the law officers of the Crown, and by the *Attorney General* in particular; and, all the sufferings of DE YONGE have arisen from the *Attorney General's not knowing the law upon this point*. It is no crime, to be sure, to be ignorant of the law upon any point; nor is it to be supposed, that *Attorney Generals* are conjurers any more than other men; but, when they seek to get the grounds of a prosecution; when they get a man to commit a crime (or when those under them do it), that they may have an opportunity of prosecuting it; when this is the case, there can be no doubt, I think, that they ought to know the law before they proceed. And, I am quite sure, that, in all such cases, where there is an acquittal at last, the suffering party ought to be indemnified for his sufferings and losses. For, if this be not so, what man is safe from utter ruin? Who may not be ruined? What DE YONGE has suffered we shall now see, in a Letter, which he has had the gratitude to address to Lord Folkestone, and which, as being a very clear and modest statement of his case, and as a document connected with the great subject of which we are treating, I here insert.—
"MY LORD; I should be wanting in gratitude were I to omit returning you my most sincere thanks for your disinterested endeavours on my behalf, and I assure your Lordship I do not feel the less grateful because they were unsuccessful.—Your Lordship will perhaps excuse me if I mention a few circumstances in my case of which I think I am justifi-

write upon the operations of the army under Lord Viscount Talavera, the title of *TALAVERA'S WARS*, the complete history of which I promise myself the pleasure of writing as soon as I have leisure, which will be, perhaps, when the Paper-Money matters are *finally closed*. The Most Noble Marquis Wellesley has, upon a recent occasion, called my Lord Talavera "that *DISTINGUISHED WAR-RIOR*," and that he will continue to be a distinguished warrior I have not the least doubt: at any rate, if he be not, it shall not, if I live, be for want of one to give, and put upon record, a full account of all his operations: not a lying account; not a hireling account; not a base and abominable string of frauds upon the people of England, which serve to cheat some of them and to furnish others of them with excuses for their villainies, but which, so far from deceiving the rest of the world, are the scorn and contempt of all foreign nations; not an account of this

"fied in complaining, and particularly as "Mr. Attorney General asserted that I "had suffered no material hardships.— "In the first place, I did not seek the "barter or exchange which formed the "subject of the accusation against me, the "plan was laid by the Mint Solicitors to "tempt me to the bargain, and then to "prosecute me.—Pursuant to this arrangement, a foreigner was employed, who "came to my house as the interpreter to "another man, in his company; they "stated, that they were recommended to "me to make the purchase, and, after "urging me to deal with them, officers "came into my house, seized me and my "money, and, at a late hour in the evening, I was hurried from my family to a "loathsome prison, (the Poultry Counter) "and there kept three days and three "nights in custody without bail being "admitted.—At length, on the final examination, I was discharged on giving "bail to a large amount, which I had "some difficulty in procuring; and had I "not been able to obtain them, I must "have remained in custody 18 months, "the period this question has been pending.—Lastly, the expence and anxiety "I have sustained has been enormous, "some through the solicitors for the prosecution, for, after going through all the "necessary forms of law to bring the first "indictment against me to issue, and, indeed, when it stood for trial, the prose-

sort, but a *true* account; an account which will place all the actors, on both sides, in their proper light; that will hold up the skilful and the brave to the admiration of posterity, that will show what misfortunes, disgraces, and miseries proceed from putting power in the hands of a fat-headed fool, and that will damn to everlasting infamy those who have sought to disguise their cowardice by the means of blustering and lies, be they on which side they may.—When Talavera first went into the Peninsula I was glad; because I wished to see some of that family, of whose wars in India we had heard so much, *put* against Buonaparté; but, I was quite delighted when the Most Noble Marquis went as *Embassador*, taking his brother HENRY WELLESLEY with him, while Lord Talavera was to be commander in Chief of our Troops there. "*Now*," said I, "we shall *see* who are the best men, "the Buonapartés or the Wellesleys. "These our statesmen and warriors have

"cutors moved to quash it and prefer "another, because they had misrecited "the proclamation.—A second Indictment was according found, and this also "I proceeded in, until it was coming on "for trial at the Old Bailey, when, to my "great mortification and astonishment, it "was removed by the prosecutors into "the Court of King's Bench, by which "means, I had, as it were, my defence "again to commence.—Being in very "moderate circumstances, and having a "family to support, I have necessarily "sustained many deprivations in consequence of the great law expences incurred in defending myself against this "accusation, and, I fear, it will be a considerable time before I can recover myself from the injuries I have sustained.— "I will not further trouble your Lordship, "but conclude with observing, that I "humbly conceive the Law Officers of "the great public bodies and of government, having, as they must, the best "means of information on legal points, "ought to be somewhat more circumspect "and accurate in their expounding acts of "parliament, before they distress and bear "down an humble individual and expend "the public money, by harrassing and "groundless prosecutions.—I am, my "Lord, with the greatest respect, your "most obedient and very humble Servant,
107, *Houndsditch*, "JAMES DE YOUNG."
17th July, 1811.

"conquered many kingdoms and principalities in Asia; we shall now see what they will do in Europe. And, above all things, we shall now see, what they, with all the flower of the English army, will do against the French." Such were my observations at the time. Since that the Most Noble Marquis has come home; but, it has only been to have still more power, as to foreign nations, while the brother Henry Wellesley supplies his place as Ambassador in Spain.—Well, then, here we see the Wellesleys on one side and the Buonapartés on the other side. Every thing has given way to the object of supplying Talavera with the means of carrying on the war. The whole of the troops of the country have been sent off to him as fast as they could be got ready. Transports, Ships of War, nothing has been spared to make him, in point of numbers, a match for the enemy. He has had, in short, the resources of the kingdom poured out upon him. At no time of our history did England ever put so great a mass of means at the disposal of any Commander. Therefore, we are now to wait the result, in order to determine, who are the best men, the Buonapartés or the Wellesleys. I am aware, indeed, that the Buonapartés do not come forth here in person; but, they send their Marshals, and if my Lord Viscount Talavera *beat them*, I shall be prepared to claim for him and his family the victory over the Buonapartés.—So much by way of INTRODUCTION to a *Series of Articles*, which I foresee I shall have to publish under the title of **TALAVERA'S WARS**.—Let us now look at the present situation of Talavera, first taking a hasty glance at the events which have occurred since the *retreat of Massena*, by which retreat this "*thinking nation*" was filled with joy up to their very lips, filled up to blubbing height.—On account of that retreat Talavera did, as the reader must remember, receive the *Thanks of the two Houses of Parliament*. The Minister (Perceval) in moving these *Thanks* said, that there had been, from day to day, *distinguished actions* during the campaign; that our general had given our allies a most *useful lesson*, and had, at least, *secured them for another year*; that those who had till now doubted of the power of the nation to preserve its character, must now congratulate the *illustrious glory* with which their country had been crowned; that now, now, *aye now*, we all knew that we

should have a British army to *defend our country*, if ever the enemy landed; and, said he, raising, as I can suppose, his voice and his head at the same moment, and looking about him to receive the approving nods of his audience, "*what must NOW be the feelings of the enemy after all his insolent boastings, and what must be now his CONFUSION, when he sees that he is without the means of carrying his designs into execution.*" The statesman then took an enlarged view of the continent, gave a significant hint as to the effects which Lord Talavera's victories might produce in France; said it was not unreasonable to suppose that we might be the instruments to effect the *deliverance of Europe*; led us to hope that in Spain and Portugal the "*power of the tyrant would find its grave*;" and concluded with asserting, that so long as "*distinguished military glory, acquired in a righteous cause, so long would the fame of Lord Talavera stand embalmed in the memory of a grateful posterity*, and so long would he continue to receive the *Thanks of mankind*."—This is, in part only, what was said by the prime minister of this country, the man, under the king, at the head of this government; this was, in part, and only in part, what was said by him in the moment of that joy which was inspired by the retreat of Massena.—All this I dissented from, and, in my Register of the 4th of May in particular, I endeavoured to caution this "*most thinking nation*" against indulging any very sanguine hopes of future successes in Portugal or in Spain, and, I told them expressly, that the expressions: "*driven out of Portugal; evacuation of Portugal, and the like, made use of at that time by the COURIER and TIMES and other venal prints, were mere inventions to deceive this credulous nation.*"—Whether I was right, or not, we shall very soon see.—It was always plain to me, that Massena's retreat was, as far as regarded any thought of us, a *matter of choice*; that our army did not, and could not force him to retreat; that he was in want of provisions himself, and that he saw, that, while we lay covered by the Lines of Torres Vedras, he could not get at us, and could not injure us or weaken us, because we were easily fed from the sea, whence we were supplied from home, from America, and even as to certain articles, from France! Therefore, Massena, whether he had been in want of provisions himself, or not, must have thought it wise

to draw Talavera out if he could. Whenever I have been rat hunting I have observed, that, when the pursued party gets to his hole, the pursuers, if they have not the means of ferreting him out, always draw off to a distance from the mouth of the hole, and there wait till the party chose to come out again, and then the way we used to go to work was either to fall in upon the party outright and kill him if possible, or to push away towards his hole, and having fairly shut him out, give him chase, from which he had great good luck if he escaped.—Massena seems to me to have acted upon this principle; for, no sooner had he arrived at the point where he intended to make a stand, than he turned about and fell upon those who fancied themselves to be his pursuers! How the English and Portuguese armies must have been surprized at finding themselves so furiously attacked as they were, to lose so many in killed and wounded, and to have so many prisoners taken from them, by those whom, but two or three days before, they looked upon as being run-aways!—

While MASSENA was playing this part, SOULT was co-operating with him in the most effective and able manner. He had, just about the time of Massena's starting on the retreat, stepped across and taken BADAJOS, which was of very great importance, because, while the French held that place, it was not safe to send the whole of our army after Massena. If we did, the French had nothing to do but to go and take possession of the Lines at Torres Vedras. This was a grand feature in the campaign. It did, indeed, decide the fate of it before it was hardly begun. Our army being thus divided was the more easily assailed. How it was assailed in the neighbourhood of Almeida the reader well knows; and he also knows how it was assailed at Albuera, where Soult made his attack so soon after the attack of Massena, that there was no time left for the sending of assistance to Marshal Beresford, who had been, with a large part of the allied army, amused with the siege of Badajoz.—After the battle of Albuera Lord Talavera joined Beresford, and the siege of Badajoz was undertaken: for *what* they best know; but, for my part, the reason is quite beyond my comprehension. Here, after almost literally knocking their brains out against stone walls; they were compelled to raise the siege, upon hearing of the approach of the French armies; aye,

the approach of those very Frenchmen, whom, it was said, our general had but a few weeks before driven out of Portugal. —Lord Talavera has now, we find, declined a battle with the French, and has made some movements towards his Lines at Torres Vedras! But, of these matters I must speak more fully in my next. I have here only had room to open the subject, and to call the attention of my readers to it. I shall resume it with a resolution to leave no part of it unexplained to this "thinking people," who, in the meanwhile, should compare the siege of Badajos with the siege of Tarragona, and the siege of Almeida this year with the siege of Almeida last year. Here are facts present to our view, which nobody can deny. Here we have deeds and not words to judge from. Read LORD VISCOUNT TALAVERA's account of his siege of Badajos, and then read SUCHET's account of the siege of Tarragona; and, when you have done that, you will, if you are not quite blinded by prejudice, be able to form a pretty good judgment of how things are going on.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 19th July, 1811.

N. B. The Dispute with America in my next.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE.—*Exposition of the State of the Empire, presented to the Legislative Body at its sitting of June 29, by his Excellency Count Montalivet, Minister for the Interior.*

(Concluded from p. 64.)

..... As for the rest, if there have existed other causes of disunion between the Emperor and the temporal Sovereign of Rome, there exists none between the Emperor and the Pope, as the head of religion; and there is none which can cause the least inquietude to the most timorous souls.

Judicial Order.

Civil justice had been separated from criminal justice; the Magistracy did not pursue crimes till they had been marked out by the Police. The late code which you have adopted, has united civil to criminal justice; it has erected imperial courts, invested with the right of pursuing and of accusing, and has armed them with all the force necessary to cause the laws to be executed; the jury system maintained and brought to perfection; the con-

fronting of the witnesses, and the publicity of examination, have united all that was good in the old and the new system. In appointing to different offices, his Majesty has sought out the men who still remained of the old Parliaments, and whom their age and their knowledge capacitated for being employed in the imperial courts; he invited them of his own accord, thus giving a new proof of his constant wish to see the French forget their ancient quarrels, and finish by embodying themselves with the interests alone of the country, and of the throne.

Administration.

Many reclamations have been presented with regard to the limits of different departments. Opinions have ever been listened to, which went to substitute great prefectures in the room of those at present existing; but his Majesty has rejected them, and has adopted as a principle, to consider as established and permanent what has been already done. Instability destroys every thing. A great revolution has passed over, under the existing organization of the departments: it is become like a species of property, which his Majesty does not wish to touch. These departments have been formed and consolidated amidst imperious circumstances, which have brought together their inhabitants, and they shall ever remain united as they are.—The administration of Communes is every where brought to perfection. The Budgets examined in the Council of State, direct and check the administration of all the Communes of the Empire, which have a revenue of more than 10,000 francs. Already the mass of these revenues amounts to more than 80 millions. Never in any time, or in any country, were the Communes so rich. Every where else the tax called the *Octroi* is an impost of the Sovereign: his Majesty has left it to the Communes; in consequence of which all their establishments are in the best state, and in almost all of them the erection of town-halls has been set about, of market places, of public magazines, and of other works, which must embellish or augment their prosperity.—The hospitals are every where ameliorated: it may be said, that never at any time were they better kept. The acts of charity are copious, and the legacies accepted by the Council of State for the hospitals amount to several millions annually.—His Majesty has sanctioned and endowed a great number of congregations of

Charitable Sisters, whose object is to wait upon the sick, and serve in the hospitals. The intention of his Majesty is, that all these Sisters should, in respect to religious matters, be under the direction of their Bishops, who alone have the power of interfering in spirituals, through the extent of their diocese.—Depôts of mendicity have been established in 65 departments; in 32 they are already in activity; and in these 32 departments begging is no longer permitted. These depôts still require to be improved, in such a way that different kinds of labour may be there carried on, and thus they may provide for the greater part of their expences.

Public Instruction.

The University has made some progress. Several Lyceums were ill constituted: the principles of religion, the basis of every institution as of all morality, were either discarded or feebly inculcated. The Grand Master and Council of the University have remedied the greatest part of these abuses. Much, however, still remains to be done to realise the hopes and the views of the Emperor in this grand creation.—Domestic education is that which merits the greatest encouragement; but since parents are so often obliged to entrust their children to colleges or places of education, it is the intention of the Emperor, that the organization of the University should be extended to all colleges and places of education of all degrees, in order that education may no longer resemble a manufacture or a branch of commerce, followed from views of pecuniary interest. To direct education is one of the noblest functions of the father of a family, or one of the principal ends of national institutions. The number of Lyceums and of Communal Colleges shall be augmented, and the number of private seminaries shall be gradually diminished till the moment when they shall all be shut up.—All public education ought to be regulated on the principles of military discipline, and not on those of civil or ecclesiastical police. The habitude of military discipline is the most useful, since at all periods of life it is requisite for the citizen to be able to defend his property against internal or external enemies.—Ten years more are still requisite for realising all the benefit which his Majesty expects from the University, and for accomplishing his views; but already great advantages are obtained, and what exists is preferable to that which has ever existed.—For the primary

instruction of children his Majesty perceives with pleasure the establishment of small schools; he desires their increase.— Besides the houses of St. Denis and—, six houses have been established for the education of girls whose fathers have been devoted to the service of the State.

Sciences and Arts.

The discovery of the magnetised-needle produced a revolution in commerce; the use of honey gave way to that of sugar, the use of woad to that of indigo. The progress of chemistry is operating at this moment a revolution in an inverse direction: it has arrived at the extraction of sugar from the grape, the maple, and the beet-root: woad, which had enriched Languedoc, and part of Italy, but which was unable, in the infancy of art, to support the competition with indigo, resumes the superiority in its turn: chemistry at this day extracts from it a residuum which gives it over indigo the advantage of price and of quality. All the branches of science and of art are advancing in improvement.

Public Works.

Great works have been undertaken within the last ten years, and are advancing every year with new zeal, and a new increase of means. In 1810, 138 millions were appropriated for these works: 155 millions are appropriated in 1811. (Here there is a table shewing the different sums appropriated to each branch, such as roads, bridges, &c.)—In the midst of wars, of expences required by immense armies, by the creation and organization of numerous fleets, the sacrifices which the imperial Treasury has made for the public works are such, that they surpass in a single year all that was employed on them under the old government for one generation.

Fortifications.

Great part of these expences has for its object the creation of new strong places: these are labours engaged in for the benefit of future times, in order to consolidate and fortify the empire. (Here several works in the Texel, at Antwerp, Cadsand, &c. are enumerated.)—In 1810 and 1811 more than eight millions were expended on the forts of the Scheldt: it was natural to bestow great labour upon a point which will ever be the object of the jealousy and the fears of our natural enemies. [The Report proceeds to enumerate other works constructed at Ostend, Boulogne, Cherbourg and Havre. Of the latter place,

it says, "Havre had been constructed by Vauban some years before the Revolution, it was thought proper, under foolish pretences, to destroy the fortifications. That city was left dismantled and exposed, which is the key of the Seine, and which may properly be called the port of Paris. It is now fortified and in a state to support a siege."—At Corfu, a place already very strong, great works have been constructing for the last four years. New plans have been adopted, and this key of the Adriatic is guarded by 12,000 troops, having provisions for two years, and a numerous artillery provided for a siege of the longest duration.—The Report then mentions new additions to the fortresses of the Rhine, and thus proceeds:—]—On seeing the activity which has reigned for these eight years in the works on all our frontiers, one would say that France was menaced by an approaching invasion. I shall have no occasion to place before your eyes, by way of contrast to this idea, the situation of all our neighbours who are our allies, and who are united to our system, and the preponderance which the late campaigns have given us; but I shall only say, that since, under such circumstances, more than 100 millions have been devoted within a few years to an expenditure which interests only the future, we ought to render thanks to the Government which, not content with securing the happiness of the present generation, wishes also to guarantee the tranquility of posterity, and thus provides against even the most remote chances of fortune.

Ports.

At our ports the labours go on with the same activity. At Antwerp, since the end of the last year, they have removed the dam from the bason. Eighteen ships of the line, even three deckers, can enter, and go out fully equipped. In the beginning of this year, two eighty gun ships have been coppered and refitted there. The works are going on with great activity. Before the end of next September, the bason will be able to hold thirty ships.—Ships of the line can only enter the bason of Flushing without their guns. The sluice is now dried and insulated, and they are busied in lowering it, so that 20 ships will be able to enter it with their guns. The quays which the English damaged are now restored. They are labouring now at reconstructing the magazine, and in making it bomb-proof.—The ground has already been chosen for the bason of

Terneuse; its foundations are now laying. Twenty ships of the line, fully equipped, will be able to leave this bason in one tide. It will be able to hold forty.—The sluice of the race of Ostend is finished; it has been of the greatest service to the fort: that of Dunkirk will be finished by the end of the year. Great advantages are expected from deepening the channel. The sluice of Havre is finished, and has been of great advantage.—At Cherbourg, the expences of the road are of two sorts. The first operation is to raise the dyke above the low water mark, and this will be accomplished in the course of the present year; the second is to construct the forts at the extremities of this dyke to defend the road: the fort of the centre is just finished. The road being in this manner secured, it remained to dig the port of this great work; nine tenths are executed. Thirdly, ships of the line will be able to lie in the port and bason; already a vessel which had received damage at sea has entered the bason, and been refitted there. The avant-port and bason will be finished in 1812. The building docks and frames already exist. The works of Cherbourg alone require more than three millions yearly.—Works are carrying on at all the ports of the 2nd or 3rd order; and all are improving with great rapidity.

Canals.

The Canal of St. Quintin is finished. From the beginning of this year navigation has been in great activity upon it; its effect has already been felt in the prices of wood and coal in the metropolis.—The Canal of the North, to unite the Rhine and the Scheldt, was one third part finished, but the union of Holland having made it useless, these works have been suspended.—The Canal Napoleon, which joins the Rhine and the Saone, will be finished in four years. Three millions a year are applied to it. The Canal of Burgundy, which joins the Saone and the Seine, is continued with spirit. In the course of this year a million and a half will be expended upon it. The canal of Arles, which brings the Rhone to the Pont-du-Bou, is one-third part executed. That which cuts the peninsula of Brittany, in joining the Ronce to La Vilaine, is now going on. The canal of Bleuët, which joins Napoleonville to L'Orent, and which will one day lead from Napoleonville to Brest, is almost finished. Many other canals of less importance, are either finished or going on with the greatest activity.

Roads.

In the improvement of the roads the distances are lessened. It has been computed that Turin has already been brought 36 hours nearer Paris, 24 hours by the passage of Mont Cenis, and 12 hours more by the new road of Maurienne. His Majesty has decreed the establishment of a new road from Paris to Chambery by Tournes. This road, by avoiding the mountains, will be shorter by eight hours. In this manner Turin will be brought nearer to Paris by 44 hours, which is almost half the distance.—Milan is by the road of Simplon brought nearer Paris by more than a march of 50 hours, if the present road is compared with that which existed ten years ago.—Bayonne and Spain have been brought nearer to Paris by 18 hours, by the road which has been made through the sandy plains between Bordeaux and Bayonne.—Mayence and Germany have been brought 12 hours nearer, by the road which has been made in the sands from Mayence to Metz. Hamburg will be nearer by more than sixty hours in the course of the next year, by the road made across the sands of Maestricht to Wesel, and from that to Hamburg: and this will be the first example in history of eighty leagues of roads made in the course of two years. Ten sets of workmen are employed: and before the end of the year 1811, much more than half of it will be finished. Amsterdam will be brought twelve hours nearer Paris by the road through the sands of Antwerp to Amsterdam, at which they are labouring at many points. New roads are opened from Spezia to Parma, from Florence to Rimini, and from Nice to Genoa.—All the Councils-General of the departments rival one another in zeal to second the intentions of the Sovereign; and every where roads are opening to establish communications between the different points in the departments.—The construction of a great number of bridges is begun. Those of Bordeaux, Rouen, Avignon upon the Rhone, of Turin on the Po, are the most remarkable. Those of Bordeaux, and Rouen, as well as that over the Durance, which was finished last year, were considered as impossible. A great number of other bridges are also finished.

Works at Paris.

The canal of l'Ourque, and the distribution of its waters in the different parts of Paris, are attended with an expence of two millions and a half of francs a year.

In a few years these works will be completely finished.—Already sixty fountains spread the waters of the Ourcq in the different quarters of Paris. The water arrives there constantly. The Seine, the Marne, the Yonne, and the Oise, have considerable works constructing on them to improve the navigation.—The cut of St. Marne, which will be finished in the next year, will shorten the navigation of the Marne by five leagues, and will spread its waters by numerous channels. The sluices constructed at Port d'Arche, at Vernon, and at ———, will facilitate the navigation of the Seine; and other sluices will continue it to Troyes and l'Aube.—The bridges of Choisy, Besen, and Jena, facilitate the communications, or concur in the embellishment of the capital.—The Louvre is finishing; they are pulling down that quantity of houses which was between the Louvre and the Thuilleries. A second gallery re-unites the two palaces.

Marine.

We have lost Gaudaloupe and the Isle of France. The wish to relieve these colonies would be no sufficient reason for trying to send out our squadrons in the state of relative inferiority in which they are.—Since the annexation of Holland, that country has furnished us with 10,000 seamen, and 13 ships of the line. We have considerable fleets in the Scheldt and at Toulon. Squadrons of ships of the line, more or less strong, are in the different ports, and 15 ships on the stocks at Antwerp. Every thing there is so arranged as to add every year a great number of ships of war to our squadron in the Scheldt. Two ships of the line are building at Cherbourg; and the magazines of timber, and other materials of every kind, are there so considerable, that we may put five on the stocks before the close of 1811. L'Orient, Rochefort, and Toulon, have all their frames occupied. Numerous ships are constructing at Venice.—Naples ought, in pursuance of treaties, to have this year six ships of the line, and six frigates. That kingdom has them not; but its government will be convinced of the necessity of repairing this negligence.—Our resources, our interior navigation, are sufficient to advance the material part of our marine to the same point as that of our enemies.—The experiments made of a maritime conscription have succeeded: young men of 18, 19, and 20, sent on board our ships, display the best inclination, and are rapidly forming. The fre-

quent sorties of our squadrons, the cruising on the coast, the evolutions of our fleets and flotillas in the Zuyder Zee, the Scheldt, and in our roads, have enabled our young conscripts to make a progress which justifies our entertaining the best hopes.

War.

In one year the greater part of the strong places in Spain have been taken, after sieges which do honour to the genius of the artillery of the French army. More than 200 colours, 80,000 prisoners, and hundreds of pieces of cannon, have been taken from the Spaniards, in a number of pitched battles. This war was verging to its close, when England departing from her usual policy, came to present herself in the front line. It is easy to foresee the result of this struggle, and to comprehend all its effects upon the destiny of the world.—The population of England not being able to suffice for the occupation of the two Indies, of America, and of a variety of establishments in the Mediterranean; for the defence of Ireland, and of her own coasts; for garrisons, and the manning of her immense fleets; for the consumption of men in an obstinate war, supported against France on the Spanish Peninsula; the chances are greatly on our side, and England has placed herself between the ruin of her population, if she persists in supporting this war, or disgrace if she abandon it, after having put herself forward so strongly.—France has 800,000 men under arms; and while new forces, new armies, march into Spain to combat there our eternal enemies, 400,000 men, 50,000 horses, remain in our interior, or on our coasts, ready to march in defence of our rights wherever they shall be menaced.—The Continental system, which is followed up with the greatest constancy, saps the basis of the finances of England. Already her exchange loses 33 per cent.; her colonies are destitute of outlets for their produce; the greatest part of her manufactories are shut; and the Continental system has only just arisen! Followed up for 10 years, it alone will be sufficient to destroy the resources of England.—Her revenues are not founded on the produce of her soil, but on the produce of the commerce of the world; even already her counting-houses are half closed. The English hope in vain, that from the advantages of time and of events which their passions light up, some markets will be opened to their commerce.—

With regard to France, the continental system has produced no change in her position: we have been for ten years past without maritime commerce, and we shall still be without maritime commerce. The prohibition of English merchandize upon the Continent has opened an outlet for our manufactures; but should that be wanting, the consumption of the empire presents a reasonable market; it is for our manufactures to be regulated by the wants of more than 60 millions of consumers.—The prosperity of the Imperial Treasury is not founded on the commerce of the universe. More than 900 millions, which are necessary to meet the expences of the empire, are the result of home taxes, direct or indirect. England must have two milliards, in order to pay her expences; and her proper revenue could not furnish more than a third of it. We shall believe that England will be able to support this struggle as long as we can, when she shall have passed several years without loans, without the funding of Exchequer-bills, and when her payments shall be in money, or at least in paper convertible at pleasure.—Every reasonable man must be convinced that France may remain ten years in her present state without experiencing other embarrassments than those she has felt for the last ten years, without augmenting her debt, and, in short, meeting all her expences.—England must every year of war borrow 800 millions, which, in ten years, will amount to 8 milliards. How is it to be conceived, that she can contrive to support an increase of taxes to the amount of 400 millions, in order to meet the interest of her debt—she who cannot meet her current expences without borrowing 800 millions a year? The present financial system of England is baseless without a peace. All the systems of finance, founded upon loans, are in reality pacific in their nature, because borrowing is calling in aid the resources of the future for the relief of present wants. Notwithstanding this, the existing Administration of England has proclaimed the principle of perpetual war; this is, as if the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that he should propose, in a few years, a Bankruptcy Bill. It is, in fact, mathematically demonstrable, that to provide for expenditure by an annual loan of 800 millions, is to declare, that in some years there will be no other resource but bankruptcy. This observation every day strikes intelligent men; every campaign it will be still more striking to

the capitalists.—We are now in the fourth year of the war in Spain; but still, after some campaigns, Spain shall be subdued, and the English shall be driven out of it. What are a few years in order to consolidate the great empire, and secure the tranquillity of our children? It is not that the Government does not wish for peace; but it cannot take place while the affairs of England are directed by men, who all their lives have professed perpetual war; and without a guarantee, what would that peace be to France? At the close of two years English fleets would seize our ships, and would ruin our ports of Bourdeaux, Nantes, Amsterdam, Marseilles, Genoa, Leghorn, Venice, Naples, Trieste, and Hamburg, as they have done heretofore. Such a peace would be only a trap laid for our commerce; it would be useful to England alone, who would regain an opening for her commerce, and would change the Continental system. The pledge of peace is in the existence of our fleet and of our maritime power. We shall be able to make peace with safety when we shall have 150 ships of the line; and in spite of the obstacles of war, such is the state of the Empire that we shall have that number of vessels! Thus, the guarantee of our fleet, and that of an English Administration founded on principles different from those of the existing Cabinet, can alone give peace to the universe. It would be useful to us, no doubt, but it would also be desirable in every point of view: we shall say more, the Continent—the whole world demands it: but we have one consolation, which is, that it is still more desirable for our enemies than for ourselves; and whatever efforts the English Ministry may make to stupify the nation, by a multitude of pamphlets, and by every thing that can keep in action a population greedy of news, they cannot conceal from the world how much peace becomes every day more indispensable to England.—Thus, Gentlemen, every thing at present guarantees to us a futurity as happy as full of glory; and that futurity has received an additional pledge in that infant so much desired, who, at last granted to our vows, will perpetuate the most illustrious dynasty; of that infant, who amidst the fêtes of which your meeting seems to form a part, receives already, with the Great Napoleon, and the august Princess whom he has associated to his high destinies, the homage of love and of respect from all the nations of the Empire.

FRANCE.—*Intelligence from the Armies in Spain.*

Raising of the Siege of Badajoz.

The Duke of Ragusa, Commander-in-Chief of the army of Portugal, put himself in motion in the beginning of June, with the intention of driving beyond the Coa that corps of the English army which Wellington (on departing for the siege of Badajoz) had left on the frontiers before Ciudad Rodrigo.—On the 5th of June, the Duke of Ragusa arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo with his advanced guard, and a corps of 2,000 horse: the enemy did not think proper to wait the arrival of the army, and retreated during the night. At day-break, the Duke of Ragusa sent his cavalry in pursuit: only some parties of General Craufurd's division were met with, who were driven into the Coa under the ruins of Almeida. Some prisoners were taken. The English divisions forced their retreat into the mountains of Sabugal and Alfayates, in order to gain the Tagus.—The Duke of Ragusa having, without a blow, succeeded in his plan of expelling the enemy from this part of the frontier, immediately directed the march of his army towards the Tagus.—General Regnier took the command of the advanced guard, and arrived on the 9th at Placentia.—On the 12th two divisions passed the Tagus at Almaras, the bridge of which was securely established, and covered by strong batteries. Quantities of provisions and stores had for some time arrived at this important point. The Duke of Ragusa also received there a grand bridge equipage, which he sent forward with the rest of the army, in the direction of Merida.—Meanwhile the Army of the South, under the Duke of Dalmatia's orders, had received numerous reinforcements. Twelve thousand men, under the Count D'Erlon, had arrived on the 8th at Cordova, and followed the Duke of Dalmatia's movements, who again advanced to Santa Martha, and occupied Almendralejo with his right, thus being in readiness to communicate with the Duke of Ragusa.—Wellington, whose army was greatly fatigued through want of provisions, and sickness, successively collected his troops round Badajoz; but feeling himself so much pressed, resolved to make a great effort to carry the place before the junction of the two armies. After a dreadful firing of artillery, a first assault was made; but the breach was defended by Frenchmen. Six

hundred English remained on the spot. A second assault had the same result; so that the English lost more than 1,200 men in these fruitless attacks. Wellington was about to make a desperate effort, when on the 16th the Duke of Ragusa arrived at Merida, and effected his junction with the Duke of Dalmatia. The two armies marched on Badajoz, the siege of which place Wellington precipitately raised, re-entering Portugal with all his troops. Part of his battering artillery and many of his sick have been taken.—On the 21st, the Duke of Ragusa had his head quarters at Badajoz.—The details of the siege are every instant expected to be brought by General Philippon, who, as well as the garrison, has covered himself with glory; for the breach was every where practicable.

Fourth Corps of the Army.

The insurgents of Murcia thought they should be able to profit by the absence of the Duke of Dalmatia to attack General Sebastiani, and by threatening his communications with the Sierra Morena, force him to leave Grenada open. Their chief corps took up a position at Gor, between Basa and Guadix, whilst their right wing proceeded upon Ubeda, which the weak garrison was forced to evacuate, to take up a better position towards Baesa.—On the 12th of May General Sebastiani reconnoitred the enemy upon Gor, with some squadrons. Some blows of the sabre were sufficient to check the march of the enemy, who fell back upon Venta del Babul, where he began to entrench himself: this skirmish was sufficient to check at Ubeda the enemy's column which had proceeded thither. From that moment the enemy, instead of attacking the fine position of Guadix, where General Sebastiani waited for them to make them repent their temerity, employed themselves only in entrenching themselves at Ubeda and Bahul. General Sebastiani, wishing to force them to abandon Ubeda, directed a strong column on that point by Cabra Santo Christo, whilst he proceeded himself, on the 24th of May, with a strong reconnoitring party upon Venta del Babul. The enemy's advanced posts were attacked at Gor, and overthrown in a moment: they were pursued at the point of the sword to Venta—50 men were killed and three officers at the foot of their intrenchments, which they dared not quit. However, this manoeuvre, joined to the march of the column

sent upon Ubeda, was attended with complete success: the enemy, fearing to be cut off, evacuated precipitately Ubeda, and fell back between Lorca and Basa.

District of the Army of the North.

The petty war against the brigands continues with activity: the moveable columns do not leave them time to acquire any consistency. Several Chiefs have been taken, particularly one Urgate, one of the most ferocious. For some time, Espos had re-organised his bands in the mountains of Navarre. The Junta of Valencia had sent him some arms. General Caffarelli set off from Vittoria with orders to penetrate into Navarre by the mountains of Biscay, whilst General Reicle left Pampeluna, and General Dumoustier guarded the passes of the Tagus. On the 9th of June General Caffarelli came up with a strong band in the valley of Ulzana; at the first fire they dispersed into the mountains. We were informed that the rendezvous of the bands was round Estella. Measures were taken to march towards that point, but the enemy had been forewarned, and had passed at Puente la-Reina, proceeding towards Sanguessa. On the 14th General Reicle took that direction, and came up at last with the principal mass of brigands, who were forced to fight. General Caffarelli, who was only a league distant, arrived in his turn, passing through a wood, where he found several hundreds of brigands concealed, a part of whom were killed. The affair was very warm; the brigands were overthrown: more than 600 men were killed on the field; the rest owed their safety to the abruptness of the mountains, which it was necessary to scale. Measures are taken to pursue the wrecks of this assemblage. The wretches have scarcely any clothes, are badly armed, without shoes, and nearly destitute of provisions: their Chief saved himself with fourteen men only, attempting to gain Valencia.

Blockade of Figueras.

The works of the blockade are in such perfection that it is impossible any thing can go in or out. Disease makes considerable ravage in the place, which is nearly destitute of every thing.

His Serene Highness the Prince of Neuchâtel and Wagram.

Monsieur, —The defence of Taragona, become more obstinate in proportion as the attack advanced, had only concentrated itself since the taking of the exterior works of Olivo and Francoli. It was kept up by succours of all kinds, which a land army cannot intercept from a maritime place without the assistance of a fleet to complete the blockade. The suburbs, or the lower town, which comprehend the Fort and the Mole, are covered by a front of fortifications strengthened daily by new batteries, and against which I directed all our efforts. I had the honour to give your Excellency an account of the third assault made on the 16th of June at the Lunette du Prince, with the same success as the two preceding ones. The capture of this point was a first step into the interior of the lower town. The artillery immediately transported its breaching-battery, and, with 10,000 sacks of earth, was established on the very ground of the work itself. The engineers pressed more and more the front attacked, opened a third parallel, pushed two débouchés upon the salient angle of the covered way of the bastion St. Charles, and on that of the half moon, crowned the top of the glacis, and in fine executed the descent of the ditch at the angle of the bastion des Chanoines.—On the 21st, an enemy's howitzer blew up the powder-magazine of our breaching battery; in an hour it was repaired: all our batteries, by a continued and well-kept-up fire, silenced that of the enemy, and opened three practicable breaches. At four in the afternoon, I ordered the assault, and at seven all was ready; 1,500 grenadiers were united with sappers and scaling-ladders, and disposed in columns of attack and reserve. They were followed by a thousand workmen. General Palombini commanded the assault. I ordered General Montmarie to command a second reserve at the left of the trenches. He was to be seconded by two battalions of the 7th, and by the fire of Olivo or fort Salme; whilst at the same time on the left General Harispe should make movements to alarm the garrison on the road to Barcelona, and throw bombs among the shipping. (To be continued.)

"I looked upon the Bullion Report as likely to lead to what would be likely to secure the country from the natural consequences of that overwhelming corruption, which I regarded as the fruit of the paper system; and, as I have the accomplishment of this great object deeply at heart; as I look upon the happiness and honour of my country as of far greater value to me than any other worldly possession, I said, and I still say, that the Bullion Report has given me more pleasure than I should derive from being made the owner of the whole of Hampshire. As to any idea of a party nature, I shall, I am sure, be believed, when I say, that I did not care one straw to what party the Committee belonged. If I had a wish as to party, it certainly would be, that *no change of ministry should take place*; for, without prejudice to the OUTS, who, I think, would do the thing full as well with a little more time, I am quite satisfied, that the present people will do it *as neatly and as quickly*, as any reasonable man can expect."—POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. XVIII. p. 427, Sept. 32nd, 1810.

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TO THE READERS.

The Sheet containing the TABLES and INDEXES to Vol. XIX, and also the TABLE OF PRICES, &c. &c. is published with the present Number.

PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS
IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XXVIII.

Progress of Lord Stanhope's Bill—Effects of its Provisions—Mr. Brougham's Resolutions—The Justice of Lord King's Claim insisted on—Illustrated by the Grants to the King and the Additions to the Pay of the Judges.

GENTLEMEN,

THE Bill is past! And, be you assured, that the *die is cast*! When, I wrote the passage, which I have taken for my motto to this letter, I did expect to see what I hinted at in the close of that passage; but, I must confess, that I did not expect the progress to have been *quite so rapid* as it has been. For the future my calculations will be more likely to keep pace with events.

Well, the Bill of Lord Stanhope is now become a law. We will, therefore, take

a short view of the rise and progress of it; and, when we have so done, we will examine its provisions, and endeavour to point out its consequences.

The Bill was brought into the House of Lords and read a first time on the 27th of June, when no division took place, and when an intimation was given by the ministers, that they should *oppose* it. On the second of July, it was read a second time, and, being now *supported* by the ministers, the question for the second reading was carried, 36 for it, 12 against it. On the 8th of July, it was read a third time and passed, 43 for it, 16 against it. In the Honourable House, it was read a first time on the 9th of July, and, upon a division on the question, there appeared 64 for it and 19 against it. On the 15th of July it was read a second time, 133 for it, and 35 against it. On the 17th of July it went through a committee of the House, and, on the 19th of July, it was read a third time and passed with the amendments, relating to the *penalties*. On the 22nd of July, the amendments introduced by the Commons were agreed to by the Lords. On the 24th of July it received the Royal Assent by Commission; and thus it is become A LAW; thus a new *penal law* has been added to the almost endless number already in existence. Many hundreds of the people of this country have been banished, or put to death, for *imitating* the promissory notes of the Bank Company; and now the people are liable to be punished for *passing them for what they may deem their worth*, though they be their *own property*.

The provisions of the Bill are not numerous: it is a *pity* affair. The first part relates to the passing of coin and paper, and

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the second to the recovery of rents. It will be best to insert the words. Those of the first part are as follows: "Be it enacted, that from and after the passing of this Act, no person shall receive or pay for any gold coin lawfully current within the realm, any more in value, benefit, or advantage, than the true lawful value of such coin, whether such value, benefit, profit or advantage be paid, made, or taken in lawful money, or in any note or notes, bill or bills of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, or in any silver token or tokens issued by the said Governor and Company, or by any or all of the said means wholly or partly, or by any device, shift, or contrivance whatsoever.—And be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that no person shall by any device, shift, or contrivance whatsoever, receive or pay any note or notes, bill or bills of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, as of less value in money, except lawful discount, than the sum expressed therein, to be thereby made so payable."—Thus it stood as it went from the Lords. There were, I believe, some trifling verbal alterations made in the Honourable House, who also added the *penalty*, and made it a *misdemeanour* to disobey this part of the law; of course, offenders against it may be punished by *fine* and *imprisonment*, or, as I am, by *both*, at the discretion, perhaps, of the Judges; but, of this I am not sure, not having, as yet, seen the Act in its finished state.

Thus, then, the Bank Company, after having applied to the Government to issue an Order in Council, after having subsequently applied for acts of Parliament, to screen them against the consequences of refusing to pay their promissory notes in coin, now see a law passed making it *criminal*, for any one to get rid of any of those notes that he may happen to possess for their real worth in coin!

This law does what the laws already in existence could not do in the case of DE YONGE; or, at least, it *attempts* to do it. It forbids and punishes the selling of gold coin for more than its nominal worth in Bank Notes, which was precisely what DE YONGE did. But, do you believe, Gentlemen, that this will put a stop to the traffick? I should think, that nobody could believe this; and, if any one were

inclined to believe it, he need only consider the little effect produced by the conviction of DE YONGE to convince him of the contrary. That gentleman was found *guilty* of the crime of selling guineas at *Twenty two shillings and sixpence* each, and, while he lay under that conviction, the price of the guinea rose to *Twenty six or Twenty seven shillings*. This is a pretty good proof that the price of the guinea is not to be kept down by penal laws. But, if the law should put an end to all purchases of gold coin in *Bank of England notes*, it cannot have any such effect with regard to *Country Bank Notes*. Suppose, for instance, that one of you had a fancy for a hundred guineas to lay snugly aside, and I had them to dispose of; the price would be 135*l.* but, say we, the bargain must not take place in notes of the Governor and Company in Threadneedle Street, for so says lord Stanhope's law. But the law does not say, that such bargains shall not be made in *Country Bank notes*; and therefore, you give me 135*l.* in the notes of Paperkite and Co. which notes will, in all probability, answer my purpose full as well as the London notes, or better if I want to pay them away in the country; and, if they should not answer my purpose quite so well, what have I to do but go to the country banker and get them changed for Bank of England notes? I keep the country bank notes if I please, and if I please I change them. This is one way, then, and a most effectual way too, of rendering the Bill of no use as to its main apparent object.

But, how many are the ways, in which such a law may, must, and will be evaded? It is a law intended to make people part with their property for *less* than it is worth in the one case, and to make them obtain for it *more* than it is worth in the other case. The old adage of "a thing is *worth* what it will *bring*" is, by this law, to be totally destroyed after having lived in the world ever since purchase, or even barter, was known amongst men. According to this law, a thing, in one case will be *worth more* than it is to be suffered to *bring*, and, in the other case, a thing will not bring *so much* as it is to be asserted to be *worth*. It is a law, in short, to compel men to dispose of certain articles of their property (if they dispose of them at all) at a price fixed on by the government; and is such a law as never was heard of before, except in France, during the times

of Robespierre and Danton and Marat. It is as Mr. BROUGHAM has called it, in his Resolutions, a law of *maximum* as to gold coin; but, it is a law, which cannot be generally enforced, and which can have only a temporary and partial effect, if any at all, in checking the traffic in coin against paper; and to whatever extent it is efficient, it will be efficient in driving all the coin out of the kingdom, excepting such portion as people are enabled to hoard; for, if I have a guinea, or any thing else, that is worth 27 shillings, and if there be a law which prevents me from getting at present in England more than 21 shillings for it, I shall certainly hoard it 'till I can get the worth of it, if I have no safe means of sending it abroad. Where is the man who will not do this? I am sure that there is not a man amongst you who would not do it. Yes, I am sure, that there is not one single farmer in all England, who will not hoard a guinea rather than exchange it for a bank note of twenty one shillings. So that, as I have observed to you before, and as has been very well expressed in Mr. BROUGHAM's Resolutions, this law will, as far as it shall be efficient, drive the little remains of gold coin into hoards or out of the country, and, by preventing a free and open and unrestrained competition between the coin and the paper, will, as far as it has effect, prevent the operation of the only cure for the evil of a depreciated paper money.*

* It was on the 19th of July, that Mr. BROUGHAM proposed his RESOLUTIONS to the House of Commons. They were negatived; and, gentlemen, I beseech you to compare them with such resolutions as were agreed to by that House. These Resolutions are well worthy of attention, containing as they do what will become a memorable protest against the law, which is now the subject of discussion, and which will be a subject of observation with our children, if any trace of it shall remain beyond our own times.

I. That by the Law and Constitution of these Realms, it is the undoubted right of every man to sell, or otherwise dispose of his property for whatever he deems to be its value, or whatever consideration he chuses to accept. And that every man possessed of a Bank Note, or other security for the payment of money, has an undoubted right to give it away for nothing, or in exchange for whatever sum of money he pleases; or if he cannot obtain what he demands, to retain possession of it.

I have before observed, that, in all ready-money transactions, this law must be nugatory; and I have given an instance of a farmer, having a pig to sell at market. It will, of course, be the same in all other bargains for ready-money; and, even in cases of credit, amongst friends and neighbours, the same will take place. Some roguery may be, in this respect, created by the law, but the law will never compel men to give the guinea and receive the note at their nominal value, one compared with the other. In that place, where, of all others, one might expect to see the dispositions of men concur with this law; I mean, the *Stock Exchange*, a distinction between coin and paper is already made; for Stock has frequently been bought with guineas at a price much lower than the rate of the day, which rate is regulated upon the supposition that paper-money is to be the medium. And, who is to prevent this, without a general law of *maximum*; that is to say, a law putting a price upon all commodities whatever, and punishing men for selling them for more than the price so fixed? This present law, therefore, is nothing of itself. It is nothing unaccompanied with a *maximum* of prices. Those who have begun in this path, must keep on, and go the whole length, or they do nothing at all, except drive coin out of the country or into the hoards, and, perhaps, in many cases, cause a breach of contracts between man and man.

II. That any statute, having for its object to restrain this right, would be contrary to the principles of the British Constitution, and a flagrant violation of the most sacred Rights of Property, and the ancient and inalienable Liberties of the People.

III. That any statute, having for its object to prevent the Bank, or other Paper Currency of the Country from being exchanged against the lawful money of the realm below a certain rate, would, if it could be carried into effect, cause the lawful money of the realm to disappear, and would, in proportion to its efficacy, preclude the application of the most appropriate remedies for the present derangement in the circulation of the country.

IV. That the free exchange of the lawful Money of the realm with the paper currency on such terms as the holders of each may think proper to settle among themselves, is not only the undoubted right of the subject, but affords the best

To a maximum they must come at last, or what is done will be of no effect at all.

The other provision of the Bill relates to *distress for rent*; and it is as follows: "And be it enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that in case any person shall proceed by distress to recover from any tenant or other person liable to such distress, any rent or sum of money due from such tenant or other person, it shall be lawful for such tenant or other person, in every such case, to tender notes of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, expressed to be payable on demand, to the amount and in discharge of such rent or sum so due to the person on whose behalf such distress is made, or to the officer or person making such distress on his behalf; and in case such tender shall be accepted, or in case such tender shall be made and refused, the goods taken in such distress shall be forthwith returned to the party distressed

means of restoring the circulation of the country to its sound and natural state, by establishing two prices for all commodities, whensoever the one currency is from any causes depreciated below the other.

V. That no law whatsoever can alter the real value of the paper currency in relation to the lawful money of the realm, nor alter the real value of either kind of currency, in relation to all other commodities; and that any attempt to fix the rates at which paper and coin shall pass current, must, in proportion to its success, interfere with the just and legal execution of all contracts already existing, without the possibility of affecting the terms upon which contracts shall be made in time to come.

VI. That it is the bounden duty of the Commons House of Parliament, as the guardians of the rights of the people, to discountenance and resist a scheme which has for its immediate objects the establishment of a maximum in the money-trade of the realm, and the dissolution of the obligations already contracted by numerous classes of the community, but which has for its groundwork principles leading to an universal law of maximum, and the infraction of every existing contract for the payment of money; and that a Bill touching the gold coin which has lately been brought from the Lords, has all the said objects, and proceeds upon the said principles.

"upon, unless the party distraining and refusing to accept such tender shall insist that a greater sum is due than the sum so tendered, and in such case the parties shall proceed as usual in such cases; but if it shall appear that no more was due than the sum so tendered then the party who tendered such sum shall be entitled to the costs of all subsequent proceedings: Provided always, that the person to whom such rent or sum of money is due shall have and be entitled to all such other remedies for the recovery thereof, exclusive of distress, as such person had or was entitled to at the time of making such distress, if such person shall not think proper to accept such tender so made as aforesaid: Provided also, that nothing herein contained shall affect the right of any tenant, or other such person as aforesaid, having such right to replevy the goods taken in distress, in case, without making such tender as aforesaid, he shall so think fit."

Now, what does this part of the Bill effect? It has frequently been said, that the *tenantry* ought to be protected, and Lord Stanhope has all along said, that his object was to protect the *tenant*. What, then, has this bill done for the *tenant*? If the thing leased be a farm, or lands of any sort, *distress* is not the mode that the landlord would pursue. He has other remedies, and those much more efficient than that of distress. So that, in fact, this law affords no protection at all to the tenant.

But, though this law will do the tenant no good, it may, and, in some cases, will, do him a great deal of harm, especially as the minister has avowed his intention of making the bank notes a *legal tender* if this law should prove insufficient for the object in view. Under such circumstances, no man in his senses, will let a *new lease*, or *renew an old one*; for, though a *corn-rent* might possibly serve to guard him against the total loss of his estate, still he will be afraid, and he will think it the safest way to let no lease at all. Tenants for term of years will, therefore, become tenants at will, and will have their rents raised upon them every year agreeably to the depreciation of money and the rise in prices; and, another consequence will be, that landlords will, whenever it is practicable, take the lands into their own possession and use, seeing that even a yearly letting may, in the times that may arise, become dangerous; for, if a law be passed to-day

in consequence of a single landlord's demanding his rent according to law, what have not landlords to fear? The safest course, therefore, that they can pursue is to keep, as far as they are able, their farms in their own hands; and this, to a very great extent, they certainly will do. So that this law, as far as it is efficient, will produce a virtual violation of contracts and a discouragement to agriculture.

During the discussions upon this measure, several hints were thrown out as to the *courts of law setting their faces* against those who should demand payment in gold. Sir SAMUEL ROMILLY observed upon what Mr. Manning said about the *law being too strong for the landlords*, that it alarmed him to hear such language; and that he thought it dangerous in the extreme to expose men to such uncertainty as to the real meaning of the law. But, Mr. FULLER and Lord STANHOPE, as appears from the reports in the news-papers, came to the point at once. The former is reported to have said, in the debate of the 9th of July, that "he wondered to hear "any doubt of the solvency of the Bank, "as it was to be supported by the solvency of Government; and Government "surely had ships and stores, and plenty "of valuables besides. He (Mr. Fuller) "did not understand the objects of the "persons who had brought forward the "question, but he was convinced they "were something sinister. (*A laugh.*) As "to Bank-notes, if any landlord was "offered payment in them, and he wanted "gold, he (Mr. Fuller) did not know what "might be done; but of this he was sure, "that **THE WHOLE TENANTRY OF "THE COUNTRY WOULD MEET "AND TOSS HIM IN A BLANKET.** (*laughing.*) And the latter is reported to have said, in the House of Lords, on the 22nd of July, that "his Noble Friend " (Earl of Lauderdale) had called the Bill "a legislative HINT: but it was a pretty "broad hint, too. He did not know whether his Noble Friend had been educated "at any of the Universities: but, he believed, not at Oxford. There was a "story there about a broad hint, which "they called "*John Keale's broad hint.*" "There was a man that John Keale did "not like: John gave him a hint that he "did not like his company: but he "would not go away. "What did you "do, then," says one to John? "Do," "says John Keale, "why, I kicked him

"down stairs. That was a pretty broad "hint!!!" (*laughing.*) So he, (Earl "Stanhope) had given Lord King a hint; "and if he followed up this business, why, "when next Session came, he would give "him a BROAD hint! (*a laugh.*)" Quite a wit, I declare: "Quite a sea-wit, Mr. "Benjamin!" Well, you know, Gentlemen, that there is a time for all things, and, of course, a time for *laughing*. But, it is well worthy of remark, that this war (for it is the same that began in 1793) was waged for the "PRESERVATION "OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY "AGAINST REPUBLICANS AND LEVELLERS," that was the title of the Association at the Crown and Anchor. This is well worthy of remark; now is the time to make such remark. This war has now been going on eighteen years; this war for the support of *order and law and property*, and now, behold, we hear, in the two houses of parliament, the supporters of this system, talk of *tossing a landlord in a blanket and kicking him down stairs*, if he should persist in demanding payment of his rents agreeably to the contract in his leases!

Gentlemen, if you have read the reports of the debates in parliament, upon this subject, you must have observed, that the people in the ministry have very loudly disapproved of the conduct of Lord KING for demanding of his tenants payment in gold, or in notes in sufficient amount to make up for the depreciation of money. Now, observe; they have brought forward, several times, propositions for large grants to the King and to others, on account of the rise in prices, which, as I have already explained to you, is only another name for the depreciation of money. I beg you to mark well what I am now going to state to you; because it will give you a clear insight into this whole matter.

In 1802, eight years ago, a large sum of money, no less a sum than 990,053*l.* (why not have made it a round million *l.*) was granted by parliament "to the King "to discharge the arrears and debts due "upon the CIVIL LIST on the 5th of January, 1802." The *Civil List*, Gentlemen, is the King's establishment of servants and officers of different sorts, and, in short, of all his expences. The King had a permanent allowance, fixed by Act of Parliament, of 800,000*l.* a year for these purposes; but, in 1802 (the time

we are now speaking of) the Civil List had got into debt; and the then Minister, Addington, taking advantage of the national satisfaction at the Peace of Amiens, proposed a grant of the above sum, for the purpose of paying off this debt. Mr. Fox and others opposed the grant; but it was supported by PITT, GEORGE ROSE and the majority, and upon a division there were 226 for it and only 51 against it. And, let it be borne in mind, that the grant was justified by PITT upon this ground: that it did not make an increase to the Civil List equal in proportion "to the *increase of the price of commodities*," and to THE DEPRECIATION OF "MONEY." So he said; so they all said; and the assertion was sanctioned by a vote of the House granting 990,053*l.* to the King. Now, then, if the King was to have a grant like this on account of the *past depreciation of money*, why should Lord King be reviled, why should he be *tossed in a blanket*, or *kicked down stairs*, for demanding payment in such a way as to give him some security for *future depreciation of money*, especially when we consider, that he only demanded the *fulfilment of a bargain*, while the grant to the King was *over and above the fulfilment of a bargain made with him by the public*?

But, did the demands for the King *stop here*? Very far from it; for, in the year 1804 (only *two years* afterwards), PITT, who was then come back into power, called for another grant for a similar purpose, to no less an amount than 591,842*l.* 3*s.* 10*d.* How scrupulously exact the Gentleman was! To a half-penny, you see! Oh, wondrous financier! This grant also was made, and without any division of the House, though it was strenuously opposed by SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, upon the ground of its being a departure from a bargain with the public, and of the practice of making such grants being calculated to render the Royal Family absolutely dependent upon the Minister of the day. This grant also was justified upon the ground that *money had depreciated* and the *prices of all commodities increased*. This grant was accompanied with a *permanent addition* to the Civil List of 60,000*l.* a year; and, indeed, the annual sum, now paid by the people on that account is 958,000*l.* exclusive of 295,968*l.* 1*s.* 8*d.* in allowances and pensions to the Royal Family, besides the amount of sinecure places and military offices that some mem-

bers of the Family enjoy; the propriety or impropriety of none of which I am discussing, but it is necessary to state them in order to enable you to judge of the fairness of the attacks upon Lord King, who only wanted a *bare fulfilment of contract* with regard to *his own private estate*; who only wanted to save himself from ruin from the *future depreciation of money*, and who gave up to his tenants all they had gained from him by the *past*.

Now, Gentlemen, I beg you to observe, that this second grant to the King; this grant of £.591,842 was to pay off what he had lost in *two years* by the depreciation of money; and, you will also observe, and mark it well, that these are *two out of the nine years that have elapsed since Lord King let the Estate respecting the rent of which you have seen his notice to his tenant*. The King, in 1802, had a fixed allowance of £.800,000 a year out of the public money; and, at the end of *only two years*, his advisers find him to require a grant of £.591,842 on account of the depreciation of money; that is to say, £.295,921 in each of the two years. *More than 30 per cent. per annum!* And, is Lord King, after having silently suffered under the gradual depreciation for *nine years*, to be attacked in this manner; is he to be lumped along with *Jews and Pedlars and Smugglers*; is he to have a hint that he will be *kicked down stairs* or *tossed in a blanket*, because he now, when he sees the guinea selling at 25, or 26, or 27*s.* is resolved to have a fulfilment of his bargain, and not to be wholly ruined by this depreciation of money?

But, Gentlemen, this principle of augmenting allowances out of the *public treasure*, on account of the depreciation of money, has not been confined to the King and his family. It has been acted upon in almost all the departments under the government, the army and navy excepted, where, as far as relates to the Commissioned Officers especially, little augmentation has taken place. I will, however, here confine myself to one particular class of persons, namely, THE JUDGES, and I do it the rather because it has been hinted pretty broadly, that the *Courts of Law* would set their faces against the efforts of those, who might attempt to *enforce payment* in gold.

Be it known to you, then, Gentlemen, that the Judges' pay has had *two lifts*

since the Bank stopped its payments in gold and silver. The first was, in the year 1799, two years only after the passing of our famous Bank Restriction Act. The two Chief Judges, whose incomes were very large, underwent no augmentation by Act of Parliament; but, the pay of all the rest was augmented by the Act, Chapter 110, of the 39th year of the King's reign; and, no trifling augmentation did their pay receive, it being upon an average nearly, if not quite, *half the whole amount of their former pay*. The Chief Baron of the Exchequer had £1,000 a year added to his former £3,000 a year; and all the nine Puisne Judges had £1,000 each added to their former pay, which was, in some cases a little more and in some cases a little less than £2,000 a year before. And, besides this, the Act enabled the King, that is to say, his advisers, to make a permanent provision for any judge that might become *superannuated*, and it fixed on great pensions for them in this case, which pensions can, in consequence of that act, be granted without any particular consent of the parliament, which was not the case before. Mr. TIERNEY opposed this measure in a very able manner. He said, that the House of Commons would thus lose all check and controul as to such remunerations; and that the influence of the Crown would be thus greatly and most fearfully enlarged. The measure was, however, adopted; and thus the Judges, in Scotland as well as in England, received an ample compensation for the depreciation of money, up to the year 1799.

Having gone on with this pay for ten years, it appears to have been thought time to give them another lift; and, accordingly an Act for this purpose was passed in the year 1809, of which the people seem to have taken not the least notice. It seems to have escaped every body's attention; but, indeed, the Acts now passed are so numerous, that it is next to impossible for any single man to be able to pay attention to them all, or to a quarter part of them. This Act, which is Chapter 127 of the 49th year of the King's reign, makes an addition of £1,000 a year, to the pay of the Chief Baron of the Exchequer; also an addition of £1,000 a year, to each of the nine Puisne Judges; and it gives an additional £400 a year to each of the Welsh Judges. Thus, at the end of twelve years from the time when the Bank stopped paying in gold, the pay of

the English Judges was nearly doubled; and, shall my Lord King be represented as a *pedlar*, a *jew*, and a *smuggler*, because, at the end of *nine years* of depreciation of money, he wishes to put a stop to the ruinous progress? And shall he be threatened with the hostility of these same Judges, in case he should attempt to enforce his legal claim? Shall he be told about being fought off in the courts, and about the law being *too strong* for him?

At the time when these Acts were passed for augmenting the pay of the Judges, one of the arguments was, that such augmentation was necessary to support the DIGNITY of the office of Judge. Now, in what way was an increase of pay to produce such an effect? Certainly in no other way than that of enabling the Judge to augment his expences of living; for, as to his authority, as to his powers, as to his station, the money would make no alteration at all in them. This being the case, there appears to have been no good reason for augmenting the Judges' pay any more than the pay of the officers of the Navy, or of any other persons in the public employ. Mr. TIERNEY used, at the time when the first augmentation was proposed, an argument very applicable to our present purpose: "If," said he, "an augmentation of income be necessary to support the station of a Judge, has the country no interest in enabling the officers of the Army and Navy, or the Ministers of the Church, or the Magistrates, to maintain their station of society? If the circumstances of a Judge, who has 2,000*l.* a year, require that he should have an additional 1,000*l.* we know very well what must be the situation of a private Gentleman with an income of 2,000*l.* a year."

This argument applies precisely to Lord King. The answer to Mr. Tierney was, that the private Gentleman, if his estate was in land, would, of course, raise his rents, in order to make his income keep pace with the depreciation of money. But the reply to this is, that, if his estate was let upon lease, as Lord King's is, he could not raise his rents, till the expiration of that lease; and if he let a farm upon a fourteen years' lease in the year 1798, he has been receiving money at the rate of that time, during the last thirteen years, whereas the pay of the Judges has been doubled in the space of twelve of those years. This is, in fact, the situation of

Lord King. Either, therefore, it was not necessary, and it was not just to augment the pay of the Judges in any degree; or, it is extremely unjust that Lord King should be prevented from augmenting his income. Indeed he has had, till now, all the legal means of making his income keep pace with the depreciation of money, by demanding his rents in gold; that is to say, agreeably to the terms of the contract, in good and lawful money of the realm.

This legal, this equitable, this fair, this honest, this indubitable claim, he was preparing to enforce, when my Lord Stanhope steps forward with the proposition of a law, avowedly intended to prevent him from so doing; to throw impediments in his way; to interfere in the management of his estates; to take from him part of the legal means which he before possessed of preserving his property; and for having signified his intention to use those means, he is held forth as a *jew*, a *pedlar*, and a *smuggler*. I have observed, that Mr. SHERIDAN has taken part upon this occasion with those who have censured Lord King. And, this is the more remarkable as he has seldom taken part in any discussion whatever. Is Mr. SHERIDAN aware of the consequences to which this may lead? It is hardly necessary to tell him, that the day may not be far distant, when the CIVIL LIST will have to be settled anew; and, I should be glad to know whether, in that settlement, it is likely to be the wish of the parties concerned, that the sum should be fixed as if it were to be paid in gold. Whether, in short, the amount of the Civil List would be fixed for the future, at its present amount. But, if that were not to be the case, how could a *larger amount* be proposed or supported by those who have now railed at the conduct of Lord King?

Endless are the difficulties, into which those have plunged themselves, who have reprobated the conduct of this nobleman as unjust, or who have represented it as unwise. Such persons will hardly muster up the resolution to make a frank acknowledgment of their error; and yet, if they do not do this, with what face can they propose, or support, or sanction, either expressly or tacitly, any measure which shall have for its object, the preservation of the Crown, the Royal Family, the Army, the Navy, the Courts of Justice, or any

department of the state, against the effects of the depreciation of money? The measure of Lord King fell far short of the justice due to himself, for, though the money had depreciated considerably at the date of his oldest leases, still, it has gone on depreciating further from that time to this. He, therefore, would have been fairly entitled to payment in Gold, and nothing else, for the remainder of those old leases. But, pursuing a moderate and liberal course, he restrained his demands far within their legal bounds. With a considerateness that does him great honour, he suffered his tenants quietly to retain what they had gained during the past, and only required of them a due fulfilment of contract for the future, which was not less necessary to the welfare of his tenants, than it was to his own protection; because without such a measure, it was impossible they ever could obtain a renewal of their leases.

Much, during the discussions upon this famous Bill, has been said about *patriotism*; and Lord King has been charged with a want of that quality, because he made the demand, of which so much has been said. But, if Lord King, in barely demanding the fulfilment of a contract in order to protect himself against the effects of the depreciation of money; if Lord King, in barely appealing to the law already in existence for his protection against this ruinous effect of paper-money; if, for this, Lord King is to be accused of a want of *patriotism*, and is to be lumped with Jews, Pedlars, and Smugglers, what will be the inference with regard to the King and royal family, and my lords the Judges, to protect whom against the effects of depreciation *laws have been passed*, laws proposed by the *minister* of the day and sanctioned by the *majority*. Lord King comes for *no law* to protect him; he asks for *no law against his tenants*; he only wants his due according to the existing law; and yet, he is, and by the very people, too, who approved of the above-mentioned large grants to the King and the Judges, accused of a *want of patriotism*!

The venal prints have not failed to join in the accusations against Lord King, whom the COURIER, on the 5th instant, charges with motives of "*base lucre*," as the ATTORNEY GENERAL did me, and with precisely the same degree of justice. The article here referred to in the COURIER

concludes with some observations as to the duty of patriotism, in this case; and says, that, "On an occasion in which ALL SUFFER, the man who first *abandons the general cause* for his own personal interests, must needs make a very sorry figure before the world, just like the *coward who is the first to fly in battle*, while victory is doubtful. But if this man were an high officer, a Legislator, an hereditary Counsellor of his Sovereign, whose peculiar duty it is to set an *example of bravery, of fortitude, of contempt for personal consequences* in the general cause, with what feelings could we view his conduct?" Now, it is to be observed here, that all this talk about the public cause is most shocking nonsense, and what no man in the world besides one of these hirelings would be found to put upon paper. But, if to demand merely the fulfilment of contracts in order to preserve his fortune against the effects of depreciation of money, if this be to "*abandon the general cause for his own personal interests*," if this be to resemble "*a coward who is the first to flee in battle*," how will this venal man speak of the *King and Royal Family and the Judges*? The King has, since the year 1799, had two great grants in augmentation of the sum allowed him, the Junior Branches of the Royal Family have had one additional grant (in 1806) and the Judges have, as we have above seen, had their pay *doubled*, actually *doubled*, since that time. And yet this venal man accuses Lord King of "BASE LUCRE" because he is endeavouring to get what is *his due*; because he is endeavouring to get *his own*; because he is trying to protect himself against that ruin which he foresees will come upon him, if he does not now begin to obtain the fulfilment of his contracts.

"On an occasion," says this venal man, "in which ALL suffer." No: not all. The king has not suffered from the depreciation, nor have the Judges, whose pay has been, as we have seen, actually *doubled* since the stoppage of cash payments took place, and who, of course, would be now as well off as they were before that time, if the pound bank note were worth only *ten shillings*, and Mr. HORNER tells us it is yet worth about *sixteen shillings*. "ALL" do not suffer, then. The Judges, so far from suffering have gained very greatly; and yet, no one has ever charged them with motives of "BASE LUCRE." The

Judges of England alone have received, since the year 1799, in virtue of the two Acts above-mentioned, no less a sum than 120,000*l.* that is, one hundred and twenty thousand pounds of principal money, more than they would have received had not these two grants been made to them; and if we include the interest, as in all such calculations we must, they have received, since 1799, over and above their former pay, about 145,000*l.* And, yet, my Lord King is, by this venal scribe, accused of motives of "BASE LUCRE," because he wishes to prevent the whole of his income from being sunk in the depreciation of money. The Judges have actually put in their pockets this large sum of money; they have actually touched it, since the year 1799, and, of course, the *National Debt* is so much the greater on that account; the interest upon that Debt is so much the greater on that account; the quantity of bank notes to pay the Dividends are so much the greater on that account; and, of course, these two Acts of Parliament have tended, in some degree, to hasten the depreciation, and to produce the very effect which now threatens to ruin Lord King, and to find out a remedy for which puzzles so many men who think themselves wise. Lord King's measure does not tend to add to the *national Debt*; it tends to produce no addition to the Dividends or the bank paper; it is a mere measure of management of his private affairs, which does not trench upon the public good in any way whatever; and yet, he is lumped along with Jews, Pedlars, and Smugglers, and is accused of a want of patriotism!

This writer tells us, that it was the duty of such a man as Lord King to set an example of "*contempt of personal consequences*," meaning, of course, *pecuniary consequences*. But, was it more his duty than it was the duty of the King, the Royal Family, and the Judges? He says that Lord King ought to have done it, as being an hereditary counsellor of the crown. If Lord King had had much to do in counselling the Crown, the present subject would, perhaps, never have been discussed; but, be that as it may, was it more his duty to set an example of *contempt of pecuniary consequences* than it was of the King? Was it more his duty than it was the duty of the Judges? Was no example of this sort to be expected from them, while it was to be ex-

pected from him? And, I beg you to observe the wide difference between the case of the Judges and that of Lord King. No new law is made to favour the interests of the latter; but a new law is made, and afterwards another new law, to favour the interests of the former. Lord King does not attempt to obtain any *real addition* to his original rents; but there is granted to the Judges a very large *real addition* to their original pay. The COUNCIL calls upon Lord King to suffer quietly for the good of his country. His suffering would not do the country any good, but a great deal of harm. But, upon the supposition that it would do the country good, what does the same man say about the augmentation of the pay of the Judges? When the augmentation to the pay of these persons was under discussion, Mr. PEARCEVAL (who was then a *barrister*) argued, that the Judges ought to have quite enough to maintain them in all their state *without touching their private fortunes*; and, observe, this he said *at the very time*, in that very year, 1799, when Old George Rose, who was then one of the Secretaries of the Treasury at 4,000*l.* a year, and who had another good 4,000*l.* a year in sinecure places, was preaching up to "the most *thinking* people of all-Europe," his doctrine of *sacrifices* and *salvage*, a specimen of which I gave you in my last letter. "The *imperious* and *awful* necessity of the *present crisis*," said GEORGE, "unavoidably subjects US to heavy burdens. It has been said, that they ought to be considered as a SALVAGE for the remaining part of OUR property. The metaphor though just is inadequate; for what Tariff shall settle the difference between the BLESSED COMFORTS OF RELIGION and the GLOOMY DESPAIR OF ATHEISM." George talks of "US" and of "OUR" property; but HE was gaining all the while; aye, and he got his great sinecure place, with reversion to his eldest son, while "*imperious* and *awful* necessity" was calling upon the nation for sacrifices. GEORGE's doctrine of SALVAGE was for the use of others, and not at all for his own use; nor did this doctrine of SALVAGE apply to the Judges, who, we have seen, received an *addition* to their pay out of the public money, during the times of this "*imperious* and *awful* necessity;" during the time that George Rose was calling upon the people, for the love of

God, not to spare their money. "Oh!" said George, "it would be a *slander* to the *sense* and *virtue* of the people to suppose an abatement in that *spirit* which has enabled the government to call forth those *resources*." And, at this very time he was receiving upwards of 8,000*l.* a year out of the taxes raised upon that same people, and Mr. TIERNEY, who opposed the augmentation to the pay of the Judges, was told, that they ought to be enabled to maintain all their dignity and state, that is to say, to live and keep their families, *without touching their private fortunes*. And, yet, Lord King is to be lumped with Jews, Pedlars, and Smugglers; he is to have a hint about tossing in blankets and kicking down stairs; and, what is still more serious, he is to see a law passed avowedly to counteract his measures with regard to the management of his own estate; he is to be accused of motives of *base lucre*; he is to be held forth as an enemy to his country; and all this because he wishes to obtain what is legally and equitably his due; what is his due as fairly as the produce of their fields is the due of his tenants.

I have now, Gentlemen, to apologize to you for having taken up so much of your time in illustrating what was so clear itself. The additional grants to the Civil List, and the augmentation of the pay of the Judges, did not properly belong to our subject; but, when my Lord King was reviled, and when a law was avowedly levelled at him, because he sought, in 1811, to protect himself and family against the ruinous effects of depreciation, justice demanded of me, if I wrote at all upon the subject, to show what has been done in behalf of the King and the Judges in 1799, 1802, 1804, and 1809, and especially as these measures in behalf of the King and the Judges were approved of and supported by some of those who now reprobate the conduct of Lord King.

In my next Letter, which will be the *last of the series*, I shall have to offer you some observations of a more general nature, and in the mean while, I remain,

Gentlemen,

Your friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
July 20, 1811.

SPEECH

To the Parliament, delivered by Commission, at the Prorogation, on the 24th of July, 1811.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, has commanded us to signify to you the satisfaction with which he finds himself enabled to relieve you from your attendance in Parliament, after the long and laborious duties of the Session. We are particularly directed to express his approbation of the wisdom and firmness which you have manifested in enabling his Royal Highness to continue the exertions of this country in the cause of our Allies, and to prosecute the war with increased activity and vigour.

Your determined perseverance in a system of liberal aid to the brave and loyal nations of the Peninsula has progressively augmented their means and spirit of resistance; while the humane attention which you have paid to the sufferings of the inhabitants of Portugal, under the unexampled cruelty of the enemy, has confirmed the alliance by new ties of affection, and cannot fail to inspire additional zeal and animation in the maintenance of the common cause.

His Royal Highness especially commands us to declare his cordial concurrence in the measure which you have adopted for improving the internal security and military resources of the United Kingdom.

For these important purposes you have wisely provided, by establishing a system for the annual supply of the regular army, and for the interchange of the militias of Great Britain and Ireland; and his Royal Highness has the satisfaction of informing you, that the voluntary zeal which has already been manifested upon this occasion has enabled him to give immediate operation to an arrangement by which the union and mutual interests of Great Britain and Ireland may be more effectually cemented and improved.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

His Royal Highness commands us to thank you, in the name and on behalf of his Majesty, for the liberal supplies which you have furnished for every branch of the public service.

His Royal Highness has seen with pleasure the readiness with which you have applied the separate means of Great Britain to the financial relief of Ireland at the present moment; and derives much satis-

faction from perceiving that you have been able to accomplish this object with so little additional burthen upon the resources of this part of the United Kingdom. The manner in which you have taken into consideration the condition of the Irish Revenue has met with his Royal Highness's approbation; and his Royal Highness commands us to add, that he looks with confidence to the advantage which may be derived from the attention of Parliament having been given to this important subject.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

His Royal Highness commands us to congratulate you upon the reduction of the island of Mauritius. This last and most important colony of France has been obtained with inconsiderable loss, and its acquisition must materially contribute to the security of the British commerce and possessions in that quarter of the world.

The successes which have crowned his Majesty's arms during the present campaign, under the distinguished command of Lieutenant General Lord Viscount Wellington, are most important to the interests, and glorious to the character, of the country. His Royal Highness warmly participates in all the sentiments which have been excited by those successes, and concurs in the just applause which you have bestowed upon the skill, prudence, and intrepidity so conspicuously displayed in obtaining them.

It affords the greatest satisfaction to his Royal Highness to reflect, that, should it please Divine Providence to restore his Majesty to the ardent prayers and wishes of his Royal Highness and of his Majesty's people, his Royal Highness will be enabled to lay before his Majesty, in the history of these great achievements of the British arms throughout a series of systematic operations, so satisfactory a proof that the national interests and the glory of the British name have been successfully maintained, while his Royal Highness has conducted the Government of the United Kingdom.

KING'S HEALTH.

The following is the official Report of the State of his Majesty's health on Saturday the 6th of July, as presented to the Privy Council by the Queen's Council:

WINDSOR, JULY 6, 1811.

We the underwritten, Members of the Council appointed to assist her Majesty in

the Execution of the trusts committed to her Majesty, by virtue of the statute, passed in the 51st year of his Majesty's reign, intituled, "an Act to provide for the Administration of the Royal Authority, and for the care of his Majesty's Royal Person, during the continuance of his Majesty's illness, and for the resumption of the exercise of the Royal Authority by his Majesty," having duly met together, on the 6th July, 1811, at the Queen's Lodge, near to Windsor Castle, and having called before us, and examined upon oath, the Physicians, and other persons attendant upon his Majesty, and having ascertained the state of his Majesty's health by all such other ways and means as appeared to us to be necessary for that purpose, do hereby declare and certify, that the state of his Majesty's health, at the time of this our meeting, is not such as to enable his Majesty to resume the personal exercise of his Royal functions.—That his Majesty's bodily health is but little disordered.—That, in consequence of an accession of mental disorder, subsequent to our report of the 6th of April last, a change took place in the system of management, which had been previously adopted for his Majesty's cure. His Majesty's mental health is represented to us by all the Physicians as certainly improved since the 6th of April. We are unable, however, to ascertain what would be the effects of an immediate recurrence to any system of management, which should admit of as free an approach to his Majesty's presence, as was allowed in a former period of his Majesty's indisposition.—Some of his Majesty's Physicians do not entertain hopes of his Majesty's recovery quite so confident as those which they had expressed on the 6th of April.—The persuasion of others of his Majesty's Physicians, that his Majesty will completely recover, is not diminished—and they all appear to agree, that there is a considerable probability of his Majesty's final recovery; and that neither his Majesty's bodily health, nor his present symptoms, nor the effect which the disease has yet produced upon his Majesty's faculties, afford any reason for thinking that his Majesty will not ultimately recover.

(Signed) C. CANTUAR.

E. EBOR.

ELDON, MONTROSE,
ELLENBOROUGH, WINCHELSEA,
W. GRANT, AYLESFORD.

A True Copy.

CERTWYND.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE.—*Intelligence from the Armies in Spain.*

(Concluded from p. 96.)

..... At seven at night, at the signal of four bombs at once, five columns darted against the points marked out, crying Vive l'Empereur.—Five thousand men defended the works attacked and the Lower Town. They opposed at first a strong resistance and a very warm fire; but the irresistible impetuosity of the grenadiers overthrew all obstacles in a few minutes. Colonel Bouvier with his column scaled the breach of the bastion of the Chanoines, and pursued the Spaniards to the extremity of the bastion; they tried to stop us at the passage of the drawbridge; a dreadful carnage was made, and the ditches were filled with dead bodies. The curtain was next scaled, and we reached the breach of Fort Royal, where ladders were applied; the enemy had not time to put in play two furnaces under the salient end of the bastion of Chanoines. Capt. Thiebault having carried his small column straight to the end of the half moon, had by that bold movement forced the enemy to abandon it; from thence he joined the first column; the brave fellows dashed into the breach of Fort Royal, the enemy was overthrown, killed, or put to a disorderly flight. The flying were pursued, and at this moment the column of Colonel Bourgeois arrived on the right; the enemy were completely routed and driven under the walls of the Upper Town—we entered the bastion of St. Domingo between the town and the fort; 150 Spaniards were slaughtered, and we remained masters of the bridge, which must ensure the possession of all the rest.—At the same time the column of the Commandant Fondzelski had penetrated into the suburb, breaking down the barricades, and making every thing fly before them, whilst fifty grenadiers, proceeding by the sea-breach, attempted to reach the head of the Jetty; but there a reserve of Sarfield's had been placed to stop us, and a warm and unexpected firing made the attack falter on a sudden. The general disposition of the attack prescribed the entrenching ourselves in the houses, and defending ourselves in them, if the enemy opposed too much fire and too great a resistance. This proceeding was not even necessary. The Colonel of the 117th, Robert, who commanded the right, advanced

immediately by the sea-beach at the head of the reserve, composed of the marksmen and grenadiers of the 9th light, 42d, 114th, 115th, and 121st. His presence alone restored the battle. The enemy, intimidated and unable to retreat, were driven to the sea and the mole; a frightful carnage succeeded; every thing was done by the bayonet; nothing escaped in the suburbs, the port, the houses, ditches, and even to the walls of the town, where Major Douarch and Captain Derigny, with a handful of brave men, pursued in their precipitate retreat the last fugitives that escaped from our blows.—After the first moments of fury were over, General Palombini and Colonel Robert, commanding the trenches, made the necessary dispositions to ensure so brilliant a conquest, placed the troops, and established the posts. I ordered Generals Rognéat and Valee, chiefs of the engineers and artillery, to go over the ground and the works. Colonel Henry made the workmen advance; he made lodgements and communications, perfected the breaches, and profiting by the terror of the enemy, traced and opened on the same night, a first parallel in front of the upper town before Fort Royal, supporting his left at the bastion of Santo Domingo, and prolonging his line to the beach. At day-break, we already presented a formidable appearance to the garrison, intimidated behind their walls, and to the English, useless, but not indifferent spectators of a night so disastrous to them, and their allies. Considerable magazines of cotton, leather, sugar, and other English produce deposited in the lower town were the victims of pillage or the flames. At sight of this, an impotent rage made them forget our bombs and red-hot balls, the fear of which had kept them at a distance since we had established our coast batteries. All their vessels and frigates set sail to run down the coast rapidly from the heights of Fort Francoli to beyond the Port; and in passing by turns before our flank, they poured upon us all their broadsides, inundating our trenches, camps, and the suburbs with a real shower of balls, which scarcely did harm to any body. The garrison, encouraged for a moment by all this noise, dared present some heads of columns; but our soldiers were sheltered in the houses; in a moment they shewed themselves, and were about to precipitate themselves anew upon the enemy, but nothing more was necessary to make the enemy retire. This attempt has been the

last, or the only one, to dispossess us of the lower town, the loss of which must be fatal to Tarragona. From the following night, General Montmarie and Colonel St. Cyr Nugues established by my orders batteries towards the sea, and a second parallel was opened at 60 toises to prepare the attack and the breaching batteries against the body of the place. The capture of the lower town and its dependencies has placed in our possession 80 pieces of cannon, of which I subjoin an account; this makes the number taken 137. The number of prisoners is only 160, among whom are some officers; they are the victims escaped by a kind of miracle from the fury of the soldiers, whom each assault irritates and animates more and more. I have been obliged to burn the dead, as at the capture of Fort Olivo. The amount to this day is 1,553, and every day we discover other bodies. I fear much, if the garrison wait for the assault in their last hold, I shall be forced to set a terrible example, and intimidate for ever Catalonia and Spain by the destruction of a whole city. Our loss in this hot, but rapid action, is only 120 killed, and 372 wounded. But I must observe to your Highness, that the attack of this suburb, crowned by a triple assault, is to be dated ten days back, in which the engineers and artillerymen have suffered daily losses. Several officers have been killed, a great number wounded—I reckon, during the siege, 2,500 men put *hors de combat*. The ardour and good spirit that animates the whole army is redoubled, and we aspire to strike a last blow that shall terminate with *eclat* this long struggle.—[The letter ends with praises bestowed on particular officers.]—(Signed) COUNT SUCHET. Camp before Tarragona, June 26.

<i>Cannon, &c. taken by Assault, June 21.</i>	
Twenty-four pounders	29
Sixteen	9
Twelve	2
Eight	6
Four	3
Three	2
Howitzers, Mortars, and Iron Pieces	29
Total	80

Paris, July 9. Imperial Army of Arragon.
To his Serene Highness the Prince of
Neufchatel, Major-General, &c.

Monseigneur;—I lay at his Majesty's feet the keys of Tarragona, to which, I hope, is attached the speedy submission of Catalonia. A siege of two, or rather three months, conducted in the space of one month, and five successive assaults, have destroyed a garrison of 18,000 men, consisting of the finest troops of Spain, and put into our hands a port from whence the English fed the insurrection of the province in order to preserve a vent for their merchandize. By their multiplied succours they prolonged the defence of the place; at different times they conveyed arms, ammunition, and troops from Valencia, Alicant, and Carthagea. The fury of the soldiers was increased by the resistance of the garrison, who every moment expected its deliverance, and thought to secure success by a general sortie. The fifth assault, still more vigorous than the preceding, made yesterday, in broad day, on the last fortification, has occasioned a horrible massacre, with but little loss on our side. The terrible example which I foresaw with regret in my last report to your Highness has, taken place, and will for a long time be recollected in Spain. Four thousand men have been killed in the city; from 10 to 12,000 men endeavoured to make their escape over the walls into the country; 1,000 have been sabred or drowned; nearly 10,000, 500 of whom are officers, have been made prisoners, and are setting off for France; nearly 1,000 wounded are in the hospitals of the city, where their lives were respected in the midst of the carnage. Three Field Marshals, and the Governor, are among the prisoners; many others among the slain. Twenty stand of colours, 38 pieces of artillery mounted, 40,000 balls and shells, 500,000 weight of powder and lead, are in our possession. I shall immediately forward to your Highness correct returns of all that has been found in the place, and the details of the glorious action, which has crowned the efforts of the army of Arragon, in the province of Catalonia. I shall recommend to his Majesty's favour those brave men who have so valiantly combated. I am, &c. COUNT SUCHET. Head Quarters at Tarragona, June 29.

P. S. Captain Antoine, my Aide-de-Camp, is the bearer of this dispatch, which he will convey to you with all expedition. He shared in all the labours of the siege, was among the foremost who mounted to the assault, and can give your Serene

Highness all the information you may desire. I particularly recommend him to your kind attention, and intreat you to obtain for him from his Majesty the rank of Chef d'Escadron.

(Signed) COUNT SUCHET.

To the above is annexed a certified return of the prisoners taken on the 28th of June. The grand total is 9,781, including 497 officers. Among the latter are mentioned Don Juan Imen de Contrera, Governor General; Bascourt, Sub-chief of the Staff; General Courtin, and two Aides-de-Camp; Cabrer, General of Engineers, and Brigadier Messina.

To his Highness the Prince of Neuchâtel, Major-General, &c.

I had the honour of giving an account to your Highness of all the efforts which I had made to place the army in a state for entering the field, and manœuvring in aid of the army of the south. As I was ignorant of the precise situation of the enemy, I thought it my duty first to approach him, for the purpose of availing myself of circumstances, and also to disguise from him for some time my real intentions. I, therefore, marched my troops on the road of Rodrigo and on that of Placentia, and I advanced in person on the 5th to Rodrigo with the greater part of the cavalry, and a strong advanced guard. I availed myself of this opportunity to throw into Rodrigo a great quantity of supplies, and I set out in the night in the hope of surprising the division of General Crauford, which was cantoned three leagues from Rodrigo. A few hours were sufficient for apprising that General of my arrival at Rodrigo, and he immediately put himself in march to retire beyond the Coa, leaving his cavalry in observation, and abandoning several magazines of provisions. General Montbrun with his cavalry manœuvred against the cavalry of the enemy, pushed them with great vigour, and made some prisoners. I learned that Lord Spencer, who commanded the army in the absence of Lord Wellington, had under his orders three divisions, which were marched from the banks of the Coa as far as Castel Branco. I concluded that a part of these troops was destined to cross to the left bank of the Tagus on the first appearance of their being wanted. I resolved upon a rapid march; I sent orders to General Regnier to set out from Fuente Roblé and Los Santos, where he was with two divisions, to march upon Banos and Placentia.

The bridge-equipage, on which I reckoned in order to cross the Tagus, not having yet arrived from Madrid, my march was delayed; in the mean time, its arrival was a matter of urgency, for all the reports announced that Badajoz was attacked with great vigour; that three breaches had been made; that two assaults had been already given, and that the enemy wished, cost what it would, to make themselves masters of that important city. Whatever were the obstacles which arose from circumstances, we used so much diligence, that my advanced guard arrived at Merida on the evening of the 17th, where it joined the posts of the army of the south. On the morning of the 18th, the duke of Dalmatia and myself concerted the necessary measures for driving the enemy from his entrenched positions at Albuera, and relieving Badajoz; but the enemy retired in all haste, re-crossed the Guadiana, and re-entered Portugal, without its being in our power to come up with him. It is vexatious that he did not dare to await us, for a signal victory would have infallibly marked our arrival in these regions. We entered Badajoz yesterday, where, we were able to perceive with our own eyes, what vigour General Philippon the Governor, and his brave garrison, had exerted in the defence of that fortress, and how much their conduct was worthy of praise. —I cannot refrain from praising the excellent spirit which has animated the army during a long and painful march, under a burning sun and amidst many privations: but it would be difficult to expect too many proofs of zeal for the service of his Majesty, from the brave regiments which compose the army of Portugal. —I have the honour, &c.

The Marshal Duke of Ragusa.

Badajoz, June 21.

*To his Highness the Prince of Neufchatel,
Major-General, &c.*

Monseigneur, —I hasten to inform your Highness, that the fortress of Badajoz is relieved, and that the troops which besieged it have retired into the interior of Portugal, to join the rest of the Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish army, commanded by Lord Wellington, who has taken the same direction. —On the 12th inst. I set out from Llerena with the troops of the army of the South, which I had caused to be united; General Count D'Erlon, who, I knew, must join me two days after, followed the movement; the head of his

column arrived on the 13th at Usagre, where was the 5th corps; I advanced upon Los Santos, where I found myself in the midst of the establishments of the enemy's army. On the 15th I took a position at Fuente del Maestre; on the 17th at Almendralejo, from whence on the 18th I communicated with the imperial army of Portugal, of which the advanced guard had arrived at Merida; and the same day I concerted with Marshal the Duke of Ragusa the ulterior movements of the two armies. —On the 19th we were informed that the siege of Badajoz was raised, and that the enemy had abandoned his position at Albuera, evacuated Olivenza, and was withdrawing his troops to the right bank of the Guadiana, on the side of Elvas. In the afternoon of the same day the army made a movement in advance, and I received a letter from General Philippon, Governor of Badajoz, which confirmed the retreat of the enemy; on the 20th our troops arrived on the Guadiana, before Olivenza, and at Badajoz; the army of Portugal manoeuvred by the right bank, and took the road of Talavera; the army of the South defiled by Santa Martha and the Albuera, while a column advanced along the mountains upon the left. The cavalry of the two armies is to day in reconnaissance upon Villaviciosa, Elvas, and in front of Campo Mayor, in order to ascertain the movements and dispositions of the enemy. Upon the report which they shall give, I shall decide, with the Duke of Ragusa, as to the ulterior operations which the army of Portugal and that of the South will attempt. —The junction of the two armies on the banks of the Guadiana is one of the most marked events of the war of Spain; it will be in its consequences of the greatest effect for the benefit of the service of the Emperor; its first result has been the preservation of Badajoz; the southern provinces of Spain are also entirely relieved on the side of Portugal, and tranquillity, which was for a moment disturbed on several points, is re-establishing. The Duke of Ragusa and myself meant to give battle to the enemy; but Lord Wellington has prudently retired before we could come up with him: yet his forces amounted to 60,000 men; of whom 30,000 were English, comprehending the two divisions of General Spencer, which he had withdrawn from the north, 14,000 Portuguese, and 16,000 Spaniards: he had in this number 5,000 cavalry. —It is vexatious that a general affair has not

taken place; the event would not have been uncertain; but it is to be hoped, that an opportunity will offer itself.—I must now give your Highness an account of the situation in which we found Badajoz, and of the glorious defence of its brave garrison. The General of Brigade, Philippon, who commanded as Governor, has had the rare merit of creating for himself means, and of rendering serviceable for its defence all that there were of Frenchmen in Badajoz; while with a vigorous hand he kept down the inhabitants, and employed them even on the works of the fortifications, which were incessantly improving. I shall soon have the honour of sending your Highness a copy of the journal of the siege; at present I can only notice the principal transactions, and by you to represent to the Emperor, General Philippon as deserving the fruits of his good opinion. I have the honour to ask for him the title of Count, and a suitable endowment; I shall also solicit rewards for other military men of all ranks, who have distinguished themselves by brilliant exploits.—On the 16th of May, the day of the battle which I fought with the allied army, at Albuera, nine days had already expired since the trenches were opened by the enemy before Badajoz, and six days since the fire against the place had commenced.—On the evening of the 15th the besiegers withdrew all their troops, and united them to their other force at Albuera; they did not re-appear till the 19th. During their absence, General Philippon rased the whole of the works which they had constructed, and brought within the fortress the platforms and fascines which he found there; he even took some convoys from the enemy, who were arranging matters for restoring the works of the siege; but they did not, the second time, open the trenches till the night of the 30th of May. The fire against the place recommenced on the 3d of June, and continued without interruption till the raising of the siege. On the 6th, three breaches were already made, one in the body of the place, and two in Fort San Christoval; the first in front of the Castle, between Trinity bastion and the Guadiana, to the left of the half-moon San Roque; but General Philippon immediately set to work to escarp it, and ordered an entrenchment to be made in the solid ground of the Castle; this last

measure was perfectly understood, the enemy made only a false attack on this point.—At Fort San Christoval there was only one practicable breach in the night of the 7th: 1,500 English threw themselves into the ditch of the fort, applied their ladders, and attempted the assault; thrice they returned to the charge; 75 brave fellows, commanded by Captain Chauvin, of the 88th, steadily repulsed them, and inflicted on them very great loss; we had some soldiers wounded with thrusts of the bayonet on the height of the breach; the success was complete; the dead, the wounded, and the ladders, remained in the ditch.—On the following days, the enemy continued his fire on the fort, and endeavoured to enlarge the breach. In the night of the 10th, 2,000 English presented themselves anew, to give the assault. Capt. Jondiou, of the 21st regiment of light-infantry, commanded at San Christoval: his garrison consisted of 140 men, every soldier had four loaded muskets by his side; General Philippon had ordered to be placed a great quantity of charged bombs on the parapets, of which Serjeant Brette, of the 5th regiment of artillery, had the direction; (this soldier had before distinguished himself at the first assault of San Christoval.) Already the enemy had applied 40 ladders, the head of their column had reached the height of the breach; Serjeant Brette calls out "Captain, shall we blow up the first mine?" The bombs and grenades descend, exploding they break the ladders, and spread death and dismay among the enemy; while, with the bayonet, the garrison drive them down to the bottom of the breach; in an instant the ditches were filled with dead and wounded, among whom were several English officers; in this confusion some English officers demanded succour; the brave Jondiou ordered them to refit a ladder, and ascend into the fort, where they should surrender as prisoners. This was accordingly done. At day-breaking the enemy's General wrote to General Philippon, demanding a truce of three hours, in order to carry off the wounded, who remained in the ditch or under the fire of the fort. The demand was acceded to. The loss of the English in this affair exceeded 600 men; we had not 10 men rendered unfit for service.

(To be continued.)

"The true way of convincing your enemy, that his war upon your finances will be useless, is, to state explicitly to the world, that you are not at all afraid of the consequences of a national bankruptcy; for, while you endeavour to make people believe, that such an event cannot possibly happen, they will certainly think, that you regard it, if it should happen, as irretrievable ruin and destruction; and, therefore, as you never can quite overcome their apprehensions, the best way is to be silent upon the subject, or to set the terrific bugbear at defiance."—POLITICAL REGISTER, 18th June, 1803.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS
IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XXIX.

What is to be the end of all this?—Paper-Money is not the cause of Sunshine and Showers—We may exist without Paper-Money—England did very well before Paper-Money was heard of—What is to become of the Fundholders—The Sale of the Royal Plate and of the Church Property in Austria—Let what will happen in England the Jacobins and Levellers will not merit any Share of the Blame—Conclusion.

GENTLEMEN,

WHAT, then, is to be the end of all this? What are to be the ultimate effects produced upon the nation by this depreciation of the paper money? The *PITTITE* party tell us, that there is not gold to be had; that the Bank cannot pay in gold; and that the matter must be left to better times and to better fortune. The other party tell us, that, if they had the power of adopting what measures they pleased, they would cause the Bank to pay again in gold; that they would restore the paper to its former estimation; and, in short, retrieve the whole system. I have, I think, shown you very clearly, that, to cause the Bank to pay again in gold is impossible; and that, let what will happen, let what will take place as to commerce, or as to war, the Bank Paper will never regain any part of what it has lost, as long as the national debt shall exist; or, rather, as long as

the dividends shall be paid upon the interest of that Debt.

Now, if I have shown this to your satisfaction, the question, and the only question, that remains to be discussed, is, what would be the CONSEQUENCES of a cessation in the payment of the dividends; that is to say, the total destruction of the national Debt; the total breaking up of the Funds and the Bank Note system. This is the only question that now remains to be discussed; but a very important question it is, and one which, I hope, will receive your patient attention.

To hear the greater part of people talk upon this subject, one would imagine, that the Bank Notes were the meat, drink, and clothing of the inhabitants of this island; and, indeed, that they gave us sun-shine and showers and every thing necessary to our existence. One would really suppose, that the general creed was, that the Bank Directors were the Gods of the country, that they were our Sustainers if not actually our Makers, that from them we derived the breath in our nostrils, that in and through them we lived, moved, and had our being. No wonder, then, that there should be an apprehension and even a horror inspired by the idea of a total destruction of the paper-money; no wonder, that, when I began, about eight years and a half ago, to write against the Funding System, I should have been regarded as guilty of blasphemy, and should have been accused thereof by that devout man, MR. SHERIDAN; no wonder that some men's knees should knock together and their teeth chatter in their head upon being told, that the day is, probably, not far distant, when a guinea, a real golden guinea, will buy a hundred pound's worth of three per cents.

But, Gentlemen, is there any ground for these apprehensions? Are such apprehen-

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sions to be entertained by *rational* men? No: the corn and the grass and the trees will grow without paper-money; the Banks may all break in a day, and the sun will rise the next day, and the lambs will gambol, and the birds will sing and the carters and country girls will grin at each other and all will go on just as if nothing had happened.

"Yes," says some besotted Pittite, "we do not suppose, that the destruction of the paper-system would put out the light of the sun, prevent vegetation, or disable men and women to propagate their species: we are not fools enough to suppose that." Pray, then, *what* are you fools enough to suppose? *What* are you fools enough to be afraid of? For, if the destruction of the paper produces, and is calculated to produce, none of these effects, how can it be a thing to excite any very general apprehension? *Who* would it hurt? "Oh! it would create universal uproar and confusion: it would destroy all property; it would introduce anarchy and bloodshed, and would annihilate regular government, social order, and our holy religion." These are the words that JOHN BOWLES, the Dutch Commissioner, used to make use of. This is the declamatory cant, by the means of which the people of this country have been deceived and deluded along from one stage of ruin to another, till, at last, they have arrived at what they now taste of. If, when JOHNNY BOWLES, or any of his tribe, had been writing in this way, a plain tradesman, who gets his living by fair dealing and who has no desire to share in the plunder of the public, had gone to the writer, and, taking him fast by the button, had said to him: "Come, come! tell me, in definite terms, what you mean, and show me *how* I should be a loser by this thing that you appear so much to dread." None of your rant; none of your horrid flying descriptions; but, come, JOHN, tell me *HOW* I should be made worse off in this world, and *HOW* I should be more exposed to go to hell, if that which you appear to dread were actually to take place:" if any such man had so addressed this Treasury scribe, the scribe would have been puzzled much more than he was by his per cents about the Dutch Commission.

Why, Gentlemen, should the total destruction of the paper-money produce any

of these effects? Why should it destroy all property; why produce bloodshed; why destroy our holy religion? I have before told you, that the paper-money was unknown in England, till within about 107 years. England did very well before that time. The people of England were brave and free, happy at home and dreaded abroad, long before paper-money was heard of. Why, then, should they now believe, that, without paper-money, they would be reduced to a state of barbarism and slavery? The Church, as it is now established, existed long before paper-money was thought of, and so did all those laws, which we yet boast of as the great bulwarks of our freedom; and, what is more, I defy any man to shew me one single law, in favour of the liberties of the people, which has been passed since the establishment of the Paper-Money System, while numerous laws have been passed hostile to those liberties. Before the existence of the National Debt and the Bank, the House of Commons used frequently to refuse to grant the money called for by the Crown; since they have existed, no grant of the kind has ever been refused by that House. Before the Paper System existed, there was no standing army in England; before the Paper System existed, there were not more than two hundred thousand paupers in England and Wales: there are now twelve hundred thousand.

Why, then, should we alarm ourselves at what appears to indicate the approaching destruction of this System? "Oh, but," says the Minister (Perceval), "without the Paper System we could not have had the victories recently won in Spain and Portugal:" to which he might have added the achievements at Quiberon, at Dunkirk, at the Helder, at Ferrol, at Buenos Ayres, in Hanover, in Leon and Galicia, at Corunna, at Walcheren, &c. &c. The list might be swelled out to three times this length; but this is long enough. If what the Minister calls the "recent victories" are the fruit of the Paper System, so are all the achievements to which I have here called your recollection. Indeed they were so; for, the wars themselves proceeded from the same source. The American war grew out of the Paper System; and so did the Anti-jacobin war, which began in 1793, and which has finally produced the state of things which we now have before us. So

that, as to the use of the Paper System in this way, there can, I think, be very little doubt.

"Well, but, after all," some one will say, "*what is to become of the Fundholder?*" "How is he to get re-paid?" My answer to this is, that, it does not appear to be a matter in which the people, I mean the mass of the nation, have much to do or to say. For, what is the Fundholder or Stockholder? Why, he is a man, who, choosing a large rather than a small interest for his money, has lent it to some persons in power, under an agreement, that he shall be paid interest upon it out of the taxes raised upon the people. A man, who lends money, knows, of course, or, at least, he ought to know, the *sufficiency of the borrower*; or, if he does not know that, he, of course, takes the risk into his calculation; and he can have no right to complain if the chances should happen to turn up against him. Upon this principle SIR JOHN MITFORD (now Lord Redesdale) went in defending the first Bank Restriction Bill, when, in answer to those who contended, that it would be a *breach of faith* to compel the Fundholder to take payment in paper, he said, that the Fundholder, *when he lent his money, knew that a case like this might happen*, and that, therefore, he had no reason to complain. Till I read this, I thought that I was the only one who had held the doctrine, so that my satisfaction at seeing my opinions corroborated by such high legal authority was somewhat diminished by the reflection, that I had lost what I had deemed my undivided claim to originality.

I do not, however, see any reason why the Fundholders, or, at least, that part of them, who have been compelled to suffer their property to be thus vested, should not, in any case, have a just compensation. And how? Whence is this compensation to come? In Austria, our old and faithful and august ally, the Emperor, is acting the part of a very honest man. The paper-money in Austria has fallen to a fourteenth part of its nominal value, in spite of several *Edicts prohibiting the passing of it for less than its nominal value*. A hundred florins in silver was worth fourteen hundred and fifty three florins in paper when the last advices came away; and, perhaps, one florin in silver, is, by this time, worth fifty florins in paper. Of course the government creditors, or Austrian Fundholders, must be ruined, unless something be done to ob-

tain a compensation for them. The Emperor, therefore, like an honest man, has, as the news-papers tell us, sent all his plate, all his gold and silver, in whatever shape, to the mint to be melted down and turned into coin for the payment of the people who have lent him and his government their money. And, besides this, the Clergy, animated by a zeal for their sovereign truly worthy of example, *have given up their estates to be sold for the same honest purpose*, which, doubtless, they have been the more disposed to do, when they reflected, that the debts of the government were incurred in carrying on a war for "regular government, social order, and their holy religion," and in the producing and prolonging of which war they themselves had so great a hand, as well as in persecuting all those who were opposed to the system. Accordingly, we see accounts in the public prints of the SALES OF CHURCH LANDS going on in Austria. They are said to sell remarkably well*; and, it is stated, that, these sales together with the meltings of the Royal Plate will yield enough to satisfy all the Government Creditors; or, at least, to afford them the means of living beyond the reach of misery.

But, methinks, I see start forth a Courtier on one side of me and a Parson on the other, and, with claws distended ready to lay hold of my cheeks, exclaim: "What, cold-blooded wretch, are these, then, your means of compensation for the *English Fundholder?*" Softly! softly! Give me time to speak. Do not tear my eyes out before you hear what I have to say. Stop a little, and I will tell you what I mean.

* VIENNA, JULY 6.—"A second sale of ecclesiastical estates will soon take place. On the 23d will be sold, the estate of Keixendorf; and on the 24th, those of St. George and Baumgarten. As there are many competitors, the sums produced by these sales has greatly surpassed what the lands were estimated at. The body of merchants in this city published, some days since, a memoir in their defence, against the charges objected to them, of having contributed to the depreciation of the paper money. The memoir has been transmitted to the Minister of Finance, and presented to his Majesty the Emperor."

Now, why should you be in such a rage with me? If I were to propose that the same should be done here as is now doing in Austria, what would there be, in my proposition, injurious to either the station or character of the *king* or the *clergy*? Am I to suppose, that the Crown depends upon the possession of a parcel of *plate* by the king and Royal Family; that a throne, the seat of kingly power, is supported by a waggon load, perhaps, of gold and silver dishes and plates and spoons and knives and forks and salvers and candlesticks and sauce boats and tea-pots and cream-jugs? Good heavens! what a vile opinion must they have of the throne, who look upon such things as tending to its support! And, then, as to the Church, what could her sons wish for more earnestly than an opportunity of giving us a proof of their disregard of things temporal? Besides, there would be, in this case, a striking proof of the truth of the good maxim, that "Justice, though *slow*, is *sure*;" for, it is well known, that the Paper System, which would thus draw upon the Church, was the invention of A BISHOP of that same Church!

But, the Courtiers and the Clergy may be tranquil; for I do not think it at all likely that such measures will become necessary in England, though they have been adopted at Vienna, and, as would seem, with such singular success. I am of opinion, that there would be found ample means, *elsewhere*, for a due compensation to those Fundholders, who had been compelled to vest their property in that way. In short, I am quite satisfied, that we have nothing at all to fear from the destruction of the paper-system if that should take place; and, as the friends of the system assert, that we have nothing to fear from its continuing to exist, we are, I think, tolerably safe. The RUIN of *America* and *France* were foretold because their paper-money was falling; but, the prophecy proved false. They were both victorious; both became prosperous; and, what is odd enough, both have since become receptacles of the coin that is gone from England; aye, from that country, who hoped to triumph over them by the means of that same coin! How many times did PITT predict the time when France would be what he called *exhausted*, and how was he hallooed on by his numerous understrappers of all sorts, verbally as well as in print! Has she been ruined? Has she

lost in population or in power? Is she exhausted? Has she become feeble? We are still struggling with her; and do we find her grow weaker and weaker?

Well, then, this doctrine of RUIN from a depreciated paper-money is a false doctrine. It was engendered in a shallow brain, and brought forth by arrogant emptiness. But, suppose it to be sound as applied to us; suppose, for arguments' sake, that the destruction of the paper system should take place, and should prove the utter ruin of the country; or, suppose, at any rate, that it should send all the Fundholders into beggary, should cause all the Church and Collegiate property to be sold as in Austria, should send the Royal Plate to the Mint, should annihilate all the remaining feudal rights and tenures; and, in short, should produce a species of revolution. I say, that it need do none of this: I say, that not one of these is a necessary consequence of the overthrow of the paper system: but, for arguments' sake, *suppose* the contrary, and suppose that such overthrow were to take place; WHO, in that case, would be to blame?

This is a question that every man ought, as soon as may be, to answer in his own mind; for, if any of these consequences were to come upon us, it would be of the greatest utility to be able to say, at once, who it was that had been the real authors of the calamity. Certainly, then, the Reformers, commonly called Jacobins and Levellers, have had nothing to do with the matter. They have had no power. They have been carefully shut out from all authority. They have filled no offices of any sort. They have been held forth as a sort of enemy in the bosom of the country. There is no creature who has had power, of any sort, no matter what, who has not employed that power upon them. They have been either killed, banished, ruined, or, at the least, beaten down and kept down. Well, then, they will not come in for any of the blame, if things should turn out wrong at last. They have had no hand in declaring war against the regicides of France; they have had no hand in forming leagues, in voting subsidies, in sending out expeditions; they have had no hand in making loans or grants; and, therefore, they will, surely, not come in for any share of the blame which shall attach to the consequences. They have been re-

presented as an ignorant and factious herd, a "*low, degraded crew*;" while those who have thus described them have had all the powers and the resources of the country at their command; and, therefore, let what will happen, the Reformers will have to bear no portion of the blame. The full-blooded Anti-Jacobins; the members of the Pitt Club; all the numerous herd of the enemies to Reform may be fairly called upon for a share of the responsibility; but, to the Reformers, who have had no power, and who have been hardly able to exist in peace, no man can reasonably look.

I shall now, Gentlemen, after nearly a twelvemonth's correspondence, take my leave of you, and with the conviction, that I have done much towards giving you a clear view of the subject, of which I have been treating. I had long entertained the design to make the subject familiar; to put my countrymen in general beyond the reach of deception on this score; to enable them to avoid being cheated, if they chose to avoid it; and a sufficiency of time for the purpose being furnished me, it would have been greatly blameable in me, if I had neglected to avail myself of it: I have not been guilty of this neglect; I have, with great care and research, brought together what appears to me to be the whole, or very nearly the whole, of the useful information relating to the paper system; I have laboured most zealously and anxiously for the accomplishment of the great object in view; and it more than repays me for every thing to hear, to see, to know, that *I have not laboured in vain*.

In the course of these Letters, I have clearly expressed my opinions as to the fate of the paper-money: those opinions are in direct opposition to many of those persons, in parliament as well as out of parliament, who have delivered their sentiments upon the subject: TIME, the trier of all things, must now decide between us; and, if I am wrong, I have, at least, taken effectual means to make my error as conspicuous and as notorious as possible. One thing, above all others, however, I am desirous of leaving strongly impressed upon your minds, and that is, that it is my decided opinion, that, let what will be the fate of the paper-money, that fate, however destructive, does not necessarily include any, even the smallest, danger to the independence of England, or

to the safety of the throne, or to the liberties or the happiness of the people.

I remain, Gentlemen,

Your friend

and obedient Servant,

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,

Friday, 2nd August, 1811.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALAVERA'S WARS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.—(*Continued from page 82.*) There are two facts, connected with this subject, which, by the daily prints, have been passed over almost in silence: I allude to the removal, or movement, of GENERAL GRAHAM and MARSHAL BERESEFORD. The former, we see, is arrived in the army of Lord Talavera, where he is said to be second in command, the post which Marshal Beresford held before; and the latter is gone to Lisbon to form new corps of Portuguese Troops.—After what we had been before told, this seems, and must seem, somewhat surprising; for, in cases such as we had been led to suppose to exist with regard to these two officers, it would, one would think, have been natural for both to remain where they had achieved so much glory; glory, in each case, sufficient to entitle them to the thanks of the two Houses of Parliament.—I shall leave these facts, however, to the reflection of the reader, contenting myself with having merely pointed them out; but, at the same time, I cannot refrain from just observing, that there does appear to have been something of a disagreeable nature happened between our commander and the Spaniards respecting the Battle of Barrosa. Indeed, I have now before me a publication that contains proof of this. It is entitled: "A Reply to the Statement of GENERAL GRAHAM's Letter of the 24th of March, 1811, on General LA PENA's Manifesto and Representation to the Cortes. By GENERAL LACY." This paper, which has been printed, in the form of a pamphlet, by VOGEL AND SCHULZE, No. 13, Poland Street, Oxford Street, is a very elaborate and very able performance, and, as a literary production, at least, it certainly discovers great superiority over the Letter of General Graham. I have read it with all the attention I am master of; and, if its facts be true, the Spaniard has, unquestionably, the best of the dispute; and, of this opinion every one will be, I am satisfied, who will take

the pains to read the publication.—To return to our army on the confines of Portugal, the reader will see, by the subjoined official papers, what its movements have been since the raising of the siege of Badajoz, of which we must now say a few words. On the 6th of June VISCOUNT TALAYERA informs us (see pages 32 and 50) that the siege is going on in a very prosperous way, under his own eye; and, at the time when this dispatch arrived, the newspapers assured us, that the place could not hold out more than *ten days*, and that, then, all that part of the country would be swept clean of the enemy's troops. Seven days after this, however, another dispatch (see p. 54,) gives us an account of the *actual raising of the siege*, and of the loss sustained in two attempts to storm an out-work, called St. Christoval, in which a breach had been made.—This storming attracted my attention, and I cannot help thinking the circumstances very curious. There was, it seems, a *breach* made, and a detachment sent to storm; but, at each time, when they arrived at the edge of the ditch, they found it *emptied*, and could not mount the rampart, though they had ladders with them for the purpose.—This appears to me very strange; for, if a breach was made, the same battery which made it could still have played upon it, if any attempt had been made to clear out the ditch. Besides, if the ditch was *cleared out*, the materials must have been thrown up on one side or on the other of the ditch, and, of course, this *must have been perceived by the besiegers*, who, in that case, ought not to have attempted the storm. But, it appears, that they found the ditch emptied a *second time*, a thing wholly unaccountable, after the warning they had before received. It does, however, appear to me passing strange, that our batteries, by which a breach deemed practicable had been made, should have *allowed* the enemy to clear out the ditch. To clear out the ditch of a fortification is no trifling affair; it requires much time and numerous workmen; and as the rubbish must have been thrown up on the one side or the other, the operation must have been visible, and, of course, might (one would think at least) have been put an end to, in a moment, by the same batteries that had made the breach.—This emptying the ditch does, therefore, I must confess, puzzle me very much; nor can I account for it unless upon the supposition, that the French work by witchcraft, or by

supernatural means of some sort or other; and, at any rate, the *second attempt* at storming an impracticable breach must, I think, be regarded as an occurrence, under such circumstances, extremely rare, if not without an equal in the annals of modern warfare.—The Duke of DALMATIA has, through the French newspapers, given us his account of this siege. He tells us, that there were *three practicable breaches* (see p. 127), one in the body of the place, and two in the out-work St. Christoval. But, he says, one of the latter was rendered *impracticable* by the *clearing out of the ditch* and by an interior entrenchment; and that our assaults were attempted at the *other breach* in this out-work, which does, indeed, seem very probable. The two attempts were made, he says, on the 7th and on the 10th of June. The first with 1,500 men, who, according to his own account, behaved very gallantly, but who were repulsed with great loss. In the night of the 10th, he says, the English renewed the assault with 2,000 men, the garrison of St. Christoval consisting of only 140 Frenchmen; that every soldier had *four loaded muskets* by his side; that a vast quantity of *charged bombs* had been placed on the parapets; that the English had applied 40 ladders at the head of their column, and were mounting the breach, when the bombs and grenades were thrown down amongst them, and, exploding, broke the ladders and spread death and dismay amongst the assailants, while, with the bayonet, the garrison drove them down to the bottom of the breach; the ditch, he says, was filled with killed and wounded; that, in this confusion, some English officers demanded succour, and that they were made to ascend their own ladders, now refitted, in order to surrender to the commandant as prisoners of war. He says, that we lost 600 men in this affair, that we begged a truce of three hours to carry off our wounded, and the French *did not lose ten men*.—That this was a most bloody and disastrous affair no one can doubt; and, there can be as little doubt that the French General has omitted nothing favourable to the besieged; but, the story about the English Officers, at the head of 2,000 men, *begging for quarter* from 140 men is not, I hope, to be believed for one single moment; and especially, that they condescended to *refit their own ladders* for the purpose of ascending into the fortress, *there to surrender themselves prisoners of war!* Yet, there does, from LORD TALAYERA'S

account appear, that there were three officers *missing*, a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign; but, let us hope, that they actually mounted the breach, got upon the ramparts, and were made prisoners there.—There is one omission in the account of Lord Talavera, which is, indeed, common to all his accounts of battles; and that is, the *number of men* employed in the enterprize is not stated. It appears that the storming party was composed of men taken from sixteen or seventeen battalions; but it does not, any where, say, how many men. Two thousand men is a great number for such an undertaking; and it is certain, that, at the mouth of a breach a small number of men, with such means as the French appear to have prepared, would be sufficient to keep back, for a time at least, almost any force; but, still it does appear something wonderful that, the carnage should have been so dreadful, if the number of the enemy was really so small. It would be very desirable to ascertain the numbers employed by our General upon this occasion. But something still more desirable would be, such information as should enable us to judge of the prudence of making the attempt. The Duke of Dalmatia says, however, that the breach was *practicable*, and, as the attempt was made, it is evident that Lord Talavera thought it was practicable; but, then, the question comes, *how came that attempt to fail?* The reader will recollect, with regard to this Town, that it cost the Duke of Dalmatia, a few months ago, less than a week to take it from the Spaniards; and, he will also recollect, the disapprobation of the conduct of the Spaniards expressed by Lord Talavera upon that occasion. But, certainly, from every account, Badajoz is not a place calculated to make a very stout resistance against an army well supplied and ably commanded. I do not say, that it was possible to take the Town before the French army came up; but, this is pretty evident, that, if there was not a moral certainty of taking it, the siege should never have been attempted; because, to commence the siege and abandon it at the approach of a French army was the strongest proof that it was possible to give of a consciousness of inferiority of force on our side; and the reader cannot fail to have perceived, that this abandonment of Badajoz has produced an effect more depressing than any which has been produced by the former untoward events of the campaign.—It was easy to perceive from the moment that

our army got to Almeida, that its retreat from that point must be very speedy; and, for this event, though at the expence of an infinite quantity of abuse, I endeavoured to prepare the public; but I believe that my endeavours were totally useless. One could meet with scarcely a man, who did not look upon it, that the French were in a state of humiliation and disgrace, an opinion which derived much strength from the journey of Massena and King Joseph to France, which journey was looked upon as a *flight* and which flight was looked upon as the fore-runner of a total evacuation of the peninsula by the French, who it was confidently asserted in almost all our news-papers, were preparing to collect the whole of their troops on the north of the *river Ebro*; that is to say, on the confines of France! This assertion and assertions similar to it, were scarcely dry from the press in England, when we heard of the battle near Almeida, which was immediately followed by what has told for the French more than any victory in the field could have told, namely, that wonderful exploit, the evacuation of Almeida by BRENNIER, which exploit not to envy the enemy is impossible. This was immediately followed by a movement on the part of the enemy which compelled Lord Talavera to fly to the assistance of Marshal Beresford; but he came too late, the battle of Albuera had been fought, the army had lost many thousands, in killed wounded and prisoners, and the siege of Badajoz which the French had raised by giving that battle, had, now, to be recommenced with numerous disadvantages.—This siege was going on in the manner we have seen, when the enemy, that same enemy whom the good people of England looked upon as humbled and disgraced, and whom our venal prints described as hastening from all parts towards the north of the Ebro, was found, all at once, to be pouring down towards Badajoz, five hundred miles in the opposite direction, driving, in their way, the remains of our army out from near Almeida, and in a few days raising the siege of Badajoz, and compelling our whole army to re-enter Portugal to place itself on the great road towards the lines of Torres Vedras.—In this situation the armies now are, re-inforcements being daily arriving from England, while, on the other hand, the French appear to be collecting together at that point all the troops they can spare from other quarters.—How long our general will be able to maintain this

position, I cannot pretend to say; but, supposing him to remain where he is; supposing him to lose not another inch of ground during this campaign, what has been *gained*, I should like to know, since he last quitted the lines of Torres Vedras; this is a question which I put to all those who extolled so highly the pursuit of Massena, and especially to all those, who, like Mr. Whitbread, read their recantation with respect to the war in Portugal. What has been *gained*, then, I say, since our army last quitted the lines of Torres Vedras? I am not one of those who delight in dwelling upon the numbers of *killed* and *wounded*, and who speak of men killed in battle as men that are murdered. He who enters the army knows that his *business* is to fight, and, if necessary, to die. But, one cannot help reflecting on the number of deaths which this campaign has already occasioned; one cannot help reflecting on the number of our countrymen whom it has sent to the grave, and the far greater number that it may have disabled for life, or subjected to great bodily sufferings; and, so reflecting, one cannot help asking what has been *gained* by all this; and, to put this question those especially are entitled who have constantly endeavoured to convince their readers that the species of warfare carried on in Portugal was not calculated to insure ultimate benefit.—For my part, I never could see, in the retreat of Massena, any thing favourable to the English army, nor any thing for that army to be proud of, especially as that same English army, under that same commander, had, not nine months before retreated over nearly the same distance of ground before that same French army, with that same Massena at its head, with this difference only in the circumstances, that our army had in the interim received most abundant supplies, while that of the French, according to our own account, had been able to receive no supplies at all. In the pursuit of Massena, I saw no official account of prisoners taken. I saw none of the usual indications of defeat or dispersion. I saw them moving back, indeed, but I saw them constantly ready to turn about, and I could not persuade myself that there were any real grounds for that exultation, which so generally prevailed, and, for not joining in which I was so atrociously abused.—There is, however, nothing rare in this: it has been but too often my lot to experience abuse when I ought to have received thanks; for certainly if any

office of a public writer is more useful to his country than all others put together, it is that of checking the too sanguine expectations of the people. Indeed, there is one and but one safe rule of conduct for him to pursue, and that is, to speak the truth (*as far as he dares*) upon every subject with which he thinks proper to meddle, let it please or displease whom it may.

• IMPOSTOR PAPER.—Amongst all the symptoms of mortality, which corruption has exhibited of late years, there is none more strong than the *impotence*, to which it is constantly resorting. Some months ago, "the most thinking people" were incessantly plied with *intercepted letters* from Spain and Portugal, containing the most distressing accounts of the state of the French armies. Some of these letters purported to be written by KING JOSEPH to his brother the Emperor, in which the former complained to the latter of the perilous situation, in which he had placed him. In short, there has not been, for many years past, one week without some attempt of this sort, for the purpose of cheating this "most thinking people." The other day, when the venal press was compelled to confess that Lord Talavera had raised the siege of Badajoz, and had, in fact, retreated before that enemy, whom, it was confidently predicted but a few days before, that he would speedily attack and overthrow; when the venal writers were compelled to confess this, they did, as they always do in like cases, fabricate some most bare-faced falsehoods for the purpose of breaking the effect of their bad news. Upon this occasion they fabricated two falsehoods: one was, "*glorious news from the Mediterranean!*" And then followed an account of a great victory over a French fleet, with the capture of nine eighths of the line. The other falsehood was, that General Blake, who, with his Spanish army, had quitted Lord Talavera, had proceeded towards Seville, and having been joined by General Graham from Cadiz, had entered Seville and there captured an immense quantity of provisions and military stores.—No sea fight has there been; General Blake has not moved an inch toward Seville; and General Graham was, at the time when this lie was fabricated in England, actually landed in Portugal, and proceeding, as we have been since informed, to take a command in the army of Lord Talavera.—It must have been known, to those who fabricated, or who abetted the fabricating, these false-

hoods, that they must soon be detected; but, it was also well known, to them, that they would *amuse* the public, for the space of twelve or sixteen hours; that doubts would be excited by them, in the minds of some men; that hopes would be excited in the minds of others; that, at any rate, they would give rise to conversation, *make a talk*, and that, thus, for a day or two the attention of people would be withdrawn from the movements recently made, by Lord Talavera; and, when two or three days were got over, in this manner the public would be brought back, by degrees, to the situation of our own army. — No shame have these vile hirelings upon being detected in such falsehoods: to lie is their trade, and they are no more ashamed of that trade, than a carpenter is of making a door. — I now proceed to notice shortly the imposture which I had in my eye in the outset of this article. It made its appearance in the *Courier News*-paper of the 30th instant, and thence it was copied into the other daily papers. It is called a *French state paper*, and is said to have reached England in this manner: having been written by the Duke of CADORE to the French minister resident at PETERSBURGH, it was given, by that minister, to the Russian government, who gave a copy of it to the American minister at St. PETERSBURGH, MR. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, who sent a copy of it to his government, and one to his father, through the latter of whom, it found its way into a NEW YORK news-paper, called the NEW YORK ADVERTISER, dated 24th of June, and by the means of that paper, it found its way to England. This is the story of the *Courier*. — The paper itself has all the internal proofs of being a fabrication; it bears about it all the marks of imposture; every sentence tells the man of discernment that the paper was written in England, and was sent to America, in the same manner as the *Impostor Pamphlet* was about eighteen or twenty months ago, by the hands of a poor creature of the name of WALSH. — In a future number I shall insert the paper of which I am now speaking, and, then, I shall, I think, be able pretty clearly to show not only the object but the origin of it. In the mean while I shall point out one circumstance that can leave no doubt whatever as to the fact of its being a fabrication. The paper is dated on the 30th of October 1801. Dates are troublesome things, when men have to tell falsehoods. In this paper, it is

said, that the King of England was, by the factions, forced to leave unpunished a political agent who deserved to be impeached for disobeying and disregarding his instructions. In a note, it is said, that MR. ESKINE is meant here. The paper goes on to say that the factions have forced the King to leave *unrewarded* another political agent, whose firmness, and whose obedience to the orders of his Sovereign, exposed him to public insult and personal dangers. In a note this is said to mean MR. JACKSON; and there can be no doubt, that, let who will be the author of the paper, these are the two persons meant in this part of it. — Now, then, observe, that the impostor paper is dated on the 30th of October, and observe, also, that MR. JACKSON did not land in England, from America *till the 24th of October*; how, then, could the Duke of CADORE know, when he is said to have written his paper, that the King (who, by the by, *was then confined by his present malady*,) had been "forced to leave MR. JACKSON unrewarded?" You see, reader, that the thing was impossible. The Duke of CADORE, though he dates his paper on the 30th of October, would scarcely have written it on that same day. He would, naturally, date it on the day he sent it away, and he would as naturally write it, some days before, leaving time, of course, for it to be submitted to the Emperor. But, upon the supposition that he wrote it on the very day that he dated it, it was utterly impossible for him to know, on that day, that MR. JACKSON was not to be rewarded, because there were only six days between the landing of MR. JACKSON, at Portsmouth, and the date of the Duke of CADORE's paper at Paris; and, in the space of six days, it was not very likely that even MR. JACKSON himself should know whether he was to be rewarded or not; and how, then, should the fact become known to the Duke of CADORE? — It is very clear, therefore, that the paper is a fabrication, and that it has been written since it has been ascertained that MR. JACKSON is not to be rewarded, or, at least, not rewarded to the extent which some people may, perhaps, have expected; and, really, this part of the fabricated paper does seem to point out the origin of the whole thing. But, more of this in my next.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
August 2, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE.—*Intelligence from the Armies in Spain.*

(Concluded from p. 128.)

It was one of the finest military feats on record. The loss of the English in the siege of Badajoz may be estimated at 3,000 men at least; the Portuguese and Spaniards have also sustained some loss.—On transmitting to your Highness the journal of the siege, I shall have the honour of presenting you with the names of those who distinguish themselves, and who have deserved the favour of the Emperor, that you may represent their conduct accordingly.—The Chief of battalion Lemarre commanded the engineers; the Chief of battalion Colin, the artillery; the latter fell sick during the siege: he was well seconded by Colonel Gonzales, and the Chief of battalion Horré, both in the service of his Catholic Majesty. I regret that I cannot, in this first report, mention the names of all the brave men.—General Philippon praises the firmness of character which Mr. Theran, the Royal Commissary of the Province, has displayed, as well as the principal heads of the Spanish Administration who were in Badajoz.—On the 13th the enemy having learned the movements of our armies, began to withdraw their besieging artillery; on the 17th all their troops had disappeared: on the 18th the communication with Badajoz was reopened by means of parties which arrived there by both banks of the Guadiana. On the 20th I arrived at Badajoz, with the Duke of Ragusa.—Thus the enemy have derived from their late expedition into Estremadura, and their attack on Badajoz, only the disgrace of having failed in both enterprises.—The loss of the English is at least 8,000 of their own troops; the Portuguese have lost 3 or 4,000; and the Spaniards as many: they have procured new triumphs to the arms of the Emperor, and have ascertained in favour of the imperial army the signal victory which was gained at Albuera on the 16th ult. where I accomplished the main object I had in view—that of making a diversion in favour of Badajoz, and of enabling that fortress to prolong its resistance. It is now evident that the battle of Albuera gained us at least 20 days, during which time we were enabled to make arrangements for bringing up new reinforcements, and the army of Portugal was able to take part in the operations; thus, the second object

which I had in view in making my first movement, has been also accomplished; and the troops which fought at Albuera have not ceased a single day to act upon the offensive against the enemy.—I have the honour to transmit to your Highness the General Orders which I yesterday issued to the army.—I am, &c.

Marshal the Duke of DALMATIA.
Badajoz, June 21, 1811.

IMPERIAL ARMY OF THE SOUTH OF SPAIN.

General Orders.

The General in Chief hastens to inform the army, that the imperial army of Portugal is in combined operation with the army of the South; the junction was effected three days ago at Merida.—The General in Chief also announces the deliverance of Badajoz, and he presents as an example of experience, zeal, and valour, the chiefs and brave garrison of that important fortress, of which the Gen. of Brigade Philippon is Governor; a great number of soldiers of all ranks have distinguished themselves during the siege; their names shall be laid before the Emperor, and the rewards which they have deserved shall be solicited.—The defence of Badajoz will be cited in military annals as one of the most remarkable exploits of war. The Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish army has successively attempted the siege, and has suffered very considerable losses; within the last twenty days three breaches were made; one in the body of the fortress, and two in Fort San Christoval; the enemy twice assaulted that Fort, and was twice repulsed, leaving the ditches filled with his dead. The loss of the English in the siege of Badajoz is estimated at 3,000 men; there are in the fortress some hundreds of their prisoners.—The General of Brigade Philippon, and the brave garrison of Badajoz, have covered themselves with glory by their brilliant defence.—This important event ascertains the victory which the Army of the South gained on the banks of the Albuera, on the 16th ult. over the Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish army. On that memorable day, 20,000 French fought 45,000 enemies, and inflicted on them a very great loss; that of the English amounts, by their own confession, to 5,000 men; of whom 1,000 were made prisoners; six colours and five cannon were also taken from them. The Spaniards and Portuguese acknowledge that they lost more than 3,000 men. We

had also to regret a great number of brave men; our loss, however, did not amount to one half of that of the enemy; but the object which the General in Chief had in view was accomplished; he wished to make a diversion in favour of Badajoz, and retard the works of the siege. The enemy could not prevent that object from being attained; for during the battle General Philippon made a sally, and destroyed the works of attack which the English had erected; thus the defence could be prolonged for at least 20 days, and the necessary time was gained for combining, with the imperial army of Portugal, a grand movement which entirely relieved Badajoz. The English, then, have only derived from their late expedition into Estremadura, the disgrace of having attempted it, a loss of 8,000 of their nation, and of 5 or 6,000 Spaniards and Portuguese, and they have procured new triumphs for the Imperial armies.—The General-in-chief has already laid before the Emperor, the names of the soldiers of all ranks who distinguished themselves at the battle of Albuera, at the same time that he mentioned the corps which signalled themselves by their valour. He will hasten to announce the rewards, which on his application, his Majesty shall have granted.

Marshal Duke of DALMATIA.

General-in-chief of the Army of the South.
MOCBURY, Adj. Commandant.

PORTUGAL AND SPAIN—TALAVERA'S WARS.

—*Dispatches from Lord Viscount TALAVERA and from the Duke of DALMATIA, with a Proclamation by the latter; which Documents carry down the War to the 1st of July, 1811.*

Proclamation of the Duke of Dalmatia, (Marshal Soult), 9th June, 1811.

Fellow Soldiers; A month has not elapsed since your arms were crowned with triumph on the plains of Albuera, and since the enemy trembled at the thunder of your artillery. Discomfited they fled, and left their cannon and their standards in your possession. Soon you shall have another opportunity of displaying your valour, if the English will venture to give it you, and with another glorious and decisive victory, you shall terminate the war in the Peninsula.—Badajoz, besieged on every side; bombarded without intermission during twelve

successive days and nights, and surrounded by enemies for nearly two months, has bravely resisted every effort; still will the noble garrison disappoint the intentions of the foe, and reply to their summonses from the mouth of the cannon, returning defiance for the empty threats of the assailants. Marshal Beresford and all his Portuguese were unequal to accomplish its fall. The aid of the British Commander in Chief will also be ineffectual; and if by delays, retreats, and manœuvres of every kind, they may avert the blow for a time, yet it must and shall fall, and with such a weight as to crush our opponents.—Comrades, in this conflict the British are not the greatest sufferers? No. It is the unhappy Portuguese nation that is borne down by the burden of affliction. A people whom the Emperor wishes to make truly happy—a people possessing within themselves all means of felicity—a people who wish to retain those blessings—but a people deceived, betrayed, insulted, ruined, and trampled upon—not by us, who are mis-called invaders, but by the English, the real invaders of Portugal and Spain. That people now see their error, but too late. They now know their friends, and would willingly stretch forth the hand of peace, but it is withered by the machinations of England.—Let us then, my Countrymen, avenge their cause. Let us be the advocates of the oppressed, not by words but by deeds. Already we are in a situation to meet the English, if they dare to accept our defiance. They will not while they can avoid it, but it will soon be out of their power to refuse; and they will shrink in vain from that blow, which they have neither the strength to meet, nor the resolution to oppose.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Viscount Talavera, Quinta St. João, 20th June, 1811.

The enemy moved forward his advanced guard, consisting of about 10,000 men, to Los Santos, on the morning of the 13th.—Upon this occasion Lieutenant Streenuwitz, of the 21st light dragoons, was sent out by Major-General Sir William Erskine to reconnoitre the enemy, with a small detachment of the 2nd Hussars and 3rd Dragoon Guards, which distinguished themselves in an attack upon a superior number of the enemy, and took some prisoners.—I had arranged that the cavalry and 2nd and 4th divisions of the allied British and Portuguese army, and the corps of Spanish troops under General

Blake, should collect if the enemy should advance to interrupt the siege or blockade of Badajoz; and I went to Albuera on that night to superintend the movements of the troops.—I also moved, on the night of the 13th, General Hamilton's Division from the Blockade of Badajoz, with an intention to stop the enemy in case the Army of the South alone should have moved forward.—On the 14th, in the night, Lieutenant Ayling, of the 40th regiment, who had been employed to observe the movements of the enemy, arrived at Albuera with the account, that the advanced guard of the enemy's Army of Portugal from Castile had entered Truxillo at noon the 13th, which confirmed the other accounts which I had received of their progress up to the 12th, and as from Truxillo they might have been at Merida on the 15th, and in communication with the Army of the South, I determined to raise the blockade of Badajoz, and that all the allied troops should cross the Guadiana on the 17th. This was accordingly effected without difficulty or loss of any description; and General Blake likewise crossed with his corps at Juramenha on the 17th.—Since that period, the allied British and Portuguese army have been encamped in the woods upon the Caya about Torre de Mourro, having their right upon the Ponte de Caya; the 3rd and 7th divisions and Brigadier-General Madden's cavalry being in Campo Mayor. And the troops which had been under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Brent Spencer on the frontiers of Castile, have crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha in proportion as the enemy have crossed that river at Almaraz. The whole are now upon the Caya, between this place and Arronches.—The enemy's advance have appeared in the neighbourhood of Badajoz this day, and I conceive that their whole army will be collected to-morrow.—The enemy have collected upon this occasion all their force from Castile, their whole force from Madrid, and what is called their Centre army, and all their force from Andalusia, excepting what is absolutely necessary to maintain their position before Cadiz, and that held by Sebastiani in the eastern kingdoms of Andalusia.—The enemy have abandoned Old and New Castile, with the exception of a small garrison in Madrid, and have risked every thing in all parts of Spain, in order to collect this large army in Estremadura.

Dispatch of the Duke of Dalmatia, (published Paris, 25th July), dated Badajoz, 24th June, 1811.

Monseigneur; Yesterday all the cavalry of the armies of Portugal and of the South, were marched to reconnoitre the enemy's line. The Marshal Duke of Ragusa directed General Montbrun upon Campo Mayor, where he found 1,200 Portuguese horse, and two Anglo-Portuguese divisions. There was no engagement on this point.—I had ordered General Latour Maubourg to direct the column of dragoons commanded by General Bron towards Villaviciosa; he encountered no enemy, and returned without having pushed on so far as that place.—General Latour Maubourg having crossed the fords of the Guadiana, between Juramenha and the mouth of the Caza, with the rest of the cavalry of the army of the South, advanced straight upon Elvas. The column on the right, commanded by General Briche, occupied for some time five English squadrons, which were opposed to it; while the brigade of General Bouvier-des-Eclats, at the head of which was the 1st regiment of the Vistula, manœuvred on their right. This movement succeeded; *two squadrons of the 11th regiment, called the English Light Horse, and of the Hanoverian Hussars, were destroyed; 3 officers and 150 horsemen, with their horses, remained in our power; the enemy had besides a good many killed, and a great number wounded. The 2nd and 10th were principally engaged; this affair does them honour. Colonel Lallamant was slightly wounded, and also 10 horsemen. Ten other English squadrons remained at a respectful distance, and did not choose to engage.*—According to the information which has been collected, it would appear that there has been a separation of the allied army. It is said, that the Spanish troops, commanded by General Blake, are returning towards the mouth of the Guadiana, and the county of Niebla; that the English and Portuguese have already filed off troops towards the Tagus, and sent their baggage to Lisbon; that Lord Wellington has directed his march towards Lisbon; *and that the enemy have sent to that city more than 8,000 sick or wounded.* The arrival of a considerable reinforcement from England is also announced, which was landed a few days ago at Lisbon. The regiment of Light Horse which met with the check before Elvas, of which I have just spoken, had joined the army three days before.

Extract of a Dispatch from TALAVERA. At Quinta St. Joao, 27th June, 1811.

The enemy made a great reconnoissance with a very large body of cavalry upon Elvas and Campo Mayor on the 22nd instant. The cavalry of the Army of the South went upon Elvas from the neighbourhood of Olivenca, and the woods between that town and Badajoz; and the cavalry of the Army of Portugal upon Campo Mayor, from the neighbourhood of Badajoz. The former succeeded in cutting off a piquet of the 11th Dragoons, which had been posted on the Caya, in front of Elvas, under the command of Captain Lutyens, mistook a body of the enemy's Hussars for a body of ours sent to his support. The 2nd Hussars, also, which were on the Guadiana, on the right of Elvas, suffered on their retreat towards Elvas. The enemy were kept in check in the neighbourhood of Campo Mayor by the Hon. Major Gen. De Gray's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and they retired without seeing the position of our troops. Since that day they have made no movement of importance. Their army is along the Guadiana between Badajoz and Merida, and their principal occupation appears to be to procure subsistence. They are already beginning to experience, in some degree, the effects of drawing together, in Estremadura, their whole force. General Bennet has evacuated the Asturias. Don Julian Sanchez has possession of the open country in Old Castile, and has recently intercepted a valuable convoy of money and provisions on the road from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo; and I learn from Valladolid, that a very valuable convoy, consisting of Joseph Buonaparte's baggage and property, has been intercepted by Mina, near Vittoria. Gen. Blake crossed the Guadiana (as had been arranged) on the 22nd instant, and I understand was at Castillejos on the 24th.

Dispatch from the Duke of Dalmarin. Badajoz, 28th June, 1811.

Monseigneur; The enemy's army, which had recrossed the Guadiana, continues its retreat. It is at this moment three marches distant from us. It would appear to have given up Spain entirely, and to be concentrating itself for the defence of Lisbon.—Lord Wellington, on the 26th of June, had already his headquarters at Portalegre. More than 8,000 sick and wounded English have been sent off

to Lisbon, with all the heavy baggage. The Spaniards have separated from them, and have marched towards the mouth of the Guadiana.—The remains of six English regiments which were destroyed in the battle of Albuera are returned to England. There were left of these regiments only some officers and subalterns.—According to information collected from the inhabitants, the English, in that battle, had 6,500 men, killed, wounded, and taken. Many of the wounded are dead. The Spaniards and Portuguese lost 4,000 men. The loss of the enemy was triple ours. On the night also of the 17th, the enemy had begun his retreat; and he would have recrossed the Guadiana, had I thought it right to continue the attack; but the junction of the Spaniards, on which I had not calculated, having presented too great a mass of troops, I did not think it proper to do so. I had besides been informed, that the siege of Badajoz had been raised, and that the artillery had been withdrawn, which gave me a respite of two months to come to the relief of that fortress.—*The English are very much dissatisfied with General Beresford, who has been suspended and sent to England, for having exposed the English troops, and spared the Portuguese and Spaniards.* It is true that the latter, who were more numerous, were less exposed than the English, and suffered less loss.—**A GREAT NUMBER OF DESERTERS FROM THE ENGLISH ARMY COME IN TO US.** They all assert, that the English feel their inability to support the contest in Spain; and every thing induces me to think, *that, when the army of reserve, which your Highness has announced to me, shall have arrived upon Almeida, they will be convinced of the impossibility even of maintaining themselves at Lisbon.*—The English have experienced a great want of provisions and of money. *Money is become very scarce with them; they no longer scatter it with the same profusion. They attribute this to the unfavourable state of the exchange.*—The breaches in the fortress of Badajoz are repairing with the greatest activity. The place has been re-victualled for seven months: we have just discovered a new magazine of 100,000 weight of gunpowder, which had been concealed in the vaults.—I have caused Olivenza to be raised.

Extract of a Dispatch from Talavera, dated Quinta de St. Joao, 1st July, 1811.

Since I wrote on the 27th of June, the

enemy have withdrawn the great force which they had in the neighbourhood of Badajoz. Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton reconnoitred, with part of the cavalry, along the Xevora and the Guadiana as far as Montigo, on the 2nd inst. and found no troops excepting a small body of infantry and cavalry at Montigo; and near Badajoz the cavalry belonging to the garrison.—By all accounts, the Army of Portugal are on the right of the Guadiana, between Montanches and Merida, keeping a small post at Montigo; and the Army of the South on the left of that river, extending their left towards Zafra.—The enemy have withdrawn from Badajoz their train of artillery with which the place was taken, and have sent it to the southward.—A part of General Bonnet's troops, whose evacuation of the Asturias has been confirmed, have gone to Leon; and I have a Report from General Silveira, of the 25th of June, stating that the enemy had, on the 19th, evacuated Astorga. By accounts from Valladolid, it appears, that Marshal Bessieres had quitted that place the 12th, with all the troops he could collect, and went to Rio Seco, from whence he moved, on the 15th, towards Benavente.—The Guerilla force appears to be increasing in numbers, activity, and boldness, in all the northern parts of Spain.—I have no authentic accounts of General Blake's movements since the 27th of June, on which day his head-quarters were at Alosno, in the Condado de Niebla, and his advanced-guard, under General Ballasteros, at El Cerro.

SPAIN.—TARRAGONA.—Paris, 25th July, 1811.—*Literal Translation of a Report of the Siege of Tarragona, which GENERAL CONTRERAS, Ex-Governor of that place, addressed to the Council of Regency.*

On the 28th instant (*May*) at day-break, the enemy opened his fire to batter in breach the curtain of the front of St. John, at the angle which it forms with the left flank of the bastion of St. Paul. Our artillery and our infantry behaved heroically; they several times succeeded in silencing their fire, and retarding an operation which threatened us with an assault.—The situation of Tarragona became at this moment most critical; for, from the want of shipping, of time and opportunity, I found it impossible for me to save my garrison by sea; as little could I do so by land, because the enemy sur-

rounded me with all his army, and awaited my sallying out to drive me back.—To speak of capitulation was unworthy of the heroic defence which the place had made. The Marquis of Campoverde had promised to present himself with an army for my relief; the English had arrived two days before with another division of troops for my support, but they did not resolve upon disembarking when they saw the danger in which the place was of being invested; and thus, in spite of the aid of our troops, and the presence of our allies, I saw myself reduced to my own soldiers.—In this state of things, knowing the activity of the enemy, who would not lose a moment in attacking me before the ill-combined operation for raising the siege could be carried into effect, an operation which lasted a number of days, I took that measure which was due to Spanish honour, to my character, to my personal reputation; and resolved to die fighting, rather than think of a surrender.—I saw beforehand the two consequences which my resistance would infallibly produce: either the confusion, the defeat, the flight of the enemy, if I was victorious; or, if I failed, and the enemy penetrated into the place, a horrible carnage of my soldiers and of the inhabitants.—But in foreseeing all this, in determining to receive and to repel the French upon the breach, I again consulted, whether my force was capable of that enterprize, one of the most heroic which the war presents, and to which few men know how to make up their minds.—In reality I knew that I had still 8,000 of the best and most warlike troops of Spain, who had immortalized themselves in the defence of Tarragona, and to whom only this last effort was wanting for the completion of their work.—Resolved, then, to resist the assaults of the enemy, I placed, in the face of the breach, two battalions of provincial grenadiers and the regiment of Almeria, with orders not to fire a single musket, and to throw themselves upon the breach as soon as the French should appear there, in order to drive back their column at the point of the bayonet (for it was thus that this terrible operation was to be executed); and on compelling them to retire, such a terrible carnage was to be made among them, that they should not dare to return a second time.—I distributed among the soldiers wine, brandy, and tobacco. I spoke to them myself so as to inflame their courage; and I took all the precautions which were proper to be

taken under such circumstances. The result did not answer my expectations. Our troops received the French with a firmness worthy of admiration; but they did not altogether follow my instructions, which were to attack the assailing column in its advance; and the regiment of Almeria soon yielded the ground which it occupied for the purpose of supporting the grenadiers, and acting as a reinforcement and a reserve.—At last 1,500 of the enemy's grenadiers, supported by 5 or 6,000 men, without reckoning the bulk of the army of Suchet which surrounded the place on all sides, entered the breach. Our troops began to retire in disorder from the wall; and although all the officers and myself made every effort to stop them, and prevail upon them to charge the enemy anew, and defend themselves in the streets, this was impossible; the soldiers thinking to find safety in flight, threw themselves down on the side towards the sea, leaped over the walls and pallisades, and attempted to escape; but they were taken by the enemy's troops, who invested us on the Barcelona side of the place.—In proportion as our troops gave way, the enemy occupied the ramparts of the old and new town, and entered the streets, where all were killed or wounded without distinction of class, age, or sex. This tragedy was only less cruel, because the French officers, full of generosity, saved all they could, and even exposed themselves to become the victims of their own soldiers, who, burning with the thirst of carnage, thought only of slaughtering.—At this moment, running myself to the gate of San Magin, to collect there, if possible, some soldiers, in order to charge the enemy, to save them during the night, or to attempt to break through, I was wounded in the belly by the stroke of a bayonet, and made prisoner by an enemy's detachment. The report then spread, that I was killed; and the general disorder increased to such a degree, that the soldiers might be seen throwing away their arms, taking to flight, and thus falling into the hands of their enemies, who made them all prisoners.—Tarragona, in fine, after one of the most obstinate sieges, during which I left untried none of those measures which are dictated by the art of defence, and which the smallness of my force and means permitted, Tarragona fell, amidst the horrors drawn on by the heroism of a garrison which shut its ears to all proposals for

capitulation, on the 28th of June, a day that will be memorable in future times for the tragical end of this ancient capital of Spain, which has been condemned to see its temples and edifices destroyed, during the siege, by more than 4,000 bombs or grenades, and an innumerable quantity of bullets and of balls, which filled with terror the isles of Majorca and Minorca, and the coasts of the Mediterranean, the hospitals of which are filled with its wounded defenders; which, in short, has seen at the last moment of its existence so many victims slaughtered.—On the following day, General Count Suchet caused me to be conveyed on a litter to his headquarters at Constanti, where I found Generals Courten, Cabrer, Brigadier Mesina, and other Chiefs, who had been made prisoners, with 7,800 men, of whom 400 were officers, who have been conducted to France. The Général sent for me, and in presence of the principal officers of his army, openly told me, that I was the cause of all the horrors his troops had committed in Tarragona, because I had defended myself beyond the limits prescribed by the laws of war; and that these laws authorised him to punish me even with death, for not having demanded a capitulation as soon as the breach was practicable; that on entering by assault, he had a right to put every thing to fire and sword; and that, by consequence, the besieged ought to have hung out the white flag, as soon as the breach was opened.—I replied, that if it was true, that the laws of war prescribed, that if the assailant enter, he may deliver up a town and its inhabitants to plunder, flames, and the sword; and that they in consequence indicate, that the moment when the assault is about to take place is the time to capitulate; these same laws, however, do not prohibit the garrison to defend itself, and endeavour to repel the assailants; that I had resisted, because I had a force sufficient to repel his, which would doubtless have been the case had my dispositions been obeyed in the way that I ordered them; that, besides, I expected succours on the day following, both from Campoverde, and from the sea, &c.; that having resisted until the breach was practicable, I should have passed for a coward, had I not dared to defend it; and, in short, that no law forbade me to repel the assaults.—General Suchet, convinced by the powerful reasons which I gave him, treated me, at last, as well as the other general and private

officers, with all the distinction which we had merited by our resistance.—The garrison behaved heroically in the defence up to the moment of the assault; it then shewed some weakness, the soldier gave way and was intimidated. The officers, on the contrary, always behaved perfectly well, and sabre in hand, made the greatest efforts to keep the soldiers to their duty, and to collect them in order that they might resist and attack the French, who were pursuing and cutting them down in the streets. But their terror increased every moment, and they let themselves be sabred even by us, without even then resolving to recommence the combat.—Every thing has conspired against this poor garrison. Campoverde, on leaving it, himself promised to come speedily to its relief and deliverance, and never did so, though he daily renewed his promises, as may be seen from a great number of letters which I have preserved, and of which I send copies subjoined. The kingdom of Valencia sent to the aid of the place, General Miranda, with a division of the troops of that kingdom, who landed at Tarragona, and the following day re-embarked, and was to join the army of Campoverde. An English division made its appearance on the 26th. Colonel Skerret, who commanded it, came on shore to confer with me. On the 27th the English engineers came to reconnoitre the front of attack; and, convinced that the place was incapable of resistance, they returned to their ships; so that they all kept aloof from the place, though they had come to relieve it. This abandonment on the part of those who came in order to save it was the worst of all: it made such an impression on the spirits of the soldiers, that they began to foresee that they were lost; they were cast down; they only continued their resistance in consequence of my continual exhortations, because they saw my coolness, and the confidence which I felt, that if they executed my orders the French would never effect an entrance. These reasonings were only of weight for a few hours; the idea of seeing themselves abandoned soon laid hold of their minds, and completely subdued them.—The English Commandant came on the evening of the 26th, and asked me what I wished he should do with

his troops; I replied, that if he would disembark, and enter the place, he should be received with joy, and treated as he deserved; that he had only to choose the point which he wished to defend, and that I should immediately consent to it.—If the Marquis of Campoverde had not promised to come to our relief, without keeping his promise; if General Miranda had not shewn himself in the place with his division, only to appear and disappear, like a flash of lightning; if the English division had never come in sight; if the garrison, in short, had not been told every day and hour of its last extremity, that it was about to be relieved; convinced, then, that it had to depend only on its own strength, it would have done a great deal more; but this assemblage of circumstances, so good and excellent in appearance, but most pernicious in reality, because they rested on no plan, good or bad, discouraged the garrison, and have been the cause of that fatality, by which it lost all the merit which it had acquired up to the moment of assault.—A great number of officers fled from Tarragona to avoid the hardships and the danger, some without permission, others soliciting it upon pretexts that were far from honourable, others feigning sickness, others, in short, committing acts of baseness to conceal their pusillanimity, and these not only merit no distinction, but ought to be cashiered, otherwise they will still have the impudence to appear with their decoration, and say that they were at the siege.—The greater part of the corps were commanded by Captains, from the want of the Commandants who had departed. These captains ought to be colonels, and those who have gone off, and have been amusing themselves at Villanueva and elsewhere, should be dismissed the service; otherwise, justice will not be done, and it is necessary that justice should be done.—As to myself, I have never asked any thing, and I wish nothing else at present but to be exchanged if possible. I anxiously wish to re-enter the field; and in the mean time I hope that my wife, who is at Majorca, will receive a part of my pay, a thing, however, which I should not ask, if my property was not in the power of the enemy.

(*To be continued.*)

"Let him who fairly wins receive the prize."—DRYDEN.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALAVEIRA'S WARS (*continued from page 144*).—At the page, here referred to, I brought down the history of these wars to the raising of the siege of Badajoz. I shall now continue it to the date of the dispatches last published, and, as the reader will perceive from the following document, I have now an additional motive to execute this task of historian with zeal and fidelity. "EXTRAORDINARY PROGRAM.—The whole Nation and all Europe being sensible of the immortal services which Marshal General Lord Viscount Wellington, and his illustrious companions in arms, have done, and are doing, to the Prince Regent, our Sovereign, to our country, and to the whole human race, promising ourselves, from the glorious victories achieved by them, by Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford, and by the other Generals of the Allied Armies, the most fortunate result of the obstinate conflict in which we are engaged with the common enemy; it is the duty of every Portuguese to join according to his ability, in perpetuating the memory of such signal exploits, not only in testimony of the gratitude of a people towards their benefactor, but to the end that our posterity may receive in the heroic actions of this great General, and the gallant warriors who triumphed under his command, glorious examples of the most undaunted valour, military skill, coolness, prudence, humanity, and steadiness in defending the rights of the allied Sovereigns. From all these considerations, the above-mentioned highly-deserving Portuguese promises the reward of a *gold medal*, of the value of 50,000 *reals*, to the Author of a Treatise upon the subject proposed, under the following title:—"MEMOIRS FOR A HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF MARSHAL GENERAL LORD VISC. WELLINGTON, IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1811." This reward shall be adjudged to the writer, who, in the opinion of the Academy, has done the most justice to the subject.

"—The terms of the program are, that the Memoirs be written in *Portuguese*, *English*, or *French*; that they be transmitted to the Secretary of the Academy, at the end of May 1812, to be judged according to the established regulations. And that the names of the authors be contained in sealed papers, having the same device with the Memoirs, to be opened only in the event of being successful. — JOHN WILLIAM CHRISTIAN MILLER, Secretary to the Academy. — "Secretary's Office, June 12, 1811."— Fifty thousand *reals* do not, I believe, amount to more than about 150 *golden guineas*; but, if I obtain that sum, I shall be quite satisfied. And, it is not, I assure Sir Vicary Gibbs, the "*base lucre*" which stimulates me. It is not the money, so much as the medal, that I am anxious to win; and, most assuredly, I shall, if I have life and health, put in my claim. For, though this Academy, if it be like most others, will not like to patronize a writer, in whose work *truth* will be a principal ingredient, I will, at least, put them to the test; and, if they reject my claim, the world will be able to judge of them as well as of the rival historians. I do not much relish the putting off of the period of payment till May, 1812; for, we live in ticklish times; we live in times when so many and such great changes are continually occurring, that there does not appear to me to be any very solid ground to hope for payment, unless that payment is to take place in a few hours after the epoch with which the history is to close. However, I must stand my chance as well as others; and the only thing I shall insist upon is, that, if I win, a real *golden* medal shall be awarded me; and nothing in the shape of *paper-money*.—Here I start, then, with a resolution to do my best.—Before I proceed to the contents of the last dispatches, it will be necessary to take a look backward and see, what the Duke of Dalmatia says, with regard to some circumstances relating to the battle of Albuera. It will be recollected that no official statement of *numbers* was, upon that occasion, furnished us by our commander.

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The Duke of Dalmatia, in his general orders, issued about the 20th of June, says, that on that memorable day, 20,000 French fought 45,000 enemies; that they made 1,000 prisoners; that they took six colours and five cannon; and that, during the battle General Philippon made a sally from the town of Badajoz, and destroyed the works which the English had erected.

—Now, I am not inclined to believe this Duke of Dalmatia, upon his bare word, any more than any other military commander; but what I do believe is, that the Duke of Dalmatia would not wish to pass amongst his own soldiers and officers, for a notorious liar; and, therefore, I do believe that this statement of his must be pretty nearly the truth; because, if false, that falsehood must have been immediately known to every man in his army, this being, not a dispatch to amuse the people at home, but an *order* issued in his army, and read, of course, at the head of every company in that army.—There can be little doubt, then, I think, that the French did take *six* English standards in the battle of Albuera, though, in the reported speech of Mr. Perceval, mention was made of only *two*. At any rate, the French did take some standards, and nobody has yet pretended to say that the allies took any. Yet, the ministerial news-papers tell us, that when the news of our victory at Albuera reached St. Petersburg, the court was delighted, the rich people gave balls and other entertainments in the way of rejoicing, and that even the Russian soldiers shouted for joy! But, what have they not told this “*most thinking people*” in all Europe?—To return to the consequences of raising the siege of Badajoz: Lord Talavera informs us, that the enemy had drawn together the whole of their force from Castile, their whole force from Madrid, and all their force from Andalusia, excepting what was absolutely necessary to maintain their position before Cadiz, together with the force under Sebastiani in the Eastern Kingdoms of Andalusia. He adds, that they have abandoned Old and New Castile, with the exception of a small garrison in Madrid, and have risked every thing, in all parts of Spain, in order to collect this large army in Estremadura.

—From this picture, one would be led to suppose, that all the rest of Spain and Portugal was totally deserted by the French, and that we might expect, soon to hear, that Spain was totally free of

them. But, we are told, indeed, that there is a *small* garrison left in Madrid, and that the necessary number of troops remain posted, before Cadiz: that is to say, that the metropolis of Spain is in the hands of the French, and that they have cut off the only great sea port town and naval arsenal from all communication with the land. Madrid is mentioned, here, in a very slight way, but the mention is worthy of particular notice.—We of this “*most thinking*” nation, have a thousand times been told, that *all around Madrid* the *Guerillas* (a *Volunteer Corps*, I suppose) were in such force and so extremely active, that King Joseph was in the utmost danger, being, besides, held in the utmost abhorrence by the people of the city itself, who only waited for a fair opportunity of rising upon him and his partisans; and further, our industrious news-papers have furnished this “*most thinking people*” with divers *intercepted letters* from King Joseph to his brother Napoleon, complaining, in most desponding terms, of the state in which he was placed, of the dangers to which he was exposed, and earnestly praying to be suffered to abandon an enterprize that promised nothing but vexation in the progress and ruin in the end. But, *now*, behold, after all this, our own Commander in Chief gives us, under his hand, an assurance, that there is only a *small garrison* in Madrid, and, that there are no French troops, at all, in the whole of the country round about it; which, I take it, is a pretty satisfactory proof, of one of these two things; either, that what we were before told, was shamefully false, or, that the *Guerillas* are become less active than they were, that the people of Madrid have changed their opinions, that King Joseph's situation is become less dangerous, and his prospects more fair.—In the next dispatch, (see page 153,) our commander tells us, that the cavalry of the French army succeeded in cutting off a *picket* of the 11th dragoons, who mistook a body of the enemy, for a body of our own troops; and he says, that the 2nd Hussars, also, *suffered* on their retreat towards Elvas.—Now, let us hear what Dalmatia says upon this subject. He says (see page 152), that a *brigade* of French cavalry, and not “*the cavalry of the French army*,” having the first regiment of the Vistula, at its head, destroyed, not “*a picket*” of our horse, but two squadrons of the eleventh regiment of English

light horse, and of the Hanoverian hussars; and he says, that three officers and 150 horsemen with their horses remained prisoners in the hands of the French; to which he adds, that ten other squadrons of English horse remained at a distance, and did not choose to engage. These stories differ very widely, and I should be in no great hurry to give implicit confidence to the statement of the French general, but, the reader will bear in mind, that this regiment of the Vistula, who appear to have been engaged here, are part of those same *Polish lancers* who made such bloody work of it in the battle of Albuera. The *Courier* news-paper, in speaking of these lancers, says, upon the authority of a private letter from an officer in our army, that, they are a set of brutal *savages* who *butcher* all they can come near, and who never give any quarter.—Indeed! upon my word, it is dangerous to have to deal with fellows of this description; fellows who do not know when they have enough of it; fellows who seem to understand nothing at all of that civility and mutual forbearance, which is, sometimes, practised in war. No wonder that this gentleman should speak of them in such harsh terms, but they know, I suppose, best what suits their employer; and the only thing that we can do, is, I should think, to get, as soon as we can, some horsemen of the same description; for, it is very provoking, to see these lancers carry off whole squadrons at a time, of our cavalry, in spite of all their furs and their tippets and their whiskers. If these lancers are resolved to give no quarter, why should not we have men that will give no quarter? I have no notion of this species of liberality in the field. If we are to have war, let it be war; and let us deal the enemy as hard blows as he deals us.—On the 28th of June (see page 153) we have another dispatch from the Duke of Dalmatia, in which His Grace tells us, that the English General has sent off 8,000 sick and wounded, with all his baggage, to Lisbon; he says, besides, that *great numbers of deserters from the English army* come in to him. This is intelligence of a very serious aspect indeed; and if it be true, it accounts for a great deal of what I could not, otherwise, account for. This dispatch has been published in London about a fortnight, and has received no contradiction from any body. Let us hope, that it will receive a contradiction from the head quarters of our army; for,

this intelligence is, to me, of a nature more inauspicious than any that I have, hitherto, had to remark upon.—It appears strange to most people, that General Blake should not have remained with our army; and to account for this, the *Morning Post* informed its wise readers, that Blake had been sent off by Lord Talavera into the rear of the Duke of Dalmatia. This assertion was repeated by another venal print, the *Courier*, of the 15th of July, when it asserted that our General, by a masterly manœuvre, had thrown a large force in the rear of the enemy; that he had detached Blake with the Spaniards towards Seville; that Blake, with 15,000 men, was pushing on, in that direction, and that General Graham was advancing from Cadiz to co-operate with Blake. This manœuvre, the venal writer said, reminded him, of a similar one, practised by that consummate General, *Gustavus Adolphus*. But, we must take the article itself: it is not long, and it is a pretty instance, enough, of the, at once false and stupid publications by which this “most *“thinking nation,”* suffers itself to be amused: “We hear that Lord Wellington has, by a masterly manœuvre, thrown a large force in the rear of the enemy. Soult having boasted that he had entirely relieved the Southern Provinces from all danger of attack, Lord Wellington, as a commentary upon that boast, has detached General Blake with the Spaniards under his command towards Seville. Blake, with 15,000 men, crossed the Guadiana, while the French were advancing, and then, by a counter-march, re-crossed, taking the direction of Seville. As Victor has joined Soult with the larger part of his force, General Graham is advancing from Cadiz to co-operate with Gen. Blake. The effect of this will be the obliging Marmont to detach a force to the southward to overawe Blake, or the increasing the difficulties of drawing supplies for the subsistence of so large an army. This manœuvre of Lord Wellington’s, reminds us of a similar one practised by that consummate General, *Gustavus Adolphus*. When Wallenstein with a vastly superior force was advancing against him, he retreated, intrenched himself, and sent off half his army to Wallenstein’s rear, to ravage the country and cut off his supplies. The effect of this was, that Wallenstein was at length forced to retreat with all possible speed to prevent his troops from being

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"starved."—A string of falsehoods, of pure unmixed falsehoods, from the beginning to the end! No troops did Lord Talavera send in the rear of the enemy; never did he detach General Blake towards Seville, or towards any other point; General Blake never made any movement in that direction; Marshal Victor (the Duke of Belluno) never moved from Madrid; General Graham, so far from advancing from Cadiz to co-operate with Blake, had, at that time, actually quitted his command at Cadiz, and was coming round to Lisbon, by sea; and Lord Talavera, so far from having imitated, upon this occasion, the manœuvre, said to have been practised by that consummate General, Gustavus Adolphus, had collected around him, all his forces, and had put his army on the high road towards Lisbon. These facts have, now, been proved to us. It appears, from Lord Talavera's own dispatches, that so far from detaching Blake, he hardly knew *what was become of him*, for, in his dispatch of the 27th of June, he says that he understands, that Blake was at Castillejos on the 24th of that month. And in his dispatch of the 4th of July, he says, that he has no authentic account of General Blake's movements, since the 27th of June. It appears, that Blake, so far from marching towards Seville, intended to embark his troops for Cadiz, but, says Lord Talavera in his dispatch of the 11th of July, "Neither General Castanos nor I have heard from him, since the 18th of June!" This was the General, who, as our hireling prints told us, was detached, after the manner of that consummate General, Gustavus Adolphus, into the rear of the enemy, by the same commander that has since told us that he did not know what was become of him. It appears that Blake made an attempt to obtain possession of a place, garrisoned only by about 800 men, and failed in the attempt, though we are told, by the above writer, that he had under his command, 15,000 men. From Lord Talavera's dispatch of the 18th of July, which is the last yet received, or, at least, the last that I have seen, it appears, that Blake actually embarked, with his army, on the 6th of July; so that he and his Spaniards have entirely quitted the grand scene of action.—I have thus gone over rather in detail some of the most prominent circumstances of the war, down to as late a period as our intelligence reaches; and let me, now, appeal to the reader, whether I was not more correct

than Mr. Perceval, as to the prospects of that war, at the time when Massena retreated out of Portugal; whether the public would not have been wise if they had followed my advice and had hesitated, before they believed that Portugal was delivered, and that the deliverance of all Europe was about speedily to follow. At that time, when the motion for a vote of thanks was made by Mr. Perceval, he stated several advantages which would arise out of what he called the triumph, which had then taken place, but the principal advantage was this, that "we now know, that we shall have a British army to defend our country, if ever the battle should be brought to our own shores; an army that has uniformly beaten the army of the enemy, commanded by Generals who have out-Generaled the Generals of the enemy."—At the time when this was delivered, by the minister, and when the huzzas were spreading through the country, I endeavoured to give a check to the exultation by observing, how degrading it was for us to acknowledge that we had not, till now, discovered that we had an army able to defend our own shores against the French; but, I more particularly dwelt on the dangerous tendency of such exultation; because, if it should finally turn out that our army in Portugal was unable to withstand that of the French, the inference, upon Mr. Perceval's principle, would be, that we had not an army to defend our country if ever the battle should be brought to our own shores. This danger, events have now made apparent; for, we see that our army has had ample opportunities to cope with the enemy; we have seen it engaged in two battles with that enemy; we have seen it twice the besieger of that enemy; we have seen it blockading Almeida; we have seen it at the breach at Badajoz; and we have seen the result. Now, then, if we were to adopt Mr. Perceval's mode of reasoning, what a disheartening conclusion, must we draw? I told him, at the time, not by any means, to make the question, whether we had an army capable of defending our country against the French, if ever the battle should be brought to our own shores; I told him, not to make the affirmative of this question rest upon any success that had been gained by our army in Portugal, because, said I, if that army should be beaten by the French, or should be obliged to retreat before them, the conclusion upon your own principles will be,

that we have not an army to defend our country, and that, in case of invasion, by France, we may give the thing up at once, without a struggle.—Of the same dangerous tendency are all the flattering pictures which have been drawn, relative to the situation of affairs in Spain as well as Portugal; and, if those pictures be true, I hesitate not to say, that our situation is most desperate indeed.—We have been told repeatedly, and from what ought to be the best authority, that the Emperor Napoleon is detested and abhorred through the whole of the peninsula; that he has no partisans amongst the people in any part of those countries; that the people are every where the cordial friends of England; that they so sincerely detest the French, that they voluntarily destroy their corn fields, their cattle, their barns, their mills, their houses, their furniture, and almost the very clothes upon their backs, rather than leave a chance of any part of them falling into the hands of the French. One would suppose, from even the official accounts that we receive, that a pretty girl would regret her beauty and would almost lacerate her visage, hammer out her teeth, and flatten down her bosom to the shape, and give it the colour of an oak board, rather than charm the eyes of a Frenchman. This, would, to be sure, be an instance of most ferocious vindictiveness. But, really, to read the dispatches of our Generals, and the speeches of our ministers, even this, is not more than we might, reasonably expect.—Well, then, how stands the case? Here are we, carrying on a war with Napoleon, with all the means, of every sort, that we are able to muster; and the theatre, of that war, is, a country, containing about 13 or 14 millions of people, the whole of whom, we say, are *for us* and *against him*. We have in our pay, 60,000 men of Portugal: these are actually in our pay, and make part of our army, and, our Generals have said that they are as good troops as any in the world. Besides these there are, we are told, many thousands of Portuguese militia; there are several Spanish armies; there are, we are told, in every quarter and corner of Spain, Guerillas, or Volunteer Corps, who are very numerous, and who, upon all occasions, behave in the most gallant manner: how stands the case, then? Here we are, with all our own means, of every kind, and with all those other means, that I have now been speaking of, carrying on a war, with Napoleon,

in the midst of a people, nearly equal in population to England, Scotland and Ireland, all put together, all those people being *for us* and *against him*, and, yet, we see, that he still holds his ground; that his brother is in possession of the metropolis of Spain; that, he, in fact, reigns in Spain; that the Spanish regency are cut off from the land, being besieged in a little island, by a French army; and, that, our main army, under the General which our Minister and Parliament have lately thanked, have, recently, been compelled to raise the siege of a very important fortress, upon the approach of a part of the forces of Napoleon, and have actually been compelled to place themselves in a state, in which, it is evident that a safe retreat is the main thing provided for.—Now, how disheartening are the reflections which this picture is calculated to excite! For, if this be the state of the case, in the peninsula, what must we expect to be the lot of England or Ireland, in case of invasion? This is a thought that seems never to have occurred to those who have been boasting of the zeal and enthusiasm and valour and perseverance of the "*universal Spanish nation*." If it had occurred to them, they would have perceived, that such assertions taken into view with the events of the war, formed the greatest possible compliment to the French armies, and the most serious grounds of alarm for any country liable to be invaded by those armies. For, what can the people of any nation be more than our ministers and their writers have asserted of the people of the peninsula; what can the people of this country be more, than zealous, enthusiastic in their country's defence, brave, persevering, and implacable in their hatred against the enemy: what can they be more than this? and yet we see, that all these excellent qualities united in the people of Spain and Portugal, do not drive the French out; there are 13 millions of these people, and yet, a French army remains in the heart of their country, has been there for three years, still holds their metropolis, has established a government sufficient for the imposition and collection of taxes over a large part of the country, and, in short, rules a much greater half of the two kingdoms. What a fearful thing, then, must a French army be, if all that we have been told, in the dispatches of Generals and the speeches of ministers be true? We are often told, that if we are *true to ourselves*

(a favourite expression of Pitt and George Rose when they were proposing new taxes); if we are true to ourselves, if we are united, if we join heart and hand, we have nothing to fear from the enemy, land when he will. But if what our Generals and Ministers tell us be true, the Spaniards and Portuguese *are* true to themselves, they *are* united, they *have* joined heart and hand; and yet we do see, that their country is, in great part, commanded, possessed, and governed by a French army, and that army under the command of men, who, seventeen years ago, were either private soldiers, or were labourers or mechanics. Observe, too, that the 13 millions of people in the peninsula, have not only all their own means for their support, but are assisted with the means, the mighty means of England, who has, for the last three years, expended more, in the assisting of Spain and Portugal, than half the total amount of the revenues of France, extended as her dominion is over 50 or 60 millions of people. If a French army were to invade England or Ireland, from what foreign arm should we receive assistance? Manifestly, then, if what we have been told of the disposition of the people in Spain and Portugal be *true*, our fate would be certain, if invaded by a numerous French army. Therefore, what we have to hope, is, that the dispositions of the people of the peninsula, have not been truly described to us; that the people do *not* universally detest and abhor Napoleon; that the hatred of the French is *not* so outrageous as to induce a pretty girl to tear her cheeks and hammer out her teeth, lest, perchance, she should be so unfortunate as to charm the eyes and win the heart of a Frenchman. Let us hope that this is *not* quite true; and, indeed, the success of the French, in the first instance, as well as their having remained so long in the Peninsula, pretty clearly prove, that is not true.—I do not, and I never have, liked the notion, that *our* safety, that our means of defence, is to be judged of by any thing that has passed, or can pass, in Spain and Portugal; because, as I have more than once said, we *may* ultimately *fail* there, and, then, there is nothing left for us but *despair*, a shocking state for any nation to be in, and, assuredly, the forerunner of its subjugation; because, from the moment it despairs, it will, of course, take no measures for its safety.—It is for this reason,

that I have always endeavoured to inculcate the opinion, that the war in the Peninsula is not of such great importance as the ministerial writers would fain persuade us that it is. They represent it as all in all; as every thing to us; as a thing for the success of which we ought to grudge no sacrifices, whether in men or in money. It is true, that unless we do regard it in this light, we cannot easily reconcile ourselves to the enormous cost which it occasions; but, *whatever* those sacrifices may be, it is far better that they should be incurred uselessly, and it is far better that they should be regarded as pure waste, than that the people of this country should believe, that the fate of England depends, even in the smallest degree, upon the fate of Spain and Portugal; because, and I cannot repeat it too often, if they once imbibed that opinion, from the hour that Spain and Portugal shall be subdued, from that hour will England be plunged in despair. I do not say, observe, that the danger to England would not be increased by the subjugation of Spain and Portugal; for, I am convinced, that that danger would be greatly increased; but I well know, that there is no danger equal to national despair.—If the war, in those countries, should end in the deliverance of them from the French, and in a complete establishment of their independence, it certainly will have greatly contributed to the safety of this country against the designs of Napoleon. But, if the war finally terminate in the subjugation of the peninsula by France, then the more that termination is distant, the worse it will be for us; because, the longer the war continues the more we shall be exhausted; and, of course, the less able to withstand the rude assaults which we may then reasonably expect. And, it should always be borne in mind, that these wars do not exhaust the enemy in the same way that they exhaust us. He has 50 millions of people, from amongst whom he draws his armies; he makes those armies find the means of their own support in the countries where they are; he neither gives nor talks of compensation; he comes amongst the people as a conqueror; to those who submit he offers protection, to those who resist he offers the sword, but from all he exacts the means of maintaining his armies; his declared object is to destroy the old governments, and, of course, he seizes upon all the property of those governments, he

confiscates that of the church, of the nobility, and of all public establishments. We, on the contrary, have to draw our armies from a population of 14 or 15 millions of people; we maintain our armies, by the means of taxes levied upon the people of England; we make compensation, to some extent, at least, for the injuries we are compelled to do to the inhabitants; we go not as conquerors, but in the character of friends; we profess not to inflict punishment on any part of the people, but hold them to be unanimous in our favour; our declared object is not to destroy the old governments, but to maintain them, or to re-establish them, and to preserve or restore, all the former orders, ranks, and properties. So that, we contend with most fearful odds, in whatever way the comparison is made. Let it be observed, too, that *time*, which works against us, works with equal force, for our enemy, who is daily gaining strength, by the internal arrangement, and consolidation of his power, in every part of his dominions. We feel impatient at the lagging of the war in the peninsula: he need feel no such impatience: war is a state, which, at present, is necessary to him: peace would thwart his views against us: it would give rise to an intercourse and to discussions adverse to his vast projects: to kindle a new war might not be so easy a matter; and, as his chief object now must be, and evidently is, to form a *fleet*, that work could not go on so fast in peace as in war.—It is impossible to take this view of the war without being of opinion, that it is the wish and the intention of Napoleon to *protract the duration of it*. His interest so manifestly points this out to him, that one can hardly suppose it possible, that it should not be his settled design. The war is at a distance from him; it leaves him at leisure to settle all the other parts of his empire, at the same time that it furnishes him with a fair pretence for keeping on foot great military establishments, which are absolutely necessary to the consolidation of his sway in several quarters of his dominions; it affords him grounds for all his measures against our commerce; it serves to habituate the people of the Continent to dispense with all communication with us; and, above all things, it *exhausts*, it *wastes*, it draws out the very life-blood of England, at the same time, that it augments the quantity of her bank-notes, and, of course, hastens their depreciation.—All this

Napoleon well knows. Eight years ago, he called out to us: "*Pay your bank notes in gold, and then the world will believe in the solidity of your resources, without your going to war to prove it.*" The *Moniteur* said this in answer to a fine flaming speech of the then minister (Addington); and, from that day to this the Emperor seems to have had his eye pretty steadily fixed upon the work going on in Threadneedle Street. If he has, it is impossible that he should not wish to protract the war in the Peninsula, which creates such a quantity of bank notes. And, indeed, is there not every appearance that his generals are acting upon this plan? The Duke of Belluno lies very quietly before Cadiz; Marshal Suchet having got possession of Tarragona, has sit himself down there; King Joseph is quiet at Madrid; and the army under their Graces, Soult and Marmont, having rescued Badajoz from danger, seem to have taken care not to discourage the Conde de Vimiera (the new title which has just been given to Lord Talavera, it seems, by the Prince Regent of Portugal) from receiving reinforcements and supplies, which, if the news-papers speak truth, he is continually receiving in great abundance. The movements of the French Generals are precisely such as are calculated to encourage the Conde to call for more troops. The French Generals push on towards him with a formidable front: he draws back, feeling himself not strong enough for them: they stand and look at him, and seem to be afraid to attack: this induces him to wish for more troops; and, as far as the government is able, that wish is instantly gratified. The French harrass him with marches, compel him to expend enormous sums of money, wear out his men and his horses, so that, the waste from mere sickness has greatly surpassed the destruction by the sword.—It is impossible that any plan of warfare can be, to the French, so advantageous as this. Here they have found out a spot, to which we are resolved to send all the resources of every kind that we can get together. While we kept upon the *sea*, or, in our *islands*, guarded by the sea, they could not touch us. They had no means either of killing our people or destroying our property. But, they have, at last, found out a spot, to which we cheerfully send men and horses and money and every thing belonging to us, that they can wish to see destroyed or wasted. The *MORNING CHRONICLE* of the 8th instant, says: "Our

"troops complain of the unwholesome and tormenting climate in which they are posted. It is almost impossible to describe the effects of the burning heat of the day followed by the noxious vapours of the night. The myriads of insects by which they are incessantly assailed, are also not merely troublesome but pernicious, for they inflame and blister the body to a degree of fever: and in this situation they are doomed to remain, we suppose, until Buonaparté shall enable his Generals to resume the offensive."—Resume the offensive! Why, what are they doing now. Have they not just made the Conde de Vimiera raise the siege of Badajoz after he had made three breaches on its ramparts? Has he not drawn backwards? Is not this acting upon the offensive on the part of the French? Their object clearly was to drive him away from Badajoz, to keep that important place in their hands, and then to let him lie as far from Lisbon as possible, and there continue to support his army and his hospitals at an enormous expence. Aye, to be sure, the heat and the insects and the fevers are what the French wish to leave our army to! This is a situation in which our enemy must wish to see our army. It is a situation that daily creates a necessity for fresh supplies. There is, in the *Times* newspaper (which has become one of the most nauseously slavish) an article, of the 8th instant, affecting to regard the armies of Dalmatia and Ragusa as being dispersed! Thus it is that this nation is cheated. A succession of falsehoods is poured out from a venal press, and, when shewn to be false, none of them are ever contradicted. Thus it has been, and thus it will be, as long as this war in the Peninsula shall last; and, when that is over, some other subject will be started, equally fruitful in falsehood and fraud.

IMPOSTOR PAPER.—In my last, at page 144, I noticed the vile imposture, which has recently been attempted to be practised upon "the most thinking people in Europe" by the venal prints of London, especially the *Courier* and the *Times*, which are the principal channels for the circulation of "*intercepted letters*," and other things of the kind, all evidently proceeding from one and the same manufactory. —The *Impostor Paper*, which I am now about to notice a little more fully than I did before, and which I shall insert in the present sheet, if possible, is certainly a

very bold attempt at imposition; but, after what this nation has swallowed, what may it not be expected to swallow? After sucking down George Rose's doctrine about "the blessed comforts of religion;" after sucking down the belief, that, if they did not give their money freely to be handled and disposed of by Pitt and Rose and the rest of those who were in power, they would not only lose their lands and houses, but that they would be made atheists and have all the "blessed comforts of religion" taken away from them; after swallowing this, and after burning Paine in effigy because he wished to persuade them, that they might, if they chose, keep their money and their religion too; after this, one must confess, that a man will find it difficult to suppose an imposture the practising of which ought to be regarded as a proof of his temerity; for, what may not one expect such a people to believe.—The *IMPOSTOR PAPER* was, in my last, clearly proved, from internal evidence, to be a forgery. We shall, hereafter, learn something more about the origin of; but, that it is as gross a forgery as the famous *Eclair* was, there can be no doubt at all.—Let me now, then, ask what could be the object of this forgery? It is a foolish paper: it verifies the old maxim, than which nothing is truer; namely, that knaves are generally fools.—The object is to incense that part of us, who are friends of public liberty, against Napoleon, by representing him as a determined enemy of every reform of abuses, and as having resolved to eradicate the last remaining fibres of freedom in England.—Poor trick! Miserable shift! —And, hereupon, we are told, that now, since this paper is come to light, there can be no man in England, especially if he be a lover of liberty, who must not abhor Napoleon; and that any man who would propose a peace with him must be a traitor. —Poor trick! Miserable shift! But, why attempt this trick? Did the contrivers of it suppose, that there was any part of the people in this country, who liked Napoleon? Is it possible that they could have supposed that? Oh! what a foolish as well as knavish crew? But, what a state are they come to, when they are driven to attempt to scare the Jacobins and Levellers with a notion that they would lose their liberties if Napoleon could have his will? Verily they are a silly and a wicked set of men.—The *Impostor Paper* has all the internal marks of a

forgery. It breathes sentiments hostile to the views which Napoleon must entertain, if he does not wish for the overthrow of his own power; for, despot as he may be, he cannot wish for what is attributed to him in this paper. If he was the real author of the paper in question, how are we to account for the following publication, which has appeared in the *Paris papers*, and which has been published in the London papers, and especially in the *Courier* of the 6th instant. It relates to certain reforms in the States of the King of Prussia; and, as will be seen, the French paper expresses its approbation of those reforms, though of a Democratical cast.—

"According to all the accounts which reach us, there is actually formed in the Prussian States, a very marked opposition to the system pursued by Government, and to the numerous *ameliorations*, which it is executing in the different branches of the Administration. While all those who do not belong to the privileged classes, applaud this system, and a certain number of the members of the noblesse also support it, the principles which the Government has laid down, experience the strongest opposition on the part of many of the nobles, who see, in these innovations, the destruction of social order. These factious men are incapable of entering into the new ideas, and do not perceive that the genius of the age imperiously calls for those changes which the Prussian Government has thought it necessary to introduce. The suppression of feudal rights, and the equalisation of burthens and taxes, are the circumstances which excite the chief animosity; though all enlightened politicians have proved to a demonstration, that they are the only means of recovering Prussia from the unfortunate situation in which she was placed by the consequences of the last war, and by her ancient organization, which no longer harmonises with the other states of Europe."

—Now, I am sure that I shall not be told by any of our writers, that this would have been published at Paris without the approbation of Napoleon; and, if he approved of this, is it to be believed, that he would sanction a dispatch containing the sentiments of the *Impostor Paper*?—But, what signifies it to us what his opinions about government are? What have his opinions to do with us? If he could conquer our country, he would, of course, do what he liked with us as to government; but who is coward enough to sup-

pose that he will be able to do that, if we be resolved to defend our country? The man who can calculate upon the possibility of a conquest of the country, will never do much towards defending it; and, if a whole people could so calculate, they might be set down as more than half conquered already.—What, then, is the sense of this vile imposture? How, supposing it to be generally believed, could it operate in the way that the venal inventors would have it, namely, to make us all resolve never to have peace with Napoleon? He may think even as they represent him as thinking; he may be the author of such a paper; but, is that a reason for us to do either more or less against him! Are we never to have peace with him, because he wishes (as they tell us) to see our government annihilated? Why, do not we wish to see his government annihilated? Is there scarcely a day which does not bring forth an expression of this sort from our venal prints? And, yet, I'll warrant you, he never will be fool enough to call upon the people of France to fight up to their knees in blood on that account. This is a ground of eternal war that he would never be fool enough to put forward, whatever he think or wish.—The inventors of this stupid forgery seem to have known nothing at all of the bias of the parties, to whom they ascribe the agency in the publication; for, Mr. John Quincy Adams, who is the American Minister at Petersburg, has no such leaning towards this country as they state him to have; and, though his father, Mr. John Adams, the successor of General Washington in the Presidency, had formerly such leaning, he has long since changed his opinion, and has frankly stated it to the people of America. And, besides, how improbable is it, that he should have made public a paper confidentially communicated to his son, a Foreign Minister, and still residing at the court who confidentially communicated the paper to him!—After all, however, the best answer of all is, the flat denial of the fact of publication in the *American Newspaper*. It is stated in the *Courier* and *Times*, that the paper was published in the *New York Advertiser* of the 24th of June. Now, I believe, that there is no paper of that title; but, this I know, that other New York papers of the 24th, 25th of June, and from that day regularly on to the 12th of July, contain not only no such article, but no mention of, or allusion to, such article. So that the whole thing ap-

pears to be a sheer fabrication; a poor, mean, base device to answer the most silly purpose that can be imagined. Men, capable of such an act, are capable of any thing: of such men every thing bad is to be presumed; and, there can be no room for doubt, that, if they had it in their power, they would alter and falsify any real dispatch, state paper, or any other document, provided only that they thought such falsification calculated to answer their purpose. Whether this shameful attempt at deception may produce its proper effect, that is, prevent the authors of it from being ever believed again, is more than I can say; but, of this I am sure, that, if it does not produce that effect, this nation is doomed to fall a sacrifice to falsehood, fraud, and imposture, practised upon it by the most weak and cowardly, though the most malignant of mankind.

W^m. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate. Friday,
August 9, 1811.*

GOLDEN RULES FOR JURYMEN.

From that excellent Work, Sir Richard Phillips's "POWERS AND DUTIES OF JURIES," a Work which every man in England ought to read.

1. An honest Jurymen should die, rather than consent to a verdict which he feels to be unjust; or which in his own private judgment is not warranted by incontrovertible affirmative evidence.

2. The worst of social miseries being oppression, under colour and form of law, the sole hope and dependence of accused persons is on the good sense, integrity, and firmness of honest men in the Jury-box.

3. The attendance of Jurymen at any trial might have been dispensed with, if any other opinion than their own were to make the decision; and their office would be a mockery on themselves, on the parties, and on their country, if their decisions were not their own, and were not unshackled and independent.

4. In framing the verdict, every Jurymen is bound to exercise his own judgment, to give his private opinion freely and boldly, to remember his oath, and not to forget that the sole and entire object of the institution of Juries is to decide on their own consciences in regard to the points at issue.

5. The Jury are bound to decide, fully and finally on the point at issue by a ge-

neral verdict, unless some mere point of law is expressly reserved and stated by desire of the Judge; but such special verdict should be final and conclusive in regard to the facts.

6. Every man is presumed to be innocent, till he has clearly been proved to be guilty; no man being bound, required, or expected, to prove his own innocence, the onus of the proof of guilt lying entirely on the accuser.

7. It is better that a hundred guilty persons escape punishment, than that one innocent man should be unjustly convicted.

8. The issue of a criminal trial involves every thing dear to the accused, if he be found guilty; but his acquittal, if perchance he were guilty, is comparatively unimportant to the public.

9. Every Jurymen should do to the accused, or to plaintiff and defendant, as he would those parties should do to him were their situations changed.

10. As the decision of a Jury must be unanimous, every Jurymen is individually responsible to his own conscience, and morally responsible to the parties for the justice or injustice of the verdict.

11. A Jurymen should discharge his mind from preconceived prejudices, be on his guard against prejudices of the Court, and decide on facts only, and on the valid evidence sworn in Court.

12. He should carefully consider how far the evidence sanctions the charge of a criminal design, no act being criminal, or involving guilt and responsibility, which was not committed with a criminal mind or intention.

13. No man is punishable for the crime or act of another; so that no prejudice should lie against a prisoner, or person accused, because a crime has been committed, if it is not brought home to him by distinct and indubitable testimony.

14. Warning to others, and not revenge on the culprit, is the design of legal punishment; the decisions of Juries should, therefore, be made dispassionately, and not be influenced by sinister appeals to their feelings.

15. The subsequent punishment is generally founded on the abstract fact of the conviction, and not always influenced by the merits or demerits of the case; therefore, as the laws are made for extreme cases, the Jury ought to recommend the convicted to mercy, as often as they perceive a justifiable reason.

16. In assessing damages between party

and party, Jurymen should respect that equitable principle of *Magna Charta*, cap. 14, which in amercements even to the Crown reserves to every man the means of future subsistence; to a husbandman his implements; to a workman his tools; and to a merchant his merchandise.

17. In trying charges of libel, sedition, or treason, the Jury should be vigilantly on their guard against prejudices raised by the influence of the Administration for the time being; and they should bear in mind that it is in such causes chiefly that Juries are so eminently the barriers of public liberty, and the guardians of weak individuals against concentrated power.

18. In libel causes, Juries ought to know that Mr. Fox's Libel Bill has legally constituted them the sole independent judges of the intention of the parties; and consequently it lies entirely in their own judgment and discretion, to decide on the merit, the innocence, or the criminality, of an alledged libel.

19. He should commit the material points to writing, weigh maturely the evidence on both sides, and decide on his own intuitive perceptions of right and wrong.

20. The Foreman should ascertain and equally respect every opinion in the Jury. The verdict when unanimously settled, should be solemnly delivered; and in debating upon it every Jurymen should recollect that he is acting for his country; and that for the time being he is the arbiter of justice, and the living guardian for his posterity of those rights of Jurymen, which have been transmitted to him by his forefathers.

IMPOSTOR PAPER.

The following Paper was first published, in England, in the COURIER news-paper of the 30th of July, 1811.—The Publisher pretends, that he took it from an American Paper, the New York Advertiser of the 24th of June.—It is manifestly a fabrication from the beginning to the end; and there can be no doubt that its object was to cheat the people of England.—It was stated, in the COURIER, that this paper was delivered to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, that he sent it to his court, that his court gave a copy of it to Mr. John Quincy Adams, American Minister at Petersburg, that he sent a copy to his father in America, and that his father published it through the New York Ad-

vertiser.—The whole is a falsehood, but the device is curious, and worthy of being recorded.

By the command of his Majesty the Emperor and King, my most gracious Sovereign, I transmit to your Excellency the following confidential communication. It displays an impartial view of the great question of peace and war; it shews clearly the source from which the past and present misery of mankind originate and flow. Had, some centuries ago, the British islands been swallowed up in the sea that encompass them, the European Continent would have contained only a grand and united family. Witnessing its superior civilization and prosperity, the inhabitants of the other parts of the world would then have strived to obtain with it social compact, or a political adoption. The slaughter of generations, and the devastation of nations would then have been unknown. A slight chastisement would then have been sufficient to intimidate the refractory, and to correct the disobedient. The true God would then have been worshipped by all nations. Dutiful subjects would then have hailed their prince as another providence. But when men begin to canvass the adoration of their heavenly Creator, they will not long hesitate to assail the prerogatives of their earthly Sovereigns. Rebellion is the twin brother of impiety: anarchy and atheism are their common offspring. The English Wickliff had the sacrilegious audacity to propose innovations in religion, long before the Bohemian Huss and the Saxon Luther proclaimed themselves heretics. The latter would not have dared to stir, had not England already distributed its poison among the Germans; they merely took advantage of a contagion, suffered to become popular by the ignorance and vices of the clergy, and by the apathy and impolicy of governments. Since this time, in particular, England has never been quiet within herself, and has never ceased to disturb the tranquillity of all other states. As might have been foreseen, the success of the religious innovators encouraged the attempt of political incendiaries. The Continent was inundated with the blasphemous and perverse reveries of English antichristians and English antimonarchists. They sapped the very foundation of social order. To prove their thorough contempt for all institutions, divine as well as sacred, they opened their temples to the most ignorant and vicious

of fanatics, delivered the most virtuous of their Kings into the hands of the most ferocious of regicides. How many millions of Continental Europeans have not bled, because these islanders had with impunity braved their God and butchered their Monarch? (Alas! said feelingly, his Imperial and Royal Majesty,* without their enormous perpetrations, Louis XVI might still have reigned, and a happy obscurity been my lot. Supreme authority is but an inadequate indemnity for my anxiety and labour to be the worthy sovereign of the greatest of nations.) In fact, if the infernal assassins of Louis XVI were debased Frenchmen, they had been tutored by English sophistry; they had been misled by the examples, or seduced by the gold, of the English factions. Is it not England alone which at this moment distracts Europe, and causes the blood of its children to be lavished in Turkey, Germany, Spain, Sicily, and Portugal? Has not his Imperial and Royal Majesty almost yearly, and in the midst of his most splendid achievements, presented the olive branch, always interwoven with laurels, to ungrateful England? How often has he not, from the bottom of his patriotic soul, in vain exclaimed "Englishmen, I love you as men, and I esteem you as warriors! Let all human carnage be at an end! Let outraged humanity recover its too long lost rights! Let us be friends upon terms reciprocally honourable! Let our future rivalry be to enlighten, instead of destroying our fellow-beings!" But his Imperial and Royal Majesty has addressed himself to a Government too weak to dare to be just, and too powerful not to be able to do mischief; and to a nation too selfish to feel for the sufferings of others, and too licentious to attend to its real interests. It cannot longer be doubted, that mankind must continue to be disturbed, until the Constitution of the British Empire is reformed in a manner more congenial with the spirit of the constitutional charters, which at present secure the dignity and the power of sovereigns, and the obedience and safety of the subjects of the Continent. To effect such a salutary reform in the British Islands, the principal European Cabinets must be unanimous in their resolves, and firm and vigorous in their proceedings. England must fall prostrate if the Continent remain upright. The division and weakness of other States com-

pose her whole strength. Another Constitution must be offered her. If she prudently adopts it, her independence and dominions will be guaranteed: but if she is blind and obstinate enough to refuse, a solemn decree of all civilized governments will repudiate her for ever from the great family of the European commonwealth; and she shall be ranked for the future among the piratical States of Africa. No more neutrals shall be endured. Capital punishments shall be inflicted on the master and crew of the ships of any foreign country trading with her; and the law of high-treason shall be executed on smugglers, purchasers and sellers of her productions and commodities. These plans and regulations may at an imperfect view appear rather severe; but without them, a truce alone can be signed; but a peace can never be concluded between her and the Continent. This severity towards her is, therefore a real humanity with regard to all nations upon the globe, not excluding Great Britain herself. This fact may be proved without any difficulty, or the possibility of a contradiction. If Englishmen were made of those materials that compose all other people, it would require little knowledge of the human mind to foretell the most flattering issue, without resorting to extremities; but they differ totally from the rest of the human species.—Who can deny, that a British King, according to the organized constitutional anarchy of his kingdom, is now the most humble of slaves? When the monarch is not free, how dare his subjects talk of liberty? The truth is, that the bondage of Englishmen becomes heavier as it ascends; it emanates from the lowest of the rabble, a set of petty tyrants, ignorant and brutal, corrupt and oppressive.—Is that Monarch not a slave who is deprived of selecting his own counsellors and servants? Who, during a reign of half a century, has, among scores of ministers, not been surrounded by ten he could like or trust; by six, he could love or esteem? Are the fetters of that royal parent light, who during months is forced to see and hear a beloved son the butt of the most malignant passions, of the most malignant and debased of men? Do these ministers deserve the name of freemen, who are obliged to be undutiful and ungrateful to the Prince who has elevated them; to flatter a licentious mob, that despise and insult them? What must we

* Buonaparte,

think of the beads or hearts of sworn royal counsellors, who dare not save the bosom of their prince from torture and the character of his child from unjust ignominy: though they must know that the tormentors are the most profligate of villains, and the most unprincipled of conspirators? What must be the standard of the honour of a nobility, that not only not interposes between the infamous assassins of a prince of the blood, but suffers some of its own members to act as accomplices in the assault? Can those representatives of the people make any pretence to liberty, loyalty, or patriotism, who do not expel or punish the factions among them that try to stab monarchy by bespattering the son of their monarch? What freedom or what loyalty must these pretended friends of the throne possess, who, to shew their attachment to the royal family, purchase openly their future silence about one of the sons of their king, whom it was hardly possible any new slander could degrade, more than unnaturally to involve another son of the King in the disgrace of his brother? Can any decency or any loyalty be supposed to exist among the citizens of the first city of the British empire, who not only join the wild fiends of their sovereign every where, but encourage the senseless pratings of insolent and ignorant shopkeepers; never opening their mouths but to babble impertinence—but to bawl out treason? Did a single county interpose in the shamefully and cruelly audacious hunt of the Royal victim? Did not, on the contrary, every county emulate in this race of infamy, which should be foremost to wound the feeling of a venerable king, and to recompense the outrageous perpetrations of the bitter enemies of his domestic peace as much as his royal supremacy? Is it not evident, even to the most superficial observer, that either sound morality or rational liberty must be wanting in the British nation? If it would be uncharitable to suppose the former, it would also be ridiculous not to see the total absence of the latter.—In Great Britain faction maddles with every thing and every body: even the king is faction, in self-defence, for self-preservation. Have not however, both in ancient and modern times; both in Greece and France; both in Rome and in England; have not factions always been the most oppressive of despots? Have not factions always and every where, been the

companions of licentiousness, and the assassins of freedom? Have not factions at all times been intolerant, daring, unjust and incorrigible? To judge by the scandalous scenes in the British Islands, which an indignant continent has lamented of late, little hope remains that the factions there would desist from their nefarious deeds, were even France (as she might do) to produce damning evidence, for centuries past up to this very time, of every chief of factions; of every usurper of the name of patriot; and of every candidate for popularity in Great Britain, having either fixed his price to, or intrigued with, the enemies of his country; either accepted bribes, or received instructions, from rival or inimical cabinets. Though the majority might be convinced, a desperate minority would command. In England as has been the case in France, factions can never be mended: they must be extirpated. Some few persons, ambitious or bankrupt in characters and fortunes, will always, under the existence of the actual constitution of a Royal democracy, find opportunities to mislead the ignorant and to head the needy and the disaffected, in committing excesses dangerous to the peace of Europe, by contagious examples.—It belongs to history, to recapitulate the many recent acts of the daring spirit of British factions, and of their influence on the internal and external politics of Great Britain—of their crimes towards humanity—of their common ferocity and barbarity. But had they not power, after trampling under their feet a Prince of the royal blood to extol the exploits of a General, who deliberated when he ought to have acted, who advanced when he should have retreated, and whose retreat was a disorderly flight before a handful of pursuers; while they force another General to resign, though victorious, because the climate, the elements, and other unforeseen occurrences, prevent him from succeeding to the whole extent of extravagant expectations? Have they not forced their king to leave unpunished a political agent,* who deserved to be impeached for want of ability or of integrity, in disobeying and disregarding his instructions? Have they not forced their King to leave unrewarded another political agent†, whose firmness, and whose obedience to the orders of his sovereign, exposed him to public insult and

* Erskine.

† Jackson.

personal dangers? Have they not forced their King to swallow, without daring to resent, these and other provocations, though offered by the most weak and contemptible of governments?† But in all the branches of the constitutional establishments of Great Britain, factions sway an anarchical iron sceptre, confounding, deranging, and invading all order. Has not a captain in the British fleet, cruising in Europe, dragged his admiral before a court-martial? Though the latter has been honourably acquitted, have not factions shielded the accuser from punishment? Have not officers serving in the British army in India seduced the soldiers to mutiny? Have they not, backed by faction, added rebellion to insubordination, and held out the most dastardly and perjurious proceeding as meritorious acts of patriotism and of retaliating justice? Is not the licentiousness of the British press such, that, protected and patronized by factions, a convicted libeller,§ published from his prison the most inflammatory of essays, defying the laws, and exciting civil discords: insulting equally the Judge who condemned him, and the Government that carried their sentence into execution? Has not a Chief of Faction,|| who is also a Member of Parliament, honestly told his assembly, that the nation was not represented by its Representatives, and that their country was not worth defending? Were they not instantly all on fire,—those very factions that shortly before, with such admirable and philosophical patience, heard the son of their King most unmercifully ill-used? Did not these friends of liberty immediately decree a mandate of arrest against the declaimer of this disagreeable truth, of this bold frankness? Now, British anarchy exhibited itself in all its dreadful glory. Faction combats faction. Numbers of lives are lost in the very streets of the capital, where a civil war rages with all its fury. But, mark; when, at last, the humanity of the King orders his guards to prevent farther bloodshed, a factious Jury pronounces them murderous, because they did their duty, and did not submit to be murdered themselves by the hands of the rebellious faction!!!—The proprietors of a theatre in London augment a trifle the prices of admittance. Englishmen, like the Romans of sanguinary memory, do not miss such a propitious opportunity

to create new factions. The most disgusting scenes, the effects of the most shameful licentiousness, transform the theatre into a field of battle for boxers and bruisers, for strumpets and pickpockets. Among a people that talk so much of respect for property, the property of individuals is openly invaded, and obliged to submit to the ruinous maximum of dictatorial factions. Ought it not to be apprehended, that prosperous anarchy will not stop at the door or in the pit of a theatre, but sooner or later force an entrance into banks, offices, and magazines: there, also, to affix its maximum—to inflict its requisitions?—Since the wisdom of his imperial and royal Majesty has instructed the Continent with regard to its true interest, continental warriors are no longer tributary to insular pedlars; and Englishmen, who, in exchange for their dearly sold superfluities, received from foreigners those necessities almost for nothing, began to dread a famine. To lessen the consumption for grain, government looked for some substitute for the distilleries. Their warehouses weighing down with perishable colonial produce; sugar naturally presented itself, and was proposed. The owners of lands took instant alarm; they formed an opposition; and during months, the grain and the sugar factions; with the theatrical and reforming factions; with the naval and the military factions; with the jacobin, the city, and the parliamentary factions; continued to engage the whole attention of a truly factious, divided, and licentious people. This is not the only instance when the interior of London forms a striking resemblance with the interior of Constantinople, at the period the Mussulmen were at its walls, and with their scymetars soon settled the disputes of the contending sects and parties.—Every foreign invader of the British Islands has become conqueror. Bankruptcy may dismantle, mutiny may disperse, storms may destroy, and victory may capture fleets, hitherto the sole protectors of Great Britain against the just wrath of his imperial and royal Majesty. Submission alone can prevent Britons from being, like the Batavians, erased from the list of independent nations. Resistance may retard in making more terrible the catastrophe, but it cannot alter their destiny. They have no choice left between obedience or conquest. The reigning House never produced a hero; and the domestic virtues of a Prince, ruling this turbulent and factious people,

† United States. § Cobbett. || Burdett.

are weak pledges that the repose of continental nations will not still be disturbed or invaded. It remains, however, to be decided, whether a change of dynasty will be necessary, or a change of constitution will be thought sufficient. Long ago, the mere assent of his imperial and royal Majesty might have produced a general overthrow. Long ago have different factions caused to be laid before his imperial and royal Majesty, both requests for receiving support, and plans for effecting revolutions. But these are not times to encourage subjects to undermine established thrones. Monarchs alone shall hereafter be the judges of monarchs; and woe to the Prince who resorts to an appeal to his people against the sentence of his equals!!! He has ceased to reign.

(Signed) Duke of CADORE.

Fountainbleau, Oct. 30, 1810.

To his Excellency———,

(Most Confidential.)

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—TARRAGONA.—Paris, 25th July, 1811.—*Literal Translation of a Report of the Siege of Tarragona, which GENERAL CONTRERAS, Ex-Governor of that place, addressed to the Council of Regency. (Concluded from p. 160.)*

..... Before the fall of the place, I wrote and declared openly, that, upon the system on which operations were carried on, or rather, to speak more properly, meditated; the fortress, the garrison, and the army, would infallibly be lost. The Superior Junta of the principality can inform you of this, because I always took care to acquaint them with what was passing; on their side, they did all that they could, in order that the operation of raising the siege might be attempted, the only operation which it was necessary to be employed about and to execute without delay, and in concert with me, whatever were the numbers and nature of the enemy's force which we had to combat; but it was all in vain, and every day all this was less thought of at head-quarters, as will appear from the letter of General Campoverde, in which he orders me to send him 3,000 of the best troops of the garrison, who were to be embarked in the night of the 27th, under the orders of Colonel O'Rouan, who came to me for that purpose at eleven at night. I gave orders that he should embark with the regiment of Almeria; but this arrangement did not

take place, and no one has seen O'Rouan again.—From the same letter may be seen the confusion which reigned at head-quarters, where the Marquis of Campo-verde believed that a division of 4,000 English had arrived in the place, and the English Commandant assured me that he had only 1,000 men, who had left Cadix on the 9th of June. The Marquis also wished that the troops which he demanded of me should be embarked the same night, and he could not but know that this was impossible, for I had no other means but those which the English lent me, and the latter had then none that were disposable.

AMERICAN STATES and ENGLAND.—*Letter of Commodore JOHN ROGERS to the Secretary of the Navy of the United States, relative to a rencontre with the English Ship, LITTLE BELT.—Dated, on board the United States Frigate, the PRESIDENT, off Sandy Hook, 23rd May, 1811.*

Sir; I regret extremely being under the necessity of representing to you an event that occurred on the night of the 16th instant, between the ship under my command, and his Britannic Majesty's ship of war, the Little Belt, commanded by Captain Bingham, the result of which has given me much pain, as well on account of the injury she sustained, as that I should have been compelled to the measure that produced it, by a vessel of her inferior force. The circumstances are as follow: on the 16th instant, at twenty-five minutes past meridian, in 17 fathoms water, Cape Henry bearing S. W. distant fourteen or fifteen leagues, a sail was discovered from our mast head in the east, standing towards us under a press of sail. At half past one the symmetry of her upper sails (which were at this time distinguishable from our deck) and her making signals, shewed her to be a man of war. At 45 minutes past one, P. M. hoisted our ensign and pendant; when, finding her signals not answered, she wore and stood to the southward. Being desirous of speaking her, and of ascertaining what she was, I now made sail in chase; and by half-past three, P. M. found we were coming up with her, as by this time the upper part of her stern began to shew itself above the horizon. The wind now began, and continued gradually to decrease, so as to prevent my being able to approach her sufficiently before sun-set, to discover her actual force, (which the

position she preserved during the chase was calculated to conceal) or to judge even to what nation she belonged, as she appeared studiously to decline shewing her colours. At fifteen or twenty minutes past seven, *p. m.* the chase took in her studding sails, and soon after hauled up her courses, and hauled by the wind on the starboard tack; she at the same time hoisted an ensign or flag at her mizen peak, but it was too dark for me to discover what nation it represented; now, for the first time, her broadside was presented to our view; but night had so far progressed, that although her appearance indicated she was a frigate, I was unable to determine her actual force.—At fifteen minutes before eight, *p. m.* being about a mile and a half from her, the wind at the time very light, I directed Capt. Ludlow to take a position to windward of her, and on the same tack, within shore speaking distance. This, however, the commander of the chase appeared from his manœuvres to be anxious to prevent, as he wore and hauled by the wind on different tacks four times successively between this period and the time of our arriving at the position, which I had ordered to be taken. At 15 or 20 minutes past eight, being a little forward of her weather beam, and distant from 70 to 100 yards, I hailed “what ship is that?” To this inquiry no answer was given, but I was hailed by her Commander and asked “what ship is that?”—Having asked the first question, I of course considered myself entitled by the common rules of politeness to the first answer; after a pause of 15 or 20 seconds, I reiterated my first inquiry of “What ship is that?” and before I had time to take the trumpet from my mouth, was answered by a shot, that cut off one of our maintop-mast breast back stays, and went into our main-mast. At this instant Captain Caldwell (of Marines) who was standing very near to me on the gangway, having observed “Sir, she has fired at us,” caused me to pause for a moment; just as I was in the act of giving an order to fire a shot in return, and before I had time to resume the repetition of the intended order, a shot was actually fired from the second division of this ship, and was scarcely out of the gun before it was answered from our assumed enemy by three others in quick succession, and soon

after the rest of his broadside and musketry. When the first shot was fired, being under an impression that it might possibly have proceeded from accident and without the orders of the Commander, I had determined at the moment to fire only a single shot in return; but the immediate repetition of the previous unprovoked outrage induced me to believe that the insult was premeditated, and that from our adversary being at the time as ignorant of our real force as I was of his, he thought this, perhaps, a favourable opportunity of acquiring promotion, although at the expence of violating our neutrality and insulting our flag; I accordingly with that degree of repugnance incident to feeling equally determined neither to be the aggressor, or to suffer the flag of my country to be insulted with impunity, gave a general order to fire; the effect of which, in from four to six minutes, as near as I can judge, having produced a partial silence of his guns, I gave orders to cease firing, discovering by the feeble opposition that it must be a ship of very inferior force to what I had supposed, or that some untoward accident had happened to her.—My orders in this instance however, although they proceeded alone from motives of humanity and a determination not to spill a drop of blood unnecessarily, I had in less than four minutes some reason to regret, as he renewed his fire, of which two 32-pound shot cut off one of our fore shrouds and injured our foremast. It was now that I found myself under the painful necessity of giving orders for a repetition of our fire against a force which my forbearance alone had enabled to do us any injury of moment; our fire was accordingly renewed and continued from three to five minutes longer, when perceiving our opponent’s gaff and colours down, his maintop-sail yard upon the cap, and his fire silenced, although it was so dark that I could not discern any other particular injury we had done, or how far he was in a situation to do us farther harm, I nevertheless embraced the earliest moment to stop our fire and prevent the further effusion of blood. Here a pause of half a minute or more took place, at the end of which, our adversary not shewing a further disposition to fire, I hailed, and again asked “what ship is that?”

(To be continued.)

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"I shall be told, that, at the end of the year, the Restrictions expire. Yes; so they do; but a year is a long while; many things happen in a year; and, if all other matters hold together till next February, Mr. Perceval must be a very lame man indeed, if he be not then much more powerful than he now is, and if the Prince have not much stronger reasons for keeping him than he had for choosing him."—Political Register, 6th Feb. 1811, page 311, Vol. XIX.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

IRISH CATHOLICS.—By referring to another part of this Number the reader will see an account, the best that I have been able to collect, of what has recently passed, and is now passing in what is sometimes tenderly called "our Sister Kingdom," relative to the Catholics and their petition.——The object of this petition has been so often discussed, and has been so fully explained, that it is hardly possible that any one who can read English should want any further particulars of information upon that head. Suffice it to say here, just for the sake of giving shape to the statement of the case, that the Catholics of Ireland have long complained of the existence of certain penal laws levelled against them as Catholics, and by which laws they are excluded from certain benefits which they think they ought to enjoy in common with the rest of their fellow-subjects. To obtain, therefore, a repeal of these laws, they have repeatedly petitioned the two Houses of Parliament, and their petition has been as repeatedly rejected by majorities of those Houses. It is well known, that it was for espousing the cause of the Irish Catholics that Pitt was, as it was then thought, turned out of place in 1801; though it afterwards became manifest to every one who was capable of close observation, that this was a mere pretence, and that, in fact, he went out of place to avoid the shame of the measures then become absolutely necessary as to the war and the finances; for, we saw him return to place again without stipulating for any thing in favour of the Catholics, and, what is more, we saw him, now become minister again, oppose, ay oppose, and successfully oppose too, a petition for that very measure, which because he was not permitted to adopt himself he had, as he pretended, before quitted his place. These transactions will be well remembered; and, the reader will also bear in mind, that it was the same cause,

to all appearance, that turned out the Whigs. They had pledged themselves to the Catholics of Ireland; or, at least, they had taken that part with respect to them, that they could not refuse to do something. That something they attempted; and that attempt was made the pretence to turn them out of place, as men who wished to restore the authority of the Pope in England as well as in Ireland, and to rekindle the fires in Smithfield. Still, however, the Irish Catholics have continued to complain and to petition; and this brings us to our subject; for, it is as to the mode of obtaining a concurrence of the Catholics in the petition, that the dispute, which now agitates Ireland, has arisen.——The mode pursued or pursuing by the Catholics was this: the Catholics of each county, or other district, were to meet, and some had met, to choose Delegates to speak and act for them, and in their name, in a general meeting, called a Committee, to be held thereafter at such place as should be agreed upon, and which Committee was, besides, to be composed of the Catholic Peers and Baronets. The Delegates, thus assembled in Committee, were, of course, to discuss all matters relating to the object in view, that is to say, to the success of the petition intended next to be presented.——The government, alarmed at the progress of the cause, did not say to the Catholics that they should not petition; it did not forbid them to petition; that would have been taking from them the right which even Paine says was left us freeborn Englishmen by the Whigs at the Revolution: no, it did not say, that the Irish Catholics should not enjoy any longer the right of petitioning, that is to say the right of praying, and of humbly praying too: it did not forbid the Irish Catholics to enjoy this invaluable blessing of a "glorious constitution;" but, it forbade the Irish Catholics to choose Delegates for purposes connected with their petition; it forbade them to have representatives in this work of petitioning; it

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forbade them to pray by proxy; it seemed to say, "come yourselves if you like; "come in person with your humble "prayers, but none of your praying by "deputy."—To enforce this the government, on the 30th of July, issued a Proclamation forbidding the election of Delegates and also the meeting of such persons as had been already chosen Delegates, and calling upon all Magistrates, Sheriffs and others, to be aiding and assisting in the enforcement of such prohibition. Yet, notwithstanding this Proclamation, the Committee met the next day, and passed Resolutions expressive of their decided opinion, that the Proclamation was contrary to law; but, it appears, that, on the 8th of August, a warrant was issued by the Chief Justice of the King's Bench, Downes, upon which warrant several persons were taken up and carried before him, who admitted them to bail to stand their trial for the offence alledged against them. There appears to have been, at this beginning, only five persons arrested, namely, Edward Sheridan, Thomas Kirwan, Gregory Scurlog, H. Edmond Taaffe, and Dr. John Breen, the first for being chosen a Delegate at a place called Liffy Street Chapel, and the other four for acting as electors.—Thus stands the matter at this time. The Catholics deny that the Proclamation is lawful. It has been grounded, as the reader will see, upon an Act passed in the year 1793 (the famous year of the Antijacobin war), called the *Convention Act*; and this Act, the Catholics say, does not forbid what *they* have now been doing, and cannot be construed to mean any such prohibition.—There are several lights in which this question is to be viewed; and the first is, whether the Proclamation be agreeable to law; or, rather, what is the meaning of the law; for, a Proclamation, not founded in law, is no more than an old ballad or one of the quack puffs that are handed out to people passing through Temple Bar. The Convention Act was intended to put an end to the Societies formed and forming, in 1793, for the purpose of procuring a Parliamentary Reform; but, it made "unlawful "assemblies" of all meetings of persons, who should be "elected by any part of "the people, under pretence of petitioning for, or, in any other manner, procuring an alteration of matters established by law in Church or State."—That this Act had not the Catholics in view is very plain; for, at the time it was

passed, the Union, which gave rise to the present complaints of the Catholics, had not taken place. The Convention Act was intended solely to prevent the meeting of Delegates, bodies of whom were then forming in England and Scotland as well as in Ireland, and the main object of whom was a Reform in the Commons' House of Parliament. What has succeeded the passing of that Act we all pretty well know; we see and feel the effects of it and similar Acts daily and hourly; and we have, perhaps, only had, as yet, a mere taste of those effects. But, what we have now to consider is, whether the Act in question can be fairly construed to extend to the present case. The Act says, that the assembly shall be considered unlawful, if it take place under *pretence* of petitioning; and, therefore, if it can be proved, that there was no *pretence* at all in this case, but that the object *really* was to prepare and present a petition, I do not see how it is possible to make it out that an assembly of the Catholics upon this occasion was an unlawful assembly; and, if it was not unlawful before the proclamation was issued, let it be well recollected, that the issuing of the proclamation did not, and could not make it so.—The Convention Act was passed for the purpose of preventing forced innovations: it was passed to prevent the people from choosing men, whose object, it was asserted, was to make great alterations in the government. Now, will any one pretend to say that the Catholic delegates come under this description. Their object is, and long has been, well known; it has been clearly defined; every body understands it. The Catholic delegates are merely the messengers from the several districts of the kingdom, bearing the people's wishes as to the petition. And, let it be observed, that this petition has in view, *no alteration* in Church or State. It leaves the church and the state just as they now are. It prays, indeed, that the petitioners may be admitted to partake in certain emoluments and honours, which the government has to bestow: It prays that the petitioners may be relieved from the odium of exclusion: it prays that they may be placed upon the same footing as the rest of their fellow subjects: and I put it to any man of common sense, whether such a petition can be said to contemplate an alteration of matters established by law in Church or State. I think that such a man will answer in the negative; for, if this be not the case, what

is there that we can petition about which may not be said to belong to matters established by law, in Church or State? It is well known that there are many German and Aristocratic French officers and also Dutch officers in our army. There is an act of parliament that provides that these men may serve and may obtain high rank though they be Roman Catholics. Now, shall it be said, that the Irish; that any number of Irish Gentlemen, because they are met for the purpose of framing a petition, praying that they may be placed upon a footing not less favourable than these Germans and Frenchmen; shall it be said that such a meeting of Irish Gentlemen, aims at an alteration of matters established by law, in Church or State? Shall it be said that they are an *unlawful assembly*?—It was seen, at the time of passing the Convention Act, that it might be said to be intended to stifle all petitioning at once; and, therefore, a clause was introduced, providing that the Act should not be construed, in any manner, to prevent or impede the undoubted right of his Majesty's subjects to petition him or the Houses of Parliament for a redress of any public or private grievance. Yet, we see, that now this Act is made use of for the purpose of preventing the Catholics of Ireland from pursuing those means which, they assert, are absolutely necessary to come at a full and fair expression of their wishes. In every case of this sort the success of a petition must evidently depend, not only upon the numbers of the petitioners, but, upon their unanimity also. And how, I should be glad to know are the numbers or the wishes of the Irish Catholics to be fully ascertained, except by the means of delegates, or persons under some other name, appointed for the purpose of bringing those numbers and those wishes to one point? The opponents of Parliamentary Reform have often urged upon us, that there are no petitions; that the people do not want a Reform, if they did they would ask for it. But, is it not manifest, that, in order to collect the wishes of a whole people, you must form in the first place something of an elective body? They call out to us for petitions; but, the moment any one sets about the only mode of collecting them, he is acting unlawfully, and must abide by the consequences. We are thus placed in a situation like that of poor Sancho at the Banquet. We, like the Irish Catholics, have free liberty to peti-

tion, and those who oppose us, only wish to deprive us of the means of doing it. —But, the ministerial papers tell us; they assert, and in the most unqualified manner, that the professed object of the Catholics is not their real object; that the doors of the legislature are always open to them; that their petitions have been received, and have been discussed with the utmost solemnity; that emancipation is of no more importance to them than a child's rattle, and that they say so; that they want a repeal of the Union, a popish parliament, separation from Great Britain, and, perhaps, other connections; "these objects," say they, "if you will" but sit quietly by while we pursue, "will render us indifferent as to Catholic emancipation. *Such is the language of "the Catholics."*—Such is not the language of the Catholics, and all these assertions, so boldly made in the *Courier* of the 13th instant, are just so many base and atrocious falsehoods. The same writer says, that the real object of the Catholics is to arm the people against the government, and, in short, to rouse the country to rebellion.—The man who writes this knows it to be false; but he knows that it is likely to answer his purpose, namely that of awaking the old prejudices in the minds of some classes of the people in England and Scotland, who, it must be confessed, have been but too ready to listen to accusations such as are here presented, and thereby to prevent the adoption of those measures which have, so long, been necessary to the real union, the strength and the happiness of the kingdom. —Yet, as if it were to be taken for granted, that the Catholics of Ireland really wish for a separation from England and a connection with France, the same writer goes on to observe, that he need not wish them a severer punishment than they would meet with in the accomplishment of their wishes. It is hardly possible to conceive any thing more unjust, any thing more injurious than these charges against the Catholics. Herein, however, the Catholics have a lesson: they will now see that there is nothing to exempt them, so long as they have complaints to make, from the lot of all others who venture to complain of grievances; which lot invariably is, to be accused of partiality for the enemy, of designs to overturn the settled order of things, of a wish to produce confusion and bloodshed, and, in short, of being the worst of sub-

jects and the worst of men.—After these false and base accusations against the principal persons amongst the Catholics, this writer turns round and pays his court to the mass of the Irish people. “We except,” says he, “the great mass of the Irish people from any participation in such wishes. They know that they are not restricted in the exercise of their religion, that they are not prevented from the right of petitioning; they remain calm and tranquil, because they do not want the blessings of Buonaparté’s system; because they do not desire to make common cause with those who wish for separation from England and connection with France.”—Well, now, if this be true, what an argument is here, against the measures which have been recently adopted in Ireland. We are here told that the mass of the people in that country know that they are not restricted in the exercise of their religion, that they enjoy the full right of petition, that they desire no separation from England and no connection with France, that they are too wise to want any of the blessings of Buonaparté’s system; and that, therefore, they remain calm and tranquil.—Do they so indeed? And is this their way of thinking? If this be true, why are you afraid to let them meet together? What danger could possibly arise from their assembling? Nay, thou base and venal man, why do you suppose, that they would meet at all? If this, which you have given, be the true character of the thoughts and the views of the mass of the people in Ireland, how is it possible that the peace of the country should be endangered by any calls made upon those people for any purpose whatever, much less for the purpose of choosing delegates to be the bearers of their sentiments and their wishes; and which delegates would, of course, be such men as were conspicuous for their hatred of the system of Buonaparté, for the abhorrence of a separation from England, and their still greater abhorrence of a connection with France?—Thus is this vender of falsehoods convicted out of his own lips. But so it always happens to those who have not truth for their guide. This writer looking back upon the former part of his Article, perceived, that its natural tendency was to cause it to be believed that rebellion was a prevalent desire in Ireland; and that, in fact, he had been writing and publishing an invitation to the

enemy to invade that country. Oh! says he, this will not do. And yet I must not suppress my accusations. I will, therefore, make a distinction between these Catholic leaders and the Catholics in general; and I will say that these latter hate Buonaparté and love the present order of things; and thus I shall counteract the dangerous tendency of my former assertions. But he did not perceive that what he was doing for this purpose, was completely at variance with every word that he had said in defence of measures in Ireland, and that all the aid he was giving to those measures was to prove, that one of their advocates at least, was amongst the most foolish as well as the most base of mankind.—I cannot quit this part of the subject, without observing upon the effect which is likely to be produced upon the mind of the enemy, by the circumstance of there being a prohibition in any part of this kingdom, against the people meeting together for any purpose, not including positive breaches of the peace. Such prohibition must be necessary or unnecessary: if the latter, I need not characterise the conduct of the government that lays such prohibition; and if the former, what must be the state of the country, what must be the disposition of the people, and how heavily must the fact weigh against us in all the calculations of the enemy and of the world! If the people have no reason to complain; if they be contented; if they have reason to be contented; if this be the case, what reason, is there, let me ask, to be afraid of their assembling together? When men think rightly we all know how much more strongly they feel, in consequence of communications with one another: we all know the powerful effect of public assemblies; and why should not the government avail itself of the benefit naturally arising from this source? If the people be not unanimous in sentiment of approbation of the government, still, if there be a majority of them of that description, the government has nothing to fear from assemblies of the people, unless we can suppose that in this case, contrary to what happens in all other cases in the world, the majority is to yield to the sentiment and wish of the minority. So that, it may, I think, be taken for granted, that when the government has recourse to prohibitions against popular assemblies, the conclusion to be drawn is, that it feels a consciousness of the existence of that which this venal writer is not

willing to allow as existing in Ireland at this time.—Turn the matter on which side we will, it is, at any rate, impossible to avoid seeing, that Ireland, from one cause or another, is far from being in a state such as a real lover of harmony and peace could wish; and, let me ask those who are continually telling us of the discontents amongst the subjects of Napoleon, what they would say, what hopes they would express, what exultation we should hear from them, if events were to take place in Alsace, in Provence, or even in Italy or Holland, such as are now taking place in Ireland? I have not the least doubt that they would thereon found a prediction of his overthrow, and of the speedy deliverance of all Europe.—And why, I ask for, perhaps, the hundredth time, should such events take place in Ireland? What answer can any one give me to this question? Is it the fault of the people? Surely a whole nation can never be in fault for so many years together; and besides, if it be so, why are the people not made a better people? It is not, moreover, our custom, when speaking of rigid measures adopted towards his subjects by our enemy, to ascribe the fault to the people, whom we, and with good reason I believe, generally look upon as being in the right. Be the fact, therefore, as it may, we certainly shall have no reason to complain if the world mete us back our own measure of judgment, and look upon the Irish Catholics as not being in the wrong.—With this view of the matter before us, it is natural for us to ask ourselves, when, oh! *when*, will any change take place in the situation of Ireland? And this question naturally leads us to inquire, what are the wishes of His Royal Highness, the Prince of Wales, now Regent of the kingdom; what are his wishes upon this important subject; because, upon that must depend, whether the Catholics have any thing to expect or not, either now or whenever a change shall take place as to the possessor of the executive power.—This is a question of very great consequence: it goes to a decision as to the fate of the Catholics; and, indeed, it falls little short of being decisive as to what the whole kingdom has to expect in future; in short, it goes nearly to settle the all-important point, namely, whether the Prince has, or has not, embraced the Pitt system of rule.—For my part, I am disposed to believe that His Royal Highness has not, and never will, embrace that sys-

tem, so fatal to England; but, at the same time, I must found my judgment upon “the evidence of facts;” I must refer to my senses when I would say what I do, or do not, believe; and, if they bid me believe a thing, I am a hypocrite if I say that I believe the contrary.—There has, for some time past, evidently been a suspicion growing up amongst the Whigs, that the Prince had abandoned them, and taken to their opponents, not only in form but in substance; that is to say, that he had, after all, given the preference to Mr. Perceval and his colleagues, and that, in case of his father’s death, he meant not to change the ministry, and, of course, not to change the system. The news-papers, in favour of the Whigs, have very sedulously endeavoured to persuade the public that that was not the fact; but that, on the contrary, the Prince still adhered to them; that he suffered, indeed, the ministers to do nearly what they pleased until the year of restriction was over; and that he longed most impatiently for its being over, in order that he might avail himself of the services of the Opposition. This has been the language of the prints devoted to the Whigs; but, on this the Ministerial prints have put a flat denial. They have asserted, that the Prince cordially liked his ministers; that he approved of all their measures; and that he had no intention at all of changing them, even in case of the death of his father.—Between assertions so directly opposite, and yet equally positive, we must judge from facts that are notorious and that neither party can deny.—Now, what are these facts? First, as to the negative; we have not heard any speech, any message, any expression of the Prince, conveying even a hint of his impatience to get out of the hands of the present ministers. But, on the other hand, we have seen him make appointments, purely in his own gift, just in such a way as a man would have made them, supposing him to be a cordial friend of the present ministers. I do not allude to the appointment of the Duke of York. That might, perhaps, be fairly ascribed to mere fraternal feeling, and was, in my opinion, of very little consequence to the nation; or, at least, not of sufficient consequence to call off its attention from many other objects. But, the appointment of the new *Lord Melville* to all the Offices held by the former one of that name; this was a thing that gave me, I must confess, a shake as to my opinions

respecting the real politics of his Royal Highness. It seemed to me to be something like shaking hands with the whole set and the whole system, and especially as I saw, that, at the same time, several well-known adherents of the Prince were receiving favours at the hands of the ministers.—Still, however, I might be deceived; and I was very unwilling to express, or even hint, an opinion favouring the idea of his Royal Highness having been won over to the system; but, there is no wisdom in shutting one's eyes and ears, and, from what I see and hear, I must say, that there does not appear any good reason to suppose, that the ministers have, in hardly any instance, acted in opposition to the wish of the Regent. The contrary has been positively asserted by the Morning Chronicle and as positively denied by the Courier; and this brings us more closely to the case of the Irish Catholics, who, in all their publications, have loudly boasted of having the Prince on their side, but who, as to this point especially, have been flatly contradicted by the ministerial prints, who tell them, that the Prince's opinion, respecting them, agrees with that of his ministers, and, in short, that he is resolved to pursue the system, which, under his Royal Father, has "with the assistance of Divine Providence," brought this nation into its present safe, honourable and happy state. In answer to assertions of this kind, the Morning Chronicle of the 15th instant publishes a very curious article. It is very clearly intended to make the public believe, that, as far as the Prince has given his approbation to the measures against the Catholics, he has been *deceived* into it; that there has been a sort of *plot* against him; but that, *as yet*, the plot has not *wholly* succeeded. This article is very curious and worthy of the greatest attention. It may be looked upon as speaking, not what the Whigs themselves believe; but what they would wish to believe, and, at all events, what they would have the public believe.—The writer is upon the subject of Ireland, and, after speaking of the disputed point relative to the interpretation of the Convention Act, he proceeds thus:—"It is not a dry point of law, however, on which the judgment of the public at the present moment requires so much to be enlightened. It is fit that they now attend to the developement of one of the darkest and most artful political intrigues that ever

"was contrived since the days of Machiavel.—When his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales accepted the Regency, he saw plainly, that under the restrictions imposed on him it would be in vain to attempt any object of great and permanent national good; and when, in addition to the nullity of his situation, in point of power, the solemn and reiterated asseverations of the King's Physicians gave him reason to believe that his Royal Father would speedily resume the Government, his Royal Highness naturally felt (as every man of sense felt for him), that it would be most unfair to expect at his hands the immediate realization of those fond hopes, which his future subjects had indulged on the prospect of his accession to power. His Royal Highness relied on the justice of mankind to perceive, that, in fact, he had not acceded to power, and that he had obtained from Mr. Perceval nothing more than the temporary administration of some of the royal attributes. On this ground he appears to have resolved, that as he could execute nothing effectually, it would be wiser not to attempt the execution of any measure of importance during the restrictions.—His Royal Highness, therefore, determined to continue all things in their place. He removed no Minister. He recommended no friend to the patronage of the King's Servants; and above all, he brought forward no measures of his own.—Acting on this principle fairly and honestly, his Royal Highness had a full right to expect that the Ministers, on their parts, should, at least, meet him half way, and abstain from disturbing the existing state of things, by the obstruction of any measures which might have for their object, the strengthening their own system of Government, in opposition to the known and recorded principles of his Royal Highness. Forbearance to this extent, however, by no means suited the views of Mr. Perceval. "To be thus," he argued, "is nothing; but to be safely thus"—and he knew that he could not be "safely thus," unless he could contrive to make such good use of his time during his possession of power, as either, by his representations, to weaken the confidence of his Royal Highness in the soundness of the Whig principles which he had imbibed; or to induce him, by the force of circumstances, to consider a perseverance in the present system as a matter of necessity, even after the expiration

"of the restrictions.—On this ground, therefore, the Ministers went immediately and diligently to work. The agents of these intrigues, however, were neither so clumsy in their natures, nor so new in their business, as to expect to ensnare his Royal Highness, by presenting to him at once all the bitter ingredients of the cup he was to swallow. They went on more leisurely, as well as more safely, in their operations. The grand object was, first, to induce suspicion in the Royal mind, that all was not quite right among his Catholic friends; and then to persuade the Catholics, that his Royal Highness had cooled on the subject of religious toleration, and was by no means so friendly to the repeal of the penal laws as they had supposed him to be. To do this effectually, the Irish Government was to engage itself in a series of measures sufficiently within the compass of that system, which his Royal Highness had consented for a time to endure, to prevent his coming to an open rupture with Mr. Perceval, and, at the same time, sufficiently hostile to the Catholics to awaken their doubts, and to goad and worry them, if possible, into some indiscreet application for the redress of their grievances.—It was hoped that the more violent party among them might thus be tempted to come to some demonstration of ill humour serious enough to enable Ministers to sound the alarm of a plot, and upon this plot to present to his Royal Highness, for his approbation, a set of measures with which he must either comply, and thus embark himself in the same bottom with them; or which he must reject, AND THUS TAKE UPON HIMSELF THE ENTIRE RESPONSIBILITY, with but half the powers of the State. Thus they were to go on step by step, until, by entangling his Royal Highness in their snares, they had made it impossible for him to carry on the Government without them, while, BY SEPARATING HIM FROM HIS OLD AND TRIED FRIENDS, and by destroying the foundation on which his high public character is fixed, they would render him dependant upon their will and pleasure during his future reign and life.—Such, in part, was the honourable scheme projected by the Ministers as soon as his Royal Highness had notified to them his intention of retaining them in the King's service! *Hitherto* their success has not been very brilliant.

"His Royal Highness is a person not easily to be deceived long. His youth has been a youth of adversity; and from the lessons of that severe but faithful monitor, he has learned a quickness of penetration, as well as a rectitude of judgment, which have borne him safe through all the wiles by which he is encompassed. On the same qualities we rely for his future conduct; but in the mean time the scheme is in progress, although, as yet, it has not reached its proper degree of maturity."—Now, reader, is not this a droll sort of story? Are you to be made believe such a story as this? What! is it to be believed, then, that Mr. Perceval has the power "to weaken the confidence of His Royal Highness in those Whig principles which he had imbibed"? What! is it to be believed, then, that Mr. Perceval, or any body else, by the means of any contrivance whatever, would be able to persuade His Royal Highness to persevere in the present system even after the restrictions had expired? Is it to be believed, I say, that the Prince of Wales was to be intrigued, coaxed, wheedled, cajoled, humbugged, out of "his recorded principles." And at what age was he to be thus wheedled and cajoled? why, verily, at the age of only half a century; and, observe, half a century, too, spent in the court of George the Third! For my part, if such a thing as this was said of me, I should think it tantamount to calling me an idiot; or, at least, to an accusation of being so unsettled and so fickle that no man upon earth ought ever to place any reliance upon my word, however solemnly given, and for whatever purpose.—This writer tells us, that the minister proceeded by slow degrees; for that His Royal Highness was not to be induced to swallow the bitter cup all at once. Bitter cup! What bitter cup? What cup was there for him to swallow; or, at least, what cup, that would do him any harm! And, will this writer make us believe, that his Royal Highness does not know how to distinguish one cup from another? This is all a farce: a very wretched attempt to disguise the fact that the Whigs have been supplanted in the favour of his Royal Highness; for is it not a shocking absurdity to suppose, that the ministers could make the Prince swallow any thing against his will? It is an old saying that one man can take a horse to the water, but that twenty cannot make him drink. A man may be drowned, to be sure, but as to

wheeling a "bitter cup" down his throat, the absurdity is too great to be endured for a moment.—We are told that the ministers excited suspicion in the Royal mind, that all was not quite right amongst his Catholic friends; that then they persuaded the Catholics to suspect the sincerity of the Royal mind; that then the Irish government was so to contrive it, as to worry and goad the Catholics into some act of violence, and yet the said government was to keep within the compass of the system which the Prince had consented for a time to endure; that out of this was to grow the accusation against the Catholics of a plot; that his Royal Highness was then to be inveigled into an approbation of a set of measures, which would embark him in the same bottom with the ministers; that he was thus to be entangled by them until it was impossible for him to carry on the government without them; that having him thus separated from his "old tried friends," the ministers would destroy the foundation of his character, and render him dependant upon their will and pleasure, during his future reign and life.—Now, in answer to this pretty story, we may first observe, that it necessarily (and most unjustly) supposes a total want of discernment, a total want of the ordinary capacities of man, a total absence of common sense, a blindness, a fatuity rarely to be met with even amongst the most feeble, the most enervated of the most enervated of men; all these does this story suppose to meet in the Prince of Wales. If he was told that all was not right amongst his Catholic friends, what prevented him from enquiring into the fact? Or would this writer have us believe, that the Prince, all at once, placed implicit reliance upon every thing that the ministers said? If he did; if he was to be persuaded by them, in the manner here described, that is enough, at once, for it is pretty clear they were become his friends, and that the Whigs had lost his friendship. But, during all this time; during the time that all these shocking intrigues were going on, where were all those "old tried friends" of the Prince? Where were they? Had none of them the loyalty and public spirit to tell him to what degree he was deceived, and what danger he was in? He never asked them, perchance: Well, then, it is clear that he looked upon them as being no longer his friends.—Aye, and this, I am convinced is the light in which all the

world will see the matter, before it be long. This writer himself cannot refrain, at the close of his article, from discovering that he perceives this as clearly as I do. He tells us, that, *hitherto*, the ministers have not succeeded very brilliantly in their scheme of entrapping His Royal Highness; that the Prince is not a person to be deceived long; that the writer *relies* on the Prince's good qualities for his future conduct; but (and mark the *but*) in the mean time, the *scheme is in progress*, although, *as yet*, it has not reached its proper degree of maturity. This is just the language of a man who is clearing the way for cutting an old acquaintance; and I cannot help thinking, on what foundation I must leave the reader to judge, that a cutting between the Prince and the Whig party is at no great distance, if it has not already actually taken place.—Now, then, reader, look at the motto, and say whether I was not right in my conjectures, as to the consequences of the present ministers being kept in power by the Prince. What has now taken place it was easy to foresee. It was manifest, that the minister who could keep his place, under the Prince, whom he had so restricted in point of power, would not fail to secure the possession of it. What was the real cause of Mr. Perceval's being kept in place, after the establishment of the Regency, no one has yet fully explained to the public. Some of the reasons for his being so kept have been stated; others might be stated; but it is useless to waste time in mere conjecture. It is a well known fact, that, after his resolute opposition to the Prince, the Prince has kept him in place. All that we can, at present, say of the matter is, that the Prince has discovered that Mr. Perceval is the best man to be minister; or we must conclude that Mr. Perceval is a most winning little man. The Morning Chronicle may talk of *intrigues and plots* as long as it pleases; but, what has Mr. Perceval done more than any other Courtier would do if he could? The Whigs may be sorry for it; but they cannot justly blame their more happy rival. It is, besides, quite useless for them to rail: if they are wise they will keep their temper: instead of revilers of Mr. Perceval, they will become his imitators, or, to use the emphatical old proverb, "*take a leaf out of his book.*"

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 16th August, 1811.

PAPER MONEY.

From the Kentish Gazette.

As so much has been said and written upon the subject of the depreciation of our Paper Currency, I am aware that any farther remarks can have but little claim to novelty.—As the Bank of England has, however, by the Three Shilling Tokens, furnished us with complete data, whereby to estimate the value of their Notes, it may not be uninteresting to many of your readers, to see ascertained, in a clear and concise manner, the value of Bank Notes in Statute Currency, and of Guineas in Bank Currency.

No person can attempt to deny that the Tokens are Measures of Bank Notes, as Shillings are of Guineas.

Now a Bank Token weighs 9 dwts. 11 grs. or 227 grs. and the weight of three Shillings is 11 dwts. 15 grs. or 279 grs.

Therefore 7 Tokens are = to 1589 grains of Silver,
and 21 Shillings = 1953 ditto ditto.
Therefore a Guinea : 7 Tokens :: 1953 : 1589.

Therefore a Guinea

$$\text{is = to } \frac{7 \times 1953}{1589} \text{ Tokens} = \frac{13671}{1589} \text{ Tokens.}$$

$$= 8 \text{ To. 1s. } 9\frac{1}{4}\text{d. } \frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$$

or a Guinea is = to 25s. 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ d. Bank Currency.

Now by deducting

93 grs (the weight of a Shilling) from 1953,
and 76 (the weight of $\frac{1}{4}$ Token) from 1589,
we shall have a £.1 Note : 90s. :: 1513 : 1860.

Therefore

$$\text{a £.1 Note is = to } \frac{90 \times 1513}{1860} \text{ Shills.} = \frac{30460}{1860} \text{ Shills.}$$

$$= 16\text{s. } 4\frac{1}{2}\text{d. } \frac{1}{2}\text{d.}$$

or a £.1 Note is about equal to 16s. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. Statute Currency.

Philosophy.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES and ENGLAND. — *Letter of Commodore JOHN ROGERS to the Secretary of the Navy of the United States, relative to a rencontre with the English Ship, LITTLE BELT. — Dated, on board the United States Frigate, the PRESIDENT, off Sandy Hook, 23rd May, 1811.*

(Concluded from p. 192.)

I learned, for the first time, that it was a ship of his Britannic Majesty's; but, owing to its blowing rather fresher than it had done, I was unable to learn her name. After having informed her Commander of the name of this ship, I gave orders to wear, run under his lee and haul by the wind on the starboard tack, and heave to

under top sails, and repair what little injury we had sustained in our rigging, which was accordingly executed, and we continued lying-to on different tacks with a number of lights displayed, in order that our adversary might the better discern our position, and command our assistance, in case he found it necessary during the night.—At day-light on the 17th, he was discovered several miles to leeward, when I gave orders to bear up and run down to him under easy sail; after hailing him; I sent a boat on board with Lieutenant Creighton, to learn the names of the ship and her Commander, with directions to ascertain the damage she had sustained, and inform her Commander, how much I regretted the necessity on my part, which had led to such an unhappy result; and at the same time to offer all the assistance that the ship under my command afforded, in repairing the damages he had sustained. At nine A. M. Lieutenant Creighton returned with information, that it was his Britannic Majesty's ship Little Belt, commanded by Captain Bingham, who, in a polite manner, declined the acceptance of any assistance; saying, at the same time, that he had on board all the necessary requisites to repair the damages, sufficiently to enable him to return to Halifax.—This, however, was not the most unpleasant part of Captain Bingham's communication to Lieutenant Creighton, as he informed him, that in addition to the injury his ship had sustained, between 20 and 30 of his crew had been killed and wounded.—The regret that this information caused me was such, you may be sure, as a man might be expected to feel, whose greatest pride is to prove, without ostentation, by every public as well as private act, that he possesses a humane and generous heart; and with these sentiments, believe me, Sir, that such a communication would cause me the most acute pain during the remainder of my life, had I not the consolation to know that there was no alternative left me between such a sacrifice, and one which would have been still greater, namely, to have remained a passive spectator of insult to the flag of my country, while it was confined to my protection—and I would have you to be convinced, Sir, that however much individually I may previously have had reason to feel incensed, at the repeated outrages committed on our flag by British ships of war, neither my passions nor prejudices had any agency in this affair.—To my coun-

try, I am well convinced of the importance of the transaction which has imposed upon me the necessity of making you this communication; I must, therefore, from motives of delicacy, connected with personal consideration, solicit that you will be pleased to request the President to authorise a formal inquiry to be instituted into all the circumstances, as well as into every part of my conduct connected with the same.—The injury sustained by the ship under my command is very trifling, except to the fore and main masts, which I before mentioned; no person killed, and but one (a boy) wounded.—For further particulars I refer you to Captain Caldwell, who is charged with the delivery of this communication.

ENGLAND AND AMERICAN STATES.—Publication by the English Government, July 16, 1811, relating to the Rencontre of the LITTLE BELT with the American frigate, PRESIDENT.

Letter of Rear Admiral H. SAWYER, Commander in Chief on the North American station, to the Admiralty, dated Bermuda, June 11, 1811.

Inclosed I transmit to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a letter from Captain Arthur Batt Bingham, Commander of his Majesty's sloop Little Belt, received this day from Lord James Townshend, Captain of his Majesty's ship *Cæolus*, and senior officer at Halifax: by which their Lordships will perceive he was attacked on the evening of the 16th May last, when cruising between Cape Henry and Cape Hatteras, by the United States frigate the President, of 44 guns, commanded by Commodore Rodgers; and that after a close action of three quarters of an hour the American ship made sail from him.—Captain Bingham's modest, but full and clear statement, renders any comment from me unnecessary; and I have only to admire the extraordinary bravery and firmness, with which himself, his officers, and ship's company supported the honour of the British flag, when opposed to such an immense superiority of force. I have, however, deeply to lament the number of valuable British Seamen and Royal Marines who have been either killed or wounded on this unexpected occasion; a list of whose names is also inclosed, together with a copy of my order, under which Captain Bingham was cruising.

Capt. A. B. BINGHAM's Letter to Admiral Sawyer, dated on board the Little Belt, 21st May, 1811.

Sir; I beg leave to acquaint you, that in pursuance of your orders to join his Majesty's ship *Guerriere*, and being on my return from the Northward, not having fallen in with her, that at about eleven A. M. May 16th, saw a strange sail, to which I immediately gave chase; at one P. M. discovered her to be a man of war, apparently a frigate, standing to the Eastward, who, when he made us out, edged away for us, and set his royals; made the signal 275, and finding it not answered, concluded she was an American frigate, as he had a Commodore's blue pendant flying at the main; hoisted the colours and made all sail South, the course I intended steering round Cape Hatteras, the stranger edging away, but not making any more sail. At half past three, he made sail in chase, when I made the private signal, which was not answered. At half past six, finding he gained so considerably on us as not to be able to elude him during the night, being within gunshot, and clearly discerning the star in his broad pendant, I imagined the more prudent method was to bring to, and hoist the colours, that no mistake might arise, and that he might see what we were; the ship was therefore brought to, colours hoisted, guns double shotted, and every preparation made in case of a surprize. By his manner of steering down, he evidently wished to lay his ship in a position for raking, which I frustrated by wearing three times. About a quarter past eight he came within hail. I hailed, and asked what ship it was? He repeated my question. I again hailed, and asked what ship it was? He again repeated my words, and fired a broadside, which I immediately returned. The action then became general, and continued so for three quarters of an hour, when he ceased firing, and appeared to be on fire about the main hatchway. He then filled. I was obliged to desist from firing, as the ship falling off, no gun would bear, and had no after-sail to keep her to. All the rigging and sails cut to pieces, not a brace or bowline left, he hailed, and asked what ship this was; I told him; he then asked me if I had struck my colours? My answer was, no, and asked what ship it was? As plainly as I could understand (he having shot some distance at this time,) he answered, the

United States frigate. He fired no more guns, but stood from us, giving no reason for his most extraordinary conduct. At day-light in the morning, saw a ship to windward, which having made out well what we were, bore up and passed within hail, fully prepared for action. About eight o'clock he hailed, and said, if I pleased, he would send a boat on board; I replied in the affirmative, and a boat accordingly came with an Officer, and a message from Commodore Rodgers, of the President United States frigate, to say that he lamented much the unfortunate affair, (as he termed it) that had happened, and that had he known our force was so inferior, he should not have fired at me. I asked his motive for having fired at all; his reply was, that we fired the first gun at him, which was positively not the case. I cautioned both the officers and men to be particularly careful, and not suffer any more than one man to be at a gun. Nor is it probable that a sloop of war within pistol-shot of a large forty-four gun frigate should commence hostilities. He offered me every assistance I stood in need of, and submitted to me that I had better put into one of the ports of the United States, which I immediately declined. By the manner in which he apologised, it appeared to me evident, that had he fallen in with a British frigate, he would certainly have brought her to action; and what further confirms me in that opinion is, that his guns were not only loaded with round and grape shot, but with every scrap of iron that could possibly be collected.—I have to lament the loss of thirty-two men killed and wounded, among whom is the master. His Majesty's sloop is much damaged in her masts, sails, rigging, and hull, and as there are many shot through between wind and water, and many shots still remaining in her side, and upper works all shot away, starboard pump also, I have judged it proper to proceed to Halifax, which will, I hope, meet with your approbation.—I cannot speak in too high terms of the officers and men I have the honour to command, for their steady and active conduct throughout the whole of this business, who had much to do, as a gale of wind came on the second night after the action. My first Lieutenant, Mr. John Moberly, who is in every respect a most excellent Officer, afforded me very great assistance in stopping the leaks himself in the gale, securing the masts, and doing every thing in his power.

It would be the greatest injustice, was I not also to speak most highly of Lieutenant Lovell, second Lieutenant, of Mr. M'Queen, master, who, as I have before stated, was wounded in the right arm in nearly the middle of the action, and Mr. Wilson, master's mate. Indeed, the conduct of every officer and man was so good, it is impossible for me to discriminate.—I beg leave to enclose a list of the thirty-two men killed and wounded, most of them mortally, I fear.—I hope, Sir, in this affair I shall appear to have done my duty, and conducted myself as I ought to have done against so superior a force, and that the honour of the British colours was well supported.

Return of Officers, Petty Officers, Seamen, and Marines, killed and wounded on board his Majesty's Sloop Little Belt, Arthur Batt Bingham, Esq. Commander, in action with the American frigate President, the 16th May, 1811.

Killed.—Mr. Samuel Woodward, midshipman; Christ. Bernett, captain of the foretop; Jacob Greaves, carpenter's crew; Thomas Shippard, gunner's mate; George Wilson, able seaman; Robert Liversage, able seaman; James Grey, ordinary seaman; Robert Howard, ordinary seaman; John Pardoe, private marine.—*Wounded.*—Daniel Kilham, landman, dangerously; died ten hours after the action; Richard Coody, ordinary seaman, ditto, died twenty hours after the action; John Randal, able seaman, dangerously; Nicholas Manager, gunner's crew, ditto; Mr. James M'Queen, acting master, severely; James Dunn (2), captain of the maintop, ditto; James Lawrence, able seaman, ditto; John Richards, able seaman, ditto; Thomas Ives, able seaman, ditto; Michael Skinners, landman, ditto; William Fern, boy, ditto; David Dowd, marine, ditto; William Harrold, marine, ditto; Mr. James Franklin, boatswain, slightly; Mr. Benjamin Angel, carpenter, ditto; Peter M'Caskeil, captain of the mast, ditto; William Andrews, ordinary seaman, ditto; William Weston, ditto; Edward Graham, able seaman, ditto; George Dalany, able seaman, ditto; George Roberts, boy, ditto; George Shoard, marine, ditto; Daniel Long, marine, ditto.

Admiral Sawyer's Orders to the Cruisers on the Station.

By Herbert Sawyer, Esq. Rear-Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief

of his Majesty's ships and vessels employed, and to be employed, in the River Saint Lawrence, along the Coast of Nova Scotia, the Islands of Anticosti, Madelaine and Saint John, and Cape Breton, the Bay of Fundy, and at or about the Island of Bermuda, or Somers Island.

You are hereby required and directed to put to sea in his Majesty's sloop under your command, and proceed without loss of time off Charlestown, where you may expect to meet Captain Pechell, in the *Guerriere*, to whom you will deliver the packet you will herewith receive, and follow his orders for your further proceedings. Should you not meet the *Guerriere* off Charlestown, you will stand for the northward, and use your utmost endeavours to join him off the Capes of Virginia, or off New York; and in the event of not meeting the *Guerriere*, you will cruise as long as your provisions and water will last, and then repair to Halifax for further orders. You are to pay due regard to protecting the trade of his Majesty's subjects, and the capture or destruction of the ships of the enemy. You are to be particularly careful not to give any just cause of offence to the Government or Subjects of the United States of America; and to give very particular orders to this effect to the Officers you may have occasion to send on board ships under the American Flag. You are not to anchor in any of the American Ports, but in case of absolute necessity, and then put to sea again as soon as possible.—Given under my hand at Bermuda, this 19th April, 1811.

HERBERT SAWYER.

To Arthur Batt Bingham, Esq.
Commander of his Majesty's
Sloop *Little Belt*.

IRELAND.—*A Proclamation, relative to the Meeting of the Catholic Delegates.*—
30th July, 1811.

RICHMOND, &c.

Whereas, by an Act made in the Parliament of Ireland, in the thirty-third year of his present Majesty's reign, entitled, "An Act to prevent the Election or Appointment of unlawful Assemblies, under pretence of preparing or presenting public Petitions, or other Addresses to his Majesty or the Parliament," it is enacted, "That all assemblies, committees, or other bodies of persons elected or in any other manner constituted or appointed to repre-

sent, or assuming or exercising a right or authority to represent, the people of this realm, or any number or description of the people of the same, or the people of any province, county, city, or town, or other district within the same, under pretence of petitioning for, or in any other manner procuring an alteration of matters established by law, in Church or State, save and except the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses elected to serve in the Parliament thereof, and save and except the Houses of Convocation duly summoned by the King's will, are unlawful assemblies; and that it shall and may be lawful for any Mayor, Sheriff, Justice of the Peace, or other Peace Officer, and they are thereby respectively authorized and required, within his and their respective jurisdictions, to disperse all such unlawful assemblies, and if resisted, to enter into the same, and to apprehend all persons offending in that behalf." And it is further enacted, "That if any person shall give or publish, or cause or procure to be given or published, any written or other notice of election to be holden, or of any manner of appointment of any person or persons, to be the representative or representatives, delegate or delegates, or to act by any other name or description whatever, as representative or representatives, delegate or delegates, of the inhabitants, or of any description of the inhabitants of any province, county, city, town, or other district within this kingdom, at any such assembly; or if any person shall attend and vote at such election or appointment of such representatives or delegates, or other persons to act as such, every person who shall be guilty of any of the said offences, respectively being thereof convicted by due course of law, shall be deemed guilty of an high misdemeanour.

And whereas at a meeting or assembly of persons held in the city of Dublin, on the 9th day of July instant, and stiling themselves "A Meeting of the Catholics of Ireland," certain Resolutions, amongst others, were entered into, and have since been published, of the tenour following:—

"Resolved,—That a Committee of Catholics be therefore appointed, and requested to cause proper Petitions to be forthwith framed for the repeal of the penal laws, and to procure signatures thereto in all parts of Ireland, and to take measures for bringing such Petitions under the serious consideration of the Legislature within the first month of the ensuing Sessions of Parliament.

"Resolved,—That said Committee do consist of the Catholic Peers and their eldest sons, the Catholic Baronets, the Prelates of the Catholic Church in Ireland, and also ten persons to be appointed by the Catholics in each County of Ireland, the survivors of the delegates of 1793 to constitute an integral part of that number, and also of five persons to be appointed by the Catholic inhabitants of each Parish in Dublin.

"Resolved, That the appointment of the said persons be made forthwith.

"Resolved, That it be recommended to such Committee to resort to all legal and constitutional means of maintaining a cordial communication of sentiment and co-operation of conduct amongst the Catholics of Ireland, and generally of promoting the favourable reception of their petition.

"Resolved, That until the new Committee shall be appointed, the management of Catholic affairs shall be confided to the Catholic Peers, Baronets, and survivors of the delegates of 1793."

And whereas there is reason to apprehend, that some of his Majesty's subjects may have already acted, and that others may be misled to act in furtherance of those resolutions, by taking a part in the election or appointment of delegates or representatives for such proposed Assembly or Committee; and that the persons so elected or delegated, or to be so elected or delegated, may be disposed to meet and form such assembly or Committee as aforesaid.

And whereas such an Assembly as is by these resolutions proposed to be convened, is not only in direct violation of the provisions of the statute aforesaid, and an unlawful assembly, but tends directly to endanger the peace and tranquillity of the State.

Now we, the Lord Lieutenant, by and with the advice of the Privy Council of Ireland, being determined, as far as in us lies, to enforce the due observance of the laws of this realm, and being anxious to prevent the mischiefs which the violation of those laws, and particularly of the statute herein before mentioned, must occasion, do, by this our Proclamation, command all his Majesty's loving subjects of this part of the United Kingdom, that they do abstain from all acts and proceedings whatsoever contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid statute.

And we do further hereby call upon and

require all Justices of the peace, Mayors, Sheriffs, Bailiffs, and other Peace officers in this part of the United Kingdom, that they do proceed in due course of law to apprehend and hold to bail all persons against whom information on oath shall have been obtained of having given or published, or caused to be given or published, any written or other notice of elections to be holden, or of any manner of appointment of any representative or delegates for any such assembly as is herein before-mentioned, or of having voted, or in any manner acted, or who shall be found actually voting, or in any other manner acting, in the election or appointment of such delegates or representatives, that the person or persons so offending may be prosecuted according to law; and in case an assembly of such delegates or representatives shall hereafter attempt to meet in defiance of the law, and notwithstanding this our Proclamation, that they shall proceed to disperse the same as an unlawful assembly, pursuant to the directions of the aforesaid statute.

Given at the Council Chamber in Dublin, the 30th day of July, 1811.

MANNERS, E.	FRANKFORT,
WESTMEATH,	W. W. POLE,
MAYO,	D. LATOUCHE,
ERNE,	S. HAMILTON,
CHARLES KILDARE,	W. SAURIN,
CASTLE COOTE,	P. DUIGENAN.
DE BLAQUIERE.	

IRELAND.—*At a Special Meeting of the General Committee of the Catholics of Ireland, held in Dublin, at No. 4, Capel-Street, on Wednesday, the 31st of July, 1811.*

The Earl of FINGALL in the Chair,

Resolved, That the Catholic Committee, having adjourned on the 26th of July to the 19th of October, 1811, have, notwithstanding, deemed it expedient to hold an Extraordinary Meeting on the 31st day of July, in consequence of a communication from Government to the Earl of Fingall, dated the 30th instant, to the following effect:—"That a Privy Council was to be assembled to take into consideration the expediency of issuing a Proclamation declaratory of the Laws," &c. &c. "and likewise the course to be pursued to insure its observance."

Resolved, That this Committee, relying on the Constitutional Rights of the Subject

to petition the Legislature in the way and manner specified in a Resolution to that effect, passed at the last aggregate Meeting of their Body, do now determine to continue and persevere in the Constitutional course they have maturely adopted, for the sole, express, and specific purpose of preparing a Petition, or Petitions to Parliament, for their full participation of the Rights of the Constitution; and that, in so doing, they not only, in their opinion, do not violate, but act in strict conformity with its soundest principles.

Resolved, That this Committee will never meet under pretence of preparing or presenting Petitions, but for the strict and sole purpose of preparing and causing to be presented a Petition or Petitions.

Resolved, That the right of Petitioning secured by the Bill of Rights, is recognized by the 4th and last clause of the Convention Act, in the words following:— 'Provided also, that nothing herein contained shall be construed in any manner to prevent or impede the undoubted right of his Majesty's subjects of this realm to petition his Majesty, or both Houses, or either House of Parliament, for redress of any public or private grievance.'

Resolved, That the Resolutions of the late aggregate Meeting of the Catholics of Ireland, holden on the 9th of July, having appeared this day in an imperfect state in a Proclamation from Government, we feel it expedient to republish them, viz.—

Resolved, That being impressed with an unalterable conviction of its being the undoubted right of every man to worship his Creator according to the genuine dictates of his own conscience, we deem it our duty publicly and solemnly to declare our decided opinion and principle, that no Government can, with justice, inflict any pains, penalty, or privation, upon any man for professing that form of Christian faith which he in his conscience believes.

Resolved, That we, therefore, shall persevere in petitioning the Legislature for a total and unqualified repeal of the Penal Laws which aggrieve and degrade the Catholics of Ireland.

Resolved, That in exercising this undoubted right of petitioning, we shall continue to adhere to the ancient principles of the Constitution, and to conform also to the peculiar restrictions which, by modern statutes, are imposed on the people of Ireland.

Resolved, That a Committee of Catholics be therefore appointed, and requested

to cause proper Petitions to be forthwith framed, for the repeal of the Penal Laws, and to procure signatures thereto in all parts of Ireland, and to take measures for bringing such Petitions under the serious consideration of the Legislature, within the first month of the ensuing Sessions of Parliament.

Resolved, That said Committee do consist of the Catholic Peers, and their eldest sons; the Catholic Baronets; the Prelates of the Catholic Church in Ireland; and also of ten persons, to be appointed by the Catholics in each county in Ireland, the survivors of the Delegates of 1793, to constitute an integral part of that number; and also of five persons, to be appointed by the Catholic inhabitants of each parish in Dublin.

Resolved, That it be recommended to such Committee to resort to all legal and constitutional means of maintaining a cordial communication of sentiment and co-operation of conduct amongst the Catholics of Ireland; and, generally, of promoting the favourable reception of our Petition.

Resolved, That the appointment of the said persons be made forthwith.

Resolved, That, until the new Committee shall be appointed, the management of Catholic affairs shall be confided to the Catholic Peers, Baronets, and survivors of the Delegates of 1793.

FINGALL, Chairman.

EDWARD HAY, Secretary.

DENNYS SCULLY, Esq. in the Chair.

Resolved, That the most cordial Thanks of the Committee are due, and are hereby returned to the Earl of Fingall, for his manly, spirited, and dignified conduct in the Chair.

IRELAND.—*Account of the Arrest of the Catholic Delegates in Dublin, on the 9th of August, 1811.—From the Dublin Evening Post of the 10th of August, 1811.*

Early in the forenoon of yesterday, Henry Edward Taaffe, Esq. partner in the Bank of Lord Ffrench and Co. and Mr. Kirwan, merchant, of Abbey-street, were arrested, under a warrant from Lord Chief Justice Downes, for acting as Delegates; and Doctors Breen and Burke, and Mr. Scurlog, merchant, were also arrested, for acting as Electors of Delegates to the Catholic Committee. These Gentlemen having been brought in custody to the house of Lord Chief Justice, in Merrion-

square, and Mr. Carmichael having attended there on the part of Mr. Kemmis, the Crown Solicitor, the Gentlemen so in custody required Mr. Carmichael to state to the Chief Justice, that they had been arrested without any previous information, that they were desirous of having an opportunity of advising with Council as to the conduct they should pursue; and that time should be granted them until this day for that purpose. Mr. Carmichael said he would communicate what was so desired to the Chief Justice, and having gone up stairs, returned in a few minutes with the Chief Justice's answer, which was, that he could not give such time. They then desired Mr. Carmichael to ask the Chief Justice if it was his intention to commit them to prison, in case they did not then procure bail. Mr. Carmichael having again retired, returned soon after, and mentioned that the Chief Justice had desired him to say, if bail was not given, he would then commit the persons in custody to prison. Bail was afterwards entered for 1,000*l.* and two sureties for 200*l.* each.—Upon the bail being entered, Mr. Kirwan addressed the Crown Solicitor's Clerk, Mr. Carmichael, in the following words:—Sir, I would wish to have a copy of the information on oath, under which I have been arrested, and am now detained, as I understand the law entitles me to the same.—The Chief Justice replied—It is not usual to give it; you will take legal advice, and if you are entitled to it, the person you employ will obtain it in a legal way. Mr. Taaffe made a similar application, and received the same answer.—We heard Mr. Taaffe declare, that he did not consider this extraordinary act of power so much a Catholic question, as a violation of the subject's right generally; and with this view he would defend himself by every means pointed out by the Law and the Constitution.—So far the proceedings of yesterday. Under another head we submit some observations on the subject, to which we would claim public attention. We shall here annex the Warrant of arrest.

COPY OF THE WARRANT.—*By the Right Hon. William Downes, Lord Chief Justice of his Majesty's Court of King's Bench, in Ireland.*

COUNTY OF THE CITY } Whereas, it ap-
OF DUBLIN, TO WIT. } pears to me, by
 information upon oath, that on the ninth
 day of July last, a number of persons as-

sembled at Fishamble-street, in the county of the city of Dublin, did propose and resolve, that a Committee of persons, professing the Roman Catholic Religion, should be appointed to represent the Roman Catholics of Ireland, for the purpose, or under the pretence, of preparing Petitions to both Houses of Parliament, for the repeal of all laws in force in Ireland, particularly affecting the Roman Catholics of Ireland. And whereas, I have also received information on oath, that on the 31st day of the said month, divers other persons assembled in the Roman Catholic Chapel, in Liffey-street, in the county of the city of Dublin, for the purpose of appointing five persons to act in such Committee as aforesaid, as the Representatives therein of the parish in which said Chapel is situate, and that at said Meeting in Liffey-street, one Edward Sheridan was appointed one of the said Representatives, and that Thomas Kirwan, Gregory Scurlog, Henry Edmond Taaffe, and Doctor John Breen, were four of the persons so there assembled, and that they and each of them then and there acted in such appointment of the said Edward Sheridan, to be such Representative as aforesaid, against the form of the Statute in that case made and provided. These are, therefore, in his Majesty's name, strictly to charge and command you, to apprehend and bring before me, or some other of the Justices of his Majesty's said Court of King's Bench, the bodies of the said Thomas Kirwan, Gregory Scurlog, Henry Edmond Taaffe, and Doctor John Breen, that they be dealt with according to law, and for your so doing this shall be your sufficient warrant. Given under my hand and seal, the 6th day of August, 1811.

WM. DOWNES.

*Francis Humikon, and all
 or any of the Constables
 of the said county of the
 city of Dublin, and their
 Assistants.*

TIPPERARY MEETING.—On Thursday, a numerous and respectable Meeting of the Catholics of the County of Tipperary took place in Clonmell. We have not room to detail the whole of the proceedings, and can only briefly state, that ten persons were appointed to the Catholic Committee, and a Vote of Thanks was unanimously passed to Counsellor Scully.—The Catholic Gentlemen received twenty distinct intimations from Magistrates, assuring

them of their dissent from the Proclamation. Mr. Prittie, Representative for the County, was present; and we understand Lord Lisimore offered his support, should it be thought necessary.

PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.—THE WAR.—*Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Viscount Talavera. Dated, Quinta de St. Joao, July 11, 1811.*—(N. B. The foregoing Dispatch, in page 154, should be dated 4th July, and not 1st July.)

The enemy continued in the positions reported in my dispatch of the 4th instant, till the 7th, when they moved a large body of cavalry and about two battalions of infantry from Montigo towards the Xevora, and from thence upon Villa de Rey, Le Roca, and Albuquerque.—The object of this movement was apparently to cut off our detachments employed in observing the enemy on that side; in which, however, they did not succeed, Major Cocks having retired with all his detachments upon St. Vicente, still keeping communications open with Arronches and Portalegre.—The enemy's troops retired from Albuquerque on the 8th, and Major Cocks again entered that town with his parties on the same day.—The army of Portugal are again in the same position on the right of the Guadiana, which they occupied when I addressed your Lordship on the 4th instant.—*General Blake made an attempt to obtain possession of Niebla on the night of the 30th of June, in which place the enemy had a garrison of about 300 infantry.* I am sorry to say *this attempt failed*, and he remained before the place till the 2nd instant, and then retired towards the Guadiana.—On the 6th two divisions of infantry and the cavalry of the 5th army, under the Conde de Penne Villamur, were crossing the Guadiana, on a bridge constructed for them at St. Lucar by Colonel Austin. The artillery was embarked at Ayamonte, and General Balasteros with the advanced guard remained upon the river St. Pedro. *It appeared to be General Blake's intention to embark his troops for Cadiz*, but neither General Castanos nor I have heard from him since he marched from Juramenba on the 18th of June.—In the north Marshal Bessieres had returned again to Valladolid from Benavente; and in the end of the month of

June, the enemy assembled at and in the neighbourhood of Valladolid a considerable body of troops. General Bonnet, however, still remained in the neighbourhood of Leon and Benavente with the troops under his command; and I have received from General Silveira, a report of the defeat of the French in an attack made upon a Spanish detachment from the army in Galicia, in front of Astorga, on the 25th ultimo.—*The Guerillas likewise continue their operations*; and besides the alarm given to Valladolid on the 15th ultimo, Don Julian gave a similar alarm to Salamanca on the 29th ultimo; but a considerable party of Guerillas belonging to different Chiefs, which had taken a convoy at Penaranda, were afterwards surprised on the 30th of June, and dispersed, about 200 having been killed, wounded, and made prisoners.

FRANCE.—*Speech of COUNT SEGUR, Orator of the Council of State, to the Legislative Body, at the Close of the Session, July 25, 1811.*

Gentlemen;—We have presented you this year with but few plans of laws. Now that the codes Napoleon, of commerce, &c. are organized throughout the empire, it is natural that the labours of the administration should augment, and that of the legislation diminish. The same activity which in so few years has revived France, founded the most powerful and vast empire, re-erected the altars, raised justice, endowed the communes, intersected France with roads and canals, levelled mountains, organized public institutions, and given France those wise laws which other nations envy, and are eager to adopt; the same activity, I say, must at present give motion to all these creations, advance all these establishments, and perfect the social edifice the bases of which are laid. All the sources of riches and prosperity are opened; creation is finished; life commences. Thus, the small number of laws we now offer you, proves how salutary and all-sufficient those are which already exist; but if this Session, Gentlemen, has not been marked by the adoption of important laws, it will not on that account be a less memorable epoch for you.
(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XX. No. 8.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, AUGUST 24, 1811.

[Price 1s.

" If the contest is to be between Ferdinand and Joséph, my decided opinion is that the latter will remain king of Spain; and whatever my wishes may be, the turtle patriots would rather that Joseph should be king, than that the war should terminate with the establishment of a free constitution."—
POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. 14. page 228. Aug. 13, 1808.

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PAPER MONEY.—In the foregoing Number of the Register, at page 209, I inserted, upon this subject, an article from the *Kentish Gazette*, containing the process and result of a curious and useful calculation as to the real present worth of a one pound note of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England. The calculation was founded on the data furnished by the Bank Company themselves in their *Three Shilling Tokens*; and the result is, that the £. 1 Note of the Bank is worth 10s. 4½d. —Nothing could be more fair than the author's principle, and his result was perfectly correct. But, there is an error in the foundation on which the whole of his calculation is raised; and, of course, as all the calculations are correct, there is an error in the result, which error I have perceived by a reference to that admirable work, *Dr. Kelly's Universal Cambist*. —The Kentish Correspondent states the weight of the Three Shilling Bank Token 9 dwts. 11 grs. or 227 grs.; and, he adds, that the weight of *Three Shillings* is 11 dwts. 15 grs. or 279 grs. Hence he proceeds with his calculation, and very clearly demonstrates, that, on data furnished by the Bank Company themselves,

A Guinea is worth in Bank £. s. d.
of England Notes..... 1 5 9½

And

A One Pound Note of the
Bank of England is worth 0 16 4½

But, this Gentleman, for whose pains I beg leave to offer him my sincere thanks, forgot, or he had never known (as would have been the case with me without the aid of *Dr Kelly's Book*), that there is a considerable difference between the *fineness* of the *Token Silver* and the *Standard Silver*, and, of course, a considerable difference between the value of the one and that of the other. The *Token Silver* is the same with the *Dollar Silver*. The *Dollar* is not, as is generally supposed, worth 4s. 6d. sterling; but 4s. 3½d. as will be seen by referring to the *Universal Cambist*, Vol. 1,

page 391; And, by a reference to the same page it will be seen, that the dollar silver is, in point of *fineness*, 8 dwts. worse than English Standard Silver. Therefore, as the Dollar is now issued at 5s. 6d. and its divisions in proportion, Bank Paper is to Sterling as 31½ to 66, which makes the Sterling value of the Three Shilling Token 2s. 4½d. and of the One Pound Note 15s. 8½d. Let us state the matter clear at the expence of a little repetition.

In Sterling.

	£.	s.	d.
The Pound Note is worth...	0	15	8½
The Five and Sixpenny Token	0	4	3½
The Three Shilling Token	0	2	4½
The Guinea	1	1	0
The Shilling	0	1	0

In Bank of England Paper,

	£.	s.	d.
The Pound Note is worth...	1	0	0
The Five and Sixpenny Token	0	5	6
The Three Shilling Token	0	3	0
The Guinea	1	6	9
The Shilling	0	1	3½
The Depreciation is, therefore, 27½ per centum.			

Now, let it be observed, that these results are drawn from data furnished by the Bank Company themselves in their Three Shilling Tokens. These Tokens not only declare the real value of the Bank Notes; but, they declare what the Bank Company themselves look upon as being the real value of their notes.—Those notes are, then, depreciated, in comparison with gold and silver, 27½ per centum; and, their pound note is really worth only 15s. 8½d. in good and lawful money of this realm.—If this be false, any one may shew it by figures; and, if no one does shew it by figures, let the Paper-Mill people for ever after hold their tongues.—If one wanted any thing more to establish the fact as well as the degree of depreciation

tion, the state of the *gold market* and of the *exchange* would. The Portugal Gold coins, which are not all equal in fineness to our gold coin, now sell, leaving, of course, a profit to the broker, at £.4 17s. 6d. an ounce, if paid for in Bank of England Paper. Whereas, if that paper was not depreciated, the ounce of such coins would sell for no more than £.3 17s. 10½d. in the Bank Paper; because, as we have seen above, that is the value, in *Sterling money*, of an ounce of English Standard Gold. Under these circumstances, is it any wonder that we no longer see any gold or silver coin current? It would be very strange if we did, seeing that the guinea is worth £.1 6s. 9d. and the shilling, if good, worth 1s. 3½d. in Bank paper; and, the Crown and Half Crown, of course, in the same proportion.—As to the *exchange*, we will take the instance of France. By referring to the *Universal Cambist*, Vol. II, page 238, it will be seen, that the par of exchange between London and Paris is this: 25 livres, 11 sous and 6 deniers French for £.1 English. Now, if Monsieur Jacobin of Paris owed Sir Sothead Jubilee of London a pound, and Sothead wanted to apply the pound to the use of Sothead Junior who might be a prisoner in France, the elder Sothead would draw a Bill of Exchange for the purpose: that is to say, he would draw an order, or bill for £.1 upon Monsieur Jacobin, which, upon being presented by the younger Sothead, would, in due course be paid in the French money, livres, sous, and deniers; and, as we have seen above, young Sothead ought to receive 25 livres, 11 sous, and 6 deniers; but, “no,” says Monsieur Jacobin, “your English pound is not worth so much as it used to be. It is not a pound in *specie* that I owe to Sir Sothead Jubilee: it is a pound in Bank Paper, because what I bought of him was bought in that paper. Therefore I must pay you no more than the worth of one pound, in Bank paper.” This point being settled, they look to the price Current and Course of Exchange of the day; and, if it were on last Friday, they would find, that, agreeably to the Statement published in London by *Weichenhall*, the sum to be paid to young Sothead would be only 18 Livres, instead of 25 Livres, 11 Sous, and 6 Deniers. So that here we see, that our Bank Paper has depreciated, or fallen in value, 7 Livres, 11 Sous, and 6 Deniers out of 25 Livres, 11 Sous and 6 Deniers;

which is, as nearly as can be, a fall of 27 ½ per centum.—Thus is this fact of depreciation *proved* in all manner of ways; and yet are there hirelings to deny it. Their denials, however, answer no purpose. This is a point as to which all their tricks will be of no avail. Here is a steady principle at work, and nothing that can be said or done will put a stop to its progress.—The depreciation of the Bank Paper is daily and hourly appearing under fresh guises: it is gradually putting forth all the usual symptoms of total annihilation. At Bristol little pieces of silver, worth no more than *eightpence* sterling, have been issued by private individuals, and pass for a *shilling*, under the denomination of “*necessary change*.” At Louth, in Lincolnshire, a Company of Carpet Manufacturers, named *Adam Eve and Co.* have issued Notes for 2s. 6d. These Notes are mere *printed cards* (just like the assignats in France), payable to bearer; but, mark! not payable *generally*, but specifically in *Bank Notes*. Thus: “Pay the bearer for eight of these one pound Bank Note.” And here, then, it all hangs together in a string! I have frequently said, that *to these small notes we must come*. I have all along said it. It is the regular, the natural, the inevitable progress; and, such notes we shall see in every part of the kingdom.—This Mr. Adam Eve seems to be the founder of the half crown notes. Not a bad name for an *original* inventor. His notes are veritable *assignats*. They are just such things as they used to have in France. They will breed amazingly; and, I dare say that Mr. Adam Eve will see the country people at Louth market with thousands and thousands of the progeny in their pocket books, of a denomination down so low as that of a halfpenny.—As the gold and silver rise in price, there must be more and more small notes, or, the tokens must be raised in their nominal value, or else, others must be put forth of the present nominal value, but of less weight or of a less pure quality. Perhaps all these three expedients will proceed hand in hand. But, at any rate, the present Tokens will not remain long in circulation, unless they be raised in nominal value; for, they will soon be worth *hoarding*, or *selling* to melt down, or to export. The guineas and other gold coins have disappeared along with the crowns and half crowns and tolerably good shillings; and, when the metals rise a little higher in price, the Tokens will march the

same way ; for they can never be made to keep company with a paper that is depreciated lower than themselves.—The expedient of Mr. Adam Eve of making his assignats payable only in Bank Notes has, doubtless, arisen from the knowledge, which is now got abroad, that, as the law yet stands, a man may demand gold or silver for notes payable to bearer generally ; and, this will answer his purpose ; for, no one can enforce payment of them in any thing but Bank Notes. The example will, I dare say, be followed, by and by, all over the kingdom, by the Country Bankers, who will make their notes payable in Bank of England Notes. But, what will this do ? It will not stop the thing an hour ; but, on the contrary, will accelerate it greatly, by augmenting the quantity of paper, and, of course, adding to the depreciation.—I should be much obliged to any one who would send me one of Mr. Adam Eve's little notes ; and to any other person who would send me one of the " necessary change " pieces from Bristol. It is not for the " base lucre " of the thing ; but I have a desire to possess memorials of the progress of the grand event that is approaching. I have some of the *forged assignats*, and I should like to have one of Adam Eve's to keep them company. But, as to Mr. Adam Eve, he might, I think, send me from himself a quire or two of his money. It costs him nothing but the paper and print ; and, if it were only as a brother author he might afford me so trifling a gratification.

SPAIN.—TARRAGONA.—The language of those who were indulging, some time ago, such very sanguine hopes as to the war in Spain, is a good deal changed. They begin to tell us of treasons at Cadiz ; of enemies in our bosom ; and, in short, of every thing which indicates coolness, disaffection, and a declining cause.—To the fall of Tarragona much of this has been ascribed ; and, it must be allowed, that that event was well calculated to produce dismay amongst the people of Spain. Poor creatures ! what are they, in any city or place, to do against such tremendous means as the French have to bring to bear against them ? What are they to do ? It is fine talking about their glorious cause ; but, what are they to do ?—At Tarragona, where the governor appears to have been a very gallant and skilful man ; at Tarragona, strong by nature and by art ; at Tarragona, which was, besides,

open to us by the sea, and, at all times capable of being assisted by us ; at Tarragona if they could not, with a numerous garrison, defend themselves against the French, what have they to expect at any other place ?—At Tarragona there was, it appears, an army of about ten thousand men, at the time when the assault took place. Between eight and nine thousand were actually made prisoners. This is a fearful fact. Why, ten thousand men ought to defend well-constructed works against fifty thousand ; or, indeed, against almost any number that can possibly be brought to bear upon a fortified place. But, as the Spanish Governor himself says, his men would not meet the French in the breach. They behaved well enough, it seems, during the former part of the siege, and until the real *fighting* foot to foot began ; but then they gave way ; their hearts sunk within them ; they were appalled ; they fled in every direction ; and, rather suffered themselves to be killed by their own officers than meet the French soldiers. There is no gainsaying this. It is the statement of the Spanish Governor himself ; who says in so many words, that " the garrison behaved heroic-ally up to the moment of the assault ; " that, even then the officers behaved " well ; that they, sabre in hand, made " the greatest efforts to keep the soldiers " to their duty, and to collect them, in " order that they might resist and attack " the French, who were pursuing and " cutting them down in the streets. But," says he, " the terror of the soldiers increased every moment, and they let " themselves be sabred even by us, without resolving to recommence the combat."—This is a most striking proof of the dread which the Spaniards have of the French ; that they feel themselves inferior to them in point of courage ; and, in short, that they are impressed with a conviction, that it is their fate to be conquered.—The accounts given by our own people of the close of this memorable siege agrees but too well with what has been published by the French, as will be seen in another part of this Number. But, I really do not see the policy (to say nothing of the justice) of our *railing* against Marshal Suchet and his army. If the French had railed against Lord Nelson on account of his victory off Trafalgar, which, in point of importance, may be put, perhaps, about upon a level with this achievement of Marshal

Suchet; if the French had railed against Lord Nelson upon that occasion, what good would that have done them? It would have made us laugh at them, to be sure, just as the French must now laugh at us. What is the use of calling Suchet and his army savages and monsters? That will do us no good, nor will it do the French any harm; and, as to the justice of the charge, though we have been informed by Suchet himself, that most terrible vengeance was taken upon the town, it was what the Governor was apprized of before hand, and what he might have avoided by timely surrender. He did not choose that: he shewed himself a brave man. But, then, he was to expect the consequences; the natural, the regular, consequences. Since war has been war those who have stood out and have been captured by assault have been given up to pillage. There may have been more than ordinary severity and brutality exercised at Tarragona for ought I know; but I know, that to give up the place to pillage was nothing more than what is fully authorized by the usages of war; and it is, I am inclined to think, what any English Commander would do in a similar case.—We have been assured in our newspapers, that the French lost above three thousand men before Tarragona. There were the lives of these men to avenge. We all know how vengeance gets treasured up during a long siege, in which, until the end, the besiegers generally suffer most.—But, at any rate, our horror at the conduct of the French and our compassion for the sufferings of the Spaniards have something about them truly distinctive of the character of the war we are now waging in the Peninsula. We urge the Spaniards (poor souls!) to make a gallant defence of their towns; we extol those who hold out against the French, and we execrate those who do not. We call these latter cowards and traitors, though we did not call, by either of those names, the garrison who last year surrendered at Almeida. In short, we do every thing, that we can possibly do, and say every thing, that we can possibly say, to induce every Spanish garrison to resist to the last. And, while we do this, and while we have loud and virulent censure at hand for those garrisons who do not so hold out, is it not rather too shameful for us to pull out our handkerchiefs and affect to blubber when we see a Spanish garrison put to the sword and a Spanish town

pillaged, which we well know are the natural and the general consequences of that very resistance which we so strongly recommend? But, we do more, as far as our public prints go; we do more than urge the Spaniards to this sort of mortal resistance in their towns. We record of the Spaniards, that they, in numerous instances, *massacre the French without mercy*; that the Guerillas, as they are called by us, and the Banditti, as they are called by the French, cut to pieces all the Frenchmen they can lay their hands upon. These acts our public prints *applaud*; they bring them forward as proofs of the proper feeling of the Spaniards. And, while these prints do this, is it not a shame to hear them, in almost the same breath, revile the French for their barbarities towards the Spaniards, which are the necessary consequence of those acts of the Spaniards, which these prints so loudly commend?—Aye, we are told, but the French are *invaders*: they go into Spain as *conquerors*. Very true; and I am by no means inclined to justify the invasion and conquering of a country for the sake of conquest; but, it is, nevertheless, very well known, that the circumstance of an enemy being engaged in an invasion, and in the pursuit of conquest; it is very well known, that this circumstance does not prevent such enemy from being considered as a *lawful* enemy, and from being treated according to the *usual customs of war*. If this were not the case; that is, if an invader with views of conquest were to be considered as shut out from the usual rules of war; if his soldiers were to be butchered in cold blood; if no quarter were to be shown his army on account of his being an *invader* with views of *conquest*, what would, in numerous cases, have been the fate of *our* armies? For, how many islands, principalities, and kingdoms, have we invaded and conquered? I am not, observe, attempting a justification of, or an apology for, the invasion of Spain by Napoleon: whether that invasion was just or unjust is a question which I will not here attempt to discuss, though it is a question which ought, one of these days, to be soberly and impartially gone into. I am not attempting, by citing *our* own conduct, to make any *excuse* for the invasion of Spain and Portugal by France, though I must express my fear, that our example at Copenhagen, coupled with our constant declarations, that we are *fighting the battles of England in the Peninsula*, which

we very often call the *outworks of England*; I must express my fear, that, with these facts before the world, we should not gain much in an accusation against the French that they have invaded the Peninsula without just cause. But, let us leave all these matters for the present, and return to the question as to the laws of war, as bearing upon the point before us; and, certainly these laws, if laws they may be called, do not authorize any distinction between the treatment of an invading army and an army that is not engaged in invasion; for, in fact, how are people to make war at all, upon land, without *invasion*? The Duke of Brunswick invaded France about twenty years ago, as he had before invaded Holland, with the very same Prussian army; but, his army was not considered as excluded from the usual rules of war. The Duke of York, our present Commander in Chief, invaded France sometime after the invasion of the Duke of Brunswick; he was at the taking of a town or two, and attempted to take others. But, did ever any one hear of his army being refused quarter, or treated differently from the usual course of war? No: and, when the French republicans threatened to do it, were they not menaced with retaliation?—Hence, then, it is clear, that the French army in Spain ought to be considered as a lawful enemy, an enemy entitled to the treatment prescribed by the usual practices of war. Therefore, if we applaud (as our prints mostly do) acts of massacre committed by the Spaniards upon parcels of the French army; if this be our custom, with what decency do we set up such loud complaints against the French for their massacring of the Spaniards? I do not know which party *began* the bloody work; but, this I know, that we *applaud it* in the Spaniards, and I also know, that we therein do all in our power to keep it up on both sides, seeing that we must be well assured, that the French will not be behind hand in the way of retaliation.—Let us therefore, hear no more of these compassionate effusions in favour of the Spaniards and of these revilings of the French, until we have quite cleared ourselves of the charge of being *instigators*.—The same reasoning will apply to *all the evils* of the war in the Peninsula. We seem to think that the world has but one eye and one ear: an eye kept steadily upon the ambitious conduct of France, and an ear to listen only to our tale. We deceive ourselves

most grossly. The world has two eyes and two ears. The world saw us take possession of the Danish fleet; because *what*? Why, because there was every likelihood, that, if we did not take possession of it, Napoleon would take possession of it, and would use it against us. If the reader applies this, but for half a moment, to the case of Spain and Portugal, he will see, that all the argument is not on one side.—But, if the war be productive of such terrible evils to the Peninsula, and if we do really feel for the unhappy people, why do we prolong this war? For, no one will deny, that we are the real supporters of the war in Spain as well as in Portugal. “What!” Some one will say; “put an end to the war by “withdrawing our aid and support!” Very melancholy to be sure; but, then, leave off whining about what the Spaniards and Portuguese suffer from the war.—“What! “give up the Peninsula to the Corsican “Upstart, and thus retire in disgrace before him, all our noble commanders, all “our Lords and all our Squires, leave the “field before a parcel of old Serjeants and “Corporals, the sons of farmers and labourers.” It would be a shame, indeed; but, then, let us not talk any longer about the sufferings of the poor Spaniards and Portuguese on account of the war: let us drop that cant.—“What! quit the “Peninsula where we are fighting the battles “of England!” No, no: to be sure not; but, then, for decency sake, do not say another word about compassion for the people of Spain and Portugal who suffer from the existence of the war.—We have not here been discussing the question whether our cause be good or bad in the Peninsula: we have been discussing this question, whether it be wise or foolish in us to affect so much compassion for the sufferings of the people in those countries, and to talk so much about the extent of those sufferings; and, if my reasoning upon the subject be correct, we shall, I think, do well, in future, to hold our tongues respecting those sufferings.—I propose now to add a few remarks upon the cause of Spain and Portugal generally, taking things in a more enlarged view. These remarks are suggested by an article in the *Courier* of the 20th instant, manifestly written with a view of palliating the reverses which have recently taken place, and (an object never overlooked) of inculcating a belief that all those who did not, or do not, approve of the war in the Penin-

sula, are little better than traitors. The writer, after a great deal of labour to little effect for the above purpose, has these remarks: "But let us *make Spain the test of the patriotism* of these men; for true virtue is universal in its operation, and Spain affords an instance of the clearest villainy on the part of the enemy. When the French troops began to put in execution the designs of their master, then they told us that it was time that the *old government of Spain should be destroyed*; the French would "regenerate" the country and the people would gladly receive them. But when the *people began to associate* in different parts to oppose the French, our adorers of the "majesty of the people" were for a time silenced. They were, however, relieved by the circumstance of the insurrection not becoming at once general. O! then, it was not the people who were resisting the French, but a blinded mob, infuriated by priests and fanatic monks. *At one time there was a hope indulged that the refractory Spaniards would form a republic, and then, and only then, did British patriots seem to feel an interest in their success*; but this idea soon vanished; and *as soon as it was determined to preserve the monarchy under Ferdinand, they withdrew their good wishes, as it should seem, for ever.* Since that period their joy at the success of the French has been ill disguised, and their spleen at the *triumphs of the allies* openly discovered."—If our spleen has been moved only by the triumphs of the allies; there cannot have been much of spleen since the French entered the Peninsula; and, on the other hand, if we did rejoice at the success of the French, it must have been a continual toil to us to disguise it. However, this is all assertion: it is the offspring of the spite of those who live upon the taxes.—But, as to the history of our wishes in the case of the Peninsula, and of Spain in particular, what does this writer say? Why, that, at first, when the French entered Spain, we said "that is good: the old government of Spain will now be destroyed, at any rate; but that when the *people began to move against the French, we were, for a time, silenced.*"—Now, who is in the shape of man, except he be a Public Robber, a downright Robber, that does not think, that it would have been a good change for Spain to get rid of the *old government at any rate*? But, how much better to see

Spain free; and, therefore, when we saw something like a spirit of liberty, breaking forth amongst the Spaniards, we were, not silenced, as this writer here says; but, as he afterwards truly says, in hopes that the Spaniards would form *a new government, though no one talked of a republic.* "But" says he, "this idea soon vanished; and, as soon as it was determined to preserve the monarchy under Ferdinand, they withdrew their good wishes, as it should seem for ever."—No: not for ever. That is a mistake: our good wishes the Spaniards always will have as far as they shall be found engaged in the cause of freedom, which is their cause and our cause and the cause of all the nations upon earth; but, between Joseph and Ferdinand we do not profess to be able to judge.—We quitted the cause, it seems, as "soon as it was determined to preserve the monarchy under Ferdinand." But, who was it that came to this determination? Was it the *people of Spain*? The first that we, in England, heard of such a determination was at the memorable Turtle Patriot dinner in the City of London, where Mr. Canning, then a Secretary of State, introduced the new king to us, and toasted him as king of Spain, *though his father was notoriously still alive, and though he be alive yet.** This was the first that we heard of any determination to preserve the Spanish monarchy under Ferdinand; and, when we did hear of it; when we did find that a war was about to be entered upon for such a purpose, we expressed the opinion contained in my motto, and gave very ample reasons why such a war could never succeed. We said, that, to resist the French required a thorough conviction in the minds of the people that such resistance would lead to their freedom; that to make a people fight in defence of their country against an invader, you must make them feel that his success would be injurious to them; that the influence of nobles, priests, or of prejudice, though it might serve to rouse the people sufficiently for the purposes of partial warfare, and might produce some very sanguinary conflicts, would never be sufficient to resist, in the end, the armies of France; that there wanted, for this purpose, a new soul in Spain, a dislocation of society, an event, in short, like the French revolution, without its bloodshed, and that nothing short of that would enable the

* See Vol. 14, p. 226.

country to resist the armies of Napoleon. *This was what we said: we did not ask for republics or any other particular fancy: we only asked for freedom to the people of Spain: and we gave our reasons for believing, that, unless freedom was given to Spain, the French would become masters of the country; an opinion which seems, at last, not to be thought so very wild; and it will, I imagine, not be long before this "most thinking nation in Europe," will pretty clearly perceive, that it would have been better if our advice had been followed.*

In my next I shall state, as fully and as clearly as I am able, the whole of the case relating to the Dispute with America, which has been delayed hitherto for want of certain points of information, which I now possess.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
August 23, 1811.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—TARRAGONA.—*Account of the Siege and Capture of this place, in letters from Capt. Adam, Col. Green, and Capt. Codrington, to Admiral Cotton, Commanding in the Mediterranean.—From the 5th to the 28th June, 1811.*

*Invincible, Tarragona-roads,
June 5, 1811.*

Sir;—On the 28th in the morning the enemy opened his fire on fort Olivo from two batteries, one of four guns and a mortar, the other of three guns and an howitzer, placed on the flank of the fort. About mid day of the 29th, Colonel Green examined the works of the Olivo, owing to a report from an officer that its defences were in a bad state, and he found them very much destroyed. At night it was intended to substitute the regiment of Almeria for that of Iberia, which had been hitherto in the fort; and after dark the former regiment was marched out of the town for that purpose; but I am sorry to say the enemy found means to mingle himself with that regiment, and he got possession of the Olivo without firing a shot, making nine hundred men prisoners.

The enemy's force at present is considered to be between ten and eleven thousand men; he is supposed to have lost four thousand since the commencement of the siege in killed and wounded, and deserters.

The Spaniards, including the prisoners made at the Olivo, have lost about three thousand.

CHARLES ADAM.

Tarragona, June 11, 1811.

Sir;—The small advanced work on the sea-beach, called the Francoli, was destroyed in four hours by the batteries thrown up in the night of the 6th instant; but its situation was such as always to have made its tenure very uncertain, by being very much detached. On this occasion the conduct of the Spanish troops was particularly gallant; all the men who occupied the Francoli, to the amount of one hundred and forty-five, being either killed or wounded, and the officer in command having left the fort the last person. The enemy has since made several attempts to carry these works, which protect the communication between the sea and the town, but by the vigilance and bravery of Brigadier Sarsfield, who commands these defences, they have been repulsed with considerable loss; and, indeed, in one instance, though the enemy had rallied three times, he was completely defeated in his object. But the very hard work by day in constructing works for the support of the lines, which becomes necessary in consequence of the radical defects of the fortifications, and the constant alarms and attacks by night, causes serious anxiety for the earliest relief.

E. R. GREEN.

*Blake, off Villa Nueva,
June 15th, 1811.*

Sir;—As Captain Adam has informed you of the occurrences at Tarragona, during my absence, up to the 5th of June, I have only to add, that although the French have advanced their works to within half pistol shot of the lines of the Puerto, besides having entirely destroyed the battery of Francoli, and formed a post under the position of its ruins, they have been beaten off with very serious loss on their part in some desperate attempts to storm the Orleans and Saint Joseph batteries; and that the Spaniards under General Sarsfield have made several successful sorties with the few troops that could be spared for the purpose. My last letter to you, dated the 15th of May, will have informed you of my intention of proceeding to Valencia and Alicante with General Doyle, and I have now to make known to you the successful result of our visit to those places.—Leaving Tarragona on the 16th, we reached Peniscola on the fore-

noon of the 17th, where, finding the *Invincible*, with four empty transports, bound to Carthagea, I directed Captain Adam to remain until he heard farther from me. From thence General Doyle wrote to General O'Donnell an account of the situation of Tarragona, and of my detaining Captain Adam at Peniscola in readiness to receive any reinforcements which he might be pleased to send to that garrison. Upon our arrival at Murviedra we found General O'Donnell had already ordered the embarkation of two thousand three hundred infantry, and two hundred and eleven artillerymen, &c. which, by the zeal and exertion of Captain Adam, who received seven hundred of them on board the *Invincible*, were safely landed at Tarragona on the 22nd.—Delivering to General O'Donnell two thousand stand of arms, accoutrement, and clothing, to enable him to bring into the field as many of the recruits already trained as would supply the place of the regular soldiers thus detached from his army, we proceeded to Valencia, and landed the remainder of our cargo; by which means the troops of General Villa Campa, then dispersed as peasantry for want of arms, were enabled again to take the field, and the corps of Mina and Empecinado completed in all the requisites for active warfare, and the army of Arragon thus brought forward to act in concert with the movements of that of Valencia.—At Alicant we procured as many necessary materials for Tarragona as the ship would actually stow, besides eighty artillerymen, and a considerable quantity of powder, ball cartridge, lead, &c. sent in the *Paloma* Spanish corvette from Carthagea, in company with a Spanish transport from Cadiz, deeply laden with similar supplies. As it was impossible to receive these stores on board the *Blake*, they were conveyed at my request in the *Paloma*, with the ship under convoy, directly to Tarragona.—After returning to Valencia, where we landed the additional arms, &c. for the Arragonese army, we moved on to Murviedra; where the Count of Bisbal proceeded from Valencia to join us in a consultation with his brother, although on account of his wound, he was very unfit for such a journey. The result of this conference was a determination on the part of General O'Donnell to commit to my protection, for the succour of Tarragona, another division of his best troops, under Major-General Miranda, consisting of four thousand men,

whilst he himself would move forward with the remainder of his army to the banks of the Ebro; where, in concert with the Arragonese division, he might threaten, and perhaps destroy, the different depôts of General Suchet.—I therefore hastened to Tarragona, to collect the necessary shipping, for the purpose of giving action to their liberal and patriotic intentions. Again fortunately meeting the *Invincible* on the night of the 6th, I directed Captain Adam to anchor at Peniscola, and wait my return to that rendezvous in company with Captain Pringle, whom I ordered to do the same with the *Sparrowhawk* and the transport *William*, whenever he should have landed the mortars, &c. at Valencia, with which he was charged.—On the morning of the 7th we reached Tarragona, landed the whole of our cargo in the course of the night; and, after a consultation with General Contreras, again left that anchorage at ten o'clock in the forenoon of the 8th, taking the *Paloma* along with us.—We reached Peniscola on the noon of the 9th, where the *Invincible* had already anchored with the four transports, and were joined on the 10th by the *Centour*, *Sparrowhawk*, and *William* transport.—From the critical situation of Tarragona, I left orders with Captain Bullen, that whatever ships of war might arrive before my return, should join me immediately; and to Captain White's promptness in obeying this order, and consenting in common with Captain Adam and myself to receive each a battalion of eight hundred troops, with the proper proportion of officers, I am indebted for the power of embarking the whole four thousand on the forenoon of the 11th, and landing them at the garrison of Tarragona during the night of the 12th.—As soon as the troops were ready for embarkation at Peniscola, I sent the *Sparrowhawk* forward to prepare the garrison and also the Marquis of Campo Verde for our arrival, in consequence of the Marquis's letter in answer to General Miranda requesting I would again embark his division for the purpose of joining the Marquis in the neighbourhood of Villa Nueva de Sitges, in order to threaten the flank of the besieging army. And this farther service was so speedily executed by means of the boats of the squadron, that the whole division was again safely landed at this place on the evening of yesterday, from whence it marched this morning for Villa Franca, intending to join the Mar-

quis of Campo Verde, to-morrow, at Iquialada.—EDWARD CODRINGTON.

*Blake, in Tarragona-Roads,
June 23, 1811.*

Sir,—Besides employing the gun-boats and launches during the whole of every night in annoying the enemy's working parties, I have supplied the garrison with above three thousand sand-bags made by the squadron, and sent all the women, children, and wounded people by the transports to Villa Neuva; added to which the boats of the squadron under the particular directions of Captain Adam, but assisted by Captain White and myself, took off above two hundred men who retreated to the Mole after the French had taken the batteries, and who were safely landed again during the night at the Milagro, that is, within the works on the east side of the town. And in order to counteract the depression which might ensue from the extensive and unexpected advantages gained by the enemy on the night of the 21st, I yesterday led the squadron as near to the Mole and Puerto as could be done with safety, and drove the enemy from the advanced position they had taken. This position, which was taken with the view of picking off the artillerymen at their guns, as they did on the lines of the Puerto, was immediately afterwards, and still remains, occupied by the Spanish Guerrillas.—But the French are making a work near the Fuerte Real battery, from which they will quickly breach the wall of the town, and are digging their trenches in such a direction as will secure them from the fire of the shipping. In the mean time they are destroying the Custom house, the large stores, and all the buildings of the Puerto, in order, I presume, to ruin the place as much as possible; and I have no doubt but the town will share the same fate, if it should unfortunately fall into their hands.—The Baron de Éroles has taken a convoy of five hundred mules laden, and destroyed some of the escort.—The exertion and ability of the French in besieging this place has never, I believe, been exceeded; and I trust the brave garrison will still make a defence worthy the brilliant example which has been set them in some other parts of the Peninsula: but I am sorry to say the safety of the place now seems to depend particularly upon the army of the Marquis of Campo Verde; and I fear the town will eventually fall a

prey to the merciless and sanguinary enemy, who has so greatly circumscribed its means of defence.

EDWARD CODRINGTON.

Blake, off Tarragona, June 29, 1811.

Sir,—Yesterday morning, at dawn of day, the French opened their fire upon the town; about half past five in the afternoon a breach was made in the works, and the place carried by assault immediately afterwards. From the rapidity with which they entered, I fear they met with but little opposition; and upon the Barcelona side a general panic took place. Those already without the walls, stripped and endeavoured to swim off to the shipping, while those within were seen sliding down the face of the batteries; each party thus equally endangering their lives more than they would have done by a firm resistance to the enemy.—A large mass of people, some with muskets and some without, then pressed forward along the road, suffering themselves to be fired upon by about twenty French, who continued running beside them at only a few yards distance. At length they were stopped entirely by a volley of fire from one small party of the enemy, who had entrenched themselves at a turn of the road, supported by a second a little higher up, who opened a masked battery of two field-pieces. A horrible butchery then ensued; and shortly afterwards, the remainder of these poor wretches, amounting to above three thousand, tamely submitted to be led away prisoners by less than as many hundred French.—The launches and gun-boats went from the ships the instant the enemy were observed by the Invincible (which lay to the westward) to be collecting in their trenches; and yet, so rapid was their success, that the whole was over before we could open our fire with effect.—All the boats of the squadron and transports were sent to assist those who were swimming or concealed under the rocks; and, notwithstanding a heavy fire of musquetry and field-pieces, which was warmly and successfully returned by the launches and gun-boats, from five to six hundred were then brought off to the shipping, many of them badly wounded.—I cannot conclude my history of our operations at Tarragona without assuring you, that the zeal and exertion of those under my command, in every branch of the various services which have fallen to their lot, has been carried far beyond the mere dictates

of duty.—The Invincible and Centaur have remained with me the whole time immediately off Tarragona, and Captains Adam, White, and myself have passed most nights in our gigs, carrying on such operations under cover of the dark as could not have been successfully employed in sight of the enemy; I do not mean as to mere danger, for the boats have been assailed by shot and shells both night and day, even during the time of their taking off the women and children, as well as the wounded, without being in the smallest degree diverted from their purpose.—It is impossible to detail in a letter all that has passed during this short but tragic period; but humanity has given increased excitement to our exertions; and the bodily powers of Captain Adam have enabled him perhaps to push to greater extent that desire to relieve distress which we have all partaken in common.—Our own ships, as well as the transports, have been the receptacles of the miserable objects which saw no shelter but in the English squadron; and you will see by the orders which I have found it necessary to give, that we have been called upon to clothe the naked, and feed the starving, beyond the regular rules of our service.—Our boats have suffered occasionally from the shot of the enemy, as well as from the rocks from which they have embarked the people; amongst others the barge of the Blake, which however, I was so fortunate as to recover after being swamped and upset, in consequence of a shot passing through both her sides, with the loss only of one woman and child killed out of twelve, which were then on board in addition to her crew. But the only casualty of importance which has happened in the squadron is that which befel the Centaur's launch on the evening of the 28th, and I beg to refer you particularly to the observations of Captain White respecting Lieutenant Ashworth, whose conduct and whose misfortune entitle him to every consideration.

EDWARD CODRINGTON.

Captain Codrington farther states, that he had received intelligence that General Contreras was wounded and made prisoner, and that the General personally distinguished himself; that the Governor (Gonzales), with a handful of men, defended himself to the last, and was bayonneted to death in the square near his house; that man, woman, and child were put to the sword upon the French first en-

tering the town, and afterwards all those found in uniform or with arms in their houses; and that many of the women and young girls of ten years old, were treated in the most inhuman way; and that after the soldiers had satisfied their lust, many of them, *it was reported*, were thrown into the flames, together with the badly-wounded Spaniards; one thousand men had been left to destroy the works; *the whole city was burnt to ashes*, or would be so, as the houses were all set fire to; the only chance in their favour was the calm weather and the sudden march of the French, by which some houses might escape.

GENERAL MEMORANDUM. — Whereas, from the present distressed situation of Tarragona, many families may be obliged to embark without the necessary means of existence, until they can be conveyed to other places on the coast, where the customary generosity of the people will ensure them a share of what they may have for their own subsistence.—It is my direction that the ships of the English squadron furnish them with such provision, for the time of their embarkation and transport, as the humanity and liberality of our country will dictate.—A separate account of the provision so expended is hereafter to be given to me, regularly signed by the proper officers, for the information of the Victualling Board, instead of the people being borne for victuals as passengers usually are. — EDWARD CODRINGTON. — *Blake, in Tarragona Roads, June 25, 1811.*

GENERAL MEMORANDUM. — Whereas, in consequence of the town of Tarragona being taken this evening by assault, numbers of the troops and inhabitants who have been received on board the different ships and vessels of the squadron perfectly naked, it is my direction that they may be supplied with such articles of clothing as a due regard to decency and humanity may absolutely require.

EDWARD CODRINGTON.

Blake, in Tarragona Roads, June 28, 1811.

SPAIN.—*French Official News from the Armies.—Paris, 9th August, 1811.*

Madrid, July 16.—Yesterday was a day of rejoicing for this capital. The King, our Sovereign, entered it on his return from his journey, at half-past six in the evening, amidst the acclamations of an immense multitude, who awaited and

followed him to the Palace. A salute of artillery had announced to the inhabitants of Madrid the dawn of this happy day.—The Prefect of Madrid repaired to the confines of his prefecture, and there presented to his Majesty the homage of all the province.—The Commandant of the army of the centre, and the Governor of Madrid, went to the same place to receive his Majesty : they accompanied him as far as the Palace.—The troops of the garrison were drawn up in line along the whole of the road.—The Municipality, headed by the Corregidor, received his Majesty under an arch erected before the gate by which he was to enter ; and the Corregidor had the honour to present the keys of this capital to his Majesty.—On alighting from his carriage, the King was received by the Ministers, the Counsellors of State, the Officers of the Household, the Grandees and Nobility, the Generals and military officers not on duty, the Members of Tribunals, and principal Ecclesiastics. His Majesty condescended to address them with his characteristic affability.—A general illumination took place in the night, and this day bull-fights will be exhibited to the people gratis, and the theatres will also be opened gratuitously.

Official News from the Armies in Spain.

CATALONIA.—Marshal Suchet, after the capture of Tarragona, marched towards the interior of Catalonia. The assemblages which Campoverde had attempted to organise dispersed in haste ; the Marshal's presence made to fall back upon Agrament the corps assembled at Igualada about the end of the siege ; it is entirely disbanded ; the men are hastening to their homes in small bands, selling their arms and their horses for bread ; most of these parties threw themselves into the mountains of Arragon, when they are falling into the hands of the gendarmerie, and of the moveable columns which were sent in pursuit of them. Marshal Suchet has marched upon Vicque, where he was expected on the 13th of July. The assemblage at Olot dispersed in its turn, on his approach. Campoverde, abandoned by all his followers, was obliged to embark on the 14th at Mattaro, pursued by the inhabitants of the coast, who plundered his baggage.—Some days before the departure of Campoverde, General M. Matthieu sent a detachment to Mattaro, which burnt and destroyed the magazines which the enemy wished to form at that point ; an hundred

of the insurgents were killed ; ten English ships of war vainly endeavoured to protect Mattaro ; their hot fire cost us only 3 men and 3 horses.—The English at present are before Palamos, without daring to land.—The fortress of Figueras is more completely shut up than ever ; all the horses have been eaten, a little flour is all they have left ; the lines are watched with double vigilance, to prevent all escape on the part of the garrison, who must soon surrender at discretion.—The enemy's commandant, from the want of provisions, has dismissed unconditionally the prisoners which he took in the fort, amounting to 850.—In the mean while a corps of the army of Arragon is on its march against Valencia, and is collecting within reach of that town, a depot of ammunition and provisions, for the purpose of forthwith reducing the province.

District of the Army of the North.

The Duke of Istria having learned that an assemblage of Gallicians was forming in the valley of Vierzo, and threatened to cut off the communication between Leon and the Asturias, thought it necessary to concentrate a part of his troops, and for a moment to draw nearer to him the corps of General Bonnet, who received orders to repair to Leon about the 20th of June, after having sufficiently protected the line of the Deba. The fortifications of Astorga being considered useless and burthensome, the Duke of Istria ordered them to be razed.—On the 23d of June, the advanced guard of the insurgents made its appearance at Benavides. General Valletaux forthwith set out with 3 battalions, and 60 chasseurs. The ardour of the troops could not be restrained ; the sharpshooters dashed forward in pursuit of the enemy, and drove them to Quintanilla del Valle. In this position the enemy's army was perceived, 7,000 strong : they were too far engaged to be able to retreat ; the General made his dispositions without calculating the number of the enemy, and ordered the village to be attacked. It was carried with impetuosity, in spite of the efforts of the enemy, who was compelled to take a position in the rear. The 119th took post to the right, beyond the village ; the 122d was opposed to the enemy's columns which had formed on the roads to Fontoria and Quintana Dejor ; the Chief of Battalion, Durrel, kept in check, on the left, the troops which came from Astorga, and which made

fruitless efforts to turn him.—The action thus began was successful; our soldiers won the field of battle, on which were found 600 of the enemy dead; the number of their wounded was much more considerable.—This brilliant affair does honour to the last moments of General Valletaux, who was killed at the close of the combat; while dying he saw the defeat of the enemy; together with him we lament the loss of 30 brave men; we had 87 wounded. The Chief of Battalion, Pati, Aid-de-camp Meda, and Captain Grassi, of the 28th Chasseurs, deserve praises: as well as all the officers and soldiers of this detachment.—The enemy had retired beyond Astorga; General Bonnet reconnoitred him about the 10th of July; all the necessary measures were taken for attacking this assemblage, commanded by Santocildes.—The band of Pastor, lately formidable to Discay, is now reduced to a few banditti, whose numbers the gendarmerie daily diminish.—Longa, another chief of brigands, is hotly pursued by the moveable columns: he no longer knows where to find an asylum; his followers are availing themselves of the amnesty to surrender at discretion.—General Dorsenne is arrived at Valladolid to take the chief command of the army of the North. He immediately sent the General of Division Dumoutier, with 10,000 men and 1,500 horse, to take a position on the Coa, in advance of Ciudad Rodrigo.—Four divisions of the army of reserve have entered by Pampeluna and Vittoria. The fine appearance of these troops, of whom the lowest soldier has seen four years' service, has strongly surprised the inhabitants, and given them a new pledge of the uselessness of all the efforts of England.

District of the Army of the Centre.

Major Montigny, commanding the depots of cavalry at Madrigal, having learned that several united bands were moving upon Penaranda, concerted measures with the Commandant of Arevalo. On the first of July, two columns assembled at Flores D'Avila under the orders of Major Montigny. At day-break the enemy were discovered bivouacking near Penaranda, to the number of 1,000 men; the Major so rapidly charged them with his troop, that the brigands had not time to mount their horses. The streets, the houses, and environs of Penaranda were instantly covered with

dead bodies; near 400 brigands were left lying in the town, 100 were taken, the rest were pursued, and sabred in the corn-fields. Three hundred horses, one standard, 50 carts laden with salt, and all the baggage of the band, remained in the hands of the soldiers. Morales, one of their chiefs, was found among the dead.—The Junta of Valencia had given to General Sayas the command of all the united bands of the provinces of Cuenca; on the 3d of July that General made a movement towards Jadraque: reconnoitring parties belonging to our posts in Guadalaxara exchanged shots on the same day with the enemy's advanced posts near Hita.—On the 5th July, General Hugo was in readiness to march against the enemy, and to force his positions in order to drive him back upon the left of the Tagus. General Lahoussaye was ordered to advance in order to cut off the enemy's retreat. Sayas did not await them; he immediately commenced a retrograde movement with all his troops to the amount of 6,000 men, marching straight upon the Tagus. General Hugo set out in pursuit of him, while General Lahoussaye, leaving Guadalaxara, advanced by forced marches towards the bridge of Aunon, where he hoped to cut off the enemy's passage, who appeared to be retiring upon Cuenca. General Sayas had already passed the Tagus and collected his force at Val de Oliva. On the 11th General Lahoussaye crossed over his troops in haste; at the entrance of a defile his advanced guard fell upon the cavalry of Manco, supported by a battalion of infantry which Sayas had sent to take possession of the bridge of Aunon; 50 dragoons and a company of the 75th of the line intrepidly charged the enemy, routed and pursued them sword in hand as far as Sancon, where all our cavalry assembled; the enemy was at last come up with between Alcocer and Val de Oliva. Three battalions and two squadrons were drawn up, and thought to defend themselves by forming a square; the French cavalry soon broke through them, and all that were not sabred on the spot were taken.—A thousand prisoners, a number of whom are officers, 600 killed, one standard, all their baggage, about 200 horses, and a considerable convoy of cattle, are the results of this affair.—The remains of the troops of Sayas precipitately fled towards Cuenca. General Lahoussaye will not cease the pursuit till this corps shall no longer exist. The misunderstandings among the

chiefs, the desertion of the soldiers, the absolute want of every thing, powerfully contribute to its destruction. More than 1,200 guerillos have already returned to their homes; Martines, one of their chiefs, has surrendered with all his officers; Sayas is retiring upon Valencia.—The King has arrived at Madrid; he received upon his road the most unequivocal testimonies of the love of true Spaniards; his presence has electrified all minds; opinions are approximating.

Army of Portugal.

The English army has taken up cantonments around Portalegre, and keeps upon the defensive. The Duke of Ragusa has his head-quarters always at Merida, from whence he scours the country as far as the enemy's lines. Badajoz being in a formidable state of defence, and provisioned for 3 months, the Duke of Ragusa means to put his army into quarters for refreshment, in the Valley of the Tagus, with only an advanced guard on the Guadiana, during the heats of the month of August, which render the Valley of the Guadiana extremely unwholesome. The fifth corps will, during that period, keep up the communication between the army of Portugal and that of the South.

District of the Army of the South.

The 1st corps is constantly exerting the greatest activity in the works of the blockade of Cadiz. Puerto Santa Maria and Puerto Real are become very strong places; new batteries have been erected both on the side towards the sea, and upon all the approaches by land; they are connected by lines which also are defended by very strong batteries.—On the 13th of June, the garrison of the Isle of Leon attempted a sally against our works at the Arracise: 1,200 men advanced to our out-posts, while all the batteries and enemy's gun-boats kept up a violent fire upon the lines of Chiclana; but all this mighty racket produced so little effect, that our batteries at Chiclana scarcely deigned to return their fire. The infantry met a worse reception at the Arrecife. After a two hours fire of musketry, the enemy was compelled to save himself in haste, leaving a great many killed on the field of battle, and carrying off a great number of wounded.—Colonel Bonnemain had been sent to reconnoitre towards Tariffa, with 600 men. On the 9th of June he encountered at Sanona, an enemy's

party of the same force, consisting of English and some Spaniards, and posted on steep rocks. Col. Bonnemain took his dispositions so well, that the enemy, in spite of the advantage of the ground, was routed and forced to retire upon Algeiras, abandoning some prisoners and a convoy of 100 bullocks.—The enemy reckoned on being able to take advantage of the moment, when the bulk of the army of the south had marched into Estremadura, in order to attack in force the town of Ronda. General Benjine, at the head of three regiments of the camp of St. Roch and of the peasants of the vicinity, on the 4th of June, advanced to form the blockade of Ronda, which was defended by some companies of the 43rd of the line. The Duke of Belluno immediately caused to set out from Seville a column of troops, under the orders of Adjutant-Commandant Remond; a second column, commanded by General Pecheux, at the same time set out from the 1st corps; they united at Meron on the 15th. The enemy confiding in his strength, drew up in order of battle, two leagues from Ronda; but he was attacked with such impetuosity by our troops, that in a few moments he was broke and routed along all his line; a horrible carnage followed; near 500 dead remained on the spot, with 900 wounded; the regiments of Siguenza and of Ronda were almost entirely destroyed. The remains of the enemy's division escaped only by the help of rocks, where our cavalry could not reach them.—Our columns the same day entered Ronda, which was completely re-victualled.

FRANCE.—*Speech of COUNT SEGUR, Orator of the Council of State, to the Legislative Body, at the Close of the Session, July 25, 1811.*

(*Concluded from p. 224.*)

...Previous to opening it, the Emperor wished you should be collected round his throne; he wished to be surrounded by you when he went to the temple to return thanks to the Eternal for the birth of that infant king, who has completed our wishes, and realized our hopes: you have been witnesses of that pompous ceremony, the holiness of the place, the majesty of the throne, the union of Princes, of the Nobility, of the first corps of the empire, of the deputies from the towns, the offering of an infant dedicated to God, by glory and virtue united. The emotion of the assistants,

and the acclamations of an immense people, which on the same day were repeated throughout the extent of this vast empire—this noble and touching picture is too deeply engraved in your memories, to allow me to attempt to retrace it.—If I spoke of that universal sentiment that excited the public happiness, I should but repeat your own words, express as every Frenchman does the joy that birth has caused which guarantees the solidity of our destiny, the duration of our glory; which constitutes the happiness of our august Sovereign and his beloved consort.—In the midst of the fêtes which were given to celebrate this great event, the Emperor came to this place: he has informed you of the motives of high policy which determined him to extend our frontiers, and unite new provinces to the empire. His Majesty has described to you our flourishing situation, the fidelity of his allies, the glory of his armies, and the prosperous state of his finances. In short, in announcing to you that he had ordered his minister to place before you the expences of 1809 and 1810, his Majesty informed you, that although he was obliged to place at the disposition of his ministers an extraordinary credit of 100 millions, he did not ask any new impositions. It is thus that, after many years of war, conquests, and creations, our Sovereign terminates his discourse; whilst the Government who wishes to contend against him, every year demands new loans, imposts, and sacrifices from the English people. A few days after that memorable sitting your deputation came to lay at the foot of the throne the homage of your devotion, your love; and through your President, who enjoys the esteem of our monarch, and your merited confidence, you made known the noble and simple principles which guide, and the sentiments that animate you. In that audience you experienced fresh pledges of the paternal affection of his Majesty.—The solemn forms of the opening of your Session being fulfilled, the Minister of the interior in great detail pointed out the situation of the empire. Sixteen departments have been united to France, producing a population of five millions, and a revenue of 100 millions. The communications opened between the Scheldt and the Baltic, between the north and south of Italy, render our maritime supplies independent of the enemy's squadrons.—The Minister has spoken to you of the progress of the University,

the organization of the imperial Courts, which will restore to justice its force and dignity, and the creation of the great seminaries, of the acquisition or the repairing of a number of churches, of the success of industry which makes amends by the discoveries of genius for privations which war causes. He has informed you of the immense works undertaken to construct bridges, dig canals, drain marshes, embellish cities, &c. these works have cost nearly 380 millions; they thus equal, in two years, the efforts which were formerly made in a century.—You have not seen without surprise upon all the points of our coast and frontiers, those fortifications which prudence erects or repairs in the midst of triumphs. The activity which reigns in all the ports, the works undertaken at Antwerp, Flushing, Cherbourg, Ostend, and Terneuse, those armaments which prepare for the future successes of our marine and new destinies for the ocean, and the prosperous state of the public treasury which has to provide for so many expences. Such is the picture which has been traced to you. Happy the reign in which the recital of facts renders eulogium unnecessary.—After the presentation which has been made to you, Gentlemen, of two projects to create new subprefectures, and of a great number of transactions which interest the communes, you have adopted the project of a law upon the finances. The satisfaction which its examination afforded you, is too great to make it necessary for me to re-state the details.—The Orator of your Commission of Finance has said upon this important law all that could be added to the motives developed by the Orators from the Council of State. He has pointed out the advantages of the order established, by which five or six months are sufficient to examine and check the accounts of so many different administrations. He has remarked the amelioration which has taken place in the proceedings for the recovery of the contributions; the moderate expence of prosecution has not escaped him. He has with equal sagacity viewed the different causes of the increase of the State revenues, which at present amount to 985 millions, and the reason of the augmentation of the expence of the different departments. We have acquired 300 leagues of coast, and 10,000 sailors. Such acquisitions demand an increase of expence, but they give at the same time the means of providing for it.—The economy intro-

duced into many branches of the administration—the augmentation of the produce of the customs, the measures adopted relative to tobacco, which, without pressing upon the people, give the State the advantage which some companies exclusively enjoyed, and furnish the means of diminishing the land-tax; all give a complete assurance of constantly seeing our resources superior to our expenditure. The liquidation of the years preceding 1808 is effected; that of the following years is considerably advanced: that of the present year is completed; no inquietude exists with respect to the future. France has no occasion for any increase of the customs, nor for loans, nor for any new taxes.—Thus you have evident proofs of the happy situation of our finances, and certainly they ought to excite as much confidence in our fellow-citizens, as fear in our enemies.—At the moment when, by order of his Majesty, those satisfactory representations were placed under your eyes, a shout of triumph reached us from Spain; the junction of our armies were effected; Badajoz was delivered; and Marshal Suchet had overthrown the walls of Tarragona in presence of the English, the mortified spectators of this victory. A garrison of 18,000 men, courageous and obstinate, has not been able to resist French valour; 10,000 prisoners and a great number of cannon and standards are the trophies of the conquerors: noble presages, which confirm the hopes given to us a short time since by a monarch, all whose predictions victory is accustomed to fulfil.—At the same instant cries of distress issued from the bosom of the British Isles; credit, which supported her colossal and fictitious power, was shaken; and that Government, already banished from the Continent, but which nevertheless boasted, amidst the cumbrous heaps of its manufactures, of being able to exchange its productions for all the gold of Mexico and of Peru, is now forced to proclaim its error, to acknowledge that it loses public confidence, and to propose the enforcement of a paper money.—The English Government desires war, the monopoly of commerce, and the domination of the seas; its allies are either destroyed or lost to it; it ruins all those whom it wishes to subsidize; it exhausts its people in useless efforts; it is punished for its selfishness by its state of insolation; and, after having heaped loan upon loan, tax upon tax, be-

sieged by complaints, threatened with commotions, it is reduced to propose to the people, by way of resource, a fictitious money, which has no other pledge but a confidence which exists no longer.—The Emperor, on the other hand wishes for peace, and the liberty of the seas; he has 800,000 men under arms; the Princes of Europe are his allies; his whole empire enjoys profound tranquillity; without loans, without anticipations, 954 millions, raised with facility, secure the free execution of his noble plans; and his majesty commissions us to address you only in the language of satisfaction and hope.—What confidence, gentlemen, ought this parallel to inspire: Diffuse it among your fellow-citizens, communicate to them the impressions you have received; your task will be easy; you will find them all animated with the same sentiments towards a sovereign, who has no other object in his labours than the happiness and the glory of his people. M. de Segur, after having read the decree which ordered the closing of the session, came down from the tribune amidst acclamations of *Live the Emperor!*

M. THE PRESIDENT then spoke, with the view of pointing out, that it was the happy destiny of the Legislative Body never to assemble but in order to associate themselves in the illustrious labours of the Government, or to be able to form a better judgment of their wisdom, by seeing their valuable results; that the Deputies of the Legislative Body, after having received, through the medium of the Orator of the Council of State, the assurances of his Majesty's satisfaction, were happy in returning to their homes, to have it in their power to communicate to their fellow-citizens only new benefits on the part of Government, and that no other obligation had been imposed upon them this session but that of gratitude.—Six copies were ordered to be printed of the speeches of M. de Segur, and of the President.—M. the President then, in conformity to the Decree, declared that the session of 1811 was terminated, and the Assembly rose.

FRANCE.—*M. Regnaud's Address to the Emperor on the subject of the Finances; and his account of the Progress made in the business of the CADASTRE, or valuation of the lands.*—July, 1811.

SIRE,—I present to your Imperial Majesty, the accounts of the Administration of the Finances in 1809, and in 1810.—It

results from these accounts, that the services of 1806, 7, 8, and 9, have been paid, or that there are sufficient funds to discharge all their expences.

The service of 1810 is finished. The Ministers have presented, each for his own department, a statement of the actual expences. These expences are considerable, and the war of the Peninsula is, in part, the cause thereof: nevertheless, the state of the Finances is such, that no part of the reserve-fund will be necessary to complete the discharge of that service; but we are still too near 1810, for me to think myself justified in proposing to your Majesty to appropriate that reserve-fund to the expences of 1811: it may happen that the result of the definitive liquidations may somewhat exceed the latest calculations presented by the ministers, and I therefore think it proper to postpone this proposal till next year.—The expences of 1811 are more considerable still than those of 1810. The increase results, in part, from the extraordinary armaments which your Majesty ordered during the first quarter of this year: nevertheless, the total of the resources of 1811, after having provided for the extraordinary expences of the first quarter, and satisfied all the demands of the ministers, formed upon the expenditure of the first six months, leaves still a reserve fund of 22 millions. I am, however, induced to think, that this fund will be necessary to pay all the expences of the current service.—Thus, all the years previous to 1811 are completely provided for, and the resources of the current year amount to more than 950 millions of real money, which place the treasury in a state to meet every demand.—I am not afraid to say it,—history does not present a period when the finances of a great empire were in so prosperous a state; it cannot be equalled but in a country whose wealth is founded on the fertility of its soil, and on the great number of its inhabitants. In such a country there is no uncertainty as to the produce of the public revenue, since contributions are assessed in suitable proportions between the landholders and the consumers. The payment of taxes on property, and of duties on commodities, is equally secured by the constant produce of the land, and by the habitual wants of an immense population. Your Majesty's treasury is, in consequence, always plen-

tifully supplied; it pays to the day all demands upon it; nor does it require the assistance of intermediary credit to facilitate the receipts. The bills accepted (in advance) by the receivers of contributions, which at the beginning of my Ministry were so low as four per cent. discount per month, are not even to be seen now in the money-market, and moneyed people would be glad to discount them at the rate of four per cent. a year; but the Treasury receives directly the amount of those bills in proportion as they become due; and its leading system is now to receive and to pay every where, at the least possible expence, and with the least possible carriage of coin. In so vast an empire, this is in itself a grand and an important task to fulfil.—Should your Majesty turn your attention to agriculture, that source of all wealth, you will find it in the most flourishing state; and interior commerce has all the activity which it can be supposed to acquire from the multifarious wants of a population consisting of forty millions of souls.—It is thus that the revenues of the State have been gradually increasing, and have been kept up in such a way as to allow your Majesty to carry on at the same time the military operations necessary for the consolidation of the empire, and the works of utility and of ornament which are now in progression every where, both in the interior of the empire and in the sea-ports. In the year 1808, about 100 millions were expended for the ordinary repair of roads; for the making of new ones; for the construction of new bridges; for the necessary repairs of old ones; for draining; for navigation; for canals; for bringing the waters of the Ourcq to Paris; for works of utility and of ornament in the departments, and in the capital; for land and sea fortifications; for ports, &c.—One hundred and ten millions have been laid out on works of the same nature in the year 1809; one hundred and thirty-eight millions in 1810; and they will require one hundred fifty-five millions for 1811.—This makes on the whole a sum of upwards of five hundred millions appropriated, in the course of four years, to works, the greater part of which were not actually wanting; but this arises from that provident spirit which forms one of the principal characteristics of your Majesty's Government.

(To be continued.)

TO THE PRINCE REGENT:

ON THE DISPUTE WITH THE AMERICAN STATES.

SIR,

Feeling, as the people of this kingdom do so severely, smarting, writhing, as we are, under the effects of the war with France, and considering how easily this war might, in 1793, have been avoided without either danger or dishonour to England; thus feeling and thus reflecting, it is natural for us, when threatened with a new war, to inquire betimes, what are the grounds of such war; whether it would be just; if just, whether it would be necessary; and, be the cause what it may, whether the consequences are likely to be good or evil.

If, Sir, the counsels of Mr. Fox had been listened to, in the years 1792 and 1793, the state of England, of Europe, and of the world, would have been very different indeed from what it now is. A war against opinions and principles would not have been waged; England, instead of becoming a party in that fatal and disgraceful war, would have been a mediatress between the conflicting parties, if, indeed, she had not wholly prevented the conflict. So many governments would not have been overthrown; such rivers of human blood would not have been shed; *reformation* might and would have been produced, because the state of things and the temper of men's minds demanded it; but no where need there have been destruction; all the states of Europe might have remained on their old foundations, and the Bourbons might at this day have been upon the Thrones of France and Spain. This kingdom, too, might and must have shared in the *reformation*; but, such reformation would have made no inroads upon rank or property; and the nation would have avoided all those measures of coercion, all those before unheard-of laws to which the contest gave rise; and those enormous expences, which, first producing Debt and tenfold Taxation, led by degrees to that *pauperism* and *paper-money*, which now form the two great and hideous features in the state of

our internal affairs, and which no man, who really loves the country, can contemplate without the most serious apprehensions.

Such being the consequences of that war, or, rather, a part of these consequences, the far greater proportion of them being, in all probability, yet to come, it behoves those who have power to act to *consider well*, before they launch the country into a new war; and it is the right of every man to express, in the way which he may think most likely to be efficient, his opinions upon the subject. This right I am now about to exercise, and if I have chosen, as the vehicle, an address to your Royal Highness, it is because that respect, which inclination as well as duty dictate upon such an occasion, will not fail to make me dismiss from my mind all partiality and prejudice, and to offer nothing unsupported by fair reasoning and undeniable facts.

As to the *grounds of the present dispute* with the American States, they are some of them of very long standing. The conduct of this government relative to the war against those States was extremely unwise; but, its conduct since the war is, I am convinced, unparalleled in the annals of diplomatic folly. The moment that war was at an end, the *people* of the two countries, attached to each other by all the ties which imperious nature has provided, were ready to rush into a mutual embrace, and like children of the same common parent, whose harmony had been disturbed by a transient quarrel, to become even more affectionate towards each other than they had been before. Not so the *governments*. With them ambition and resentment had something to say. But, the American Government being, from the nature of its constitution, a thing of such transient possession, it would have been impossible for any set of men long to remain in power if they had been discovered to entertain a vindictive disposition towards England; that is to say, if the government of England had discovered no such disposition towards Ame-

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rica. Unhappily such a disposition was but too plainly seen in the whole of the conduct of our government; and hence we have witnessed, from the end of the American war to this day, a dispute and an angry dispute too, upon some ground or other, constantly existing and in agitation between the two countries, to the great injury of them both, to the great injury of the cause of freedom, and to the great advantage of France as a nation, and to the cause of despotic sway all over the world. The war was at an end, but the quarrel seemed only to have begun: a seven years war, and an already eight and twenty years of quarrel!

It was full ten years before we condescended to send a Minister to reside in America, and when we did it, the object seemed to be only to recall, or to render more active, ancient animosities. A miserable dispute about old claims for debts due to English subjects on one side, and about negroes carried off at the peace on the other side, clouded and made gloomy the dawn of this new diplomatic intercourse. This dispute was kept alive 'till new claims for vessels unlawfully confiscated arose on the part of the American Government. The treaty of 1794, which provided for Commissioners to settle these claims would, it was hoped, produce harmony; but it is well known that it only widened the breach. At last, however, we patched up this matter: we yielded, but it was without magnanimity: we gave our money, the nation was taxed to make up for the blunders of the cabinet; but we gave without the credit of generosity. In the meanwhile, the English creditors have remained, many of them until this day, unsatisfied, while a Board of Commissioners, who have been sitting either here or in America ever since the year 1794, or, at least, have been paid all that time, have swallowed up in expences to the nation, a great part of what would have sufficed to satisfy our own claimants without any application for money for that purpose to the American States. In the course of this part of the dispute there was much unfairness on the part of the American Government; and we might have been fully justified, strictly speaking, in coming to a rupture upon that ground. But, we came to neither a rupture nor a reconciliation: we asserted our claims and then gave them up; but we took care to choose that manner of doing

it, which effectually took all merit from the thing.

This point was hardly patched up, when another subject of dispute arose: to that another and another and another have succeeded, the long-contested question relative to the *impressment of American Seamen* running through the whole. So that, at last, there has grown together a mass of disputes and of ill-blood, which threatens us with a new war, and which war threaten us with new burdens, and, still worse, which threaten the world with the extinguishment of some part, at least, of its remaining liberties. The points, however, more immediately at issue, are those relating to the present *non-importation law* and the *affair between the American Frigate, President, and our sloop of war, the Little Belt*. As to the former points in dispute the Americans were the complainants: they called for satisfaction, and, whether they ought to have obtained it or not, it is certain that they have not yet obtained it. Upon these two recent points, therefore, as being thought likely to lead to war, and as being so represented by those public prints which are known to be under the influence of persons in power, I shall now proceed most respectfully to offer to your Royal Highness such remarks as the occasion appears to me to demand.

The *Non-importation Act*, that is to say, the law which has been passed in America to prohibit the importation of any thing being the growth or manufacture of Great Britain or Ireland, and which law is now in force in America, must doubtless be regarded as a measure of a hostile, though not of a warlike nature, because the same law does not apply to the enemy with whom we are at war; and, besides this commercial prohibition, our ships of war are shut out from the harbours, rivers, and waters of the United States, while our enemy's ships of war are permitted freely to enter and abide in them. These are distinctions of an unfriendly nature: they are, indeed, measures of hostility; but, then, I beg your Royal Highness to bear in mind, that they are acts of a much lower degree of hostility than were the acts of your Royal Father's ministers against France in the year 1792, though they, to this hour, contend, that that war was a war of *aggression* on the part of France; and, of course, their own doctrine, if now cited against this country, would be quite

sufficient on the part of America. But, the fact is, that the non-importation act and the exclusion of British ships from the waters of America, while importation is permitted from France and while French ships have free entrance and abidance in the waters of the United States, are acts of a hostile nature, and would, if unjustified by provocation, fully authorize, on our part, acts of reprisal and of war.

But, Sir, these measures on the part of America have not been adopted without alledged provocation and without loud and reiterated remonstrances. They have, in fact, arisen out of certain measures adopted by us, and which measures are alledged to be in violation of the rights of America as a neutral nation; and, therefore, before we can justify a war in consequence of the hostile measures of America, we must ascertain whether her allegations against us be true; for, if they be, we may find, perhaps, that she is not only not blamable for what she has now done, but is entitled to praise for her forbearance and moderation.

That we have violated the rights of America as a neutral State, there can be no doubt. The fact is not denied; nor is it pretended, that the violation would not, in itself, be sufficient to justify any degree of hostility on the part of the offended state. Indeed, to dispute these facts would be to shew a total disregard of truth; for, we have published, and, as far as in us lies, we have carried, and still carry into execution, *an interdict against all trade on the part of America, except such as we choose to licence*. We have said to her, that she shall not carry the produce of her soil and exchange it for the produce of the soil of France, Italy, or Holland. If we meet with one of her ships laden with the flour of Pennsylvania and owned by a Pennsylvanian merchant, bound to any port of the French Empire, we compel such ship to come into some one of our ports, and there to unlade and dispose of her cargo, or else, to *pay duty upon it*, before we permit her to proceed on her voyage. In short, we have issued and acted upon such edicts as establish an absolute controul and sovereignty over the ships of America, and all that part of the population and property of America that are employed in maritime commerce.

That the rights of America are herein

openly violated all the world knows. Your Royal Highness need not be reminded of the dispute, so long continued, relative to the *right of search*; that is to say, a right, on the part of a belligerent to search merchant neutral ships at sea, in order to ascertain whether they had on board *contraband goods of war*, or *goods belonging to an enemy*. It was contended by those who denied the right of search, that no belligerent had a right to search a neutral at sea in any case; and, that, if this point was given up, the *goods* of an enemy in a neutral ship ought not to be seized, for that the neutrality of the ship protected the goods. To this doctrine English writers and statesmen have never subscribed; they insisted, that we had a right to search neutral ships upon the high seas, and, if we found contraband articles or enemy's goods on board of them, to seize them, and, in some cases, to make ship as well as cargo lawful prize. But, no statesman, no lawyer, no writer ever pretended, that we had a right to seize in a *neutral ship the goods of a neutral party*. No one ever dreamt of setting up a right like this, which, in fact, is neither more nor less than making war upon the neutrals; because we do to them the very worst that we can do, short of wanton cruelty, of which the laws and usages of war do not allow.

In justification of the adoption of these our measures towards America, our government asserted, that France had *begun* the violation of the neutral rights of America, and that our measures were in the way of *retaliation*, and that the laws of war allowed of retaliation. It is a singular species of *law*, which, because a weak nation has been injured by one powerful nation, subjects it to be injured by another. If Belcher were to beat Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool in the street, Crib would not, for that reason, be justified in beating them too: this would, I presume, be deemed a new and most outrageous species of retaliation; and there is little doubt that the belligerent pugilists would soon be sent to a place where they would have leisure to study the laws of war. But, it is alledged by our government, that the Americans *submitted* to the Decrees of Napoleon; that they *acquiesced* in his violation of their rights; and that it was just in us to treat them in the same manner that he had treated them, because they had so submitted and acquiesced. The same rea-

son would apply equally well in justification of the above supposed retaliatory measures of Crib, who also might, with just as much truth, accuse Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool of submission and acquiescence with regard to Belcher; for they could not avoid submission and acquiescence to superior force; they might *cry out*, indeed, and, they would cry out; and so did the Americans, who, from the first day to the last of the existence of the French Decrees, ceased not to remonstrate against them, and that, too, in the strongest terms; and, therefore, there appears not to have been the slightest ground, whereon to build a justification of our measures as measures of *retaliation*.

But, Sir, if our measures were not justifiable upon the supposition that this violation of neutral rights was *begun* by the enemy, surely they must be declared to be wholly without justification, if it appear, that *we ourselves were the beginners* in this career of violation of the rights of America as a neutral state; and that this is the fact is clearly proved by the documents, which have long ago been laid before the public, but which I beg leave to call to the recollection of your Royal Highness.

This rivalry in the violation of neutral rights began in a declaration on our part, made to America through her Minister here, that she was to consider the entrances of the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe and the Trave as in a state of rigorous blockade, though it was notoriously impossible for us to maintain such blockade by actual forces. The grounds for this measure were stated to be, that *the King of Prussia* (and not France) had forcibly and hostilely taken possession of various parts of *the Electorate of Hanover* and other dominions belonging to his Majesty; and had shut English ships out of the Prussian ports. This might be a very good reason for shutting the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe and the Trave against *Prussian* ships; but, surely it gave us no right to shut them against the ships of America, whose government had had nothing to do with the king of Prussia's hostile seizure upon the Electorate of Hanover; who had neither aided him, abetted him, nor encouraged him in any manner whatever; and, it was very hard that the people of America should be made to suffer from the result of a dispute, be it what it might, between the

king of Prussia and the Elector of Hanover. The king of Prussia is closely connected by marriage with your Royal Highness's illustrious family: it is not therefore for me to dare to presume that he should have been capable of any thing unbecoming his high rank; but this I may venture to say, that, whatever his conduct might be, there could be no justice in making the people, or any portion of the people, of America suffer for that conduct. Indeed, Sir, it appears to me, that to involve, in any way whatever, England in this dispute about Hanover was not very closely conformable to that great constitutional Act by which your Royal Highness's family was raised to the throne of this kingdom, and which Act expressly declares, that, in case of the family of Brunswick succeeding to the Throne, no war shall be undertaken by England for their German dominions, *unless by consent of Parliament*. If the measure of blockade above-mentioned had produced war on the part of America, that war would have been made without consent of Parliament; and, though a measure fall short of producing war, it may be equally a violation of the Act of Settlement, if its natural tendency be to produce war, or to cause England to support warlike expences, which this measure manifestly has done, and has, at last, led to something very nearly approaching to open war with America, though, in the mean while, Hanover itself has been wrested from the king of Prussia and formed into a member of another kingdom.

Thus, then, at any rate, this attack upon the rights of neutrals did not *begin* with France. If it was not begun by us, it was begun by the king of Prussia, though it is not very easy to perceive how he could violate the maritime rights of America by any act of his in the heart of Germany. The Decrees of France have grown out of our measures. They carry in themselves the proof of this. The first (for there are but two), issued from Berlin, was expressly grounded upon our Orders issued in consequence of the conduct of the king of Prussia in Hanover; and thus the Emperor Napoleon became, towards us, the avenger, as far as he was able, of that very king of Prussia, whom he had just driven from his dominions! Alas, Sir, what a scene was here exhibited to the people of Europe! First the king of Prussia, closely related to the family of the king of

England, seizes upon the German dominions of the latter: the latter protests against this, and, by his Secretary of State, declares that he never will make peace without obtaining the restoration of these dominions: while this quarrel is going on, Napoleon marches against the king of Prussia, defeats him, drives him from his dominions, takes Hanover, the object in dispute, and bestows it on a third party; and, from the capital of the king of Prussia's dominions, issues a decree against England, avenging the cause of the king of Prussia!

Napoleon, in this his first decree, *declares England* (who had, by this time, extended her blockade from the Elbe to the Port of Brest) *in a state of Blockade*, and prohibits all trade and all commercial communication with England. But, this Decree, which was little less practicable in all cases than our blockade, was declared to be *retaliatory*, and was to be repealed whenever England repealed her Orders in Council which had then been issued. Certainly this was not the *beginning*. We had begun, and that, too, under the administration of those who have since so loudly censured the Orders in Council; and, which must, I presume, be a subject of regret with your Royal Highness, the state paper in which this beginning was announced to the American government, came from the pen of Mr. Fox, who appears to have yielded implicitly to the principles of his new associates in politics. At any rate, this Decree of the Emperor Napoleon was not the beginning of the open attacks upon neutral rights; and, what is of still more importance, it was *not Napoleon*, but it was *the king of Prussia*, who committed those acts of aggression in Hanover which produced our first of that series of measures, called the Orders in Council, and which measures have finally led to the exclusion of our goods and our ships from the American ports. This is a fact of great importance in the dispute, and especially if that dispute should end in war. It will be right, in that case, for us to bear in mind the *real grounds* of the war; the *true origin* of it. And, endeavour to cast the blame where we will, it will, at last, be found in the *aggression of the king of Prussia upon Hanover*.

The Berlin Decree brought forth new

Orders in Council from us; and these brought from the Emperor Napoleon the Decree issued at Milan, in December 1807. This ended the series of invasions of neutral rights; for, indeed, nothing more was now left to invade. Both parties called their measures *retaliatory*. Crib having taken a blow upon a third party in the way of retaliation on Belcher, Belcher takes another blow upon the same party in the way of retaliation on Crib. Both parties declared, that they were perfectly ready to *repeal* their Decrees; that they *regretted* exceedingly the necessity of adopting them; each explicitly promised, that, whenever the other gave up the new restrictions he would also give them up too. Napoleon said his measures had been forced upon him by us: we said our measures had been forced upon us by him. The Americans, who complained of both, were told by us, that we should always be ready to revoke our Orders if the enemy would revoke his Decrees. This was saying very little, seeing that his Decrees had been issued *in consequence of our Orders*, and, of course, he was not to be expected to revoke first, especially as the Decrees themselves declare that their object is to cause our Orders to be revoked.

The American government, having remonstrated so long in vain, and seeing no likelihood of obtaining redress by the means of diplomatic entreaties, and yet not wishing to plunge the country into a war, resort to the measure of *exclusion from their ports*, giving to both parties an opportunity of preventing the execution even of this measure of demi-hostility. During the session of Congress in 1809-10, a law was passed providing, that, if both France and England continued in their violation of the rights of America till and after the 1st day of November, 1810, the ships and goods of both should be prohibited from entering the ports and waters of the American States; that, if they both repealed their obnoxious Decrees and Orders, then the ships and goods of both were to have free admission; that if one party repealed and the other did not, then the ships and goods of the repealing party were to be admitted, and the ships and goods of the non-repealing party were to be excluded. Napoleon, the Americans say, has repealed: we have not, and, accordingly, our ships and goods are excluded, while those of France are admitted into the waters and ports of the United States.

This is one source of the present ill-blood against America, who is accused of *partiality to France*; but, before this charge can be established, we must show that the measures she has adopted are not the natural and necessary result of an impartial measure; a measure in execution of an impartial law. If a pardon were tendered to Belcher and Crib upon condition that they ceased to beat the parties as above supposed, and if Belcher persisted while his enemy did not, the injured parties could not fairly be accused of *partiality* in pardoning Crib while they punished Belcher. The American Government and people may, however, without any crime, or, at least, without giving us any just cause of complaint against them, like, and shew that they like, Napoleon better than Messrs. Perceval and Rose and Lords Liverpool and Wellesley. It may be bad taste in the American Government and people to entertain such a liking; it may be great stupidity and almost wilful blindness that prevent them from perceiving how much more the latter are the friends of freedom than the former. But, so long as the American Government does no act of *partiality* affecting us, we have no reason to complain: so that justice is done to a man in court, he has no reason to complain of the personal likings or dislikings of the judge or the jury. The people in America look at France and at the state of Europe in general with minds pretty free from prejudice. They are in no fear of the power of Napoleon. They have amongst them no persons whose interests are served by inflaming the hatred of the people against him. They reckon dynasties as nothing. They coolly compare the present with the former state of Europe; and, if they give the preference to the present state of things, it must be because they think there has been a change for the better. They may be deceived; but, it can be the interest of nobody to deceive them. Those who have the management of their public affairs may have a wrong bias; but they cannot communicate it to the people; for, they have no public money to expend upon a hireling press. The government and the people may all be deceived; but the deception cannot be the effect of any cheat practised upon either; it cannot be the work of bribery and corruption. If, therefore, the government and people of America do really entertain a *partiality* for Napoleon, we have, on that account, good ground for regret, but certainly none

for complaint or reproach. They have a right to like and to dislike whom they please. We, for instance, have a great attachment to the court and government of Sicily and also to the courts and ancient governments of Spain and Portugal. We should not permit the American government or people to interfere with these attachments of ours; and, I presume, it will, therefore, not be thought reasonable that we should arrogate to ourselves the right of judging whom the American people and government are to like.

When we are told of the "*partiality* for France," which is a charge continually preferred against the American government, we should ask what *acts* of *partiality* they have been guilty of, and that is the test by which we ought to try their conduct in the present instance. They have put their law in force; they have shut out our goods and our ships, while they freely admit those of France; and this is called *partiality*, and is made the grounds of one of those charges, by the means of which, it appears to me, that the venal press in England is endeavouring to prepare the minds of the people for a war with the American States. But, to make out this charge, it must be shown, that the French have done nothing that we have not done in the way of repealing the injurious Decrees. Indeed, this is what is asserted; and, though a regular communication has been made to the American government by the French government, that the Berlin and Milan Decrees are *revoked*; though they are by the American Minister here asserted to be revoked, and no longer in operation; still it is asserted by some here, that they are not revoked. The American government, however, is satisfied that they are revoked, and it has, accordingly, put its exclusion law in force against us.

To settle this point of fact the Americans have not been told what sort of *evidence* we shall require. They present us the letter of the French minister for foreign affairs to the American minister at Paris, telling him, that the Decrees are *revoked*, and that the revocation is to go into effect on the 1st of November 1810. This we say is nothing at all, because it is clogged with this remark, "*it being clearly understood that the English Orders in Council are to be revoked at the same time.*" Certainly. This was to be naturally expected;

and England had promised that it should be so. The Decrees *have* actually been revoked, without this condition being complied with on our part; but, if they had not, it was to be expected that the American Government would put their exclusion law in force against us at the time appointed; because we ought to have declared our *intention* at the same time and in the same manner that the French declared their intention. It was in the month of August 1810, that Mr. Pinckney, the American minister in London, communicated to our Foreign Secretary, Lord Wellesley, that the French Decrees were revoked, and that the revocation was to take effect from the 1st day of the then ensuing November. The answer which Mr. Pinckney expected was, that the English Orders in Council were also revoked, and that the revocation would take effect from the 1st of November. That he had a right to expect this will clearly appear from the communications made to the American Government by our ministers in that country, who, in answer to the complaints of America upon this score, always declared, that the King their master was exceedingly grieved to be compelled to have recourse to such measures; that nothing could be farther from his heart or more repugnant to his feelings than a wish to injure or harrass the commerce of neutrals; that he had taken these odious measures in pure self-defence; that it was his "*earnest desire*" (I quote one of these declarations) "to see the commerce of the world restored to that *freedom*, which is necessary for its prosperity, and his *readiness* to abandon the system, which had been forced upon him, whenever the enemy should retract the principles which had rendered it necessary." When, therefore, Mr. Pinckney, who had this declaration before him, communicated to Lord Wellesley the fact that the French Decrees were revoked, and that the revocation was to go into effect on the 1st of November, he had a full right to expect an immediate revocation of our Orders in Council, and an assurance that such revocation should go into effect on the same day when the French revocation was to go into effect. But, instead of this he received for answer, that we would revoke our Orders, when the revocation of the French Decrees should have *actually taken place*. But there was another condition, "that whenever the repeal of the French Decrees shall

"have *actually taken place*, and the commerce of neutral nations shall have been restored to the condition in which it stood previously to the promulgation of these Decrees," then the King will relinquish his present system. Here is a second condition. We do not here content ourselves with the revocation of the Decrees; no, nor even with that revocation having actually gone into effect. We call for something more, and that something greater too than the thing for which we before contended. We here say, that, before we revoke our Orders, we will have the neutral commerce restored to its old footing; that is, that we will have the "Continental System" abandoned by France, with which system the Americans have nothing to do, and with regard to which they can have no right to say a word, it being a series of measures of internal regulation, not trenching upon nor touching their maritime commerce. It is a matter wholly distinct from the other; it relates to the reception or exclusion of English goods in France and her dependencies; and, if we are to make America answerable for the conduct of France in that respect, it would follow that France would have a right to make her answerable for our conduct in excluding the goods of France from the ports of England.

We had, it appears to me, no right to require any thing of America, previously to our revocation of the obnoxious Orders, than an official and authenticated declaration, that the French Decrees were revoked. And, what more could we ask for than was tendered to us, I am at a loss to conjecture. The French Government officially informed the American Government that the Decrees were revoked, and that the revocation was to have effect on the 1st of November. This was officially communicated to us by the American Government through their accredited minister. We were, therefore, to give credit to the fact. But, no: we stop to see the 1st of November arrive. This was not the way to convince America of our *readiness*, our *earnest desire*, to see neutral commerce restored to freedom. The course to pursue, in order to give proof of such a disposition, was to revoke our Orders in Council, and to declare that the revocation would begin to be acted upon on the 1st of November. This would have been *keeping pace* with the French; and, if we had found that the revocation did not

go into operation in France on the 1st of November, we should have lost nothing by our revocation ; for we might immediately have renewed our Orders in Council, and we should then have continued them in force, having clearly thrown all the blame upon the enemy.

This line of conduct would, too, have been perfectly consonant with our professions to the American Government, to whom, in 1808, our minister had declared, that, in order to evince the security of our desire to remove the impediments to neutral commerce, we were willing to *follow the example* of France in the way of revocation, or, to proceed step for step with her in the way of relaxation. Our minister, upon the occasion here alluded to, in communicating the several Orders in Council to the American Government, declared that " the king felt great regret at " the necessity imposed upon him for such an " interference with neutral commerce, and " he assured the American Government, " that his Majesty would readily follow the " example, in case the Berlin Decree should " be rescinded ; or, would proceed, *pari passu* with France, in relaxing the " rigour of their measures." Agreeably to this declaration, we should, it clearly appears to me, have done exactly *what France did* in August 1810, and not evaded it by saying that we *would* revoke after her revocation should have been actually put into operation ; that is to say, that we would condescend to *begin* after France had *ended*.

This is the view, may it please your Royal Highness, which clear and unclouded reason takes of this matter. This is the light in which it has been seen by the American government and by the people of that country, who, though they do not wish for war, will assuredly not censure those who manage their affairs for acting as they have done upon this occasion. The measure of exclusion adopted against us by America is too advantageous to France for the latter not to *act* upon the revocation of her Decrees ; and, indeed, there appears now not to be the smallest doubt, that, as far as relates to America, (and she is in reality the only neutral), the Decrees are, in deed as well as in word, revoked. It is notorious that our Orders are not revoked ; and, for my part, I am wholly at a loss to form an idea of the grounds upon which any complaint against

America can be founded, as far as relates to this part of the dispute.

In a future Letter, I shall submit to your Royal Highness some remarks relating to the affair of the *Little Belt*, and shall endeavour to lay before you the real state of that case, and the consequences which would naturally arise from a rupture with America, or from a prolongation of the present quarrel.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Thursday, 29th August, 1811.*

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALAVERA'S WARS.—The inactivity of the present campaign in Spain and Portugal is truly astonishing. I thought we were told, that, long before the month of September, the Peninsula would be scoured of the French as clean as our purse promises to be by supporting the war. Mr. Perceval went so far as to anticipate consequences of great import in other parts of Europe. It was not for him, he said, to say what effect our *victories* might produce upon the *people of France themselves* ; but, he did not think it at all unreasonable to entertain the hope, that we might, in pursuing those victories, become, under Divine Providence, the deliverers of Europe. Verily Viscount Talavera does not appear to be making any very hasty strides towards such deliverance. He has, it appears, *moved* again of late ; but, to what point or for what purpose we are as yet uninformed, his dispatches, or that part of them that we are permitted to see, being as brief and as dry as the endorsement of an Attorney's bill. The French armies that were approaching him, at whose approach he raised the siege of Badajoz after his attempts to enter the breach, and before whom he retired to Elvas and Portalegre ; those armies are, our venal writers tell us, *dispersed* ; Talavera, they say, has *beat* them again. Why, then, does he not resume the siege of Badajoz, which those armies made him abandon ? That would be a proof of the French armies being unable to face him ; but, all that I can see in his present conduct is a proof of his consciousness of an inability to meet the French in the field. This, perhaps, is no fault of his : he is not to be blamed for wanting either numbers or species of troops fit to meet the

enemy: but those are greatly to blame, who represent him as being able to meet the enemy, and, at the same time, praise him for *not meeting* that enemy.—But, if what the public prints now state be true, we are about to see a new sort of exertions made in the Peninsula. We are, it seems, to *take a more commanding tone*, and, with *whom*, do you suppose? Why, with our *allies*! With our allies to be sure, with whom should we take a commanding tone? As to the enemy, he does not care a straw for our resolute *tone*. In the field he sends his Polish Lancers to answer us; and in his news-papers he challenges us to pay our Bank Notes in gold and silver. But, let us hear this curious scheme for taking a more commanding tone with our *allies*, poor fellows!—"It is *not true* that Lord Viscount Wellington is on his return to England in consequence of *indisposition*. On the contrary, we have reason to believe, from the information we have received, that he is destined to fill a more important situation, and discharge more extensive duties in the Peninsula than ever. There is a rumour that our Cabinet has at length determined to *take a more commanding and decisive tone with our Allies* than they have hitherto done, and without which they perceive, that the war may be protracted from year to year without the least advancement under the *languor, disinclination, or treachery, of the leading Councils of the two Kingdoms*.—To meet the enemy with adequate energy, it is incumbent on our allies really to draw forth all their resources, and to act with one mind. To do this they must agree to invest Lord Wellington with proper authority to *arouse and exert the faculties of the people, who are all well disposed, and desire only to have their own grievances redressed, the hope of a benignant Government established, and leaders whom they can trust*.—We have heard that remonstrances on this subject have been at length attended with success, in Portugal; and that Lord Wellington will no longer have to complain of the *dilatory and evasive* conduct of the Government, for the power to call forth the energies of the people will be *put into his own hands*. As trustee for the Prince Regent, surely England, that fights his battles, may be trusted with the means of making these battles successful; and we have no hesitation in saying, that if any thing can give us a chance of terminat-

ing the war in the Peninsula with advantage to the people themselves, it is by placing a generous confidence in the hands of the power that has come to their assistance.—We trust the same language will be spoken to the Government and the *Cortez of Spain*, as well as to the *Court of Sicily*; for we most perfectly agree with the opinion of Captain Pasley, that if we are to fight the battles of our allies, we ought to be intrusted with the means of drawing forth all the resources of the countries we defend.—A temporary Regency to be established in every country where British Armies are to fight for the deliverance thereof, is the only means of effecting that unanimity of exertions which is necessary to success; and when it is seen what frivolous divisions prevail among the leaders, and what oppressions keep down and stifle all ardour in the people, it is manifest that unless our Government is as imbecile and as besotted as those of Palermo and of Cadiz themselves, we must arouse from our own squeamish inaction, and exert a clear, an honourable, but a commanding influence in the Governments which we assist."

—This is from the Morning Chronicle; but the hint about the *indisposition* of Lord Talavera was first thrown out in the *Times*, a print, which is, for very sufficient reasons no doubt, *become* totally devoted to the Wellesleys. This was an ugly hint; and it has not been contradicted. It resembled one of those numerous little paragraphs that are published in the course of the year for the purpose of *feeling the public pulse*. But, no, my reader, we shall not, we surely shall not, see a Wellesley come home under such circumstances! Oh, no! The *Times* must have wronged him in the hint. It was a false rumour to be sure. What! taken ill under such circumstances! It is a standing order in most armies, that no man shall have a bowel complaint on the day of battle. Many persons would regret Lord Talavera's illness upon this occasion; but, few, I believe, so sincerely as I should. Sir Vicary Gibbs will suppose, perhaps, that my regret would arise from the loss of my chance of the Portuguese prize for writing the History of Talavera's Wars *;

* I find, that I undervalued this prize, when I before spoke of it. I supposed the 50,000 Reals to be worth 150 Guineas; but, by consulting the *UNIVERSAL*

and, I will not disguise, that I should feel that loss, conscious as I am that I shall have a fair claim to the prize; but, what I should feel much more severely, is, the disappointment of my hopes of seeing the grand question decided; namely, whether the Wellesleys or the Buonapartés are best men. I was delighted when I saw them pitted against each other, and I should regret exceedingly any cause that would prevent them from fighting out the battle. — As to the scheme for enabling Lord Talavera to exert the energies of the people of Spain and Portugal, it is neither more nor less a scheme for turning an *auxiliary* war into an *invasion* of the countries which we have been professing to assist. What! is it all come to this at last? We have been told of the zeal of the people, of their hatred of the French, of their attachment to us, of their devotion to the cause, of their being as good troops as any in the world: and now, behold, we are told that their energies want to be called forth; that we ought to assume a more *commanding and decisive* tone with them; that Lord Talavera ought to have greater powers; that factious and treacherous men ought not to be suffered to cramp the operations of the nation; in short, that we ought to take the whole powers of government into our own hands, or, in other words, become invaders and conquerors as far as we are able, of Spain and Portugal; and all this for the sole purpose of giving effect to the *assistance* which we are yielding these countries! — This is, indeed, a most notable scheme; such an one, I will venture to say, as was never before engendered in the brain of any one out of a straight waistcoat. — But, I must defer any further remarks on it until my next.

W. M. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 30th Aug. 1811.

CAMBIST of Dr. KELLY, I find, from page 388, vol. 1, that the Real is not a Portuguese coin, but a Spanish money, and that there are four different kinds, the lowest of which is the *Real Vellon*, and which is worth something more than 2½d. Sterling. Thus the prize must be, at least, 500 Guineas; and, if *Reals of Plate* are meant, it will double that sum. The proposers should have been more explicit.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE — *M. Regnaud's Address to the Emperor on the subject of the Finances; and his account of the Progress made in the business of the CADASTRE, or valuation of the lands.* — July, 1811.

(Concluded from p. 256.)

..... The good state of your finances, which have been constantly improving during the whole of the war, as is proved by the account I now present to your Majesty, has constantly favoured the execution of these works. It will be seen by these accounts, that the receipts have been seven hundred and seventy-two millions for the year 1808; seven hundred and eighty-six millions for the year 1809; above seven hundred and ninety-five millions for the year 1810; and that they will not fall short of nine hundred and fifty-four millions for the year 1811, by means of the various annexations of territory which have taken place since last year. — The minister then proceeds to state, that this state of things will enable Buonaparté to carry into execution a measure which had been intended ten years ago, but had been always delayed from want of favourable opportunities, that of a general recoinage ordered by a law of 1796; the object of this measure is to do away altogether the fictitious account-money called the *livre tournois*, and to substitute in its stead a coin of the real and fixed value of a franc, of a certain weight and fineness, which is to form the unit of the whole system of coinage. This operation, the Minister observes, will cost the Treasury above five millions for the current year; but on the other hand, he continues, French coin will be in future the best that can be found in any part of the world! — Let the state of France in this respect be compared with that of England, where the Government is reduced to the necessity of receiving of receiving its revenues, and defraying its expenditure, in a paper-money, which loses already 33 per cent. — But how can we establish a comparison between two powers, the one rich in the produce of its own soil, and the other resting solely on commercial profits, increased by the violation of neutral rights, as well as by the ignorance and continued blindness of the Continent? — It is, consequently, easy to foresee the fate which awaits it; and I presume to say to your Majesty, let the

system adopted since the union of Holland be still maintained for some time, and we shall soon behold the overthrow of that fabric, the foundations of which, already undermined by the baneful influence of a fictitious circulating medium, which alters the nature of all values, and enhances without bounds the price of all necessary articles, rest only on a credit and a commerce, which are in their nature uncertain and transitory.

Account of the Cadastre.

The *Cadastre* is a survey by actual admeasurement of every parish, nay of every field, in France, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact proportion of land-tax which each land-owner, or farmer is to pay. The land is afterwards valued by a kind of jury, taken from among the parishioners; and a plan of the parish, with the valuation of each field, is sent to the Minister of Finances. One copy of it is given to the head of the Department, and another remains with the mayor of the parish.—This *Cadastre* is not an invention of the present government of France: the idea originated long before the Revolution, with the Economists. A leading tenet of those philosophers was, that agriculture alone was really productive to the State; it followed, of course, that the State was to look exclusively to it for its support; but in their notions of justice, the burthen they thus laid inadvertently on the agriculture they wished to foster, would not be equally supported by all, unless an actual survey and valuation of all the lands should actually take place. So prevalent were those ideas in France at the beginning of the Revolution, that most of the cahiers, or written instructions given to the Deputies of the National Convention by their constituents, contained a recommendation of the *cadastre*.—Buonaparte thus found the idea thoroughly established; and soon discerned the advantages he might derive from it. The *cadastre* will put every acre of land in France as completely at his disposal, as the laws of the conscription mark every man for his soldier. When in want of supplies he will have only to calculate how much an additional franc on each acre will produce, and a decree will settle the business. The increase of revenue he will thus acquire will be as sudden as it will be great; for it is well known, that in the parishes already assessed according to the *cadastre*, land has been estimated at the value it

had in 1790, and the tax laid accordingly; whereas the fact is, that in those districts the least injured by the Continental System, the value of land has since that period fallen one-half, and much more in those parts where the produce of the land was chiefly intended for foreign markets.—It appears, that this new system, which will afford such resources to the enemy, is to be put in activity in the year 1813. At that epoch the French system of taxation is, as stated by M. Regnaud, to extend to Holland; it may be concluded, therefore, that the whole empire will be under the same regulations.—The following is M. REGNAUD's account of the progress which has been made in forming the *cadastre*:

Since the beginning of the admeasurement by parcels, which was first adopted in the year 1808, the *cadastre* operation has proceeded in a regular way.—On the 1st of April, 1811, the admeasurement was completed in 5,243 parishes; in the course of the current year it will be likewise completed in 2,000 more parishes; and thus upwards of 7,000 parishes will be admeasured by the 1st of January, 1812. This forms a little more than the seventh part of the territory of France.—The valuation of the land is, of course, more behind hand than the admeasurement, by which it must necessarily be preceded. The number of parishes in which the lands had been valued on the 1st of April, 1811, was 3,145: that measure will take place in 1,700 or 1,800 more, in the course of the present year; and thus, by the 1st of January, 1812, the lands of about 5,000 parishes will have been valued.—One hundred and twenty assemblies at Canton had been held in the beginning of 1811. They had proceeded to examine and to discuss the valuation of lands in the several parishes of their respective districts. The minutes (*procès verbaux*) of those assemblies contain, generally, expressions of satisfaction, and of the most respectful gratitude towards your Majesty, to whose parental care they are thus indebted for the signal advantages which are to result from that measure.—Those 120 cantons include nearly 1,400 parishes, in which the land-tax for 1811 shall be assessed according to their *cadastre*-rolls. This will do away the disproportion in the assessment which formerly existed between different parishes, and between the inhabitants of the same parish. Formerly the proportion of as-

assessment varied between them, from one half of the income to one tenth, one twentieth, and one fiftieth. Uniformity shall thus be introduced in all the assessments.—For these three years the land-tax has been already assessed in 2,400 parishes, according to the cadastre-rolls, formed on valuations made on general surveys, and which have remedied in part those imperfections which the admeasurement by parcels removes more completely; and thus nearly 4,000 cadastre-rolls will be put in activity for the year 1812. The number would have been more considerable, if experience had not proved that it was fit to await the result of the assemblies of Canton to settle the rolls definitively; and this consideration delays the execution of the measure, in a great many parishes which form part of cantons in which there are still some parishes where the admeasurement is not yet completed.—The present state of this undertaking, and the labours which will be completed in the course of 1811, will enable me to propose, next year, to your Majesty, the first application of the ultimate results expected from the cadastre-operation, as affecting the general assessment of the land-tax, to a zone composed of a fraction of each department of the empire. The only thing to be done will be to compare the amount of incomes, as ascertained by the cadastre, in the parishes forming part of the zone, with the total amount of the present assessments of these same parishes; and to establish a proportion between those incomes and the assessments; which proportion must naturally fix the part of his income which each land-owner shall have to set apart for the payment of the land-tax in the year 1813; and that proportion shall be the same for all.—Uniformity in the assessments will be thus partially established, between departments, between parishes, and between land-owners, and as completely for that fraction of the Empire as it will be for the whole when the measure shall have reached its last stage.

BANK OF ENGLAND.

French Remarks, extracted from the Moniteur of the 5th of August, 1811.

Since none of the reasons derived from the principles of justice, prudence, or humanity, have been able to induce the English Government to depart from its anti-social system,—that system which

gives it as many enemies as there are true citizens in the different States of Europe;—we may be permitted to contemplate, with some interest, the crisis in which that Bank, upon which rest the power and security of the nation, is placed.—When speaking of the affairs of a Bank, we are not involved in those political reveries, amidst which a people already blinded by its passions may be amused and deceived with impunity: here every thing is certain. If the facts alleged be true,—if it be a fact that four pounds sterling in Bank notes are worth only three guineas, (and, unfortunately for the Bank, this is disputed by no one), it must soon submit to acknowledge that its bankruptcy is almost declared. Doubtless, the Ministers and their partisans have good reasons for not all at once avowing their situation; doubtless, they have still some precautions to take, some essential operations to concert, before they give to the situation to which they have conducted affairs, the only name which befits it. This course is natural, and not at all surprising: but that there should be found men of sense and acuteness, who can shut their eyes to the light of evidence, and seek in miserable palliatives for a cure to the evil, is what will hardly be believed six months after the fall of the Bank,—that is, *very soon*.—Why was not this foreseen, will then say the stupid politicians of Wood-street? It was so clear!—One is almost tempted to laugh at the grave tone with which a Noble Lord, in the House of Commons, endeavoured to shew how much the notes of the English Bank differed from assignats, to which a Member had the indiscretion to compare them. “How can you assimilate things so unlike?” said he gravely. “Upon the creation of assignats, their issue was enormous; and it frightfully increased in a year or two. With us, on the contrary, even in a period of 15 years, there has scarcely been an increase of 15 millions sterling (360 millions of France) in paper circulation.” It might be answered, that it is by no means the quantity issued, but the power of incessantly issuing, which decides the fall of a paper-money; but it is more proper to observe, that the Noble Lord has blinked the question.—The point for consideration is not what has happened to the Bank of London, but what is now happening to it, and what must naturally ensue. How is it that a paper, issued in so small quantity, has already depreciated? The

Noble Lord should have thought of this objection, which he himself indiscreetly furnishes, and which it is natural to make to those who attribute the fall of assignats only to their enormous issue. They do not see that they take the effect for the cause; and instead of saying that the great issue was the cause of depreciation, they ought to perceive, from the then existing state of things in France, and from what is now going forward in England, that, in both countries, it was depreciation that led to issue, whether in assignats or bank-paper. The comparison, therefore, was not so misplaced as he wished to persuade the House.—As long as England shared with all Europe the weight of the struggle against a nation divided and torn by parties,—while, enjoying an immense and exclusive commerce, she developed all the sources of prosperity,—is it surprising that she kept at par the paper of her bank, and that she enjoyed a credit which the most insignificant banker obtains as long as his affairs appear in a prosperous state? Certainly not; and it must have lasted till the favouring causes ceased to operate—till the period when France, united as a whole, resumed her superiority upon the Continent. But the point is now for England to cause the effect to continue while the cause has ceased—to re-establish her credit, sinking under the weight of the very force which supported it. Such is the problem which the English Ministers have to solve.—Is there any prospect that they will succeed?—It is a truth become trite, that paper-money exists from the confidence reposed in those who issue it. This confidence is built upon their known resources and their conduct. If it is ascertained that a banking firm gains more than it expends, its paper enjoys a credit, which is in itself an addition to the property of the bankers. If unforeseen accidents or misconduct augment expences and diminish receipts, their credit declines, and can only be restored by a different system of conduct. Such is the state of the Bank of England. Its credit has declined to that degree, that the nominal value of its paper is to its real value as 96 to 75. What has produced this fall? An expenditure always increasing, which must still increase in a frightful progression; and a diminution of its receipts, which soon, from the effects of the Continental system, will be more and more reduced. What cure is proposed for the evil? This is the most curious part of

the subject. Some say that it does not exist; others, that it is of no consequence; a third party, in the hope, doubtless, of resorting to the true remedy, proclaims aloud the danger. What will be the event? One of two things: either the latter will be listened to; or the noise which they have made, and their very zeal, will hasten the evil.—But we do not anticipate events; we wish to present facts, not conjectures: the event belongs to futurity, which we do not presume to penetrate.

SPAIN.—MONT-SERRAT.—*Official Accounts from the Armies.*—Paris, 14th Aug. 1811.

ARMY OF THE SOUTH.—We read in an intercepted letter, that as soon as Lord Wellington was informed at Albuera of the march of the French army of Portugal, he assembled a Council of War to deliberate upon the part to be taken. The Spanish Generals were present: they warmly opposed the proposition of the English Generals to abandon Spain and repass the Guadiana.—For two months, say they, we have been besieging Badajoz: we have already raised the siege once: the breach is practicable, and in a few days we shall be masters of the place. The possession of Badajoz is important, because it is one of the strongest places in Spain, the key of the Guadiana, and contains all the bridges and besieging equipage of the French army.—The result of the battle we shall fight will be, if we are conquerors, the immediate fall of this important place. Cadiz has been besieged for a year. The French have constructed there a considerable flotilla: they have more than 400 pieces of large calibre in battery: the besieging works they have erected are immense: the result of the battle will be to deliver Cadiz.—The army of Murcia is in motion, and under the walls of Grenada. The result of the battle will permit our junction with that brave army.—The French army of Arragon besieges Tarragona; upon the fate of that place depends that of Catalonia, and the kingdom of Valencia. The result of the battle will be felt undoubtedly even in those provinces.—In fact, victors, we become masters of Estremadura, Andalusia, the kingdom of Cordova, Jaen, Grenada; we take Badajoz, we deliver Cadiz. The French, obliged to repass the Sierra Morena, will be harrassed on all sides, will fear for Madrid, will march the nearest

troops, which are those of Arragon, and thus Tarragona, Catalonia, and Valencia, will be delivered. Never were more important consequences attached to the fate of a battle.—If, on the contrary, we lose it, shall we not be always in time to repass the Guadiana, place ourselves under the protection of Elvas, or the heights of Portalegre? The cavalry of the Army of Portugal not having been yet entirely refitted, the means of conveyance not being yet reorganized, they can undertake nothing before September, and till that time shall we not be always able to defend the Lines of Lisbon, or to maintain ourselves under the cannon of Elvas?—Victors, we shall obtain immense advantages; vanquished, scarcely any inconvenience is attached to our defeat. Our army is as numerous as the French army; they have rather more cavalry than we have, but we have more field artillery. The bad state of the carriages of the Army of Portugal has not permitted them to bring with them more than a small part of their park. The epoch is decisive. Victors! the Peninsula may be delivered; but if, on the contrary, we repass the Guadiana, and evacuate Spain, whether it be in consequence of a battle lost, or a simple deliberation of the present Council of War, the result will be the same; Spain, abandoned for the third time, will be discouraged; Badajoz will be reinvited, the Army of Murcia will be destroyed and dispersed; Tarragona will be taken, Catalonia reduced to submission, Valencia will follow the fate of Tarragona, and the English armies, after having been useless spectators of the defeat of all our armies, will be useless spectators of the capture of all our fortresses, and consequently, of the submission of all our Provinces?—These reasons not having been effectual, the English Generals having resolved to repass the Guadiana, the Spaniards separated discontented. On the 30th June they appeared before the fort of Niebla. Colonel Fritzherz, who commanded there, had 300 men. Blake established his batteries on the 31st. On the 1st July he tried an assault. Three successive attacks directed against the two gates were repulsed. The ladders of the Spaniards were thrown down, and 300 remained in the ditches of the place. Among the wounded, the Spaniards include General Zaya.—Upon the first advice which the French Governor of Seville had of the march of Blake, he took the field. On the 5th of

July he took from them three companies at Calauas. On the 5th, the enemy embarked, and the division of Seville picked up a great number of stragglers. Upwards of 2,000 of Blake's band deserted to return home.—On the 6th, Blake and the Spanish Corps sailed for Cadiz.

ARMY OF ARRAGON.—All the predictions of the Spanish people are realized. After the capture of Tarragona, Marshal Suchet marched upon Berga, and destroyed that fort: from thence he proceeded upon Mont-Serrat. The insurrectional Junta, intimidated by the capture of Tarragona, had embarked for Majorca, leaving the Marquis D'Ayrolas to defend Mont-Serrat, the general depot and central magazine of the insurgents. Marshal Suchet made dispositions to reconnoitre this place entrenched by art and nature. He arrived at Reuss on the 20th, with the brigade Abbe. On the 22nd, the brigadier Montmarie marched against Ignalada, in front of Frere Harispe. On the 24th the troops were united. The enemy, who had for a moment been alarmed, resumed their security, not thinking we should dare to attack them; but in the night the Marshal marched rapidly upon Bruch, with the brigades Abbe and Montmarie, he found there General Maurice Mathieu with a detachment of the garrison of Barcelona. The attack began upon three redoubts placed at the foot of the mountain, and which covered the entrance of the defile; they were in an instant carried by the bayonet, and occupied by our troops. General Abbe received orders to proceed immediately in front of the defile with the first regiment of infantry, the 144th of the line, and a company of sappers.—The road, long and painful, winds on the flank of a steep mountain: fresh obstacles would have stopped at each step any but French soldiers: intrenchments, redoubts placed on inaccessible rocks, covered the entrance of the convent. Peasants stationed on all tops of the mountains, kept up a terrible fire; the Marquis D'Ayrolas, trusting in the strength of his position, contented himself with ordering that a week's provisions should be carried into the batteries, which he deemed to be impregnable: but General Abbe had already dashed on with two picked companies. These brave men arrived under the rock of the first battery. In spite of the stones and rocks hurled down upon them, they climbed the heights; they were already in the embrasures; the enemy

lose their confidence; all that could not save themselves were killed in the battery. The cannon were immediately turned against the second battery, against which marched the chief of battalion Ebrand with a picked battalion. He attacked in front, and at once turned the work, which was carried in a few minutes by the bayonet. The Spanish officer was killed on his cannon with the cannoneers.—A third battery, with a strong entrenchment, yet remained in front of the Convent, and presented the greatest obstacles to us to attack in front; but 50 marksmen had climbed, we know not by what audacity, through the clefts of the rocks, and had reached the summit of the peaks of the mountain; from thence they plunged into the very interior of the Convent and the entrenchments. D'Ayrolas immediately descended with part of his men into the ravines and impenetrable paths, where it was impossible to follow him. Some officers were taken with the rest of the soldiers, and the Convent and thirteen hermitages were instantly occupied by our brave men.—We took two standards, ten pieces of cannon, of large calibre, a million of cartridges, an immense quantity of ammunition, cloaths, and provisions.—Deserters from the fort of Figueras have declared, that there are about 1,000 sick in the garrison, which are reduced to half rations.—The English cruisers have disappeared with Campo Verde and his adherents. The merchants of Valencia are carrying off their most precious effects to Alicante and Majorca.

DISTRICT OF THE ARMY OF THE NORTH.—The assemblage of the Gallicians, commanded by Santocildes, has tried a fresh attack upon the posts of Orbigo. On the 2nd July, at two in the morning, Santocildes at the head of all his troops appeared at the village of Vellamor, upon Orbigo. Gen. Bonnet had time to collect three regiments at Villa d'Angas: he marched immediately against the enemy, who, after some moment's firing, were staggered by a fine charge of the 12th dragoons, which determined them to retreat, leaving many dead upon the field of battle.—A reconnoissance pushed on the 10th towards Astorga, announced that the enemy seemed willing to maintain themselves there, and were reinforcing themselves with peasants.—On the 14th General Bonnet, with a strong detachment, reconnoitred the position of the enemy, who hastened his retreat over the mountains of Villa Franca,

without its being possible to bring him to an action, which would have decided his fate.

DISTRICT OF THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE.—The town of Cuenca, cleared of the brigands, has been occupied in a military manner, and the province occupied like those of the interior: the greater part of the prisoners desired to enter into our service: those that were dispersed, return successively to their homes: all the Commons are loud against the frightful system of these bands, which know neither friend nor foe; they all desired arms and the honour of defending themselves: several have already distinguished themselves by the arrest of some leaders too famous for their atrocities.

SWEDEN.—*Edict for the repressing of Luxury.*—July 10th, 1811.

Sir,—The King has felt himself obliged, in order to destroy that tendency to luxury and effeminacy which has already, perhaps, taken root in the nation, not only to invite his faithful subjects to renounce such pernicious abuses, but also to renew the ancient ordinances with regard to smuggling, which shall in future be severely punished. Under these circumstances, I think it my duty to invite you to exert yourself with zeal in this important business.—The experience of past times, and the renewal of the ancient ordinances, sufficiently show the inefficacy of laws in attaining the object proposed. When nations the most respectable prefer an empty brilliancy to that which is real, frivolity to gravity, and the thirst of gain to an honest competence, they are led astray; the superfluities of foreign countries injure the native productions of their own, and every one sacrifices the public good to his personal interest. It is in vain that the law opposes its authority to the progress of the evil, while punishment, slowly reaching two or three individuals, gives time for inventing new subterfuges.—But there is a powerful mean of supporting the law, of rousing the national spirit, and of re-establishing order,—it is the example of submission to authority, of respect for the ordinances connected with decency, morals, and sobriety, which should be given by the first societies of the kingdom, by holding up the dissipated and the selfish to contempt, and by honouring those who practise temperance, and know how to impose upon themselves privations. It

becomes me especially, in the high rank which I hold from the confidence of the King and the nation, to set the first example; and it will not cost me any sacrifice to do so. From the moment when my fate was united with that of Sweden, I have not felt the least foreign want; I have had no wants but those of my new country. Desolated by war and internal troubles, hardly escaped from dangers which appeared to threaten its speedy ruin, when its preservation and security require the slight sacrifice of some imaginary wants of luxury, I cannot believe that the thinking part of the nation, who know our external relations, and our situation at home, who call to mind the honour and the virtues of their ancestors, will forget for a moment their dignity and their duties; but, listening to these two noble motives, will enforce the wise views of the King.—It is to you, Sir, as well as to the other authorities of the kingdom, that the honour will belong of realising as much as possible, by your distinguished example, the intentions of his Majesty; and I expect with entire confidence this new proof of your fidelity to your King, and of your devotedness to your country, assuring you that I shall mark it with peculiar complacency.—I therefore recommend you to Almighty God, and am your affectionate

CHARLES JOHN.

*Castle of Drottningholm,
July 10, 1811.*

**SWEDEN. — *Edict relative to Commerce.*—
July 26, 1811.**

We, Charles, by the Grace of God, King of Sweden, of the Goths and Vandals, &c. hereby make known, that whereas the term for the commercial relations between Sweden and Finland, stipulated by the 17th Article of the Treaty concluded between us and the Emperor of Russia at Fredericksbanen, on the 17th of September, 1809, expires on the 13th of October next, we have thought proper, with the concurrence of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, to prolong the same for one year, from the above date, in witness whereof we have set our hand and

seal, during the illness of my most gracious Sovereign and Lord, and by his command,

CHARLES JOHN.

**PRUSSIA. — *Edict relative to Commerce.*—
July 21, 1811.**

We, Frederick William, by the Grace of God, King of Prussia, &c. desiring invariably to conform to all the measures adopted by his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, relative to the Maritime Commerce, and the Continental System, we have decreed, in accord with his said Majesty, as follows: We renew, in the most rigorous manner, the former prohibitions against the importation of colonial products of every description, under pain of irremissible confiscation; henceforth there will be no more certificates granted for exportation which state the payment of the duties established by the Continental tariff.—On the other hand we have established the principle of not shackling the exportation by sea of continental products, destined for neutral or allied countries, and not to subject to an augmentation of duties those continental products which are considered of the first necessity, in virtue of which we command, reckoning from this day; the exportation of all kinds of grain and wood for building, destined from any port in our States to a neutral or allied country. It shall be considered free and lawful, upon paying, nevertheless, an extraordinary duty of 32 thalers 12 gros on each last of either of the said merchandizes. We consequently order our commercial agents in our different sea-ports, to throw no obstacle in the way of exporting the productions of the country, and those of the Continent in general, observing at the same time, that they are not to deliver the certificates required for corn and building-wood, intended for exportation, previous to the above-mentioned duties being paid.—Besides, the same Commissioners will act with the utmost vigilance to support the continental system, which will continue in full and entire vigour. (Signed)

FREDERICK WILLIAM.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT:

ON THE DISPUTE WITH AMERICA.

LETTER II.

SIR,

Intelligence, received since the date of the former Letter, which I did myself the honour to address to your Royal Highness, makes it more imperious upon us to examine well the grounds upon which we are proceeding with regard to the American States. The President has called the Congress together; and, there can be little doubt of his object being to propose to them, for their approbation, some measure more of a warlike character than any which he has hitherto adopted; nor, can we, it seems to me, be at all surprized at this, if, as is rumoured, it be true, that Mr. Foster, our new minister in America, has made a communication to the American government, making the revocation of our Orders in Council depend upon the conduct of Napoleon as to the Continental System.

The rise and progress of the Orders in Council and of the French Decrees have already been noticed, and sufficiently dwelt upon; it has been shown, that the grounds of the present dispute, namely, the flagrant violation of neutral rights, did not originate with France, but with England, or, if not with England, with Prussia; it has been shown, and no one will attempt to deny the fact, that the French Decrees were passed *after* the issuing of our Orders in Council; that they were passed expressly in the way of retaliation; that they were to be revoked when we revoked our Orders. It has been shown, that we professed to be animated with a sincere and most earnest desire to revoke our Orders, and, indeed, that we expressly declared, that we would revoke them whenever the French would revoke their Decrees. It has been shown, that the French officially informed the American Government, that the Decrees were revoked, and that, thereupon, the American Government called upon us to fulfil our promises in revoking our Orders; but, that we did not do this; that we

evaded the fulfilment of these promises, and, in short, that we have not revoked, or softened the rigour of, any part of our Orders. It has, in a word, been shown, that, while the French have revoked their Decrees, while they, in consequence of the remonstrances of America, have ceased to violate her neutral rights, we persevere in such violation.

The pretext for this was, at first, that the Emperor Napoleon, though he *said* he had revoked his Decrees, had *not* done it, and meant not to do it. This, may it please your Royal Highness, was, it appears to me, a very strange kind of language to use towards other powers. It was treating the American government as a sort of political idiot. It was telling it that it did not understand the interests of America, and that it was unworthy to be entrusted with power. And, it was saying to the Emperor of France, that he was to be regarded as shut out of the pale of sovereigns; that he was on no account to be believed; that no faith was to be given to the official communications of his ministers, or of any persons treating in his name. Thus, then, the door against peace, against exchange of prisoners, against a softening of the rigours of war in any way or in any degree, was for ever barred; and, the termination of war was, in fact, made to depend upon the death of Napoleon.

But, this pretext could not last long; for, the Decrees were actually revoked; the revocation went into effect; and those Decrees are now wholly dead as to any violation of the neutral rights of America. It was, therefore, necessary to urge some new objection to the revocation of our Orders in Council; and, it is now said, that Mr. Foster has demanded, that, as a condition of the revocation of our Orders in Council, the French shall revoke all the commercial regulations which they have adopted since the Orders in Council were issued; that is to say, that Napoleon shall give up what he calls the Continental System, and *admit English goods into the Continent of Europe.*

I do not say, may it please your Royal Highness, that Mr. Foster has been instructed to make such a demand : I state the proposition as I find it described in our own public prints ; but, this I can have no hesitation in saying, that a proposition so replete with proof of having flowed from impudence and ignorance the most consummate is not to be found in the history of the diplomacy of the universe. The Government of America can have no right whatever to interfere with the internal regulations of the French Empire or of any other country ; and, the Continental System, as it is called, consists merely of internal regulations. These regulations have nothing at all to do with the *rights of neutrals* ; they do not violate, in any degree, any of those rights ; and, therefore, America cannot, without setting even common sense at defiance, be called upon to demand an abandonment of that system.

But, Sir, permit me to stop here and to examine a little into what that system really is. It forbids the importation into the Empire of Napoleon and the states of his allies any article being the manufacture, or produce, of England or her colonies. This, in a few words, is the Continental System. And, your Royal Highness certainly need not be reminded, that it is a system which has been very exactly copied from the commercial code of England herself. Your Royal Highness's ministers and many members of Parliament have spoken of this system as the effect of vindictiveness on the part of Napoleon ; as the effect of a mad despotism, which threatens Europe with a return of the barbarous ages ; but, I see nothing in this system that has not long made part of our own system. It is notorious, that the goods manufactured in France are prohibited in England ; it is notorious that French wine and brandy are forbidden to be brought hither ; in short, it is notorious that no article being the manufacture or produce of France is permitted to be brought into England ; and, that seizure, confiscation, fine, imprisonment, and ruin attend all those who act in infraction of this our commercial code.

This being the case, it does seem to require an uncommon portion of impudence or of self-conceit for us to demand of the Americans to cause the Continental System to be abandoned as a condition upon

which we are willing to *cease to violate their rights*. But, it has been said, that Napoleon enforces his system with so much rigour and barbarity. This does not at all alter the state of the case between us and America, who has no *power*, and, if she had the power, who has no *right*, to interfere with his internal regulations. Yet, Sir, it is not amiss to inquire a little into the fact of this alledged *barbarity* of Napoleon. All rulers are content with accomplishing their object ; and, in this case, it would not be his interest to inflict greater penalties than the accomplishing of his object required. Our own laws against smuggling are not the mildest in the world ; and, we have seen them hardened by degrees, till they answered the purpose that the government had in view. We have been told, indeed, that Napoleon punishes offences against his commercial code with enormous *finés*, with imprisonment, and we have heard of instances where he has resorted to the punishment of death. These severities have been made the subject of most grievous complaints against him here ; they have brought down upon him reproaches the most bitter ; they have been cited as proofs indubitable of the intolerable despotism, under which his people groan. But, Sir, I have confidence enough in your justice and magnanimity to remind you, that there is nothing which his commercial code inflicts ; that there is nothing in any of the punishments that even rumour has conveyed to our ears ; no, nothing, in any of these surpassing in severity ; nay, nothing in any of them equalling in severity, the punishments provided for in the commercial code of England, having for their object, towards France, precisely that in view which the Continental system has in view towards England, namely, her embarrassment, and, finally, her overthrow.

In support of this assertion I could cite many of the acts in our statute book ; but I allude particularly to that which was passed in the month of May 1793, at the breaking out of the war against the republicans of France. That act, which appears to have been drawn up by the present Lord Chancellor, makes it High-treason, and punishes with death, and also with forfeiture of estates, all those persons, residing or being in Great Britain, who shall have any hand whatever, either directly or indirectly, in selling any goods (mentioned in the said act) to the French government,

or to any body residing in French territories. This act punishes in the same awful manner, any one who shall send a Bank note to any one residing in the French territory, or shall have any hand, in the most distant manner, in causing such notes to be sent. It punishes in the same manner any person residing or being in Great Britain, who shall have any hand in purchasing any real property in any country under the dominion of France; and it extends its vengeance to all those, who, in the most distant manner, shall have any hand in such transaction. This act is the 27th chap. of the 33rd year of the reign of George the third; and I have never seen and never heard of any act or edict that dealt out death and destruction with so liberal a hand.

It was said at the time, by the present Lord Chancellor, and by the greater part of those men who compose your Royal Highness's ministry, that this act, terrible as it was, was demanded, by the safety of the nation. This Mr. Fox denied, and he strenuously laboured to prevent the passing of an act so severe. I shall offer no opinion upon this matter; but it is certain that the code of Napoleon is not, because it cannot, be more terribly severe than this act; and this being the case, common decency ought to restrain those who justified this act from uttering reproaches against the author of the continental code. Our Government then said that the act of 1793 was necessary in order to crush the revolution that had reared its head in France, and that was extending its principles over Europe. They justified the act upon the ground of its necessity. So does Napoleon his code. He says that that code is necessary to protect the continent against the maritime despotism and the intrigues of England. His accusations against us may be false, but he is only retorting upon us our accusations against France; and between two such powers, there is nobody to judge. In truth our Government passed its act of 1793, because it had the will and the power to pass and to enforce it; and Napoleon has established his continental system, because he also has the will and the power. It is to the judgment of the world that the matter must be left, and I beseech your Royal Highness to consider, that the world will judge of our conduct according to the evidence which it has to judge from, and that that judgment will leave

wholly out of view our interests and our humours.

To return and apply what has here been said to the case on which I have the honour to address your Royal Highness, what answer would have been given to America, if she, in the year 1793, had demanded of our Government the rescinding of the act of which I have just given a faint description? In supposing, even by the way of argument, America to have taken such a liberty, I do a violence to common sense, and commit an outrage upon diplomatic decorum; and it is quite impossible to put into words an expression of that indignation which her conduct would have excited. And yet, Sir, there appears to me, to be no reason whatever for our expecting America to be permitted to interfere with Napoleon's continental system, unless we admit that she had a right to interfere with our act of 1793. The dispute between us and America relates to the acknowledged *rights of neutral nations*. These rights of America we avow that we violate. We have hitherto said, that we were ready to cease such violation as soon as the French did the same; but now, if we are to believe the intelligence from America and the corresponding statements of our public prints, we have shifted our ground, and demand of America that she shall cause the continental system to be done away, or, at least, we tell her that it shall be done away, or we will not cease to violate her rights.

The language of those, who appear to be ready to justify a refusal, upon the ground above stated, to revoke our Orders in Council, is this: that it was *natural* to expect that the revocation would be made to depend upon a *real* and *effectual* abolition of the French decrees; that the revocation is merely nominal unless all the regulations of Napoleon, made since 1806, are also repealed; that when these latter are repealed, it will be right for America to call upon us for a repeal of our Orders in Council, and not before; and, it is added, that the American President will not have the support of the people, if he attempt to act upon any other principles than these. So that, as your Royal Highness will clearly perceive, these persons imagine, or, at least, they would persuade the people of England, that, unless the President insist upon the admission of

English manufactures and produce into the dominions of France, he will not be supported by the people of America in a demand of England to cease to violate the known and acknowledged rights of America. The President is not asking for any indulgence at our hands: he is merely asking for what is due to his country; he is merely insisting upon our ceasing to violate the rights of America; and, if what the public prints tell us be true, we say in answer: "We will cease to violate your rights; we will cease to do you wrong; we will cease to confiscate your vessels in the teeth of the law of nations, but not unless Napoleon will suffer the continent of Europe to purchase our manufactures and commerce." If my neighbour complain of me for a grievous injury and outrageous insult committed against him, am I to answer him by saying, that I will cease to injure and insult him, when another neighbour with whom I am at variance will purchase his clothing and cutlery from me? The party whom I injure and insult will naturally say, that he has nothing to do with my quarrel with a third party. We should disdain the idea of appealing to America as a mediatrix, and, indeed, if she were to attempt to put herself forward in that capacity, indignation and vengeance would ring from one end of the kingdom to the other. Yet, we are, it seems, to look to her to cause the French to do away regulations injurious to us, but with which America has nothing at all to do.

As to the disposition of the *people of America*, your Royal Highness should receive with great distrust whatever is said, come from what quarter it may, respecting the popular feeling being against the President and his measures. The same round of deception will, doubtless, be used here as in all other cases where a country is at war with us. It is now nearly twenty years since we drew the sword against revolutionary France; and, if your Royal Highness look back, you will find, that, during the whole of that period, the people of France have been, by those who have had the power of the press in their hands in this country, represented as hostile to their government, under all its various forms, and as wishing most earnestly for the success of its enemies. The result, however, has been, that the people have never, in any one instance, aided those enemies; but have made all sorts of sacri-

fices for the purpose of frustrating their designs. On the contrary, the people in all the countries, allied with us in the war, have been invariably represented as attached to their government, and they have, when the hour of trial came, as invariably turned from that government and received the French with open arms. After these twenty years of such terrible experience, it is not for me to presume, that your Royal Highness can suffer yourself to be deceived with regard to the disposition of the American people, who clearly understand all the grounds of the present dispute, and of whom, your Royal Highness may be assured, Mr. Madison, in his demands of justice at our hands, is but the echo. The Americans do not wish for war: war is a state which they dread: there is no class amongst them who can profit from war: they have none of that description of people, to whom war is a harvest: there are none of those whom to support out of the public wealth the pretext of war is necessary: they dread a standing army: they have witnessed the effects of such establishments in other parts of the world: they have seen how such establishments and loss of freedom go hand in hand. But, these considerations will not, I am persuaded, deter them from going far enough into hostile measures to do great injury to us, unless we shall, by our acts, prove to them, that such measures are unnecessary.

The public are told, and the same may reach the ear of your Royal Highness (for courts are not the places into which truth first makes its way), that the American President is *unpopular*; that the people are on *our side* in the dispute. Guard your ear, I beseech you, Sir, against such reports, which are wholly false, and which have their rise partly in the ignorance and partly in the venality of those by whom they are propagated. It is a fact, on which your Royal Highness may rely, that, at the *last election* (in the Autumn of 1810) the popular party had a majority far greater than at any former period; and, it is hardly necessary for me to say how that party stands with regard to England; for, from some cause or other, it does so happen, than in every country where there is a description of persons professing a strong and enthusiastic attachment to public liberty, they are sure to regard England as their enemy. We are told, that these are all sham patriots; that they

are demagogues, jacobins, levellers, and men who delight in confusion and bloodshed. But, Sir, the misfortune is, that these persons, in all the countries that we meddle with, do invariably succeed in the end. Their side proves, at last, to be the strongest. They do, in fact, finally prove to form almost the whole of the people; and, when we discover this, we generally quit their country in disgust, and, since they "will not be true to themselves," we e'en leave them to be punished by their revolutions and reforms. In America, however, it will, I think, be very difficult for any one to persuade your Royal Highness that those who are opposed to us are sham patriots, and men who wish for confusion. Every man in that country has enough to eat; every man has something to call his own. There are no baits for sham patriots; no fat places to scramble for; no sinecures where a single lazy possessor snorts away in the course of the year the fruit of the labour of hundreds of toiling and starving wretches; none of those things, in short, for the sake of gaining which it is worth while to make hypocritical professions of patriotism. As an instance of the sentiments of the people of America with regard to political parties, I beg leave to point out to your Royal Highness the circumstance of *Mr. Pickering* (who is held forth as the great champion of our cause in America) having, at the last election, been put out of the *Senate* of the United States, of which he had long been a member, being one of the Senators for Massachusetts, his native state. The people of the State first elect the two Houses and the Governor of the State, and these elect the persons to serve them in the Senate of the Union. Thus *Mr. Pickering* was, then, rejected, not merely by the people; not merely at a popular election; but by the deliberate voice of the whole legislature of the State. And this, too, in that part of the Union called New England; in the State of Massachusetts too, which State it is well known takes the lead in the Northern part of the country, and which State has always been represented as disposed to divide from the States of the South. If we had friends any where in America, it was in this State; and, yet, even in this State, we see the most unequivocal proof of disaffection to our cause.

It is useless, Sir, for us to reproach the people of America with this disaffection. They must be left to follow their own

taste. In common life, if we find any one that does not like us, we generally endeavour, if we wish to gain his liking, to win him to it by kindness and by benefits of some sort or other. We go thus to work with animals of every description. In cases where we have the power, we but too often make use of that to subdue the disinclined party to our will. But, where we have not the power, we are seldom so very foolish as to deal out reproaches against those whose good will we do not take the pains to gain. It is, therefore, the height of folly in us to *complain* that the Americans do not like our government, and prefer to it that of Napoleon. The friends of England accuse them of giving support to a *despot*. They do not love despots, Sir, you may be assured; and, if they like Napoleon better than they do our government, it is because *they* think him less inimical to their freedom and their property. This is the ground of their judgment. They are not carried away by words: they look at the acts that affect them; and, upon such grounds, they might, under some circumstances, justly prefer the Dey of Algiers to the ruler of any other state.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Thursday, 5th September, 1811.*

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPAIN—FIGUEIRAS.—Another fortress has fallen before the French, after a long, and, seemingly, a most gallant resistance. But, 3,500 men, amongst whom 350 officers, and many of high rank, are a part of the victor's prize upon this occasion. Our public prints scarcely notice this event. It appears nothing at all to them, who belong to a nation, where City Swords and Parliamentary Thanks and Peerages are given for such achievements as those of Barrosa and Albuera and Talavera. *Three thousand five hundred prisoners!* Do you hear that, you venal men! you crowd of base hirelings! And you greater crowd of dupes! Do you hear of the three thousand five hundred prisoners of war, *surrendered at discretion?* Let me ask you, now, what you would say, if such an achievement were accomplished by the Lord Baron Douro and Viscount Talavera and the Conde de Vimeira? What would you say? Where would you begin; and where would you end? What firing of

cannon, ringing of bells, illuminations, bonfires; what paragraphs, what poems, what columns of doggerel from the pen of the pensioned poet Fitzgerald, what nauseous stuff upon the stage, what a singing and what a shouting! There is no forming the most distant idea of what would take place. I should be afraid of the whole nation's going mad: drunk I am sure they would be. And yet, no more notice is taken of this achievement of the Duke of Tarento than if it had been the mere intercepting of a convoy of provisions. What a compliment does this *silence* contain! How eloquent it is in eulogium on the French army and its commanders! For, what will *history* say? Why, that such were their famous deeds, that the capture of a fortress where 3,500 men, including 350 officers, was passed over by their enemies as an event not worthy of particular notice. On the other hand, what will history say of our deeds in arms, when it is recording the subjects of our endless boastings? It is very painful to have to make such remarks; but they are true, and they are called for by the occasion. There is nothing more injurious to the character of a country than boasting without good ground; and, let it be observed, that our army will never be the better for our shutting our eyes against the truth, whether as to their deeds, or to the deeds of the enemy. It is bad policy, besides being unjust and false, not to speak of both as they deserve. The fear of censure is as necessary as the love of praise; and, if praise on our own side is, in all cases, to be bestowed; if we are thus to go on praising our own army through thick and thin; and are to speak contemptuously of all the victories of those to whom it is opposed, where are we to look for the motives to great and gallant deeds? I am for giving to our own army a full measure of commendation. I would deprive no man of it of his due, from the highest to the lowest; and, I would rather over than under do my duty in this respect. But, I would not overlook glaring faults; I would not be silent when I saw Brennier march out of Almeida with a thousand men in the face of the English army. And, on the other hand, I would never suppress a fair account, a candid notice, of the successes of the enemy. This is the only way, in which, as far as relates to these matters, the press can be useful: not pursuing this course it must, indeed, be mischievous. Mischievous it has been dur-

ing the whole of this long war against France; but especially, during the war in the Peninsula. Who, to read our public prints, would not imagine, that our army had lived in a continued series of victories? Who would imagine, that the enemy against whom they have to contend was not to the last degree contemptible? In short, such a press, a press so conducted, is the vilest imposture that ever was practised in the world.—As to the effect which the fall of Figueiras will have upon the affairs of Napoleon in Spain, it is not an easy matter to settle; but, that it will have a great effect is pretty certain. The state of things in Spain is such as to promise a result by no means favourable to us. There is a talk of *treasons* at Cadiz; and we know what *treasons*, in such a state of things, always mean. The feeling of the Spanish government is pretty clearly evinced in the recent appointment of General *Lacy* to a considerable command; for, it will be recollected, that this was the gentleman, who, in so able and spirited a manner, answered the charges of General *Graham*. This is an act of a nature entirely unequivocal; and, with this act before them, if there be any persons in England who expect to see harmony restored at Cadiz, all I can say is, that I wish them joy of their happy state of mind.

GERMAN DESERTERS.—In the meanwhile, however, we have, for our comfort, a new freight, it seems, of German Soldiers brought into England from Spain. "The desertions," says the *Morning Chronicle* of the 3rd instant, "from the French armies have been so numerous since their entrance into Spain, that Government found it necessary to establish a *depot* for them at Gibraltar. From thence they are conveyed to this country, and distributed among the different foreign corps now in our service. Upwards of 1000 German recruits have accordingly arrived at Portsmouth in the course of last week; but it is uncertain whether they are to be formed into a separate corps, or drafted into the several foreign regiments."—These are not the Polish Lancers, I suppose. Not those "savages," as the letters from officers in our army are said to call them. Not those murderous ruffians, who think no more of the life of a man than of that of a dog; and who run their lances into a carcass without the smallest consideration for the muffs and tippets and gloves and

furberows by which it may be enveloped. It would be a good thing to catch these people deserting.—It is curious to observe how the above-mentioned German deserters became "*recruits*" all at once when they are taken up by us. But, if they were at Gibraltar, why send them to England? Why send them into Hampshire? Why not land them at Lishon, whither we are sending so many troops from England? Why bring them to England from the Peninsula, at the same time that we are sending Englishmen thither? *Why* do this?—"And, why do you ask these questions?" says the Morning Chronicle. "You know, as well as any body, *why* this is done." How do you know that I do? At any rate, it is for you, who have stated the fact, to account for its having taken place.—Indeed, I do not believe this fact. I do not believe, that these Germans ever were in the service of France. It may be said so at Portsmouth, and they may say so themselves; but I do not believe it a bit the more for that. The French armies do not desert. The war in Spain and Portugal has proved that fact. There has been every temptation to desertion, and every opportunity offered; and, yet, where have we ever seen any official return of deserters received from the enemy? If his men did really desert, we should not fail to have the proof of it laid clearly before us, to which there would be such powerful motives; and, as we have seen no such proof, common sense, if we have any left, bids us reject a belief of the fact. But, whence, then, came these "*German Recruits*?" I do not know; nor do I know, that there are any such people in existence; but, if there are, my firm belief is, that they never were in the service of France.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
September 6, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—FIGUEIRAS.—*News from the Armies in Spain, dated Paris, 29th Aug. 1811.*

Official News from the Armies in Spain.

CATALONIA.—An aide-de-camp of Martinez, the commandant of Figueiras, deserted on the 8th of August, and announced that the garrison was in a frightful state of destitution, and reduced to a few ounces of bread and a little water; that,

no longer expecting relief, they had determined to make a desperate attempt and break through with the bayonet: but Figueiras was surrounded with a formidable line of circumvallation, more than 4,000 toises in extent; this line was formed by a chain of strong redoubts, connected together by entrenchments and protected by a double row of abattis. For some nights an increased vigilance took place; the Generals spent these nights in the lines; the Duke of Tarento had taken the most effectual measures for depriving the enemy of all means of escaping his fate. Having exhausted all his provisions and ammunition, Martinez, on the night of the 16th, attempted to force the lines at the head of all his garrison; he had advanced near the first abattis, when a terrible fire opened upon his column, killed 400 of his men, and compelled him to re-enter the fortress. On the morning of the 19th, he surrendered at discretion, demanding only that life should be spared. The garrison defiled, without arms, upon the glacis; it still consisted of 3,500 men, and near 350 officers, of whom there was one Field Marshal, several brigadiers, and 80 superior officers; this garrison arrived at Perpignan on the 21st and 22nd. Two thousand men perished in Figueiras by our fire, or by disease, since the commencement of the blockade, which lasted four months. The place not having been attacked, and all the operations having been confined to those of a rigorous blockade, this important fortress remains untouched. The perseverance and activity displayed by the blockading troops cannot be too highly praised; the artillery and engineers, in their immense labours, have rivalled each other in zeal.

Letter from the Duke of Tarento to his Excellency the Minister at War.—Camp before Figueiras, August 17, 1811.

MONSIEUR DUKE; I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that the effective part of the garrison of Figueiras, to the number of 3,500 men, last night unsuccessfully attempted to make their escape.—This general sally took place on the side towards the plain, but the fire of our advanced posts having given notice of it, the enemy was received with so warm a fire of musketry, accompanied with shouts of Long live the Emperor! and by so many shells and chain-shot, that he precipitately retired in disorder to his ramparts; day-break discovered to our view

the field covered with dead, wounded, and shattered remains.—From the account of several superior officers taken this morning, their loss in wounded was numerous; not a man was able to clear the first line of abattis; and they had besides other obstacles to surmount before they could reach our bayonets.—For two days the Spaniards had been employed in breaking and destroying that which they could not carry off or burn; the ovens were destroyed. They had distributed a double ration of brandy and three days' bread. Such is the account which his Excellency the Colonel-General has sent me this morning, at the same time begging to be authorised to take advantage of the confusion and terror which the above reception must have produced in the Spaniards, by summoning them to surrender at discretion, on pain of being put to the sword. Though I place little dependence on the success of this summons, which would hasten, by some days, the surrender of the fortress, yet I have given him authority.—My advanced posts at Liers were attacked yesterday by the Miquelets; I ordered a general beating up, which dispersed them all. It would appear that 7 or 800 of these people were endeavouring to favour the evacuation of the fort.—Every thing leads to a belief that the fall of Figueiras is near at hand. I have the honour, &c.—

(Signed) *The Marshal Duke of Tarento,*
McDONALD.

LETTER II.—*Camp before Figueiras, August 19, 1811.*

Monsieur Duke; I have the satisfaction to inform your Excellency, that the valour, the zeal, and perseverance of his Majesty's army in Catalonia, have triumphed over the perfidy of the traitors who delivered the fortress of Figueiras to the enemy; they are in irons. That fortress is this day reconquered, and in the power of the Emperor.—The Spanish garrison having in vain attempted to escape in the night of the 16th, and with a loss of 400 men, has been forced to surrender at discretion, and the only favour granted is saving their lives.—It came out of the fortress this morning without arms, 3,500 in number, and about 350 officers, of whom are Field Marshal Martinez, several Generals of Brigade, 80 superior officers, &c.; it was marched in three columns towards Perpignan, where it will arrive on the 21st and 22nd.—This garrison lost, during the blockade, more than 2,000 men by our

fire, or by a natural death; 1,500 sick remained in the hospital, and there are 200 non-combatants, who shall be dismissed.—The army of his Majesty braved more than 60,000 cannon-shot, and two million rounds of musketry, without much loss.

It has borne, with a constancy truly exemplary, labour, fatigue, and the inclemencies of the weather during a blockade of four months and nine days; and since the 24th of July has spent 25 successive nights under arms.—The works of the lines of countervallation and circumvallation are immense; his Majesty will be able to judge of them, should he condescend to look at the plan which I transmit to your Excellency.—The engineer department directed them with constant zeal and activity.—The artillery department has been excellent, as it always is; the General of Division Tamil commands it, and General Noufry erected and pointed all the batteries, some of which were boldly placed at less than 300 toises from the fortress.—The redoubts of the 37th of the line, of the 8th light, 16th and 67th of the line, 32d light, 11th, 81st, 60th, 93rd, those of the Imperial Gendarmerie and of the Westphalians, received the names of the corps which constantly worked there; the first mentioned were within musket-shot of the covered way; the 3d, and 23d light, also laboured a great deal.—These corps under the orders of Generals Quesnel, Clement, Palmarole, Plansonne, Lefebvre, Colonels Lamarque and Petit, formed the line of blockade or reinforced it every night. The squadron of the 20th, and 29th Chasseurs, the squadron of the 24th dragoons, and the lancers gendarmes, were also in horseback in part.—In fine, a select reserve, consisting of the foot-gendarmerie, and of detachments from different corps, commanded in turn by Generals Favier, Nourry, and Prost, and Adjutant Commandant Nivet, was destined to support all the points that were threatened.—His Excellency the Colonel General was every where. He displayed very great activity; in general every one has perfectly done his duty. I feel pleasure in doing this justice to the army, in the hope that the Emperor will deign to cast a look of favour on these brave men,—also begging your Excellency to cause his Majesty to remark, that his army of Catalonia had nothing to do with the event which brought them under the walls of this place.—I have just displayed the Imperial flag upon the walls; it was saluted by an hundred

rounds of cannon : this salute will be heard by the English ships on the coast, and the assemblages of insurgents at Olot; it will make known to them the recapture of Figueiras and the termination of the war in this part of Catalonia.—I have the honour, &c.—*The Marshal Duke of Tarento,*
MACDONALD.

P. S. Your Excellency's Aid-de-Camp, the Chief of Battalion Schneider, bearer of this dispatch, has shared in the fatigues of the troops, passing whole nights in the trenches; he has seen the fort, the prisoners, and can give your Excellency all the information which you may think necessary.

Translation of a Letter written by General Juan Antonio Martinez, Commandant of the Fort of San Fernando de Figueiras, to the principal Junta of the Principality of Catalonia.

Pont de Moulin, August 19, 1811.

Most excellent Senor,—After enduring more than four months obstinate blockade, without any relief on the part of the army, I have found myself under the necessity of surrendering the fort of San Fernando de Figueiras, from the total want of provisions. I have employed even the last resources; *from our horses to the lowest insect, all has been eaten up.* On the night of the 16th I attempted a sally at the point of the bayonet, with all the garrison; and in spite of the obstacles which the line of circumvallation opposed, I myself reached the abattis, or trunks of trees obstructing our passage, which could not be effected, in consequence of the great strength of this impenetrable line. In fine, I have this day surrendered prisoner of war, with the garrison, which has been treated by the French *with the generosity which characterizes that nation.*

(Signed) JUAN ANTONIO MARTINEZ.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Proclamation of the President for the Meeting of Congress.—24th July, 1811.*

Whereas great and weighty matters, claiming the consideration of the Congress of the United States, form an extraordinary occasion for convening them, I do by these presents appoint Monday, the 4th day of November next, for their meeting at the City of Washington; hereby requiring the respective Senators and the Representatives then and there to assemble in Congress, in order to receive

such communications as may then be made to them, and to consult and determine on such measures as in their wisdom may be deemed meet for the welfare of the United States. In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed, and signed the same with my hand. Done at the City of Washington, the 24th day of July, in the year of our Lord, 1811; and of the independence of the United States the 36th,

JAMES MADISON.

SOUTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION.—*Correspondence and Documents relative to the Revolution at Buenos Ayres, 1811.*

Buenos Ayres Extraordinary Gazette of the 20th of June, 1811.

In the Extraordinary Gazette of the 18th instant, among other official papers which General Don Jose Artigas transmitted with regard to his operations against Monte Video, there was also given an overture made by Don Xavier Elio after the battle of Las Piedras, soliciting the armistice. During this, the result of the negotiation also reached him, which in that extremity he had set on foot directly with the most excellent Junta, through the medium of the officer Don Jose Obregon, and with which the public has already been made acquainted. As Elio perfectly foresaw the rejection which his application, so contemptible in many respects, was doomed to meet with, he visibly attempted to influence the good faith of General Artigas by the insidious mode in which his letter was drawn up, pretending that the English Government was embarked in the same cause, by the instructions which it had actually given to Capt. Heywood, Commander of the Nereus frigate.—Our General, deeply convinced, as well as the Government, of the true sentiments of the English nation with regard to the present affairs, returned a very proper answer: he spoke with a full knowledge of the daring and cunning character of the man to whom it was addressed; and with all the energy and resolution which animates us in our undertaking. But the honourable officer of his Britannic Majesty could not view with indifference the inconsiderate audacity of Elio, who had so falsely compromised his reputation in an affair of so much delicacy, and who, when Capt. Heywood had been expressly charged to observe a complete

neutrality in our affairs, had represented him as to a certain degree, taking part in them. Capt. Heywood, therefore, thought it his duty to clear himself of all such interference, and transmitted to the Government the following declaration, which is published for that purpose, and that all may be apprised of the sole object of his arrival :

On board his Britannic Majesty's Frigate the Nereus, before Buenos Ayres, June 19.
Most Excellent Senor ; In the Buenos Ayres Gazette of yesterday I have observed an official document, in which I am erroneously represented as a negotiator between his Excellency the Viceroy, Don Xavier Elio, and the Most Excellent Provisional Junta of Government. And as, wherever that Gazette is circulated, it may produce an impression injurious to me as Captain in the Royal Navy of his Britannic Majesty, whose duties are of a nature more open, active, and decided than those of a crooked policy and diplomatic intrigue, to which my character is abhorrent ; and having, also, received an express prohibition to interfere in these matters, I have thought it necessary to observe for the present, that the Viceroy must have been greatly mistaken in expressing himself as he has done with regard to me.—I also leave it to your Excellency to inform the public (if you think it of importance) whether or not your Excellency, since my arrival in this river in the Nereus, has entered into any official conversation with me, or any other individual, relative to the existing political disputes of these provinces, in which we disclaim all right, and even inclination, to interfere.—Though I have not thought it necessary or proper hitherto to say any thing, yet I now avail myself of this opportunity, that it may be well and clearly understood, that the spirit and tendency of the orders with which I was sent to, and still remain in, the river Plate, have in truth for their chief and only object the protection of the persons and commerce of the subjects of his Britannic Majesty from any unjust effects of commotion ; and to lend all possible assistance, by means of the ship under my command, to such of them as may wish to remit their property or retire from the river Plate.—In the execution of this last part of my orders, I consider it my duty to endeavour to obtain the co-operation of this Government, for their own benefit, and that of my

countrymen. Why this co-operation has been so suddenly and unexpectedly denied, is a question which I have neither the right nor the inclination to ask, and with regard to which it becomes me, as an officer of the English Navy, to be perfectly indifferent.—I have the honour to be, &c.
To the President and Members of the Provisional Junta of Government. P. HEYWOOD.

The following is the letter of the Viceroy to General Artigas, conveyed by a flag of truce, and to which the preceding correspondence refers :

Monte Video, May 20.

I have to inform you, that I have set on foot negotiations with the Junta of Buenos Ayres, through the medium of Capt. Heywood, of the British frigate Nereus, which officer has also instructions from his Government to the same effect. One of the propositions which he has to make to the Junta, is, that an armistice and suspension of arms should take place till our existing differences can be accommodated. I expect from day to day accounts of this negotiation, and in the mean time I hope you will concur in the humane sentiments which animate me, by suspending all hostilities between our troops, as producing only a lamentable and useless effusion of blood ; as the Junta must comply with the pacific propositions made by the English and myself.—The reply of General Artigas was in substance as follows :—

Camp at Las Piedras, May 20.

Senor ; The cause of the people does not admit of the least delay. If you really desire to avoid the effusion of blood, so contrary to the feelings of humanity, enter into a negotiation with me, who am well acquainted with the wishes of the Junta, and will give you and Monte Video a new proof of its generous and pacific views. These are comprised in the re-establishment of communication and relation between the inhabitants of Monte Video and those of the capital ; ties marked out by the mutual interests of both, and by nature itself ; ties which are broken by a declaration of war on your part, which has carried desolation and mourning into those families which have suffered from that effusion of blood which you profess to lament.—This army will shortly bring to a conclusion the work which is already so far advanced ; and you will bring to a climax the misfortunes of Monte Video, unless you resolve that the autho-

city of the Provincial Junta of these provinces be recognised by that city, in order that it may transmit its wishes by the medium of a Representative, conformable to the regulation which has been published, and in imitation of the measures which all the provinces in Spain adopted for the purpose of preserving entire the dominions of our august Sovereign Don Ferdinand VII. from the oppression of the tyrant of Europe. This is the only condition on which, in virtue of the authority which I exercise, I shall cause hostilities to cease on the part of my troops.

(Signed) JOSE ARTIGAS.

From the Buenos Ayres Gazette of the 15th June.

Letter from his Excellency Lord Strangford to this Most Excellent Junta.

Most Excellent Senor; I have received the letter of your Excellency of the 24th of February, in which you inform me of the proceedings of General Elio, in interrupting the commerce of Buenos Ayres, and in which, after some observations on the supposed want of legitimate official authority on the part of that General, you beg me to communicate them to my Government. On this point I will comply with your Excellency's wishes; but I am convinced that I only anticipate the opinion of my Court, when I assure you, that this communication will be received with the deepest regret and will augment those painful feelings which must be inspired by the present unfortunate contest between Buenos Ayres and its dependencies. —The confidence which your Excellency has placed in me, and the conviction that I shall acquire a new title to it by the proposal which I am about to submit to your consideration, encourage me to speak frankly and without reserve. —Your Excellency, by constantly expressing a fixed determination to adhere to the common cause of the Allies against France, to respect the authority and preserve the claims of our legitimate Sovereign, have secured an undoubted right to the friendship and good offices of Great Britain, founded on a basis much more solid and extensive, than that of the advantages and concessions which you have so liberally and wisely granted to its subjects. —But it is nevertheless to be lamented, that while these principles deserve every applause, their practical results have hitherto so little corresponded to their tenour; and that, in a crisis which requires united efforts and

undivided energy, the power of the confederation formed against France should be weakened by the failure of those resources, which might rationally be expected from those who are in no small degree interested in the event of the struggle, but who, unhappily, cannot contribute to its fortunate issue, because they are plunged in all the evils of civil dissension. —Your Excellency knows too well the scrupulous good faith of the Court of London, the sacred ties which connect it with Spain, and the great and universally important object of their mutual alliance, to believe, that Great Britain, without violating that faith, sacrificing these obligations, and abandoning these objects, can lend the sanction of her approbation to measures productive of dissension between the component parts of a coalition, the happy issue of which depends upon a cordial co-operation and good understanding among all its constituent members. —But though it is thus impossible for Great Britain to act in opposition to her obligations, and the interests of the just cause which she supports, the just claims which your Excellency has to her friendship, inspire her with a sincere desire to become instrumental to your happiness and prosperity in the only way in which she can at present promote these objects. —I therefore take upon me to offer to your Excellency, in the most ample manner, the good offices and friendly interpositions of the English Government, for the purpose of facilitating an amicable settlement of the differences which at present subsist between the Spaniards of both hemispheres, and delivering them from the greatest of all calamities—civil discord, as the origin of their ruin, and of the greatest danger to the common cause. —I offer this mediation to your Excellency in the firm confidence that it will be undertaken with promptness by the English Government, and in the knowledge of what has been already proposed and accepted by other parts of the Spanish Monarchy, which were in circumstances similar to those in which Buenos Ayres is now placed. —I beg your Excellency clearly to understand, that the proposal which I make does not involve any disposition on the part of my Court to interpose in the political affairs of the Spanish Monarchy, or to support any system inconsistent with liberality and justice, and with the permanent prosperity of Spanish America. —It does not appear possible,

that your Excellency can confide your cause in better hands than those of England. Every motive of interest and policy unites in declaring, that the prosperity of Buenos Ayres must lie to us an object of importance; and this consideration, founded on identity of interests, is calculated to produce the most unlimited confidence on the part of your Excellency.—Should the proposal which I have had the honour to make be adopted by your Excellency, I would suggest as the first step to its actual execution, the adoption of measures for an armistice between your Excellency and General Elio; nothing can be more simple than such a negotiation: the withdrawal of your Excellency's troops on the one side, and the cessation of the blockade on the other, would be just measures of mutual concession. It might be stipulated, that this armistice should last till the final adjustment, under the friendly mediation of Great Britain, of the points at present in discussion between the government of Buenos Ayres and that of Spain.—A proposition of this nature, so analogous to the moderation which has characterised the commencement of your Excellency's proceedings, would cover Buenos Ayres with honour; and even should it be rejected, the very fact of having made so equitable an offer would prove, that you had left no means untried to avert the calamities of civil war, while the party that refused to accede to so just a measure would be in a great degree responsible for them.—Your Excellency cannot fail to perceive the various immediate advantages which would result from this proposal. The restoration of commerce would instantly follow; the termination of the difficulties under which British agents have laboured in this part of the world; and the removal of every disposition to interfere in the affairs of Spanish America, which may have been felt by any other State under the influence of the jealousies excited by the military movements and political proceedings of its neighbours.—I think it proper to apprise your Excellency, that I have also written to General Elio on the subject to which this letter relates, and that I have laboured to produce in him a disposition, corresponding to that which I confidently hope and believe is felt by your Excellency.—I conclude by again requesting your Excellency's attention to the proposition which I have had the honour to make; and that you will favour me with

your sentiments upon it, as soon as you conveniently can; and to believe that I am solely actuated by a sincere desire for your peace and prosperity, and for the prosperous issue of the just contest in which we are equally engaged, and in which we cannot hope to conquer if we are divided among ourselves.—I have the honour, &c. STRANGFORD.

Answer of the Junta.

Most Excellent Senor; The Junta has received by Captain Heywood, of the Navy, the confidential letter addressed to them by your Excellency, acknowledging the receipt of theirs of the 24th of February. It is not difficult to discover the reasons of your Excellency's silence on the most material part of its contents, nor of your answer to the last, dated March 6th, even had it not been ascertained by other channels, that your Excellency, acknowledging those ports to be in a state of blockade, even to ships of your own nation, chose rather to give a silent refusal, notwithstanding the reasons in opposition to it.—This unexpected event, and the excessive exertions of Admiral De Courcy to free the British flag from the obstructions put many months before, by the Government of Monte Video, to there being free ports, present to us a very mortifying contrast. The Junta can assign no cause for this retrograde movement, unless it form part of the plan of the British Government to adopt no measures that may tend to disunite America from Spain. The Junta, however, cannot reconcile such inconsistent projects. It is certain that the commercial projects of Great Britain and America have nothing to do with this disunion.—If Spain should ever renounce her system of exclusion with respect to America, it is time for her to know that in the state of insignificance in which she is, her true interest consists in soliciting England to approach these sources, whence she may supply that strength which she has exhausted for the interests of Spain, and be enabled to clothe a people left naked by Spanish tyranny; at least, in this way, she might acquire an idea of gratitude and justice; but she chuses rather to be deficient on this score, than to renounce exclusive rights, to which she believes herself to be entitled to all eternity, declaring imperiously, by her emissary, General Elio, those ports to be in a state of blockade, and issuing express orders to annihilate the British

commerce in this quarter; while she cannot reconcile such conduct with her declaration of attachment to Great Britain, her ally, she gives the highest offence to the Colonies, who, as subject to the same King, have equal right with Galicia, the Asturias, and Catalonia, to a direct intercourse with the nation that affords them protection. These reasons are of weight sufficient to convince the Junta, that without any violation of the good faith pledged to Spain, and without a breach of any positive agreement, the Court of London may resist the blockade which General Elio has imposed upon British ships.—Your Excellency observes, that it is matter of regret, that, in the present crisis, the power of the confederacy against France should be weakened for want of resources. The Junta is of opinion, that, to avoid the prejudices of which your Excellency speaks, and not to come to a state of the greatest weakness, the most effectual way is, not to place the resources of America in the hands of Spain, without making them pass to England, by means of an open and unrestricted commerce.—The whole world is not ignorant how incapable Spain is to employ her public funds with economy, as well as to direct her armies, because she has already dilapidated the supplies remitted from America for her defence. Such contributions of loyalty and of honour ought to be kept sacred; their disposition was determined by the same necessities, and the intention of those who granted them. Notwithstanding this, no consideration was sufficient to limit the prodigality and covetousness of the Spanish Administrations, yet they now haughtily ask, who has provided funds sufficient to support so many years the expences of the armies? These provinces profess entire fidelity to Ferdinand the Seventh; they wish to direct only by themselves, and without the hazard of risking their means to the rapacity of unfaithful hands; they promise to enter into the coalition against the tyrant so long as their civil independence is acknowledged. Here your Excellency will observe a means of strengthening the power of the confederation, till a final success, much more secure and more conformable to the principles of equity, than by threatening us with menaces, punishments, and blockades, into a subordination which no person has a right to require.—Your Excellency may be firmly assured that the blockade imposed by General

Elio is more prejudicial to the interests of Great Britain, and to Spain herself, than it is to us. If the scrupulous considerations of your nation carries it to dissemble such aggressions, the Junta cannot propose to the people such a species of humiliation. They can perceive in it nothing else than a determination to resist the audacious attempts of a Chief, who, without any other authority than a simple letter from the Secretary Bardaxi, his relation, exhibits himself a hostile Viceroy. It was this circumstance which hastened the aversion they formerly bore in their minds, and made the people of the eastern province take up arms. They demanded assistance from this Junta, and they have confined their aggressions to investing the walls of Monte Video.—In this state of things, the armistice which the conciliating disposition of your Excellency proposes, can produce no other effects than to frustrate an enterprize already far advanced; to expose the safety of many patriots to the vengeance of Elio; to excite an universal convulsion among the provinces, and the abandonment of our expectation to fluctuating opinion. This would surely be acting contrary to the principles of our institution, and to raise again the colonial system which our hands destroyed. This Junta entertain too sublime an idea of the penetration of your Excellency, to attribute your proposal to any other motive than an acquaintance with occurrences which are obscured by distance.—In respect to the mediation which your Excellency has proposed to remove the differences which subsists between these States and the Peninsula, nothing could be more satisfactory to this Junta than to place their cause in hands so faithful and generous as those of the British Cabinet. The good faith which characterize it, and the identity of their interests with ours, are causes which assures us of its fidelity. But the Junta cannot discover reasons to authorise them at present to avail themselves of such mediation. The Peninsula is no more than a part of the Spanish Monarchy, and that so maimed, that it would be no small concession to put it upon an equality with America. It therefore follows, from this principle, that the Peninsula cannot hold any authority over America, nor this over that. Were the English Cabinet to act the part of an impartial Mediator, it would be a precise acknowledgment of the independence of the two States. On the

other hand, were the British Cabinet possessed of an idea of our inferiority, it would not be surprising that the result of a negociation would be, to grant us much more by favour than we deserved in justice. Therefore, until we can know the opinion of the British nation, all ulterior proceedings should be suspended. In addition, your Excellency combines your mediation with the armistice, and should a negociation take place, General Elio would continue to hold all the authority of Viceroy, wherewith he is invested by the Junta of Cadiz, even here, where he now occupies; but this would involve a contradiction in principles; Elio, and the illegitimate power from which he derives his authority, would remain triumphant over our rights before the termination of the dispute.—The unlimited confidence which the Junta has in the pure intentions of your Excellency, convinces us that you have no other object in view than to unite the political ties which subsist in common betwixt both nations; but your Excellency may rest assured, that if the state of our negociations do not admit us to adhere to them, our friendship towards Great Britain shall not be less firm, nor our consideration of your Excellency. God preserve your Excellency many years.
From the Members of the Junta,
Buenos Ayres, May 18, 1811.
To his Excellency Lord Strangford, &c.

Buenos Ayres, June 14.

This day entered this capital the veteran troops of infantry and dragoons which the kingdom of Chili has sent to us to support the just cause in which we are equally engaged. The General Commandant, at the head of all the regiments, marched out to receive them, at the distance of a quarter of a league from the city; and incorporated with our warlike legions, amidst the acclamations of a numerous population, they were conducted to the great square, in front of the town-hall, in the balconies of which, the Junta and the Members of the Municipality were assembled: There they renewed the most solemn oaths to die with us, should it be necessary, for the destruction of tyranny, and in defence of the imprescriptible rights of our native soil, that our children at least may enjoy the precious gift of liberty. They have come determined not to return to their homes without the palm of victory. Let the haughty despot and his followers be filled with terror;

and consider, that if Buenos Ayres alone was at one time able to inflict punishment on much more powerful enemies, his intrigues, his machinations, his miserable power, and his threats are perfectly contemptible when opposed to the united force of America.

Buenos Ayres, June 10.

Letter from the Conde de Linhares, Portuguese Minister at Rio Janeiro, to the Junta. Rio Janeiro, April 27, 1811.

Most Excellent Senor;—Don Manuel Sarreatea, who has just arrived here, delivered to me your letter, which I have laid before the Prince Regent, my master. His Highness has charged me to assure you, that he feels, and is always anxious to maintain with the Junta and people of Buenos Ayres, the same sentiments of friendship and good harmony to which he is bound by the alliance which happily unites him with his Catholic Majesty. Your Excellency knows the good faith and entire impartiality by which his Royal Highness is actuated. You are not ignorant how much he desires the conservation of the Spanish Monarchy, and to secure the eventual rights of his august spouse; your Excellency must therefore naturally suppose how anxious he is to see union and harmony re-established among all parts of the Spanish dominions, and with what pain he has witnessed the commencement of a civil war on the very frontiers of his States. He is of course particularly anxious for its termination, to which he would most willingly contribute by all the means which can be suggested by the friendship and impartiality which he feels for all the subjects of his Christian Majesty. In obedience to the Royal orders which I have received, I feel great satisfaction in making this declaration of the sentiments of his Royal Highness, which I hope will be agreeable to your Excellency. May God preserve, &c.

CONDE DE LINHAREZ.

Reply of the Junta.

Most Excellent Senor;—This Junta has learned, with the greatest satisfaction, the pacific sentiments with which his Royal Highness the Prince Regent is impressed, and his anxious desire to contribute, by all amicable means, to the restoration of that harmony which has been unfortunately interrupted among those who have the honour to be the subjects of the same Monarch. Had the prejudices of the

Spanish Government permitted them calmly to attend to our rights, and had not the former depositaries of the royal authority in this part of America been resolved to act contrary to the evidence of facts, by disseminating every where doubts and errors, our loyalty would have been much more confirmed, and even the remains of civil discord would have disappeared from among us. But, unfortunately, guided the most of them, by personal views, they introduced the deadly germs of division, which, though put down in the greater part of this viceroyalty, is still committing ravages in the province of Paraguay, and within the walls of Monte Video.—The public papers will have informed your Excellency of the just and undeniable ground on which, without prejudice to our allegiance to Ferdinand VII. we have founded our right to resume the management of our own affairs. As to the dissensions more immediately in your vicinity, it is equally notorious that the object of the military expedition to Paraguay was no other than to place the inhabitants of that province, confined to an angle of the kingdom, in a situation to deliberate on the means of saving the State from the subversion which threatened it. But they chose rather to listen to the suggestions of ill-designing men, who were interested in their errors, than to the wise counsel of their brothers. Hence it happened that hostilities took place. But the Junta, whose first object was to spare the blood of their Countrymen, viewed these disasters with horror, and ordered all hostilities to cease, leaving to time the work of undeceiving the Paraguayans.—With regard to the affairs of Monte Video, the Junta of Cadiz were so inconsiderate as to place at the head of affairs Don F. Xavier Elio, with the respectable title of Viceroy. This audacious man, whose instinct for destruction is notorious, since his arrival in these parts, has not ceased to treat us as rebels—to denounce against us the vengeance of the law—to blockade our ports—to make preparations to reduce us by force; and, in fine, to irritate the inhabitants of the Eastern district by the sacrifices which he exacts, and the miseries to which he reduced them.—The inhabitants being placed in this cruel situation, prudence obliged them to resort to violent measures; they rose in a mass, and demanded assistance from this capital. The Junta would have been criminally indifferent to the distresses

of their neighbours, had they not sent them aid. They therefore, dispatched some troops, who have in part arrested the current of these misfortunes.—The Junta have thought proper to explain to your Excellency the motives of their separation from Spain, and to give a brief exposition of the most recent events. They trust that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent will be enabled to judge from this statement, that neither the ultramarine Spaniards, nor Elio, nor his followers the Europeans in Monte Video, are entitled in any degree to his protection, in prejudice to our just cause.—Upon the whole, the Junta will never lose sight of the considerations with which they ought to be impressed as subjects of their king. They wish the happy moment to be accelerated, when we shall see Ferdinand VII. restored to the throne of his ancestors, and when all of us, reconciled, shall labour in concert in supporting without alteration the rights of the crown. Doubtless the powerful influence of the Prince Regent, your master, might smooth the difficulties in the way of such an event. But considering that by the general wish of the people, it has been thought necessary to convoke their Representatives for the purpose of discussing those difficult questions which have been excited by the passing occurrences, and for securing the interests of the nation, it is the opinion of this Junta, that without the consent of that Congress, it would be premature to enter into any measures of negotiation with Spain. The same obstacles are not opposed to our reconciliation with the city of Monte Video. The consanguinity of its inhabitants, the vicinity of their territory, and their intimate relations with this metropolis, all concur in exciting a desire for our reunion. The Junta will therefore receive any proposition that may be made to them through the medium of his Royal Highness, but will not compromise the interests which have been entrusted to them.—God preserve, &c.

Buenos Ayres, May 16, 1811.

To his Excellency the Conde de Linhares.

Buenos Ayres, June 26.

Our army at present consists of 22,000 warriors, the flower of the provinces, without including the Indians, who voluntarily join the service, and chiefly convey the artillery and baggage. They are not all, to be sure, armed with muskets, but a considerable part of them are. Our cavalry

are provided with every kind of side arms; and are able of themselves to rout those miserable legions, from whom the efforts of their chiefs have not been able to conceal the injustice of their cause.

Circular of the Junta to the Cabildos of the United Provinces.

Nothing is more important to the great objects which this Junta promotes, than to see the moment arrive when the provinces shall be represented in a Congress which shall commence its weighty deliberations. And, as notwithstanding the repeated invitations, which have been issued for the purpose of hastening the arrival of a day which will be the most remarkable in the future annals of America, a number of the deputies of which that august assembly is to be composed have not yet arrived, the Junta, therefore, on account of its pressing importance to the State, have resolved that the National Congress shall commence its sittings about the end of November in the present year. In consequence, the Government requires you to accelerate the mission of your representatives, and that one at least be elected for each of the cities in your districts; with this understanding, that should unforeseen difficulties prevent you from carrying the measure into effect within the time prefixed, supplementary Deputies will be appointed, till they arrive who are legitimately invested with powers from their constituents. —This Resolution is communicated to you, that you may with zeal and love for the cause of your country, take all necessary measures for hastening the assembling of the said Representatives in this city.

Buenos Ayres, June 26, 1811.

FRANCE.—Decree relative to Prisoners of War. Aug. 5, 1811.

Prisoners of war, having the rank of officers, as well as hostages, shall enjoy the favour of proceeding freely and without escort to the place assigned for them, and to reside there, without being detained, after their having given their parole not to depart from the road marked out for them, nor from the place of their residence.—Every prisoner of war having the

rank of officer, and every hostage, who, after having given his parole, shall violate it, shall, if he be retaken, be considered and treated as a soldier with respect to pay and rations, and shut up in a citadel, fort, or castle.—Prisoners of war having the rank of officers and hostages, who shall not enjoy the favour granted by the first article of the present decree, shall be kept in the dépôts, and shall not travel but under the escort of the armed force. If they escape on the road, or from a dépôt, and be retaken, they shall be confined in a citadel, fort, or castle.—Prisoners of war who have not the rank of officers, and who escape either on the road, or from a dépôt, from the battalion of the establishment, or from the houses of private persons, where they may have been placed, shall, in case they are retaken, be confined in a citadel, fort, or castle.

FRANCE.—Address to the Emperor from La Lippe and from the Ionian Isles, together with his Imperial Majesty's Answers—Paris, 19th Aug. 1811.

Yesterday, and Sunday the 18th, before Mass, the Emperor, surrounded by the Princes, grand Dignitaries, the Ministers, the grand Eagles of the Legion of Honour, &c. received in the Hall of the Throne a deputation from the department of La Lippe, and another from the Ionian Isles. The Duc de Looz, President of the deputation from La Lippe, presented the following address:

SIRE; The deputies of the department of La Lippe, authorised by the clemency of your Imperial Majesty to deposit at the foot of your throne the most respectful expressions of the submission and gratitude of a people newly united to your Empire, amidst the imposing spectacle of the grandeur and of the power of the first Monarch of the universe, feel themselves encouraged by the thought that they speak in the name of the descendants of those ancient Germaus, whose valour long balanced the fortune of the Roman eagles, and who have been always remarked for the uprightness and loyalty of their character, and for a steady attachment to their sovereigns and their laws.

(To be continued.)

TO THE PRINCE REGENT:

ON THE DISPUTE WITH AMERICA.

LETTER III.

SIR,

Before I enter upon the affair of the American Frigate and the Little Belt, permit me to call your Royal Highness's attention, for a moment, to the servility of the English press, and to offer you some remarks thereon.

Towards the end of last week a Council having been held, and an Order relative to American commerce having been agreed upon, it was, by those who merely knew that some order of this kind was about to come forth, taken for granted, that it contained a prohibition against future imports from the American States into this country, by way of retaliation for the American non-importation act. There needed no more. The busy slaves of the press, who endeavour even to anticipate the acts of government, be they what they may, with their approbation, lost not a moment. This "measure of retaliation," as they called it, was then an instance of perfect wisdom in your Royal Highness's ministers: it was a measure become absolutely necessary to our safety as well as our honour; and, indeed, if it had *not* been adopted, we are told, that the ministers would have been *highly criminal*. Alas! It was all a mistake: there was no such measure adopted: and, oh! most scandalous to relate! These same writers discovered, all in a moment, that it would have been *premature* to adopt such a measure at present!

I have mentioned this fact with a view of putting your Royal Highness upon your guard against the parasites of the press, who (though it may be a bold assertion to make) are the worst of parasites, even in England. "Hang them scurvy jades, they would have done no less if Cæsar had murdered their mothers," said Casca of the strumpets of Rome, who affected to weep, when Cæsar fainted, and who shouted when he came

to again. And, be your Royal Highness well assured, that these same writers would have applauded your ministers, if, instead of an Order in Council to prohibit the importation of American produce, they had issued an order to strip the skin over the ears of the Roman Catholics, or to do any other thing, however tyrannical, however monstrous, it might have been.

Suffer yourself not, then, Sir, to be persuaded to act, in any case, from what is presented to you in the writings of these parasites. Reflect, Sir, upon the past. During the whole of the last twenty years, these same writers have praised *all* the measures of the government. *All* these measures were, according to them, the fruit of consummate wisdom. Yet, these measures have, at last, produced a state of things exactly the contrary of what was wished for and expected. *All* the measures which have led to the victories and conquests of France, that have led to her exaltation, that have produced all that we now behold in our own situation, the paper-money not excepted; *all* these measures have received, in their turn, the unqualified approbation of the parasites of the press. To know and bear in mind this fact, will be, I am certain, sufficient to guard your Royal Highness against forming your opinion of measures from what may be said of them by this tribe of time-serving writers, who have been one of the principal causes of that state of things in Europe, which is, even with themselves, the burden of incessant and unavailing lamentation. Buonaparté! "The Corsican Tyrant"! The "towering despot," Buonaparté! Alas! Sir, the fault is none of his, and all the abuse bestowed upon him should go in another direction. The fault is in those, who contrived and who encouraged the war against the Republicans of France; and, amongst them, there are in all the world none to equal the parasites of the English press.

In returning, now, to the affair of the American frigate and the Little Belt, the first thing would be to ascertain, *which vessel fired the first shot*. The Commanders

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on both sides deny having fired first; and, if their *words* are thus at variance, the decisions of Courts of Inquiry will do little in the way of settling the point. This fact, therefore, appears to me not *capable* of being decided. There is no court wherein to try it. We do not acknowledge a court in America, and the Americans do not acknowledge a court here. Each government believes its own officer, or its own courts of inquiry; and, if the belief of the American government is opposed to what ours believe, there is no decision but by an appeal to arms. But, there is a much better way of settling the matter; and that is *to say no more about it*, which may be done without any stain upon the honour of either party. And this is the more desirable, if the supposed attack upon the Little Belt can possibly be made, in some general settlement of disputes, to form a set-off against the affair of the Chesapeake.

Yet, may it please your Royal Highness, there is a view of this matter which it is very necessary for you to take, and which will never be taken by any of the political parasites in this country. We are accustomed to speak of this supposed attack upon the Little Belt, as if it had taken place *out at sea*, and as if there had been *no alledged provocation* ever given to the American ships of war. But, Sir, the Americans alledge, that the Little Belt was found *in their waters*; that she was one of a squadron that formed a sort of blockade of their coast; that this squadron stopped, rummaged, and insulted their merchantmen; and, that in many cases, it seized and carried away their own people out of their own ships within sight of their own shores. The way for us to judge of the feelings that such acts were calculated to inspire in the bosoms of the Americans, is, to make the case our own for a moment; to suppose an American squadron off our coast, stopping, rummaging and insulting our colliers, and, in many cases, taking away their sailors to serve them; to be exposed to the loss of life in that service; and, at the very least, to be taken from their calling and their families and friends.

Your Royal Highness would, I trust, risk even your life rather than suffer this with impunity; and you would, I am sure, look upon your people as unworthy of existence, if they were not ready to bleed

in such a cause. Your Royal Highness sees, I am fully persuaded, but one side of the question, with regard to America. The venal prints present you with publications made by the enemies of the men at present in power in America; that is to say, by the *opposition* of that country. But, the fact is, that *all parties agree* in their complaints against our seizure of their seamen, with instances of which their public prints abound. This is a thing so completely without a parallel, that one can hardly bring oneself to look upon it as a reality. For an American vessel to meet a packet between Cork and Bristol and take out some of her sailors and carry them away to the East or West Indies to die or be killed, is something so monstrous that one cannot bring oneself to feel as if it were real. Yet, this is no more than what the Americans complain of; and, if there be good ground, or only slight ground; if there be any ground at all, for such complaint, the affair between the American Frigate and the Little Belt is by no means a matter to be wondered at. I beg your Royal Highness to consider how many families in the American States have been made unhappy by the impressment of American seamen; how many parents have been thus deprived of their sons, wives of their husbands, and children of their fathers; and, when you have so considered, you will not, I am sure, be surprised at the exultation that appears to have been felt in America at the result of the affair with the Little Belt.

As a specimen of the complaints of individuals upon this score, I here insert a letter from an unfortunate impressed American, which letter I take from the New York Public Advertiser of the 31st of July, —“*Port Royal, Jamaica, 30 June, 1811.*
 “—Mr. Snowden, I hope you will be so good as to publish these few lines.—I, Edwin Bouldin, was impressed out of the barque Columbus, of Elizabeth City, Captain Trafstor, and carried on board his Britannic majesty's brig Rhodian, in Montego Bay, commanded by capt. Mobary—He told me my protection was of no consequence, he would have me whether or not. I was born in Baltimore and served my time with Messrs. Smith and Buchanan. I hope my friends will do something for me to get my clearance, for I do not like to serve any other country but my own, which I am willing to serve. I am now captain

"of the fore-castle and stationed captain of a gun in the waist.—I am treated very ill because I will not enter.—They request of me to go on board my country's ships to list men, which I refused to do, and was threatened to be punished for it.—I remain a true citizen of the United States of America, EDWIN BOULDIN."—This, may it please your Royal Highness, is merely a specimen. The public prints in America abound with documents of a similar description; and thus the resentment of the whole nation is kept alive, and wound up to a pitch hardly to be described.

Astonishment is expressed, by some persons, in this country, that the Americans appear to like the Emperor Napoleon better than our government; but, if it be considered, that the Emperor Napoleon does not give rise to complaints such as those just quoted, this astonishment will cease. Men dislike those who do them injury, and they dislike those most who do them most injury. In settling the point, which is most the friend of *real freedom*, Napoleon or our Government, there might, however, be some difference of opinion in America, where the people are free to speak and write as well as to think, and where there are no persons whose trade it is to publish falsehoods. But, whatever error any persons might be led into upon this subject, the consequence to us would be trifling, were it not for the real solid grounds of complaint that are incessantly staring the American people in the face. There may be a very harsh despotism in France for any thing that they know to the contrary; though they are not a people to be carried away by mere names. They are a people likely to sit down coolly and compare the present state of France with its state under the Bourbons; likely to compare the present situation of the great mass of the people with their former situation; and extremely likely not to think any the worse of Napoleon for his having sprung from parents as humble as those of their Jefferson or Madison. But, if they should make up their minds to a settled conviction of there being a military despotism in France, they will, though they regret its existence, dislike it less than they will any other system, from which they receive more annoyance; and in this they do no more than follow the dictates of human nature, which, in spite of all the wishes of man, will still continue the same.

The disposition of the American people towards England and towards France is a matter of the greatest importance, and should, therefore, be rightly understood by your Royal Highness, who has it in your power to restore between America and England that harmony, which has so long been disturbed, and which is so necessary to save the remains of freedom in the world. I here present to you, Sir, some remarks of a recent date (25 July,) published in an American print, called the "*BALTIMORE AMERICA*." You will see, Sir, that the writer deprecates a war with England; he does not deceive himself or his readers as to its dangers; he makes a just estimate of the relative means of the two nations; and, I think your Royal Highness will allow, that he is not ignorant of the *real situation of England*. I cannot help being earnest in my wishes that your Royal Highness would be pleased to bestow some attention upon these remarks. They are, as a composition, not unworthy of the honour; but, what renders them valuable is, that they do really express the sentiments of all the moderate part of the people in America; they express the sentiments which predominate in the community, and upon which your Royal Highness may be assured the American government will act:

"God forbid that we should have war with England, or any other nation, if we can avoid it. For I am not of the temper of that furious federalist, who would have unfurled the American colours long ago against a less offender. I had rather see her starry flag floating in the serenity of a calm atmosphere than agitated and obscured in the clouds, the smoke and flashes of war. But if Britain's unchangeable jealousy of the prosperity of others, her obdurate pride and enmity to us, should proceed upon pretence of retaliating upon what she has forced, to more violent and avowed attacks, I trust that your older and younger Americans will meet her with equal spirit, and give her blow for blow. I have never expected her to abstain from injury while our merchants had a ship or our country a seaman upon the ocean, by any sense of justice—but have trusted only to the adverse circumstances of her state, to restrain her violence and continue our peace. Heaven grant that it may be preserved, and if possible without the distress of her own

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"partly innocent people. But if her
 "crimes will not allow it; if urged by
 "the malignant passions she has long in-
 "dulged, and now heightened by revenge,
 "she throws off all restraint, and loosens
 "war in all its rage upon us, then, as she
 "has shed blood like water, give her blood
 "to drink in righteous judgment.—I know
 "too well, that we must suffer with her.
 "Dreadful necessity only justifies the
 "contest. I call you not, young Ameri-
 "cans, to false glory, to spoil and triumph.
 "You must lay down your lives, endure
 "defeat, loss and captivity, as the varying
 "fate of war ordains. But this must not
 "appal you. Prepare for it, with unsub-
 "mitting spirit, renew the combat, till
 "your great enemy, like the whale of the
 "deep, weakened with many wounds,
 "yields himself up a prey to smaller foes
 "on his own element. This, by the order
 "of Providence, has been the case before.
 "When they possessed the sea in full se-
 "curity, our sailors issued out in a few
 "small barks, mounted with the pieces
 "dug from the rubbish of years, and
 "scanty stores of ammunition, seized their
 "trade, and baffled their power. From
 "such beginnings grew a numerous ship-
 "ping, that fearlessly braved them on
 "their own coasts, and on every sea;
 "that brought plenty into the land, and
 "at once armed and enriched it. What
 "shall prevent this again? Have our ene-
 "mies grown stronger, or we become
 "weaker? Or has Heaven dropped its
 "sceptre, and rules no more by justice
 "and mercy? We are now three times as
 "many as in 1775, when we engaged
 "them before. Our territory is greatly
 "enlarged, and teems with new and useful
 "products. Cotton, formerly known only
 "to the domestic uses of a part of the
 "people in two or three States, is now in
 "sufficiency to supply clothing to all
 "America, and from its lightness can be
 "easily conveyed by land to every quarter.
 "Wool, flax and hemp are furnished in
 "increasing quantities every day.—Ma-
 "chines for every work, manufactories for
 "every useful article, are invented and es-
 "tablishing continually. Large supplies
 "of salt, sugar and spirits are provided for
 "in the western countries, and can never
 "be wanting on the sea coast. Lead,
 "iron, powder and arms we have in abun-
 "dant—parks of artillery for the field
 "and fortifications—magazines and arse-
 "nals ready formed and increasing—a
 "sufficient force of disciplined troops and

"instructed officers to become the basis of
 "larger armies—a number of ships of war,
 "with men and officers trained and pre-
 "pared for naval enterprise—a people
 "ready in the spirit of independence, to
 "rush against the enemy that wrongs and
 "challenges them—a government formed,
 "established, operating all round, with
 "every material for intelligence, direc-
 "tion and power—revenues, credit, confi-
 "dence—good will at home and abroad—
 "justice and necessity obliging, and
 "Heaven, I hope, approving.—It is a
 "common opinion that our enemies are
 "stronger; but this appears an illusion,
 "from the fleets of other nations having
 "been vanquished one by one, and left
 "the ocean. Her strength has not in-
 "creased in proportion. She indeed pos-
 "sesses a thousand ships of war, but no
 "increase of people. Her commerce is
 "distressed, her manufactures pining, her
 "finances sinking under irrecoverable
 "debts; her gold and silver gone, her
 "paper depreciating; her credit failing—
 "depending upon other countries for
 "food, for materials of manufacture, for
 "supplies for her navy; her wants in-
 "creasing; her means lessening. Every
 "island and port she takes demands more
 "from her, divides her force, increases
 "her expence, adds to her cares, and mul-
 "tiplies her dangers. Her government is
 "embarrassed, her people distracted, her
 "seamen unhappy and ready to leave her
 "every moment. The American com-
 "merce has been a staff of support, but
 "will now become a sword to wound
 "her.—Instead of supplying, we shall
 "take her colonies. Her West India pos-
 "sessions will be able to contribute no-
 "thing; their labour's turned to raise
 "bread. Their trade stopped as it passes
 "our coast; obliged to make a further
 "division of her forces, her European ene-
 "mies will seize the opportunity to break
 "upon her there. Ireland is in a ferment
 "and must be watched. The East Indies
 "bode a hurricane. She is exposed to in-
 "jury in a thousand places, and has no
 "strength equal to the extension. She
 "may inflict some wounds on us, but they
 "cannot go deep; while every blow she
 "receives in such a crisis may go to her
 "vitals. She will encounter us in despair;
 "we shall meet her with hope and
 "alacrity.—The first occasion that has
 "presented, proved this fact; though the
 "sottishness of her Federal Republican
 "attempted to prevent the volunteer of

"fering of our seamen to Decatur, as a
 "proof of our inability to procure men.—
 "Had we impressed, as England does all
 "her crews, what would it have proved
 "by the same logic?

"AN OLD AMERICAN."

Such, Sir, are the sentiments of the people of America. Great pains are taken by our venal writers to cause it to be believed, that the people are *divided*, and that Mr. Madison is in great disrepute. This, as I had the honour to observe to you before, is no more than a continuation of the series of deceptions practised upon this nation for the last twenty years with such complete and such fatal success. If, indeed, the Americans were to say as much of Ireland, there might be some justification for the assertion; but, there is no fact to justify the assertion as applied to America, in the whole extent of which we hear not of a single instance of any person acting in defiance of the law: no proclamations to prevent the people from meeting; no calling out of troops to disperse the people; no barracks built in any part of the country; no force to protect the government but simply that of the law, and none to defend the country but a population of proprietors voluntarily bearing arms. There can be no division in America for any length of time; for, the moment there is a serious division, *the government must give way*: those who rule, rule solely by the will of the people: they have no power which they do not derive immediately from that source; and, therefore, when the government of that country declares against us, the people declare against us in the same voice.

The infinite pains which have been taken, in this country, to create a belief, that the American President has been rendered unpopular by the publications of Mr. Smith, whom he had displaced, can hardly have failed to produce some effect upon the mind of your Royal Highness, especially as it is to be presumed, that the same movers have been at work in all the ways at their command. I subjoin, for the perusal of your Royal Highness, an address to this Mr. Smith; and, from it, you will perceive, that, by some of his countrymen at least, he is held in that contempt, which his meanness and his impotent malice so richly merit. And, Sir, I am persuaded, that his perfidy will meet with commendation in no country

upon earth but this, and in this only amongst those, who have always been ready to receive with open arms, any one guilty of treason against his country, be his character or conduct, in other respects, what it might. This person appears to have received no injury but what arose from the loss of a place which he was found unfit to fill, and from which he seems to have been removed in the gentlest possible manner. Yet, in revenge for this, he assaults the character of the President, he discloses every thing upon which he can force a misconstruction; and, after all, after having said all he is able to say of the conduct of the President, whose confidence he seems to have possessed for nearly eight years, he brings forth nothing worthy of blame, except it be the indiscretion in reposing that very confidence. The publication of Mr. Smith is calculated to raise Mr. Madison and the American government in the eyes of the world; for, how pure, how free from all fault must the government be, if a Secretary of State, who thus throws open an eight years' history of the cabinet, can tell nothing more than this man, animated by malice exceeding that of a cast-off coquet, has been able to tell!

The praises, which have, in our public prints, been bestowed upon the attempted mischief of this Mr. Smith, are by no means calculated to promote harmony with America, where both the government and the people will judge of our wishes by these praises. This man is notoriously the enemy of the American government, and, *therefore*, he is praised here. This is not the way to prove to the American government, that we are its *friends*, and that it does wrong to prefer Napoleon to us. That we ought to prefer the safety and honour of England to all other things is certain; and, if the American government aimed any blow at these, it would become our duty to destroy that government if we could. But, Sir, I suspect, that there are some persons in this country, who hate the American government because it suffers America to be the habitation of freedom. For this cause, I am satisfied, they would gladly, if they could, annihilate both government and people; and, in my mind there is not the smallest doubt, that they hate Napoleon beyond all description less than they hate Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Madison. This description of persons are hostile to the existence of

liberty any where, and that, too, for reasons which every one clearly understands. While any part of the earth remains untrodden by slaves, they are not at heart's ease. They hate the Emperor Napoleon because they *fear* him; but, they hate him still more because they see in his conquests a tendency to a reforming result. They are the mortal enemies of freedom, in whatever part of the globe she may unfurl her banners. No matter what the people are who shout for freedom; no matter of what nation or climate; no matter what language they speak; and, on the other hand, the enemy of freedom is invariably, by these persons, hailed as a friend. Such persons are naturally averse from any measures that tend to restore harmony between this country and America, which they look upon as a rebel against their principles. What such persons would wish, is, that America should exclude not only from her ships, but also from her soil, all British subjects without distinction. This would exactly suit their tyrannical wishes. This would answer one of their great purposes. But, this they never will see. No government in America would dare to attempt it. The very proposition would, as it ought to do, bring universal execration down upon the head of the proposer.

The charge against the Americans of entertaining a *partiality* for the Emperor of France is one well worthy of attention; because, if it were true, it would naturally have much weight with your Royal Highness. But, from the Address to Mr. Smith, which I subjoin, you will perceive, that the same men in America, who complain the most loudly of Great Britain, condemn, in unqualified terms, the system of government existing in France. And, which is of much more interest, Mr. JEFFERSON himself (supposed to be the great founder and encourager of the partiality for France) expresses the same sentiments, as appears from a letter of his, which I also subjoin.

With these papers before you, Sir, it will, I think, be impossible for you to form a wrong judgment as to the real sentiments of the American government and people; and, I am persuaded that you will perceive, that every measure, tending to widen the breach between the two countries, can answer no purpose but that of favoring the views of France. Even the

Order in Council, issued on the 7th instant, will, I fear, have this tendency, while it cannot possibly do ourselves any good. The impossibility of supplying the West India Islands with lumber and provisions from our own North American Provinces is notorious. The Order, therefore, will merely impose a tax upon the consumer, without shifting, in any degree worth notice, the source of the supply. And, indeed, the measure will serve to shew *what we would do if we could*.

There is one point, relative to the intercourse between America and England, of which I am the more desirous to speak, because I have heretofore myself entertained and promulgated erroneous notions respecting it: I allude, to the necessity of the former being supplied with woollens by the latter. Whence this error arose, how it has been removed from my mind, and what is the real state of the fact, your Royal Highness will gather from the Preface (hereunto subjoined) to an American work on Sheep and Wool, which I, some time ago, republished, as the most likely means of effectually eradicating an error which I had contributed to render popular, and the duration of which might have been injurious to the country. This work, if I could hope that your Royal Highness would condescend to peruse it, would leave no doubt in your mind, that America no longer stands in absolute need of English wool or woollens; that, if another pound of wool, in any form, were never to be imported by her, it would be greatly to her advantage; and, in short, that it comports with the plans of her most enlightened statesmen not less than with her interests and the interests of humanity, that she should no longer be an importer of this formerly necessary of life. This, Sir, is not one of the most trifling of the many recent revolutions in the affairs of the world; and, it is one, which, though wholly overlooked by such statesmen as Lord Sheffield, is well worthy of the serious consideration of your Royal Highness.

There is no way, in which America is now dependent upon us, or upon any other country. She has every thing within herself that she need to have. Her soil produces all sorts of corn in abundance, and, of some sorts, two crops in the year upon the same ground. Wool and flax she produces with as much facility as we

do. She supplies us with cotton. She has wine of her own production; and, it will not be long, before she will have the oil of the olive. To attempt to bind such a country in the degrading bonds of the custom-house is folly, and almost an outrage upon nature. In looking round the world; in viewing its slavish state; in looking at the miserable victims of European oppression, who does not exclaim: "Thank God, she cannot so be bound!" A policy, on our part, that would have prolonged her dependence would have been, doubtless, more agreeable to her people, who, like all other people, love their ease, and prefer the comfort of the present day to the happiness of posterity. We might easily have caused America to be more commercial; but, of this our policy was afraid; and our jealousy has rendered her an infinite service. By those measures of ours, which produced the former non-importation act, we taught her to have recourse to her own soil and her own hands for the supplying of her own wants; and then, as now, we favoured the policy of Mr. Jefferson, whose views have been adopted and adhered to by his successor in the Presidential chair.

The relative situation of the two countries is now wholly changed. America no longer stands in absolute need of our manufactures. We are become a debtor rather than a creditor with her; and, if the present non-importation act continue in force another year, the ties of commerce will be so completely cut asunder as never more to have much effect. In any case they never can be any thing resembling what they formerly were; and, if we are wise, our views and measures will change with the change in the state of things. We shall endeavour, by all honourable means, to keep well with America, and to attach her to us by new ties, the ties of common interest and unclashing pursuits. We shall anticipate those events which nature points out: the absolute independence of Mexico, and, perhaps, of most of the West India Islands. We shall there invite her population to hoist the banners of freedom; and, by that means, form a counterpoise to the power of the Emperor of France. This, at which I take but a mere glance, would be a work worthy of your Royal Highness, and would render your name great while you live, and dear to after ages. The times demand a great and far-seeing policy. This little Island,

cut off, as she will be, from all the world, cannot, I am persuaded, retain her independence, unless she now exert her energies in something other than expeditions to the continent of Europe, where every creature seems to be arrayed in hostility against her. The mere *colonial* system is no longer suited to her state nor to the state of Europe. A system that would combine the powers of England with those of America, and that would thus set liberty to wage war with despotism, dropping the Custom House and all its pitiful regulations as out of date, would give new life to an enslaved world, and would ensure the independence of England for a time beyond calculation. But, Sir, even to deliberate upon a system of policy like this, requires no common portion of energy. There are such stubborn prejudices and more stubborn private interests to encounter and overcome, that I should despair of success without a previous and radical change of system at home; but, satisfied I am, that, to produce that change, which would infallibly be the ground work of all the rest, there needs nothing but the determination, firmly adhered to, of your Royal Highness.

To tell your Royal Highness what I expect to see take place would be useless: whether we are to hail a *change of system*, or are to lose all hope of it, cannot be long in ascertaining. If the former, a short delay will be amply compensated by the event; and, if the latter, the fact will always be ascertained too soon.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Thursday, 12th September, 1811.*

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALAVERA'S WARS.—The wars of Talavera, seem to travel at a slower and still slower pace towards that deliverance of Europe, which Mr. PERCEVAL seemed, in May last, so confidently to anticipate. An effort has been made by the hireling writers to keep up the delusion of their dupes, by telling them, that the Viscount was *going soon to do something*; that he had a vast plan in his eye; that, it was suspected, that he was going to take Rodrigo by a siege, and Salamanca by a coup-de-main! Now, however, these stories have died away, and the Viscount, who regularly filled a column or two of every bir

ling print, seems fast sinking out of sight. The *Comet* has completely eclipsed him: the Lottery people have dropped the latter and taken up the former as a catch-word to their puffs.—But, though the noble Viscount and his forces make less noise in the hired news-papers than formerly, they are, we may be assured, not less efficient upon the *pay list*: it does not require less expence, less taxation upon us, to keep them on foot, than it did many months ago. The people of England sweat for the war in the Peninsula, whatever may be the pace at which that war advances.—The French are said to be sending forward reinforcements. To any extent I do not believe this to be true; and the reason why I do not believe it is, that recent events have shown that they have quite enough force already to keep the Lord Marshal Conde de Vimiera from *advancing*, and even to push him back when necessary, and that it is manifestly the most foolish thing that Napoleon can do to put an end to the wars of Talavera, which cost us so many thousands of men and so many millions of money every year; and which, though we have had many drains in our time, is the greatest that the country ever experienced. It must be the object of Napoleon to exhaust England; to impoverish her; to cause as many of her able men as possible to be killed; to cause the people to be weighed down by tax upon tax; to cause the paper-money to increase faster than in its natural progress; and, to secure all this, what can equal the war in the Peninsula?—We have never seen Napoleon indulge his passions at the expence of his interests. We have often seen him patiently suffering what our empty politicians, our miserable, petty, petulant crew of politicians called *dégrace*, in order to be able to strike, at last, the heavy, the sure, the home, the mortal blow. This we have seen in many instances; and, therefore, I see no reason why we should not conclude, that the prolonging of the war in the Peninsula, which is so clearly pointed out by his interest, does not make a part of his settled plan. For my own part, at any rate, I must do in this as in all similar cases; namely, judge of another's wishes by what would be my own; and, if I were in the place of Napoleon, especially if my ultimate object were to invade and subdue England or Ireland, I should deem it a great misfortune to see an end put to Ta-

lavera's war. I should say to myself: "there is a country that I want to invade" and subdue, but it is strong and rich: I must first exhaust it: I must drain away its men and money: yet, how am I to do this, for I cannot get at any of its territories, and cannot meet its fleets upon the sea? If I could get my mighty armies to bear upon this country, I could soon overwhelm it." How should I bless my stars, if, in the midst of this difficulty, I was told of a scheme for drawing the men out of this country that I could not get at, to fight my armies in a third country, to which I had access by land! And, should I not be a most stupid politician, if I did not take care to feed and nurse such a war, until my enemy should be completely exhausted; until all his ablest men had been killed, and a great part of his wealth expended in a way never to return to him again?—These are my reasons for not believing that any very great reinforcements have been sent into Spain by Napoleon. An attack will, I dare say, be made upon the Lord Marshal long before the end of the year; the French may, perhaps, force him to retreat again to the lines of Torres Vedras, after having destroyed many thousands of his men and caused a monstrous expenditure on our part. This is possible, and, if possible, it will be done; but, if they drive our army back to their old lodgings, there they will leave them for a while; nay, they will invite them out again, as Massena did before; and thus they will keep up the war, as long it suits their purpose. This they will do, if they can; and, yet, there are men, or, rather, two-legged brutes, in England, to rejoice at what they deem the *inability of the French* to drive our army out of Portugal!—More of this in my next.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate. Friday,
September 13, 1811.

AMERICA.

An Address to ROBERT SMITH, late Secretary of State to the President, on his publications against the latter.—From the New York Public Advertiser, 30th July, 1811.

TO ROBERT SMITH.

THE people of the United States, to whom you have appealed from the decision of their President, will not be un-

grateful to you for the compliment you have paid their understanding, in believing them capable of estimating the merits of the controversies, which have terminated in your resignation of the office of Secretary of State.—Until enlightened by your address, they could perceive nothing in that resignation but the change of one minister for another; a change, which even had it been made by the direct authority of the President, he would have owed no account of to any human being. Both the theory and the practice of our constitution recognize him, subject to the negative of the Senate only, as the ultimate judge of the propriety and expediency of exercising this authority. Responsible as he is for the conduct of his ministers, to public opinion, and to the law, it is immaterial whether it be defect of talent or integrity discovered in them, or a mere difference of opinion on public men and public measures; whether it be the detection of gross incapacity or dishonesty, or a variance in judgment upon a phrase in a public letter, he is not bound to assign to his constituents the reasons and motives which may induce him to displace one agent, and appoint another. Still less does he owe an account of a change effected by the voluntary resignation of an officer, over whose inclinations he can have no rightful controul. In such a case, it is for the officer himself, if he deems his personal griefs in any way connected with the public interests, to apologize in the best mode in his power, for deserting the service of his country. This task you have undertaken to perform. But instead of satisfactorily accounting for your resignation, which in my humble judgment you have failed to do, you have invoked the attention of the people to a bill of accusation against Mr. Madison, which, though professing to be “a plain unvarnished tale,” is drawn with all the craftiness and subtlety of a special pleader, and whatever credit it may reflect upon your head, dishonours your heart. The magnanimity of the people of this country has already pronounced judgment upon the rancorous malice which stains every page of your address, and which dwells with greedy delight upon the little imperfections of human nature developed in the unsuspecting moments of confidential intercourse, and published to the world as important items of presidential delinquency.—Another of the features which mark your elaborate

performance is the extreme anxiety you have manifested to attract the favor of those who have charged the administration with being under the controul or influence of France. To the distempered jealousy of these men you have furnished the aliment upon which it lives. You have fanned anew the dying flames of their political zeal, and furnished them with weapons, compared with which those wielded by Randolph and Pickering, are puny indeed. You have stooped to the degradation of propitiating the resentment of these men by attempting to offer them in sacrifice the immaculate reputation of Mr. Madison. But the victim is not yet bound—the sacrifice is not yet completed, and public indignation steps in between you and your intended victim. Nor will you succeed in conciliating the favour of those who have repeatedly branded you with the foul imputation of being sold to France, by attempting to prove that Mr. Madison is more of a Frenchman than yourself. Notwithstanding the ardent zeal with which you have laboured to undermine his well earned reputation, your own conscience must tell you that suberviency and submission to France are not the most flagrant errors of our policy.—The time was when you yourself could avow, that in aiming to wipe away this imputation, our government had inclined more to the views and interests of Britain, than to those of France; and that in the comparative account current of injuries and insults, those inflicted by the former, greatly exceeded in amount, those received from the latter. No true American will pretend to justify or palliate the misconduct of France. Her policy towards this country has been not only extremely flagitious and unjust, but to the last degree foolish and absurd.—But our propensity has been rather to amplify and exaggerate, than rigorously to scan the nature of this injustice and this impolicy. All our ancient colonial ideas have been revived; and the anti-gallican prejudices of this country have never, since our independence, been more live and watchful. This pre-disposition of the public mind has been greatly strengthened by the re-establishment of despotism in France after the bright prospect which had appeared of its final extinction. The people have not unwisely concluded that the fruits of this bitter tree cannot be good, and they put no confidence in the professions of regard for the liberty of the seas coming

from the man who has destroyed all the institutions of civil freedom within his reach. But do not suffer yourself to suppose, sir, that though you have artfully availed yourself of this state of public opinion, and though the offering you have made to the malignant genius of federalism is more acceptable than the gift of your predecessors in the path of apostacy, that therefore your treachery will be more successful than theirs. You were not born either to create or destroy governments. If you have stepped from your limited sphere of usefulness for the latter purpose, fatal experience will soon convince you that you have passed the bounds of your genius, and that you will never be able to rise to fame and power upon the ruins of that imperishable monument of worth and honour, erected with the labours of forty years exclusively devoted to the public service, decorated with all those accomplishments which dignify human nature, and unblemished by the stain of vice or the commotions of passion.—You state in the introduction to your letter that the proffered mission to Russia affords “demonstrative proof of Mr. Madison’s confidence in you as to fidelity and as to ‘capacity in public affairs.’” Whence then your griefs, and what the necessity of publicly disclosing collisions of opinion between yourselves and the President; and those also touching our pending differences with foreign powers? If the offer of the mission manifested the President’s opinion both of your integrity and talents in public business, whence the necessity of “obviating the honest misapprehensions ‘of some, and the wanton misrepresentations of others,’ since Mr. Madison was to be ranked in neither of these classes? Did not the different important offices you had sustained under the government sufficiently imply the confidence which you had inspired? What man, what print had calumniated your character? The enemies of the administration alone honoured you with their reproaches, as they now dishonour you with their applause.—Mr. Madison had published no book to ruin your reputation—he had revealed to the world no confidential conversations of yours—he had said nothing of your foibles, of your ‘embarrassments and awkwardness’—your ‘confusion’—your ‘perturbation’—your ‘disquietude’—your ‘peevishness’—and of his own compo-
sure, and your want of it. Provocation there was none, nor can any justification

be found, or your conduct be imputed to any other motive than the gratification of the basest passion which disgraces human nature.—You have stated that your differences of opinion with Mr. Madison respected certain public measures and public men. But you have not shewn what constitutional right you had to press upon the president your opinions upon public measures, and still less of nominations to office, in which the senate are his sole constitutional advisers. He may indeed “require the opinion in writing of the ‘heads of the executive departments upon ‘any subject relative to the duties of their ‘offices.’” But for rejecting their opinions, delivered in any other mode, he is no wise constitutionally responsible. Unless then you can shew that Mr. Madison has, to the injury of the national rights and interests, rejected your advice, in writing on subjects relating to the duties of your office, you do not furnish even *prima facie* evidence to support your charges. Instead of this, the weapons you have aimed at him recoil back upon yourself, and you stood self-convicted of having in many instances travelled out of the bounds of your department, of having trespassed on the rights of the President, attempted to usurp his authority, and rejected upon ‘suspicion’ merely an ‘honourable appointment,’ decorously proffered, as you have admitted, and which you consider as affording ‘demonstrative ‘proof of his confidence in your fidelity ‘and capacity in public affairs.’ If the President, without distrusting either your integrity or talents, but discovering that the difference of opinion which had arisen between you and himself, rendered it inconsistent with the public good that you should remain in the administration, proposed your acceptance of the mission instead of your office, at the same time intimating, with that decorum and moderation for which he is distinguished, his motives for desiring such a change. Upon what ground have you appealed to the people? They cannot partake of your ‘suspicions,’ because they do not know upon what grounds they rest; still less can they sympathize with you on account of your wounded pride, your boasted hopes, or your disappointed ambition. If because you could not overrule the measures of administration, you have quitted the service of your country, the people can feel no other interest in the affair than merely to ascertain the fitness of your suc-

cessor for the situation to which he has been called. On this head they are satisfied that your place is amply supplied. Being thus satisfied, you will not be able to shake their well-grounded confidence in their President by such tales as you have yet told, or which your inventive faculty may hereafter compose. Edifying and amusing they undoubtedly will be to that faction who delight in the disgrace of their government and country—but they will excite in the breasts of honest and impartial men no other emotions but those of contempt and indignation.

PHOCION.

Letter from Mr. JEFFERSON, late President of the American States, to the EARL OF BUCHAN, taken from the New York Public Advertiser of the 24th July, 1811.

Washington, July 10, 1803.

My Lord—I received through the hands of Mr. Lenox, on his return to the United States, the valuable volume you were so good as to send me on the life and writings of Fletcher of Salton. The political principles of that patriot were worthy of the purest periods of the British constitution. They are those which were in vigor at the epoch of the American emigration; our ancestors brought them here, and they needed little strengthening to make us what we are.—But in the weakened condition of English Whiggism, at this day, it requires more firmness to publish and advocate them than it did then to act upon them. This merit is peculiarly your lordship's, and no one honors it more than myself; freely admitting at the same time, the right of a nation to change its political principles and constitution at will; and the impropriety of any but its own citizens censuring that change. I expect your lordship has been disappointed, as I acknowledge I have been, in the issue of the convulsions on the other side of the channel, (in France.) This has certainly lessened the interest which the philanthropist warmly felt in those struggles. *Without befriending human liberty, a gigantic force has risen up which seems to threaten the world*—but it hangs on the thread of opinion, which may break from one day to another.—I feel a real anxiety on the conflict in which your nation is again engaged, and bless the Almighty Being, who in gathering together the waters under the heavens into one place, divided the dry lands of your hemisphere

from the dry land of our's, and said; "here at least be there peace." I hope that peace and amity with all nations will long be the charter of our land, and that its prosperity, under this charter, will re-act on the mind of Europe, and profit her by the example. My hope of preserving peace for our country is not founded on the Quaker principle, of non-resistance under every wrong: but in the belief that a just and friendly conduct on our part will procure justice and friendship from others, and that in the existing contest each of the combatants will find an interest in our friendship.—I cannot say we shall be unconcerned spectators of the combat. We feel for human sufferings and we wish the good of all. We shall look on therefore with the sensations which these dispositions and the events of the war will produce.—I feel a pride in the justice which your lordship's sentiments render to the character of my illustrious countryman, Washington. The moderation of his desires, and the strength of his judgment enabled him to calculate correctly, that the road to that glory which never dies, is to use power for the support of the laws and liberties of our country, not for its destruction, and his will accordingly survive the wreck of every thing now living.

THO. JEFFERSON.

To the Earl of Buchan.

ENGLAND AND AMERICA.—*Order in Council, published in the Gazette of 7 Sept. 1811, relative to the American Commerce with the West Indies.*

It contains an order grounded on an Act of the 46th of his majesty, intituled "An Act for authorising his majesty in council to allow, during the present war, and six weeks after the ratification of a definitive treaty of peace, the importation and exportation of certain goods and commodities in neutral ships, into and from his majesty's territories in the West Indies and Continent of South America." By virtue of this Act, Orders in Council have been made at different periods, permitting the importation into the territories above-mentioned of certain articles, goods, and commodities specified, for the most part the products of the United States, or of the fisheries of the same; but by this new Order, it is directed, that after the 1st of December, no importation of the under-mentioned articles shall take place into

any of our West India Islands, "in which there shall not be, at the time when such articles are brought for importation, the following duties on such articles, being of the growth or produce of the United States of America; namely,

	Sterling Money.
For every quintal of dried or salted Cod, or Ling Fish, cured or salted.....	£ 0 2 6
For every barrel of cured or pickled Shads, Alewives, Mackarel, or Salmon, a proportionate duty.	

	Current Money of Jamaica.
Wheat Flour per barrel, not weighing more than one hundred and ninety-six pounds, net weight.....	0 6 8
On Bread or Biscuit of Wheat Flour, or any other Grain, per barrel, not weighing more than one hundred pounds net weight	0 3 4
On Bread for every hundred pounds made from Wheat or any other Grain whatever, imported in bags or other packages than barrels, weighing as aforesaid	0 3 4
On Flour or Meal made from Rye, Peas, Beans, Indian Corn, or other Grain than Wheat, per barrel, not weighing more than one hundred and ninety-six pounds.....	0 3 4
On Peas, Beans, Rye, Indian Corn, Callivancies, or other Grain, per bushel.....	0 0 10
On Rice, for every one hundred pounds net weight	0 3 4
For every twelve hundred (commonly called one thousand) of Red Oak Staves	1 0 0
For every twelve hundred (commonly called one thousand) of White Oak Staves, and for every one thousand pieces of Heading	0 15 0
Horses, Neat Cattle, or other Livet Sock, for every one hundred pounds of the value thereof, at the port or place of importation	10 0 0

AN

ESSAY ON SHEEP,

Intended chiefly to promote the introduction and propagation of Merinos

in the United States of America, by proving, from actual experiments, the great advantage thereof to Agriculture and Manufactures.—By R. R. LIVINGSTON.—Printed by Order of the Legislature of the State of New York.—London, reprinted:—With a Preface and Explanatory Notes by WILLIAM CORBETT.

PREFACE.

THE following work is, in my opinion, well calculated to be useful to any proprietor of sheep, and particularly to any one who is desirous of raising a flock of Merinos. It is, besides, full of curious matter, and the reading of it produces the pleasing effect of bringing us, as it were, *into a country*, which we have only *heard of* before. But, that which most strongly recommended it to me, and which induced me to re-publish it, was, that it completely settled the very important question, namely, *whether the American States could dispense with European Wool and Woollens*; a question of very great interest to the world in general, and to England in particular.—Having never seen, in any part of America, an assemblage of sheep worthy of the name of *flock*; and, having, from habit, always looked upon *Grass Fields*, and *Downs* and *Turnip Fields* as being *indispensably* necessary to the rearing and keeping of sheep in any considerable number, I gave it as my opinion, about three years ago (when writing about the then dispute with America), that the Americans never could do without *wool* from other countries, seeing that, for the want of *winter herbage* and *turnip fields*, which they could not have for feed, in winter, on account of the deep snows, they had it not in their power to keep sheep in number sufficient to supply them with a tenth part of the wool requisite for their various uses. But, upon reading a French work by C. P. LASTEYRIE, entitled "*A History of the introduction of Spanish Sheep into the different States of Europe, &c. &c.*" I found that my notion of the absolute necessity of *grass* or *turnip fields*, in winter, was quite erroneous; and, that the very *finest flock of sheep in all Europe*, were kept *at house* during five, and sometimes six, months in the year. I found, that in Saxony, in Silesia, in Denmark, in Sweden; I found, that in all these countries, it was the *invariable* practice to keep the sheep *at house and yard*, like oxen or other cattle, all the winter;

and, I also found, that, under this treatment, the Merino race of sheep as well as others had succeeded perfectly well. I now find, too, that the very *finest* wool known to the English manufacturer comes from *Saxony*; into which country the breed of Spanish sheep has been introduced only *forty-six years* at the longest; that is to say, a little more than twice the length of time that the present war has been going on.—When I learnt, that flocks of sheep could be kept for whole winters, year after year, in houses and yards, fed upon straw, haulm, dried leaves, horse-chesnuts, hay, and potatoes; and, when I perceived, that these flocks not only *lived* but increased most wonderfully, and that they sent to England even *finer* wool than any that ever was, or that could now be, obtained from Spain; when I perceived this, I could entertain no doubt of the practicability of multiplying sheep to any extent in the American States, where animals of every kind are uncommonly prolific, and where all the above-mentioned means of wintering are found in superabundance. Before, therefore, I saw Mr. Livingston's Essay, I was fully convinced, that, if the Americans did not speedily become independant of all other countries for *wool* and *woollens*, it must be entirely their own fault.—It appears that they do not mean to incur this blame; for, the whole country seems to be animated with the desire of rearing sheep chiefly for the sake of the *wool*, as will clearly appear from the facts stated by Mr. Livingston. Indeed, the circumstance of this Essay having been *published by Order of the Legislature of New York*, and at the *public expence*, professedly, (as will be seen from the subjoined Resolutions. of the two Houses,) upon the ground of public utility; this circumstance alone is quite conclusive as to the fact, that the increase of sheep and of the manufacture of wool are become objects of great public interest in America; objects in the accomplishment of which they will have been powerfully assisted by the measures adopted against their commerce by the Governments of England and France, who, very likely, were wholly unconscious, that they were, in this case, acting under the guidance of the genius of freedom.—It is, I think manifest, from the following pages, that, in three or four years, at the most, America will be able to supply herself with wool, and also with *woollen cloth*; and that, even

now, if it should become necessary, she could do very well without importing any wool or woollens from any part of the world. This is a great event. It is a great change in the affairs of nations. The Americans, who, until now, have been obliged to look to *England* chiefly for coats, made of wool that came from *Spain*; *ten millions* of people who got the principal articles of their wearing apparel in this round-about way, will now grow those articles upon their own lands, and will keep at home, for the feeding of cloth-makers, those articles of food, which they used to raise in order to pay England and Spain for manufacturing and for wool. The intelligent reader will be at no loss to perceive how great must be the advantage of this change to the American States; a change which that country owes to the folly and tyranny of other governments.—But, this change, favourable as I hope it may prove, to the interests of mankind in general, could not have been so rapidly produced, had it not been for the actual invasion of Spain by the Emperor Napoleon, who, without intending it, perhaps, has by this invasion, scattered the inestimable flocks of Spain over the face of the earth. Not the Spanish monarchy only, but the Spanish nation, has he *broken up*, dispersing its goods and chattels to all who were in a condition to take them away. Its pictures and its plate and its jewels, all its valuable moveables are, long ago, divided amongst its invaders; its flocks have been driven out, shipped off, or devoured; its houses, after having been pillaged, have, in no small proportion, been levelled with the ground: and, the ground itself is all that seems to have any security of remaining. Yet, amidst all this ruin, amidst this general wreck of society, it is much to be questioned, whether the great mass of the people in Spain are not as well, and even better off, than they formerly were; for, what interest had *they* in the flocks which composed the riches of their country? What knew they of those flocks but in as much as they were a *scourge* to themselves? The exclusive property of the privileged order, not only was it impossible for the cultivator of the land to obtain any share in the *benefit* arising from these flocks, but he was *compelled* to assist, without payment, in their support, by throwing open his fields and his garden to be devoured by them in their periodical journeys from one part of the

country to the other!* With this fact before him, what man, who is not either a tyrant or willing slave, can regret that these flocks have been dispersed? And, I think, it must be peculiarly gratifying to the American farmer, to see raised in his own fields and fashioned under his own happy roof, that coat, by his former mode of obtaining which he used to enrich and abet the owner of those flocks whose ravages insured hunger as well as nakedness to the miserable peasant of Spain.—I am aware, that there are many persons, who will learn with sorrow, that America is becoming, if not actually become, independent of England. Such is not the feeling, with which I have learnt the fact, being of opinion, that what has generally been called *commercial greatness* may be fairly numbered amongst the most grievous of our country's calamities. And, indeed, it does appear to me to require a pretty complete perversion of intellect, to make men regard such a traffic as that which has existed between America and England, as conducive to the happiness of their people. Is there not, upon the face of it, something offensive to reason in the proposition, that the *mutual happiness* of two nations is promoted by the *clothing* of the one being made by the other in return for *food* supplied to the latter by the former; and that this interchange takes place across a sea of three thousand miles broad, while, at the same time, each nation has the means of making the whole of its own clothing and raising the whole of its own food within its own territory? What we receive from America, in payment of our *cloth*, is the produce of her lands. We sell our wool and the *labour of our manufacturers* for the produce of American lands. Now, why not employ this labour upon our *own lands*, and produce thereby (as we can as far as her commodities are *useful* to us) those articles we now receive from the American lands? And why should not she keep her food at home for the use of those persons who

* I have heard of but one species of oppression to exceed this; and that is the instance which the Rev. MR. BUCHANNAN gives us of the *poor people in the Western Islands of Scotland* being compelled to rear and feed the *children of the rich*; and also to give *part of their goods* to their landlord's bride at the time of her marriage!

might be employed in making her the articles she now gets from us? This is the true view of it. Men may load the subject as much as they please with fine sounding terms and epithets; but, at last, to this it comes, that we employ clothiers to make coats for the American farmers, and America employs farmers to raise food for our clothiers; and that this is going on, while we have land whence to raise more food than sufficient for all our people, and while America has ample means of raising wool and of making coats for all her people. If, indeed, it was impossible to make cloth in America and also impossible to raise food enough in England for our people, I should be ready to acknowledge the exchange to be advantageous, though carried on at a distance of three thousand miles, with all the expences and uncertainties of maritime commerce. But, situated as the two countries are, each possessing within itself ample means of being independent of the other, it appears to me, that the exchange operates, and can operate, solely to the advantage of monopolizing individuals and companies, who thrive not from administering to the necessities of the two countries, but from the supplying of wants created solely by folly.—There is another light, in which the change, now taking place, is of great importance. It will, for a while at least, diminish the power of *taxation*. The American farmer now pays, upon his coat, not only all the duty laid on by his own government, but all the duty laid on by foreign governments. The arm of foreign governments can never reach his coat, if raised and wove in his own country; and, as to his own government, it will be, at least some years before it will have power to tax the produce of the land or any domestic manufacture: so that, as MR. LIVINGSTON has shown, the American farmer will obtain his coat at a *third part of the expence* that it has hitherto cost him; while he will have the satisfaction to reflect, that he is no longer clad by the labour of the ragged and the naked; that he does not owe these, which are amongst the greatest of his comforts, to the ingenuity and the toils of misery; that, "For him no wretches, born to work and weep,
"Pine at the loom, or tempt the dang'rous deep."
When we reflect on the vices and misery, on the degradation of the human character, generally attendant on a seafaring life, it is impossible not to feel plea-

sure at the prospect of a diminution of maritime commerce. It may be said, that men enter *voluntarily* on board of merchant ships. So they do into the stews and the gaming-houses, and into every thing that tends to a corruption of morals and to the producing of unhappiness and dishonour. It certainly is the business of individuals to resist temptation; but, it is the business of governments, and, indeed, their duty, to lessen, as much as possible, the number and the strength of temptations to vice. The first duty of a government is to see that the people who live under it are happy; and, of course, it is its duty to prevent, or, at least, to discourage, by all the means in its power, the establishment, or growth, of those professions, or callings, which, from experience, have been found to produce vice and misery. It may so happen, that, without employing a considerable number of the citizens of a State upon the waters, the independence of the State itself would be endangered. In such a case the government has no choice; but, this is not the situation of America, who stands in need of little maritime force for her defence, and who, after a diminution of her foreign commerce, would require still less, because she would have less shipping to protect, and her sea-ports would become an object of less importance.—The large towns also, those numerous assemblages of people, which are formed by maritime commerce, constitute an evil the extent of which is hardly to be calculated. No one will deny, that vice and wretchedness choose populous cities as their favourite abode; that there no small part of the causes of all the miseries of mankind are engendered; and that, of all descriptions of population, that of a sea-port is the worst. Let any man, who has a mind formed for serious reflection, only walk through the streets and alleys in the neighbourhood of shipping. The whole of a sea-port town presents a picture sufficiently disgusting; but, as we approach the water's edge; as we draw near the bales, the casks, the boxes, the wharfs, the lighters and the ships, the aspect of every thing animate or inanimate, grows more and more loathsome, every sound grows more and more hideous; all is a scene of wrangling, rapacity, violence, insolence, deceit, bribery, perjury, filth and disease. It is impossible, therefore, for a man of a right mind, not to see with pleasure, any change in the affairs of the world, the natural tendency of which

change is to render so large and increasing a country as America independent of others, and, of course, to prevent the corruption of her people by collecting them together in sea-port towns: and, as to us, I am thoroughly convinced, that, the same cause will operate equally to our advantage; and that, *in the end*, all that France is now doing, as to *commerce*, will be found to have contributed to the permanent safety and happiness of England.—Be it, however, matter of joy or of regret, the *fact* is, that the *dependence* of America upon Europe, is now at an end; and, indeed, political circumstances seem to threaten an end even to the *intercourse*. This I should regret; because, an intercourse between nations is the source of an increase of knowledge, which has always been as favourable to the freedom and happiness of mankind, as a great, monopolizing, combining, speculating, taxing, loan-jobbing *commerce* has been hostile to every thing that is patriotic, liberal, and just. This sort of commerce, so different from that which opened and kept up the enlightening intercourse between nations, is always, and always will be, the fast ally of despotism, wherever to be found, in whatever shape, under whatever sham names or outward appearances the accursed thing may exist. This sort of commerce is not only a fast ally of despotism, but, is, perhaps, its most powerful ally; and, I cannot disguise, that it gives me very great pleasure to see, and to have the proof before me, that, at any rate, this all-corrupting commerce, which was fast growing up in America, has now received a deadly blow; and, of that blow, it appears that no small part of the merit is due to the Author of this work.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,
Wednesday, 3rd April, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE.—*Address to the Emperor from La Lippe and from the Ionian Isles, together with his Imperial Majesty's Answers—Paris, 19th Aug. 1811.*

(Concluded from page 320.)

..... Penetrated with respect for the eminent virtues of your Majesty, and full of confidence in that powerful genius which regulates the destinies of Europe, and secures the happiness of all his subjects, we present as pledges of our fidelity and entire devotedness, the benefits which our department is

about to enjoy from the union of its inhabitants with the great family of which your Majesty is the father. Already the genius of your Majesty has divined our wants; an uniform and enlightened legislation will secure the rights of property; speedy justice, founded upon one system, will watch over its maintenance. The creditors and pensioners of the State, whom the misfortunes of war had condemned to long and painful privations, will owe their happiness to their new quality of French subjects. Already the roads which are opening, the canals which are digging, restore comfort and industry in countries little favoured by the nature of their soil; and your new subjects have formed the hope of rivalling your old ones in prosperity, as they this day engage to equal them in devotedness to the august person of your Majesty.

The address closes with felicitations on the birth of the King of Rome.

Reply of His Majesty.

Gentlemen, Deputies of the Department of La Lippe,—The city of Munster belonged to an ecclesiastical Sovereign. Deploable effect of ignorance and of superstition! Providence, which has willed that I should re-establish the throne of Charlemagne, has caused you, with Holland and the Hanseatic towns, to return to the bosom of the empire. The moment you became French, my heart made no distinction between you and the other parts of my states. As soon as circumstances shall permit, I will feel a lively satisfaction in being in the midst of you.

M. Theotoki, President of the Ionian Deputation, presented the following address.

Sire; Interpreters of the wishes of your people of Ionia, we come to place at the foot of your Majesty's august throne, their renewed expressions of fidelity and lively joy for the fortunate event which has given an heir to your great empire, an infant to your paternal heart, and to us the assured hope of an hero, who, to be the worthy Sovereign of forty millions of men, has only to place before himself your immortal model.—From the sovereign height of glory to which your triumphs, and magnanimous talents have raised you, deign, Sire, to turn your regards towards the inhabitants of the Ionian Isles, of which a part, though usurped for

a moment, but always faithful to your Majesty, could only have been calumniated by the machiavelism of an enemy envious of their felicity.—If it is true, Sire, that in those of our isles occupied at this moment by the enemy, there are to be found some senseless beings who have the audacity to prefer to the glorious title of your subjects, the ever hateful name of enemies of their country and of its most sacred rights, let them experience the fate which their crimes and the indignant voice of their fellow-citizens invoke upon their heads.—But let not Greek honour be sullied by the crimes of some infatuated individuals; the Greeks are still the same men, whose former ages of glory can only be effaced in the records of immortality by the age of your Majesty.—The benefits, Sire, you have conferred upon us,—the treasures of industry which your imperial munificence has poured out,—your cares, by which Corfu, the central security of the Ionian isles, is daily surrounded by new resources traced out by your genius,—and the choice of a man to govern us who does honour at once to humanity and war,—all these are powerful motives which attach our hearts to your sacred person, from whom alone we can expect our regeneration.—Should the enemy dare to present himself under our walls, we will seize with zeal that opportunity of proving to your Majesty, and to the universe, the value which we attach to the ever glorious title of subjects of Napoleon the Great.

Reply of His Majesty.

Gentlemen, deputies of the Ionian Isles; I have caused great works to be carried on in your country. I have there collected a great number of troops, and stores of every kind. I do not regret the expence which Corfu costs my treasury—it is the key of the Adriatic. I will never abandon the Isles which the enemy's naval superiority has caused to fall into his hands. In India, in America, and in the Mediterranean, all that is and has been French, shall always be so. Conquered by the enemy through the vicissitudes of war, they shall be restored to the empire by other events of war, or by the stipulations of peace. I should consider it as an indelible blot on the glory of my reign, ever to sanction the abandonment of a single Frenchman.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XX. No. 12.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1811. [Price 1s.

"The universal Spanish Nation."—MR. CANNING. Declaration against France.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPAIN.—ENGLISH MINISTER'S COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PRESS THERE.—The phrase, which I have taken for my motto, will remind the reader of what took place in the Spring and Summer of 1808, and, if he has forgotten it, he need only refer to the Register, Vols. XIII and XIV, where he will find, under the head of "SPANISH REVOLUTION," the history of the origin and grounds of the war, which, from that time to this, England has been carrying on in Spain.—It will there be seen, that the invasion of Spain by the French was viewed in different lights by different persons in England; that while some of us, amongst whom I was one, regarded it as a fine opportunity for the people of Spain to recover their freedom and form a new government; others saw in it nothing more than an opportunity of opposing a new resistance to Buonaparté, caring much less for the liberties of the people of Spain, than for that security which they thought the event likely to bring to themselves. We contended that if England took any part in the contest she ought by no means to concern herself in the internal affairs of the country, and, above all things, that she ought to avoid, as she would avoid the poisoned chalice, making herself the supporter or partizan of any part of the old reigning family: we contended, in short, that the thing to be desired was a real, radical revolution in Spain, without which there was not the smallest chance of eventually succeeding in a resistance of France. Our opponents contended, that England ought to take a decided part for Ferdinand the 7th, though it was notorious, that his father was still alive, that his father denied the right of the Son to the Crown, and though it was equally notorious, that both of them had abandoned the people of Spain, that both of them, and the junior members of the family, had made a formal abdication of the Crown in favour of the Emperor Napoleon. Our opponents contended too, that the only way to secure success to the resistance against France, was for us to set our faces against every

thing of a revolutionary tendency; and, in short, that the Spaniard who should think of a revolution, or of any new species of government to the prejudice of Ferdinand; ought to be considered as not less a traitor than if he were actually fighting under the banners of France.—There appeared to me to be something so foolish, so wild, so perfectly mad, in this last set of notions, that it was impossible for me to impute them to mere want of understanding. I could not help thinking, and I said at the time what I thought, that those who held this language were much more afraid of the example of Spanish liberty regained, than they were of the establishment and extension of French despotism; and I must say that he who has not arrived, by this time, at a conviction of the truth of this opinion, must have a mind incapable of profiting from observation, or must have been a very inattentive observer of what has been passing during the last three years.—To our opponents, therefore, the present state of things in Spain gives much less pain than might be imagined. The French are sweeping over the country, and there appears little ground to expect that they will not become its conquerors; but, at any rate, there has no revolution taken place in Spain; the people of Spain are not republicans; the people of Spain have not regained their liberties.—But, how is all this to end? How is it to end with regard to England, who has already expended so many millions of money in the cause of Ferdinand the seventh? This question cannot be answered with certainty yet;—but a pretty good guess at it may be formed from the facts, which have recently come to light, and which it was impossible any longer to disguise, with all the means which a hired press holds forth for that purpose.—We have observed, for some time past, that Cadiz was far from being a scene of harmony; we saw gen. Graham, whom the parliament and the city had thanked, quit the theatre of his glories, and join the army in Portugal. Mr. Sheridan's speech blubbing with joy, and the Scotch poems, seem not to have ac-

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corded with the sentiments of the Spaniards at Cadiz. The Spanish General Lacy, who had answered the publication of General Graham, we have seen selected for choice service by the Spanish government. There was, however, in the publication of General Graham itself, quite sufficient to convince any reasonable man, any man not completely hood-winked by our hired news-papers, that harmony between our people and the Spaniards was at an end. If any doubt of this fact could remain till now, it surely can remain no longer, after the reading of the documents, which are subjoined to this article, and upon which I shall now proceed to offer the reader a few observations.—The Note of our Minister, Mr. Wellesley, contains a formal complaint to the Regency of Spain against the freedom of the *Press* and even against the freedom of *speech* at Cadiz. He says, that he has hitherto forbore to complain of the *rumours* and *writings* which have for some time been circulated in Cadiz, in the belief that his *forbearance* and *moderation* might *disarm* the parties; but that the papers that have been published, as well as the reports that have been circulated have, *at length*, become so injurious to the British *good name* and *character*, that he can no longer look with indifference on the *unjust* and *unfounded* calumnies, which are daily circulated against his country.

—Gentle reader, it is the writing of a minister plenipotentiary, of a representative of your king, that you have just been reading; and, therefore, you are to suppose, that in such a case good name and character mean different things; for as to tautology, you are not to suppose such a person capable of using such a figure. You must bring to your aid some such principle of judging, also, with regard to the unjust and unfounded calumnies of which this gentleman is pleased to talk; for, when, amongst common mortals, did you ever hear of *just* calumnies, of *well-founded* calumnies. Calumny means, *false charge*, *groundless accusation*, and, of course, to talk of *unjust* and *unfounded* calumnies, was the same as to tell the Spanish Secretary of State, that his countrymen had uttered *unjust*, *false* charges, and *unfounded* *groundless* accusations against our country. But, reader, these are liberties which I have observed frequently taken with our poor mother tongue, by the bright geniuses, who have worn black trenchers upon their heads, and long sweeping gowns upon their bodies, while they were drink-

ing at the rich fountain of the learned languages, at Oxford and Cambridge, supported there too, by the rents of very good farms and houses, commonly called college property.—Well, but let us not forget the subject before us. The complaint of this our minister is pretty intelligible, I must confess. It leaves no room for doubt. It tells the world, that, at Cadiz, the language both through the press and through conversation, is too free for the English minister to tolerate, or, at least, that it is such that he can no longer hear it without complaint, and that it is levelled against the British good name; It tells the world, in short, that this country is calumniated at Cadiz to such a point, that our minister can no longer refrain from making an official complaint of it to the Government of Spain.—But, *what* are these calumnies? our King is calumniated, we are told, and so is his government, but *what* are these calumnies? Mr. Wellesley says, that in order to “give a specimen of the “terms in which these *assertions*” (meaning, I suppose the *calumnies*) “are conveyed, he sends the Secretary of State a “paper to read.” I wish Mr. Wellesley had sent the paper to *us*. And *why* do we not see it? What is the reason for keeping it from us? Ours is certainly the basest press that ever existed in this world; for it is not to be believed that those to whom these state papers were communicated, had not the means of coming at the paper in question. Aye, and they have it, too, but it does not suit their purposes to publish it. They take good care to publish every thing flattering to our government, that issues from the press at Cadiz; and their not having published this also, is a pretty clear proof, that they found it not so very easy to refute.—Mr. Wellesley, however, gives, in his Note to the Spanish Secretary of State, something in the way of description of this offensive publication. He says that it imputes to our king, to our government, and to the British Nation, intentions destitute of honour, of justice, and of good faith, and entirely subversive of all the principles with which Great Britain has come forward to aid the cause of the Spanish Nation; that it asserts that the Spanish provinces bordering on Portugal, were placed under the command of Lord Wellington; that the Spanish army was to be placed under English officers; that it was to be formed into an army, British, in fact; and that it was the design of the British Government to send to Cadiz a

reinforcement of troops, sufficient to take possession of the city and Island, and retain it, in the name and possession of his Britannic Majesty. — The word it in place of the word them, we owe, I suppose, to some principle of the “learned languages.” But, to the matter, leaving the sound, and leaving too the delicious grammar of the original description, to those of a taste sufficiently refined to relish them. To the *matter*, I say, and here are, it must be confessed, some pretty thumping charges. They are, by no means, of an equivocal nature. Whether they be true or false, is what I shall not pretend to determine. I leave that task to the advocates of the war for Ferdinand; but this I say, that in this state paper, Mr. Wellesley has not proved them to be false. He says, that, considering all that Great Britain has done for Spain, he “ought to be far from being under the necessity to *refute* charges such as those contained in “this paper.” Now, who would not imagine from this exordium, that he was about to enter upon a regular refutation of these charges? The exordium does not stop here, however, but proceeds, to say, in substance, that nothing short of the critical circumstances of the moment could make him consent to “suffer the humiliation of *vindicating* the honour of his country,” against the calumnies contained in the paper in question. — Now, then, surely the *refutation* is coming! Surely, we are now going to hear our honour *vindicated*, by this our minister, in Spain. Let us hear him, then, he says, that notwithstanding the *humiliation* that he feels in condescending to enter the lists with the author of the offensive publication, his desire to preserve undiminished the sentiment of respect and esteem with which the two nations are mutually animated, makes him consider himself, “as under an obligation,” to to do what, think ye, Reader? Why to do what he talked of, to be sure, to *refute* the charges contained in the publication. Oh! no! To *refute* means, to *prove the falsehood* or *error* of any thing; and Mr. Wellesley in this, his state paper, does no such thing. He *denies* in the most positive and solemn manner; in other cases he *affirms* with equal solemnity; but he, in no case, *proves*, or *attempts to prove*, that which he denies, or that which he affirms. Proof is derived from *evidence* or from *reasoning*, and Mr. Wellesley has produced neither, in support of his denials and affirmations. Whether he could have pro-

duced any evidence or reasoning sufficient for the purpose, which he obviously had in view, is more than I can say, but, those denials and affirmations as they now stand, unsupported by proof, amount to nothing beyond assertion; and, though one assertion is as good as another, where there is nothing but assertion on either side, there can be *no refutation*. In this case, too, it was the more desirable to have proof in support of our minister's assertions, because the publication is omitted which he thinks it necessary to answer. He, indeed, gives us the substance, as he says, of a part, at least, of that publication. That which he gives us, amounts to no more than assertion, unsupported by proof; but, it does not follow that the publication itself contained no proof in support of its assertions. In answer to a publication containing nothing but assertion without proof, assertion without proof is as much as we have a right to demand; but, in answer to a publication, of which I myself state nothing but the assertions, proof may fairly be demanded at my hands; because by omitting to give the whole of the publication of which I complain, I leave the reader at liberty to infer, that the assertion of my opponent was backed by proof. — Mr. Wellesley, concludes his note by requesting that all proper publicity may be given to it by the Spanish government, in order to prevent the serious consequences which must inevitably result, should the Spanish Nation once believe the offensive publications. But, did Mr. Wellesley imagine, that this end would be answered by the publishing of an answer containing assertions without proof? If he did, he judges very differently from the way in which I should have judged in such a case; and, especially, when I perceive that his Note is full of reproaches and insinuations against the persons who have issued the publications complained of. If these persons were contemptible, whether in point of rank, or of character, it is obvious that no answer should have been given them, and no serious notice taken of their efforts. If their rank or character were such as to make their influence dangerous, an answer to them might become necessary; but, then, the answer should have been full and complete, carrying conviction to every impartial mind of the falsehood of the mischievous publications. Any thing short of this was calculated to do harm rather than good; to inflame rather than assuage passions at work against us; and whatever

Mr. Wellesley may think of the powers of his pen, I scruple not to advise him, the next time he has the task of preserving harmony to perform, especially amongst such a people as the Spaniards, not to talk too much of consenting "to suffer the *humiliation* of vindicating the honour of his "country" against their attacks.—Far better would it have been, it appears to me, if he had followed the example of the Spanish regency, so significantly pointed out to his attention by the Spanish secretary of State, in these words: "The council of regency has more than once been "the mark of calumnies, more, or less injurious, both in words and writings; but, "certain of its rectitude of conduct, and "thoroughly satisfied that it has its support "in the opinion of good men," far from paying attention to the attacks upon it, it has remained perfectly tranquil, in the conviction that nothing but the combined efforts of both nations can bring their common cause to a successful issue.—Certainly, this was the conduct for wise and upright men to pursue, conscious that they were doing the best for their country; or, at any rate, it is as clear as day light, that there was no choice between *silence*, on the one hand, and a complete *refutation* on the other.—The answer of the Spanish government is civil. It is, like most papers of the kind, full of expressions of respect, friendship, and confidence; but it is dryness itself. The fairest skin in the month of March is not dryer. It is dry even to chapping. And it talks too of the contemptibleness of the persons, whose publications and language are complained of, and who are described as "*some individuals*," who aspire to an *ephemeral* celebrity; and it concludes by expressing a confidence that this answer of the Regency will "suffice to *calm the inquietude which momentarily was excited in the mind*" of our Minister.—This answer is, in fact, upon the score of the complaint, a *gentle rebuke*, and as such it has been, I see, regarded by our hired print, the *Courier*, the Editor of which remarks, with manifest chagrin, not to say, malice, that the Spanish Regency has "omitted to *promise to restrain, by SEVERE PUNISHMENT,*" such discourse and writings as have been the subject of the complaint of our Minister. But, we must see the whole of this article of the *Courier* of the 17th instant, because it will enable us to judge of the real state of things better than any paper received from Cadiz. The papers from

Cadiz do not contain the offensive publications, nor even the specific one sent to the Secretary of State by our Minister; and, as was observed before, it has, through the venality of our press, been suppressed here. Just as was the paper of General La Pena, while the *answer* of General Graham was published in every print in the kingdom. Therefore it is necessary to be the more particular in attending to articles of home manufacture, like this of the *Courier*, from which we shall easily discover what he himself (the silly fellow!) was above all things desirous to disguise from our knowledge. "We lament," says he, "that "our Government should have felt itself "under the necessity of complaining of "the calumnious reports and publications "circulated at Cadiz against the honour "and good faith of this country. We "had thought our efforts had been *so vigorous*, our motives *so well understood*, and "our *disinterestedness* so manifest from the "commencement of the contest, that none "but the enemy could assert, what not a "Spaniard would believe, that we were "influenced by *one sordid, selfish, or ungenerous principle*. That such rumours and "writings have been instigated by the "enemy there can be no doubt; but even "they, we should think, could no longer "impose upon any one after the *solemn pledge* thus given and recorded by our "Government, that we have no views of "aggrandizement or territorial acquisition, either in Europe or America, at "the expence of the Spanish nation; that "our *whole and sole view is to assist Spain* "in recovering her liberty and independence; and that the success of these "efforts will be *our best and most glorious reward*. What, but the most noble principles, could have influenced us in "doing what we have done, when, if we "had only consulted *our own interests*, we "might have gratified them to the utmost "extent! What, if we had demeaned ourselves not merely as tame spectators, "but as active agents against Spain! "What, if we had said, *you have united* "yourself with the common enemy of "man; you have acted as the engines of "that *accursed fiend*, take the reward of "your servility and folly, and follow and "feel the fate of those nations whom you "have helped him to subdue! What, if "we had carried our power to the shores "of the new world, invited the American "Provinces to declare themselves independent, and promised them our coun-

“tenance and protection! *Here were tempting baits* for our interests and our commerce, if we had looked only to them. But we have soared above them; Spain wanted our assistance, and we immediately *forgave and forgot* that she had aided the common enemy against us; we flew to her *as brothers*, before almost she had returned into the scabbard *the sword she had drawn against us*.—The reply of the Spanish Regency to Mr. Wellesley’s note is expressive of confidence in our good faith, and of gratitude for our assistance. BUT we remark the omission in that reply of *all promise to restrain* by SEVERE PUNISHMENTS practices which, in the present circumstances of Spain, amount to HIGH TREASON of the blackest die.”

—This is a paragraph to be kept constantly before the eyes of the people; before the eyes of the people of *both nations*; for, we have here, we may be well assured, the sentiments of OTHERS besides the editor, or, to use Mr. Wellesley’s phrase, the sentiments “*of a certain class*,” a class, which, God knows, all of us have long had but too good reason to know.

—In our remarks upon this paragraph, let us proceed in due order, concluding with the chagrin here expressed, that *no severe punishments* were to be inflicted on those in Cadiz, who had made such free use of their tongues and their pens. This man talks about the vigorosness of our efforts, and the disinterestedness of our motives in a very vigorous style, but he has not condescended to give us any proofs of either. We have twice entered Spain with an army, I mean under Sir John Moore, and under the Lord Viscount Talavera; and we have twice got out of Spain again, in what manner I shall not describe; but this the Spaniards know, if we do not, that the vigour we displayed there was attended with consequences most fatal to many of them. We have seen Rodrigo taken in sight of our army, we have seen Badajoz besieged by our army, but not retaken. Tarragona has fallen in sight of our fleet, and after being, as the report of the Spanish commander states, visited by us, who declined to risk any troops in his defence. Now, it is not for me to say whether we had it in our power to do more in these several cases: perhaps, we did, in every case, all that we were able to do, but this is quite certain, that we did not do much; or, at least, that our efforts were not calculated

to give the Spaniards any very high notion of our vigour.—We must not forget, too, that, upon various occasions, the Spaniards have not derived much credit from fighting in company with us. At the Battle of Talavera, we know what was said of Cuesta; we know what our newspapers called him and his soldiers, though it is perfectly notorious that we left the care and protection of our sick and wounded to them, and, that they afterwards were upon the same route *between us and the French*. At the battle of Barrosa our language with respect to them was still less equivocal; our newspapers called the Spanish General a traitor, who was called not much better by some of the speeches elsewhere; our commander, General Graham, appears to have sent home to England, the eagle taken from the French in that battle, though he himself was under the command of a Spanish General; and, at last, we saw him engaged in a paper war with the Spanish officers commanding at, and in the neighbourhood of Cadiz. At the battle of Albuera, the case was not much better. The Spaniards committed errors; our commander was unable to tell the state of them after the battle was over, and in a few days afterwards, our commander in chief is unable to tell what is become of them. I do not choose to give my opinion as to the truth or falshood of what was said of the Spaniards upon these different occasions; but this all the world knows, that in the defence of many of their towns the Spaniards have shewn great and most obstinate bravery, and, that there is abundant proof that their Guerillas, as they are called, have, in numerous instances, displayed a degree of courage and perseverance hardly to be equalled. Indeed, it is notorious, that our newspapers are continually representing these Guerillas as composed of men ready to devote themselves to destruction for the sake of their country, and they go so far as to tell us that we may expect from the efforts of these Guerillas alone the final extirpation of the French. These Guerillas are composed of Spaniards, and how has it happened, then, that the Spaniards, when engaged in company with us, have acted in the manner, in which they have been described in our newspapers to have acted? This is, to say the least of it, extremely unfortunate; and, whatever we may think of the matter, the Spaniards, especially those in Cadiz, have not read with complacency the remarks of our newspapers upon their

conduct when engaged in company with us.—But, this writer tells us that our *disinterestedness* must have been so manifest to the Spaniards, that they must have been so well satisfied that we have not been influenced by one sordid or *selfish* principle. Verily this is a very foolish writer; for in another part of this very paper of the 17th inst. he says in answer to the Morning Chronicle, who had asserted that the war in Spain was of no utility to us; in answer to this, he says, that the war is of great utility to us, because it compels Buonaparté to “employ his main force against Spain, instead of directing the whole against Ireland!” Aye, I know very well that this is the notion; and the Spaniards know it too; for it has been said a thousand and a thousand times over, in the Parliament and in the public prints, and yet this man in this very same newspaper of the 17th instant, tells us that none but a Frenchman could ever assert, that we have been actuated by one selfish principle, and that the Spaniards must now be stupid indeed if they do not believe that our *whole and sole view* is to assist them, and that the success of these efforts will be our *best and most glorious reward!*

—But, says he, if we had consulted our own interests we might have gone to South America and invited the provinces there to declare themselves independent. And what should we have got by that, unless, indeed, we had resolved to carry liberty into South America? And if we had done that, a declaration of independence would, by no means, have cut off the connection between Old and New Spain, both countries being inhabited by Spaniards, and being so closely connected, by all the ties of interest and of blood. Spain, in that case, would have yielded to Napoleon without a struggle. There would have been no ravages and no bloodshed, and the whole force of Spain would have been directed against us, if peace had not taken place. By the war in Spain we have, hitherto, prevented this; but, we might have prevented it for ever by giving liberty to Spain; by a war for the people, instead of a war for Ferdinand. It is, therefore, not at all owing to our disinterestedness that we forebore that which the Courier threatens with respect to Spanish South America, which were no tempting baits, or, if they were, they were beyond our reach, or, at least, not to be made use of for our own purposes. What he says about our forgetting and forgiving the

conduct of the Spaniards, and about her *drawing the sword against us*, is something too impudent to merit an answer.—We now come to the complaint of this writer against the Spanish regency for omitting, in their answer to Mr. Wellesley, “all promise to restrain, by SEVERE PUNISHMENTS, practices which, in the present circumstances of Spain, amount to HIGH TREASON of the blackest dye.”

—So, reader! This is the sort of treatment that this hired writer in England, points out for those who make what our minister in Spain deems too free a use of their tongues and pens at Cadiz. A law of libel, informations *ex officio*, jail for years, heavy fines, harrassing prosecutions, bail for a man's life; all these are not sufficient for this prostituted English writer. He is for dragging the Spaniards to a scaffold or a gallows for writing, aye, and for speaking that which our minister there deems improper! This is the way that he and those who think like him, and of whose words he is merely the repeater, would insure to the people of Spain the blessings of *liberty!* High treason, of the blackest dye, too, for men to utter their apprehensions about the introduction of foreign troops into their country; about placing part of their country under the military command of a foreign General; about placing their native Soldiers under the command of foreign Officers; to express their apprehensions of these things is here deemed a crime amounting to High Treason of the blackest dye, and, of course, meriting the punishment of an ignominious death, a punishment for not promising to inflict which the Spanish government is reproached by this venal English writer! This is the liberty, is it, which we flew “like brothers” to insure to the people of Spain; the liberty of being swung from a gallows-tree, if they dare to express their fears at seeing their sea ports, their provinces, and even their armies, put under the command, and into the hands of foreigners.—It is possible that the suspicions, and fears of which we have been speaking might be groundless. For my part I believe that they were groundless. But am I to represent a Spaniard as a wretch worthy of death, am I to call him a traitor and censure his government for not punishing him as such, merely because he entertained such suspicions and fears? But, why do I ask these questions? There is no man, who is not at bottom the enemy of all liberty amongst men, who

must not execrate the spirit by which these remarks of the *Courier* were dictated. The source whence those remarks have flowed is all despotism, sheer despotism, unmixed with a single particle of any thing else. It would suffer no human being to write, speak, breathe, or think freely; and, it seems to be ready to expire in the overflowings of its own venom, because it cannot extend its poisonous influence to every corner of the earth.—The reader will bear in mind, that we are continually speaking of the miseries, the degradation, the baseness, of those nations who permit the *French* to garrison their towns and to take the command in their provinces. I beg the reader to call to his recollection how our public prints have treated all such nations, with what scorn they have spoken of them, how execrably base they have represented them to be. Yet, I really have never heard of any case, in which the army of the natives has been put under the command of *French officers*. What impudence, what insolence is it, then, for this writer to talk thus about the nations who submit to the obtrusion of the *French*, while, at the same time, he would have the Spaniards hung up like dogs merely because they make what he deems a too free use of their tongue or pen in speaking or writing against the introduction of foreign troops into their territory? “Aye, but the troops, in this case, are *English*!” And, you insolent hireling, do you, then, really believe, that, in the eyes of other nations, an act changes its nature, and from bad becomes good, merely because we are the agent?—But, perhaps, our own example will be cited. The Spaniards may be said to be unreasonably jealous in their opposition to the introduction of foreign troops by us, seeing that the English very quietly see great numbers of foreign troops introduced into England; see them quartered and stationed in England; and, in some cases, have seen several counties of the kingdom, formed into a military district, placed under the command of a German Baron. The Spaniards may be told this, and, as a further proof of the disposition of the people of England, the Spaniards may be told, that Roman Catholic officers are permitted to serve in these foreign corps without taking an oath, which Irish Roman Catholics are obliged to take, in order to be capable of rising to rank equally high. I am aware, that all this may be said to the Spaniards; but the answer is short: that men differ in their

tastes; and that, by no course of fair and sound reasoning, can it be made out, that because foreign troops are introduced into England, foreign troops ought also to be introduced into Spain. The people of England may like to have foreign troops brought into their country; but, if the people of Spain do not like to have foreign troops brought into their country, they have surely a right to say so; they surely ought not to be stigmatized as traitors and doomed to the gallows, because they express their apprehensions upon so important a point.—As if to leave nothing wanting to make an exposure of his folly or something worse, this writer, in only two days after his denunciations against the poor Spaniards, falls upon Napoleon as an enemy of the freedom of the press! The occasion was as follows: the Editor of a news-paper, called the *Abeille du Nord*, published at Altona (in the territories of Denmark) has been obliged to apologize for having inserted in his paper some passages of history, or, at least, of works published a considerable time back. The apology is thus worded, under the date of Aug. 27, 1811.—“The Editor of this Paper, having imprudently inserted in “the Papers No. 51, 66, and 67, an anecdote taken from works published a considerable time back, and which do not belong “to the history of the present time, which “is the object of this paper, makes known, “that in-consequence of this indiscretion, “it has been imposed as a punishment by “the Police, and enjoined by the supreme “authority, that he must abstain from inserting anecdotes drawn even from the “history of times past, calculated to offend “Governments on friendly terms with that of “Denmark.” Upon this the *Courier* makes the following remarks, and they are well worthy of the attention of the reader. They are all that was wanted to the exposure of the hireling who has put them forth to the world.—“The Editor of the *Abeille du Nord*, a Paper “printed at Altona, has been forced to “apologise again for having inserted an “anecdote drawn from history, and has “been cautioned by his Government to “abstain from inserting any anecdotes of “times past which might give offence to “friendly Governments: that is, to Buona- “parte!! What a fear and a despotism does “the conduct of this Russian evince! It will “soon be deemed HIGH TREASON, we “suppose, to have an historical work in “the library of an individual.”—The

reader must be struck with the singular aptness of this quotation. Here it is predicted, that Napoleon will make it *high treason*; but, this writer himself had made it high treason two days before for Spaniards to express their apprehensions at putting their towns, their provinces and their troops into the hands of foreign troops and foreign commanders. When this paragraph was written, that of the 17th was not recollected; though, to say the truth, the impudence of these hirelings sets all decency as well as truth at defiance.—

The *Abeille du Nord* was, it seems, to suppress that which might give offence to friendly governments; and it was because their publications gave offence to our government, that the Spaniards at Cadiz were found fault of by our Minister; and, for having given this offence, the Courier does not content him with demanding an apology; no, he would have “*severe punishments*” inflicted by way of terrific example; he calls the crime *high treason of the blackest die*, and, of course, would send the offenders to be hanged and quartered. And this man has the impudence, and that, too, almost in the same breath, to attribute the gentle reproof of the *Abeille du Nord* to “*the fears and the despotism of the ruffian*” Buonaparté.—And, does this man and his associates imagine that they can deceive the world by such invectives as these? Do they imagine, that, because they can cajole the people of England; because they can deceive and cheat them, they can also deceive and cheat the people of the Continent and of America? Do they imagine, that the Editor of the *Abeille du Nord*, for instance, is not able to make a comparison between the *liberty of the press* in Denmark and that in England? Do they suppose, that the world are to be made noodles of like the poor cowed-down frightened wretches who read their purchased pages? Oh, no! The people of the Continent understand this matter very well. They understand *the worth of our liberty of the press* as well as we do, and, if it were to reach them, the paragraph of the Courier must make them laugh heartily.—When the system of deception, of base fraud and hypocrisy, in the carrying on of which this Courier is one of the agents; when this vile system of cheater, this imposture of impostures, will come to an end I know not; but, as long as it exists, and I exist, it shall have in me, if not a powerful, at least an implacable foe.

COLONEL M'MAHON's appointment and some other topics must wait till my next.

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
20th September, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—Note of the Honble. Henry Wellesley, the English Minister in Spain, transmitted to Don Eusebio de Bardaxi y Azara, first Secretary of State. Dated Cadiz, August 5, 1811.

Most Excellent Sir,—I have hitherto abstained from calling the attention of the Spanish government to the rumours and writings which have for some time been circulated in Cadiz, in the belief that my forbearance and moderation might disarm those who have endeavoured to weaken the bonds of friendship and confidence which so happily, and with so many advantages to the cause, have hitherto subsisted between Great Britain and Spain. But the papers that have been published, as well as the reports that have been circulated, have at length become so injurious to the British good name and character, and so adapted to promote the interests of the enemy, and sow dissensions between the allied nations, that I should be wanting to the duties of my charge, and to all the sentiments of an Englishman, anxious for the happy issue of this glorious and interesting cause, if I could look with indifference on the unjust and unfounded calumnies which are daily accumulated against my country.—To give a specimen of the terms in which these assertions are conveyed, and which originate, as it appears to me, from a certain class of persons, I think it will be sufficient to request your Excellency to read the subjoined paper, in which are imputed to my Sovereign, to his Government, and to the British nation, intentions destitute of honour and justice, and of good faith, and entirely subversive of all the principles upon which Great Britain has come forward to aid the cause of the Spanish nation. But the complaints, and imputations contained in this paper, relative to the conduct of Great Britain, rumours noticed in the month of March last, are again revived,—that the Spanish provinces bordering on Portugal were placed under the military command of Lord Wellington; that the Spanish army was to be placed under English officers; and in a word,

withdrawn from subordination to the Spanish military authorities, in order to form an army truly British. To the British Government is also attributed the design of sending to Cadiz a reinforcement of troops, sufficient to take possession of this city and island, and retain it in the name and possession of his Britannic Majesty.—Considering the sacrifices which great Great Britain has made in support of the Spanish cause; considering her repeated declarations of the conduct which she has resolved to observe with respect to the Spanish colonies, some of which have been published in the Gazette of the Regency; considering the decisive proof which she has just given of her disinterested views, by offering her mediation between Spain and the Colonies which have refused to acknowledge the authority of the mother country; I ought to be far from being under the necessity to refute charges such as those contained in this paper. In fact, it was necessary that we should find ourselves in a situation so critical as that in which we are reduced to the narrow bounds of this place, the salvation of which depends on harmony and good understanding, so indispensable at all times, but especially at this critical moment, to consent to suffer the humiliation of vindicating the honour of my country, attacked as it has been by publications, the malignant tendency of which is sufficiently apparent. Desirous however, to preserve, without the least alteration, the sentiments of respect and esteem with which the two nations are mutually animated, I consider myself as under an obligation to deny, in the most positive and solemn manner, in the name of his Britannic Majesty, that of his Government, and that of the whole British nation, all the imputation of views of aggrandizement, or territorial acquisition, either in Europe or America, at the expense of the Spanish nation. With the same positiveness, I deny that there is any foundation for the interpretation given to the notes which I presented in the month of March last, suggesting that the Spanish provinces on the borders of Portugal should be placed under the temporary authority of Lord Wellington; as by this no more was intended than to authorise him to derive from them the military supplies which they were capable of furnishing. I, in like manner, solemnly affirm, that neither my Sovereign nor his Government had any intention to render themselves masters of Cadiz; and that if any reinforcements

were sent to this city, it was solely and exclusively in order to contribute to the defence of this important position, and preserve it to the Crown of Spain.—Lastly, I repeat, what on many occasions I have declared to your Excellency, that Great Britain in taking part in this contest had no other view than to assist the glorious efforts of the Spanish nation to recover its liberty and independence; and that she persevered in it without any idea of her own aggrandizement, or any exclusive advantage which she might derive from the unfortunate circumstances to which the Spanish nation has been reduced; but solely to contribute to the expulsion of the enemy, and the re-establishment of the integrity and independence of the Spanish monarchy.—In conclusion, most Excellent Sir, I earnestly intreat your Excellency will be pleased to present, with the least possible delay, this note to the Council of Regency; and I think myself obliged to demand from the Spanish Government, that all proper publicity may be given to it, in order to prevent the serious consequences which must inevitably result, should the Spanish nation once conceive the intentions of the English nation to be such as the injurious suspicions which the rumours and writings circulated throughout this city are calculated to inspire.—I have the honour to reiterate to your Excellency the assurances of my distinguished consideration. (Signed)

H. WELLESLEY.

ANSWER.

Dated Cadiz, 7th August, 1811.

Sir; Without loss of time, I presented to the Council of Regency the note which your Excellency was pleased to transmit to me on the 5th instant, as well as a copy of the paper lately printed and published in this city. His Excellency, fully impressed with what your Excellency has been pleased to state concerning the malicious rumours which have been for some time so industriously circulated in these parts, has ordered me above all things to declare, that believing himself as much interested as your Excellency in discrediting reports and writings which can in the least degree offend the respect and decorum due to his Britannic Majesty, his Government, and the English nation, he will most willingly hasten to publish the note of your Excellency, with this reply; well persuaded that their publication cannot fail to undeceive the incautious, who

have allowed themselves to be seduced by people who intend to destroy the friendship and amity which happily, and without the least interruption, subsists between the two allied nations; and without which, neither union nor concord can subsist between their respective Governments.—In regard to the imputations to which your Excellency refers in your note, considering them as injurious to the august Sovereign as to the Government of the British nation, they cannot certainly be attributed to the generality of the inhabitants of Cadiz,—of this bulwark of Spanish independence,—much less to the nation in general, which has given so many proofs of its gratitude for the generous assistance of Great Britain. They can, therefore, have their origin only in the imagination of some individuals, who, influenced by the enemy, or carried away by the desire of being singular in their opinions and writings, aspire at an ephemeral celebrity, to which they sacrifice the most sacred interests of their country, which they do not know or prefer to their own.—Fortunately, the number of persons engaged in introducing mistrust between the two allied nations is very limited, and so very inferior to those who properly appreciate the generous efforts of Great Britain in the present contest, that they can never obtain the end which they have proposed: but rather, on the contrary, the artifice employed by the enemy to sow discord being once known, as well as the instruments made use of, both will be included in the execration of all good Spaniards, who, without dispute, constitute the greater part of those who compose this vast monarchy.—Nothing proves so much what I have stated, as the injurious suspicions which accompany the reports and rumours spread respecting the pretended occupation of Cadiz by the troops of his Britannic Majesty, to which the French have contributed from the first day they presented themselves before this place for the purpose of introducing discord, and producing mistrust in the minds of its inhabitants. The object of this imposture being known, it will not be difficult to comprehend the views of those who are so eager in circulating and giving credit to them; but the public in reading the concluding expressions of your Excellency on this point, and well persuaded before, that the two Governments cannot do less than agree in respect to the number of troops necessary for the defence of

so important a position, will remain tranquil in the confidence with which the Government must inspire them, and in the good faith of the British Cabinet.—The same Council of Regency has more than once been the mark of calumnies, more or less injurious, both in words and writings; but certain of its rectitude of conduct, and that nothing could be attached with the least foundation, contrary to the decorum and dignity of its representation; thoroughly satisfied that it has its support in the opinion of the good, his Excellency has in consequence charged me to inform your Excellency, that the Spanish nation, as well as its Government, far from paying attention to the insidious remarks with which the enemy has continually endeavoured to dissolve the firm bonds which unite the two powers, are completely convinced that nothing but the combined efforts of both can bring to a glorious conclusion the arduous enterprise for which they have fought; and they are therefore penetrated with the just gratitude they owe Great Britain, for the lively interest with which, from the commencement of the war, it has protected and assisted Spain in defence of its King, and political independence.—The expressions contained in this reply, and the sincere protestation, that the Council of Regency ardently desires, as your Excellency must know, to every day draw closer the relations of friendship and reciprocal confidence between both nations, will, without doubt, suffice to calm the inquietude which momentarily was excited in the mind of your Excellency by the rumours and writings which gave occasion to your Excellency's note; and at the same time, I flatter myself, will ensure the continuation of the aids which the painful situation of Spain renders so indispensable, in order to happily conclude the heroic contest in which it is engaged, and whose success must necessarily be promoted through the united efforts of the two united nations. I reiterate to your Excellency my great esteem and consideration. God preserve your Excellency many years.

EUSEBIO DE BARDAXI Y AZARA.

SPAIN.—*Decree of the Cortes, 19th of June 1811.*

1. The Mediation offered by Great Britain, for the purpose of conciliating the Provinces of America, is accepted.
2. The indispensable basis must be, the

submission of the Provinces to acknowledge and swear allegiance to the Cortes and the Government, and to name Deputies who shall represent them in the said Cortes, and shall incorporate themselves with the other Representatives of the Nation.

3. That all hostilities shall be reciprocally suspended, and all persons, of either party, who are prisoners, shall be set free.

4. That the pretensions of the Provinces at variance with the Mother Country (disidentes) shall be heard, and attention paid to them as far as justice will permit.

5. At the expiration of eight months from the commencement of the negotiation, or sooner if possible, a Report of the progress of it shall be made to the Spanish Government.

6. Great Britain shall be permitted, during the negotiation, to trade with the said provinces, it being left to the Cortes to consider whether they shall be admitted to a share of the trade with all the provinces of America.

7. The negotiation must be concluded within fifteen months.

8. If, at the expiration of that time, it is not accomplished, Great Britain shall suspend all intercourse with the Provinces at variance with Spain, and shall assist the Mother Country in bringing them back to their duty.

9. The Government, in its answer to the English Minister, shall previously explain to him the motives which have induced it to accept the mediation, and to preserve its honour.

REMARKS, on the above Decree, published in the English hired print, the COURIER, of the 4th Sept. 1811.

We are too well aware of the perplexing difficulties, with which the leading Patriots of the Peninsula are environed, to inculcate harshly or without reluctance even the present Regency of Spain. With far greater pain do we feel ourselves called on to arraign the measures, or to question the motives of the Spanish Cortes, from the newness of the members to the science of legislation and the arts of government, and the strangeness of the circumstances which require all the helps of the maturest and most manifold experience, united to an intuition and foresight which no experience can of itself supply. We have systematically, and from the very commencement of their arduous struggle, both reprobated and exposed the ungenerous

scorn, and not less impolitic than irrational abuse, with which the speakers and journalists attached to the Grenville party or the Burdett faction, have at all times slandered the successive governments of Spain, and not seldom the Spaniards in general. The giant size of the dangers which assailed the insurgent nation on all sides we saw no less plainly than they, and measured far more distinctly, because we did not look at them through the confusion and exaggerating mist of panic and party-passions, and because we reflected on them, which these writers neither did or could do, from the habitual prostration of their spirits before that shapeless blaze with which unexampled success had invested unexampled iniquity. We were among the first too in preparing the public mind for the obstacles likely to arise from the prejudices and defects of the Spaniards, obstacles which ever appeared to us more truly formidable than the numbers, skill, and veteran courage of their invaders, and which at all times damped the confidence with which we should otherwise have predicted the ultimate success of the invaded nation. We never presumed to affirm unconditionally the final triumph of the righteous cause; but we did, and still do venture to anticipate, that if it fail, it will not be solely or principally by the armies of Napoleon, but through folly, languor, and treachery on the part of Spain itself, through the unnatural aid afforded to her oppressors, by the indolence, mismanagement, bigotry, and cowardly selfishness of her great landed proprietors, whose own estates (an awful truth, not confined to the Peninsula, yet strangely overlooked in the common presumptions of patriotism), whose own vast estates, we say, are bribes to them against their own country. The war with France presented to our minds evils far less fatal than the civil war between the good and the bad among the Spaniards themselves, than the civil war between the heroic and defective qualities of the Spanish character itself—between patience and fortitude, and contempt of death, strong nationality and useful antipathies on the one hand, and languor, want of foresight, and indiscreet application to their allies; of feelings which should have been either suspended or reserved for their enemies, of jealous pride, religious zeal, and that ill-timed overweening sense of their own self-sufficiency, in which their national haughtiness acts the unconscious pandar for their national sloth.

But while we were alive and broad awake to these depressing truths, we could not, however, look at these defects in a separate thought from the virtues with which they are in fact, alas! too indissolubly interblended, or from the honourable feelings which are the common source of both—

—twy-streaming fount,

Where good and evil flow, honey and gall!

Above all, for that can never be too often said, which never can be too often recollected, we could not forget, and we have never ceased to remind the public, that with all their faults and prejudices, and the miserable blunders or treachery of their leaders, the Spaniards have endured more, done more, and effected more against the common enemy of civilized humanity, than all the Courts, veteran Commanders, and disciplined armies of the whole Continent—more in four years than all the rest of continental Europe for almost twenty. And we have been accustomed to seal up the whole with the one home-truth, that if we are fighting the battles of Spain abroad, the Spaniards are fighting the battles of Great Britain in their own country, at the price of its devastation, and with their own ruined cottages, fields, and vineyards before their eyes.—Our readers will, many of them, perhaps, think it unnecessary for us to have thus anxiously prefaced the following animadversions on the general measures of the Cortes, and especially on its Decree of June the 19th; but we well knew the triumph, with which any apparent deviation on our part from our former hopes and predilections for the Spanish cause would be blazoned forth by the Party, which has signalized itself by its despair and abuse of the Spanish combatants, in the ordinary vehicle of its destruction; and that it would probably be attributed to influences which we disown, and to a change of opinion elsewhere which, were it as true as we believe it false, we have no means of knowing. We held it not unwise therefore to preclude the charge, as far as it is in our power: that is, to take away its plausibility, and disarm it for the candid and dispassionate. In many points have our wishes been disappointed in one only our expectations. We confess, that misled by historical analogies, chiefly of America, and not duly appreciating, or rather at that time dwelling on the effects of English descent, English laws, customs, literature, religion, and connection on the character of the first American Revolution—

ists, we had expected too much from the convocation of the Cortes in Spain: and though we still believe, that this measure has been of advantage, and still hope that it will become more so, yet on the whole, we confess that we have been disappointed. As to the importance of a Representative Body during a revolutionary war, our opinions remain unchanged; but had we at any earlier period have been as well acquainted with the measures and results of the Cortes summoned in the war of the succession, we should have been less sanguine in our expectations of finding in the present Cortes all those essentials, which must combine to render a body of men assembled, a genuine Representative Body.—We may proceed to the measure, which has occasioned these prefatory remarks. The decree in question respects a point of the deepest interest to Great Britain, and of Spain herself, both directly and indirectly. It is obvious, that had there been nothing objectionable in the different articles of the Decree, yet the Decree itself would remain, in its domestic bearings, an encroachment of the Legislature on the Executive Power, and one sad specimen among too many others, both of ignorance as to the principles of a just Government, and of that all-meddling disposition incident to bodies of men suddenly invested with a power, for which neither their education had fitted, or their former habits prepared them; while in its foreign relations, it was surely imprudent, needlessly and prematurely to obtrude on the public attention the only point, in which the interests of Spain, whenever she shall have been re-established in her integrity, and those of her zealous Ally, can be thought to stand in opposition to each other: the future interests of Spain, not the present, and in truth according to our convictions her supposed rather than her real interests. What measure more fatal to the hopes of the Peninsula could Napoleon have dictated to his emissaries and secret agents than ere the battle was half fought to stir up jealousies and heart-burnings among the allied combatants themselves concerning the fruits of their victory?—Such would have been the character of the Decree, from its very title and object; and the contents are every way answerable. The various accessory and aggravating reasons deducible from the temper, constitution, and past treatment of the Colonies, and the present circumstances of the Mother Country, we

shall reserve for an after discussion: at present, we confine ourselves to such objections, as lie on, or rather put out from, the surface of the articles themselves. We scarcely need notice the hostile feeling and absurd pride, betrayed in the selection of the absolute and offensive word, submission, in the 2d article, or the same haughtiness combine with injustice in the tone and spirit of the fourth. Proposals so worded might Buonaparté make to an insurrectionary town, which he had beleaguered, in the insolence of ostentatious clemency; but such a body of Representatives should at no time make to their constituents or fellow-subjects—how much less then the present imperfect, though perhaps blamelessly imperfect, Cortes in the present circumstances of Spain? But if these articles are to be lamented, as having a direct tendency, and almost seeming to imply a design, to alienate their South American countrymen, far more must we regret the sixth and eighth, as equally unjust and irritating both to the Colonies and to Great Britain. When we recall the enthusiastic generosity with which the latter, without making a single condition, without extorting a single promise in her own behalf, poured and has continued to pour into Spain, her clothing, arms, treasures, and the very pride and pith of her military force, with a confiding liberality which placed its last step to the uttermost limit of prudence, and which halted not but in obedience to the paramount duty of self-preservation, when we re-peruse the strong and glowing language, in which the noblest Spanish patriots, and the very Cortes itself, conveyed their gratitude and expressed their admiration; when we reflect, that the conduct of the British Government was the organ and interpreter of an almost universal sentiment in the British nation, and that the Tyrant himself has officially attributed the prolongation of the contest, and the delay of his success, to the circumstance, that Great Britain had, for the first time, come forward as a principal in a military war; as we could never have expected, so can we not even now derive from the noble character of uncorrupted Spanish Patriots, a niggardly doling out of returns, not in the measures of gratitude, or even of a wise and liberal policy, but in the spirit of a hard bargain, so much for necessity, and so much in expectation of a greater gain in repayment! You may trade for 15 months to the revo-

lutionary Colonies, first, because we expect from you a restoration of their exclusive possession to ourselves, and which we ourselves cannot achieve; and secondly, because it is out of our power to prevent you, or to receive any advantages from them but through you:—but whether we shall grant the privilege, where it as yet remains in our power to prevent you, that must be matter for future consideration. In other words, our decision will depend on the result of a struggle between our hopes and fears, whether by this very prevention we shall or shall not be likely to throw the yet unrevolted into a community of means and aims with the revolutionary colonies. However we in England may appreciate the wisdom of the scruple, yet the Cortes, as Spaniards, ought assuredly neither to forget or under-rate the notorious fact, that we might have acquired the exclusive trade of the Spanish Settlements, if we would have bribed them from the mother country, at that time our open enemy, by an offer of independence. That our Commanders were prohibited from making them this offer, let this prohibition be politic or impolitic, could only have proceeded from the sacred principle of doing as we would that others should do to us.—But if the sixth article be, as we have shewn, at once impolicy and meanness of spirit, the eighth is characterised by the most glaring extravagance, and a folly of short-sighted selfishness almost suicidal. From Great Britain hitherto we have received our chief and amplest supports. Stripped of our colonies, from Great Britain alone can we receive any assistance. And yet while we add year after year to her burthens, we demand of her that she shall stop up the very channels by which she may in part recruit her resources, and while we want treasures which we by our own strength are unable to provide, we will prevent our ally from procuring them for us. The blood of her noblest children is lavished in our behalf, and yet as far as in us lies we will deprive their mother of the very means, by which she is to furnish them with arms, of the gold and silver, for which alone the Spanish farmers will supply them with food. And then the modest request, that if we fail to reconcile the colonists, as a common friend, we should hasten to cut their throats, as volunteer enemies and substitute combatants against our own interests—this really is folly that might lead even a reluctant mind to a suspicion of more than 'folly.

Must we not ask, what is the state of those colonies? And how came they to this state? and what measures have you taken to amend it?—But of this on a following day.

PORTUGAL.—*Extracts of Dispatches from Baron Douro, of Wellesley and Viscount Wellington of Talavera and of Wellington, and Conde de Vimiera, to Earl Liverpool, one of the Secretaries of State. Published in the London Gazettes of different dates, as under stated.*

Quinta Joao, July 18, 1811.

The Army of Portugal broke up from their position on the Guadiana on the 14th instant, and have moved towards Truxillo. I have not yet heard that any troops had passed that town towards Almaraz; or that the cavalry which had been about Talavera and Lobon, had retired further than Merida.—They are fortifying the Old Castle of Medellin, as well as that at Truxillo.—*General Blake embarked his corps in the mouth of the Guadiana on the 6th.* As soon as General Blake's corps embarked, the body of the enemy's troops, which had marched towards the Guadiana, and had turned towards Cartaja, retired from the frontier towards St. Lucar.—I understand that the troops belonging to the fourth corps, which Marshal Soult had brought into Estramadura, have marched towards Granada. There is nothing new on the side of Valladolid, excepting that Joseph Buonaparté had returned to Spain, and, it is said, arrived at Burgos with an escort of about three thousand men on the 5th instant.

Portalegre, July 25, 1811.

The enemy's cavalry left Merida on the morning of the 17th. The enemy have since continued their march upon Almaraz; and on the 20th, one division of infantry had arrived at Placentia. On the same day Marshal Marmont was at Almaraz, and other divisions had marched upon Truxillo in the same direction. One division of infantry and some cavalry still remained at Truxillo according to the last accounts.—There is nothing new in the North. Joseph Buonaparté was at Valladolid on the 10th, and proceeded on the 12th on his journey towards Madrid.

Castello Branco, Aug. 1, 1811.

I have moved the whole army to their left. I propose that they shall take up their cantonments in Lower Beira, instead of Alentejo.—The army of Portugal re-

main in the position which I informed your Lordship that they occupied in my dispatch of the 23th July, excepting that the division at Placentia has extended through the mountains to Bejar and Banos.—By a letter from General Silveira of the 21st of July, which I received on the 26th, I learnt that General Santocildes had retired with the army of Galicia from the neighbourhood of Astorga to Mancanal on the 17th, in consequence of Marshal Bessieres having collected at Benavente a force consisting of 11,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry.

Fuente Guidaldo, Aug. 31, 1811.

The enemy have made no movement of any importance since I addressed your Lordship on the 14th. On that evening a detachment, consisting of about one thousand two hundred infantry and cavalry, arrived at Gata, which is on the south side of the mountains which separate Castile from Estramadura; and on the following morning they surprised a small picquet in St. Martin de Trebejo, under Lieutenant Wood, of the 11th Light Dragoons, whom they made prisoner with ten men, and went off that evening to Moralego, and on the next morning to Monte Hermoso.

COUNT DE LILLE (Louis XVIII.)

The London Gazette of Saturday the 7th of September, 1811, contains an Advertisement, offering 200*l.* Reward for the discovery of the author or sender of the following Threatening Letters sent to this person, and which Letters are stated, in the Advertisement, to have been as follows:

Whitchall, Sept. 7, 1811.

Whereas it has been humbly represented to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, that various anonymous threatening Letters have been sent to the Count De Lille, and others of the French Princes, of which the following are extracts;—

No. I.

A. Monsr.
Count De Lille
Hartwell House
Aylesbury
Bucks

You are of a bad Race, mercy is in the Protestant, you imposing Vagabonds Die by nostra manus.

I visit your House every week you damn'd Villain—look at your Effigie inclosed.

No. II.

The Count de Lille a French Refugee
Halford House
Aylesbury
Bucks

signed Gordonius.

Bone has offered a Dutchy for your Head, he shall have it.

Mind, a good Boat and many of us Prisoners of War will seize on you, put you into it at Yarmouth you Enemy of Europe. A Man can die but once you Vagabond Louis.

No. III.

The Count Lille
Hartwell House
Aylesbury
Bucks

Your proceedings will not do, our intentions have been delayed in hopes of something being abjured or done on your part and the Prisoners of War your countrymen restored to their Native land our party encrease very strong against you and only temporize for a time, but many are near your Person of our Party which makes us sure of our designs. So if I do not get my Friends Home you shall be arrested, murdered, shot or slain. Charlotte Corday shall visit you first. You are at our Bar and renounce, adjure, or die by our hands.

No. IV.

Le Comte De Lille
Halford House
near Aylesbury
Bucks.

You shall be attacked from us in our Prison Wincanton, Crediton, Tiverton, and other Places.

No. V.

His Highness's
Duke de Berri
or De Condé
or De Lille
Wimbledon.

If there be any commotion among the People. The Populace know the Road to the House you live at. Resign your pretensions, live in peace, or be overcome in L'Assyle.

Given at our association of Warning.
(Here follows an offer of a reward of 200*l.* for discovery.)

HAYTI. (*St. Domingo*)—*Coronation of the Negro King and Queen, 2nd June, 1811.*

At Cape François (*Cape Henry* now) great preparations were, on the 27th May,

making for the Coronation of their Majesties of Hayti, to take place on the following Sunday, previously to which a number of his favourite Generals were *ennobled*, some made *Princes*, some *Dukes*, some *Counts*, some *Barons*, some *Chevaliers*; this new creation could not but astonish the gaping multitude, little used to such sights, by the splendour of their appropriate dresses, some of purple, some of blue, some of white silk or satin, richly ornamented, whilst embroidered cloaks or mantles gracefully flowed from their shoulders, and their heads covered with gold laced hats, turned up in front with a button and plume, exhibited a likeness of the ancient nobility, as they are represented in some of our old paintings.—The previous matters being arranged, the ceremony that next took place was the consecration of the national standard or colours, which was performed with great pomp by the *archbishop*, who they say is a *German*, and a man of some erudition: but the grand business of all, and that which far outshines all the rest, was the coronation of their Majesties, which took place on *Sunday the 2nd of June*, in a large square called the *Champ de Mars*, where temporary canopies and coverings were erected for that purpose. This day, was ushered in by ringing of bells, bands of music, innumerable discharges of cannon, and every demonstration of joy. About seven o'clock, their Majesties in their state carriage, drawn by *eight white horses*, attended by Madame Dessselines, in her carriage and six, and the other nobility, in such carriages as they could procure, brilliantly attired, proceeded to the *Champ de Mars*, where his royal Majesty, with the Queen, left their carriage, and ascended a temporary throne, richly ornamented; here the King, having previously put a Crown of gold, richly furnished with precious stones, upon his head, now took it off, and delivered it, with another for the Queen, into the hands of the Archbishop, who crowned their Haytian Majesties, with all the pomp and ceremonies used on such great occasions. Thus graced by the diadem, to which also they added grace, this august pair retired into the royal tent, with the Archbishop and some of the great officers of state, and there received the holy sacraments; which being finished, their Majesties descended, and having taken their carriage, attended in the same manner, returned to the Palace, where they held a *Levee*, and received the congratulations of the No-

bility and Gentry, on the auspicious occasion, and also the compliments of *Captain Douglas and Captain O'Grady of the British Navy*, whose ships were seen at anchor in the port. After the Levee, at about two o'clock, their Majesties and the Nobility, in the same order of procession, repaired to another square, where under the shade of the entwined boughs, well arranged for the purpose, a repast, consisting of 600 covers, was prepared, to which all the English and American merchants were invited, and where Captains Douglas and O'Grady had the first places of honour. At this entertainment, the King, rising from his seat, gave the following toast: "*My Brother, the King of Great Britain*," which was drank with three times three; to which he added, "*may he prosper and be successful against Buonaparté*, and continue the barrier between that tyrant and this kingdom." The next toast was given by the Archbishop, "*The King of Hayti*," which was also drank with three times three. After this their Majesties returned in the same order to the Palace, before which a great body of troops, to the number of near ten thousand, paraded for a long time, every company preceded by its band of music, which, together with the incessant firing of guns, ringing of bells, and rude shouts of the populace, almost stupefied the senses. The Royal Cavalcade then took a ride about the town, and scattered money in great profusion among the people; and the business of this great day was at length concluded with splendid illuminations, and an Opera at the Theatre. On Monday, 3rd of June, *high mass was celebrated*, and the *Te Deum sung*, at the Cathedral; after which their Majesties had a Levee, and received the compliments of the Nobility and Gentry, and the evening was concluded with illuminations, and a Comedy at the Theatre.

HAYTI.—*Royal Ordinance.*—*Renewing the prohibitions made to foreign Merchants, established in our Kingdom, to sell in retail the cargoes consigned to them, and to fix the quantity of each kind of Merchandise they are to sell.*

Henry I, by the grace of God, and of the constitutional Law of the State, to all whom these presents may come greeting: Being informed that the foreign merchants

established in our kingdom, do not conform to the regulations of the 15th of October, 1804, which forbid them to sell in retail the cargoes they receive. That frequent complaints have been made to us by the foreign merchants relative to the difficulty of recovering the amount of their goods disposed in retail, to Haytian shopkeepers: Wishing to put an end to all such complaints, and afford to foreign traders greater facility for the recovering, from Haytian shopkeepers, the amount of the sales of the cargoes confided to them. We have ordered and do order what follows:—**Art. I.**—We renew, as far as is necessary, the prohibitions made in the above-mentioned Ordinance, of the 15th October, 1804, to all Captains of foreign vessels arriving in any of the ports of our kingdom, of selling their cargoes in retail to either shopkeepers or individuals.—**II.**—No foreign merchant, who shall have vessels consigned to him, shall be permitted to sell the cargoes to another foreign merchant, nor have them sold by retail by women in their keeping; and three months, beginning the first instant, is allowed to those to whom this may apply, to set off their stock, and close their stores.—**III.**—The foreign merchants shall not be allowed to sell a smaller quantity of merchandize than what are here designated, to wit: 10 barrels beef, 10 ditto pork, 25 cases soap, 10 ditto candles, 10 firkins butter, 10 ditto lard, 10 baskets or boxes sweet oil, 8 do. codfish, 20 cases do. 20 bls. flour, 5 pipes wine, 10 cases do. 6 bls. lamp oil, 5 hds. beer or porter, hats, shoes, &c. or the case or bbl. cheese and hams of bacon wholesale, cordials, do. dry goods by the bale, case, trunk, bbl. hhd. without retailing any by the piece or ell.—**IV.**—Whomsoever shall act in contravention to the present Ordinance shall forfeit 3,000 dollars for the first offence; and in case of a repetition, double that sum, and three months imprisonment.—We do order that these presents, to which is affixed our Royal Seal, be addressed to all the courts and tribunals of justice, and administrative authorities; that they be entered on their records; that they observe them, and cause them to be observed throughout the kingdom; and that our Minister of Justice be charged with its execution.—Done at Cape Henry, the 19th June, 1811, year 8 of the independence. **HENRY.**

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XX. No. 13.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1811. [Price 1s.

"There is now nothing that the Prince may wish to do for any one *attached to his person* (so that the party to be served *meddle not with politics*), which will not be readily and cheerfully done. Nay, I should not wonder, if Mr. Tierney and another or two were to be admitted into the buildings at Whitehall; but, as for the Ministry-Makers, the men of "*stake*," never will they again put their noses into those buildings. "But, at the end of a year, the Restrictions will expire." So they will; but, a year is a *long while*: many things happen in a year; and if all other matters hold together till February next, Mr. Perceval must be a very lame man indeed if he be not then more powerful than he now is, and if the Prince have not much *stronger reasons* for keeping him than he had for choosing him."—POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. XIX. page 311, Feb. 6, 1811.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

COL. M'MAHON'S SINECURE. — For now nearly twenty years the people of this "*most thinking nation*," as the sinecure placeman, Lord Stormont, once called them, at the beginning of the French Revolution; for now nearly twenty years, this most thinking people have been told, that it is necessary for them to give their money freely, in order to save them and their dear wives and children from the horrible effects of Jacobinical principles, from confusion and uproar, from robbery, violation and murder, and, what has been still more loudly insisted on, from *atheism*. It was very difficult, to be sure, for any people to see in *what way* their giving their money could preserve them from *atheism*. Yet, this thinking, this "*most thinking nation*" do seem to have believed the fact; and, I trust, that our children, in speaking of it, will not forbear from those expressions of contempt, for which so degrading a fact, a fact so disgraceful to human intellect, calls with so audible a voice. Yes, let it be remembered; let it be told through the world; and let it be handed down to posterity, that the people of England were told by Old George Rose and many others, who were receiving large sums annually out of the public money in the way of sinecures and pensions; that by these men the people of England were unblushingly told, that, to preserve them and their children from *atheism*, they must continue to make *pecuniary sacrifices*; and, Oh! indelible disgrace! the people of England, or, at least, many of them, believed what was thus told them; or, which is still worse, they affected to believe it, in order to disguise their baseness in keeping silence under such an abominable insult.—And yet we affect to despise those who give *priests* money to say masses for them: we affect

to laugh at those who give their money at the shrines of Saints, with a view of thereby obtaining safety to their souls. But, is there in this any thing so absurd, so despicably stupid, so wretchedly base, as for a whole nation, or, at least, a great majority of it, to believe, or affect to believe, that it was necessary to give immense sums of money to sinecure placemen and pensioners, in order to preserve the nation in the enjoyment (to use a phrase of Old George Rose) of "*the blessed comforts of religion*?" George, who was, I believe, about thirty years ago, a purser of a man of war, now, together with one of his sons, receives from the public, upwards of TEN THOUSAND POUNDS a year. They have been in the receipt of a sum equal to this for nearly twenty years past; and a considerable portion of it is to be paid them *for life*; George, who has, during the war against France, written upon the subject of politics, has, in these his writings, told the most thinking people of England, that, they had their choice, either to make *great pecuniary sacrifices*, or, to be *deprived of the blessed comforts of religion*, and to be made *atheists*: that is to say, that if they did not give their money freely, they would be damned to all eternity.—This is the fair, the clear, the indubitable meaning of that part of his writings which I here allude to; and which I would quote at full length, had I not done it so lately, in my letters to the People of Salisbury.—George may have done no more than many others, and no more than is done by every Methodist Preacher who wants to live well upon the labour of his truly sheep-like flock. But, what shall be said of the people of England, who *believed* him, or *affected* to believe him? What shall be said of their stupidity, or their baseness? The little child, in Somersetshire, who

lately gave a *Witch* money to prevent her from tormenting her, is not to be laughed at by "this *most thinking* people;" and, indeed, I can form an idea of no folly, of no stupidity, of no baseness, equal to this belief, or affectation of belief, on the part of the people of England.—Let us take one more look backward before we go forward.—The people of France, whom we had, for ages, called *slaves*, had risen upon their masters. They had declared that they would no longer be slaves. They had refused any longer to be compelled to bake their bread at other men's ovens and to pay a toll for it. The poor had refused to make the roads, without being paid for it, for the rich to ride upon. The farmer and the land-owner had resolved to kill game upon their own property and possessions without being liable to be punished for it, and they had also resolved that others should no longer come there and kill their game and destroy their property with impunity. The people of France had resolved no longer to give one tenth part of all the fruits of the earth to priests and monks. These resolutions were no sooner known in England, than, by some, a cry was set up, that the French were about to *destroy all religion, and social order, and to make all the world Atheists!* There seemed to be no connection between the two things. It seemed not to be at all necessary, that Atheism should be the consequence of an abolition of feudal tyranny and ecclesiastical exactions; but the most thinking people of England were persuaded to believe that this consequence was a necessary one, and they acted accordingly. They have, from that day to this been carrying on a war against France, which war, though its object was changed, was *begun* as a war against principles, as a war against Atheism, as a war, to use the words of George Rose, for the preservation of "*the blessed comforts of religion.*"—The consequences of having thus acted are now before us and are fast coming upon us. This war, from sixteen millions a year, has swelled our taxes to seventy millions a year. It has spread misery amongst the poor from one end of the kingdom to the other. It has caused many thousands of the most industrious and enterprising people to emigrate from the country. It has caused the current coin of the realm to give place to a degraded paper currency. It has, in short, been productive of every evil that a nation can experience.—In looking forward, I should have been happy

to be able to say that I saw a prospect of a change of system; but truth compels me to say, that I now see no such prospect.—When his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales was constituted Regent, all the persons with whom I had an opportunity of conversing upon the subject, were very anxious in their hopes that great changes might be expected. They saw in the character of the Prince, generally, what they regarded as good grounds of such an expectation. They had, indeed, no proof that he would adopt a new system; but they thought, that experience, that what he himself had seen; they thought that what has passed upon the continent of Europe held forth such a lesson to him, that, together with what they regarded as the bent of his own disposition, a very material change must take place. At any rate they thought it fair and just not to be too hasty in expressing any fears that should arise of his pursuing the old system. They thought it just to give him full time, and to make due allowances for the difficulties of his situation.—But, though they expected little from him during the continuance of the restrictions; though they expected nothing of any consequence to be *done*, they had a right to expect, that every new thing which essentially partook of the present system, would, as far as lay with the Prince, be left *undone*.—It was with no less grief than surprise, therefore, that they saw, amongst the first of the Prince's acts, the restoration of the Duke of York to his former situation. In this restoration they thought they perceived a sort of earnest of what they had to expect in future; but still, it was the first act of hostility to their wishes, and they were willing, if possible, to consider it rather as the offspring of fraternal affection than as that of political system. But, when they saw the heir of Lord Melville, which heir had always belonged to the set of men at present in power; when they saw this man made the successor of his father in his sinecure places; when they saw this and looked back to the history of Lord Melville and considered what he had done to the country, it brought into their minds Pitt and the whole system, and they could not help fearing, that, by this act, his Royal Highness had irrevocably declared himself the supporter of that system.—If, however, they still doubted, could they possibly doubt, after the appointment of Colonel M' Mahon? In the case of the Duke of York, the boon was to a Brother, and though the relation ought

to be sunk in the Sovereign, the triumph of the former will, except in very monstrous cases, be excused. In the case of Lord Melville it might be said that the Prince yielded to the importunities of the ministry; that it was a place destined to be the reward of political men; and, in short, that, to give it contrary to the wishes of the ministry, would have been the same thing as to quarrel with the ministry and turn them out, or rather worse. These are pitiful excuses for such an act; pitiful as they are, however, there are none such to offer for the appointment of Colonel M^r Mahon, who, it is well known, has been an attendant about the Prince's person for a great number of years; who would not, therefore, have accepted of the office without the Prince's cordial approbation, and who, indeed, must have been selected for the office by the Prince himself; or, at least, the circumstances of the case are such as fairly to warrant this conclusion. This being the case, the appointment is a pretty fair criterion of what the nation has to expect, in this way, at least, at the hands of his Royal Highness. Let us, then, enquire, what is the nature of this office, which has been given to Colonel M^r Mahon, what are the profits of it, and what are his pretensions to it.—The title of the office is that of Paymaster of Widows Pensions. The widows of officers who are killed in the land service have certain pensions allowed them as mentioned in the note below.* These pensions are paid out of money voted annually by the House

* Rates of Annual Pension to the Widows of Officers of the Land Forces; the same to commence from the 25th of June, 1806.

	£.	s.	d.
Colonel.....	80	0	0
Lieutenant Colonel.....	60	0	0
Major.....	50	0	0
Captain.....	40	0	0
First Lieutenant.....	30	0	0
Second Ditto.....	26	0	0
Cornet.....	26	0	0
Ensign.....	26	0	0
Paymaster.....	30	0	0
Adjutant.....	30	0	0
Quarter Master.....	26	0	0
Surgeon.....	30	0	0
Assistant Surgeon.....	26	0	0
Veterinary Surgeon.....	20	0	0
Chaplain.....	20	0	0
Physician dying subsequently to the 24th June, 1806, after having served abroad as such	40	0	0

of Commons, at the same time that the pay is voted for the army. The pensions are paid at the War-office by a clerk upon the establishment of that War-office, who receives *one hundred pounds* a year, for transacting the whole of the business.—Yet, strange to tell! Or, at least, it would be strange to tell, in any other country but this, there are a *Paymaster* and a *Deputy Paymaster*, neither of whom performs any duty whatever connected with this office, or, at most, the deputy, alone, has any thing at all to do with it. The deputy, which is odd enough, is not paid by the paymaster himself, but by the *public*, and the paymaster has only to pay one of the clerks in the War-office, who, as I said before, really does all the business.—This post, then, of Paymaster of Widows Pensions, is a complete sinecure; that is to say, it is a name of a place made use of for the purpose of giving a man so much a year out of the public money for doing nothing at all. And now let us see, then, *how much* it is that Colonel M^r Mahon is to have annually. Last year, General Fox, who had the office from his *childhood* to the day of his death; General Fox, (the brother of Mr. Fox) who held the place, and sucked in its profits from the first year of the King's reign to the fifty-first year of his reign, and who is now succeeded by Colonel M^r Mahon; General Fox, during the last year, sucked in a neat two thousand seven hundred pounds, from this office, while, at the same time, he had a most lucrative command abroad.—The profits of the office vary with the number of widows, who, of course, increase in proportion to the increase of the army, and the number and destructiveness of the battles, in which that army is engaged, or in proportion to the success of hardships and disease. That these profits have gone on

Physician having died previously to the 25th June, 1806, or dying on or subsequently without having served abroad as such.....	30	0	0
Purveyor.....	30	0	0
District Paymaster.....	30	0	0
Surgeon.....	30	0	0
Apothecary.....	26	0	0
Deputy Purveyor.....	20	0	0
Hospital Mate who has served abroad as such.....	20	0	0
Commissary at 20s. per Day...	30	0	0
Ditto at 15s. ditto.....	26	0	0
Ditto at 10s. ditto.....	20	0	0

increasing need not, therefore, be asserted when one considers the state of the army and the events of the war. Three years ago the number of widows of officers in the army was 1,400. Now, in all probability, the number may surpass 2,000. And this suggests a remark not wholly inapplicable to the subject; and that is, that, if we reckon 20 non-commissioned officers, drummers and private soldiers to every commissioned officer in the army, and take the number of commissioned officers at 12,000, which is not far from the mark, we shall find, that there are, at this time, in this kingdom, not less than 40,000 women, the widows of non-commissioned officers, drummers and soldiers; unless, indeed, we suppose, that the soldiers marry less than the commissioned officers. Say, then, there is but half the number; say there are only 20,000 widows; and then bear in mind that the far greater part of them have been made widows by a war begun against the Republicans in France, lest they should spread anarchy and misery over the dominions of Great Britain!—The profits of the office vary, then, with the number of widows, because the Paymaster receives a shilling in the pound upon the sum paid to the widows. There has been a mistake as to the source of this poundage. It is not taken from the pensions of the widows, who receive the amount of their pensions without any deduction (other than that fearful deduction which the *paper money* is daily making) but is paid by the public, upon the sum voted on this account in each year. For the present year 58,000*l.* has been voted, and, of course, the profits of the Paymaster will amount to 2,900*l.* except one hundred pounds which he will have to pay to that particular clerk of the war office, who does the duty. The Paymaster's deputy receives his hundred pounds from the public, out of the sum voted annually for the service; so that the real profits of Colonel M' Mahon will be 2,800*l.*—This is a pretty good sum of money as it now stands; but if we take into view what the battle of Albuera, the battle of Almeida, the siege of Badajoz, the battle of Barrosa, and the diseases of the peninsula have done for the Paymaster, we shall find him placed, in point of income, upon a level with some Peers; and above great numbers of country gentlemen of ancient families. The longer the war continues and the more destructive its progress, the longer and

the more will Colonel M' Mahon continue to thrive; and if the war were to continue upon its present scale for only a few years, the profits of this office would probably amount to 5,000*l.* a year.—But, as it is, we may well enquire *what Colonel M' Mahon has done*, to entitle him to such an income from the public purse, granted him for life. I shall be told, perhaps, that it is not granted him for life, and only to the time when the restrictions upon the Regent will cease. But, my answer is, that it has been granted by the Prince for as long a time as his Royal Highness has the power to grant it. I say that he has done all that he *can* do, with respect to the perpetuating this burthen upon the people. There is no man in his senses, who, when he views all the circumstances of the case, will affect to believe, that the grant will not be continued at the termination of the restrictions. Every one must perceive that this will be the case; but, whether it be or not, I repeat, that the Prince has done all he *can*, all that he has the power to do, in the perpetuating of this burthen, and, which I regard as of much greater consequence, he has, unfortunately, done all he can to give countenance to that system which has been fostered and maintained by appointments like that, which is the subject of these observations.—What, to return to my question, has this Colonel M' Mahon done, then, to merit this large sum of money, this splendid income, this income equal to that, I believe, of twenty Captains in the army, and equal to that of seventy Captains widows; what has he done, I say, to merit this at the hands of the people of England, who are never backward, God knows, either in acknowledging or rewarding services of men in the public employ? What has he done; where are we to look for the record of his services? For many years he has been an attendant upon the person of the Prince. He has been a servant, very likely an obedient and faithful servant, in the household of His Royal Highness; and, doubtless, the Prince deemed him worthy of some reward. But, Mr. M' Mahon has been an officer in the army all this while. He has not been losing his time. His rise in the army has gone on, and we may be sure it has not advanced less slowly on account of his being so near the fountain of favour. What he has gained, in the way of promotion, which, let it be observed, has been accompanied with a corresponding augmentation of pay; what he has thus

gained, has been gained without any risk of life or of health; without any hardship to undergo; without any losses from being sent to this place or that place. In short, he has gradually risen in the army; his pay has been gradually augmenting, and during the time he has enjoyed all the advantages and all the pleasures attendant upon a state of life, which leaves a man nothing to wish for.—Here, I think, we shall find an ample compensation for any services that he can have rendered to his Royal Master; but, at any rate, be those services what they may, they are *utterly unknown to the public*, and, therefore, to the public it appears to me he ought not to have come for a reward.—Here I should have stopped, had I not perceived that some endeavours have been made by the *out* party, through their paper, the *Morning Chronicle*, to ascribe this extraordinary grant *solely to the ministers*. Such endeavours only tend to expose the insincerity and the meanness of those who make use of them. Why should the ministers select Colonel M' Mahon? He has never been a partizan of theirs. I am aware, that, if their object was to prevail upon the Prince to perpetuate this burthen upon the people, and thus give his countenance to these grants so much complained of; I am aware, that if this was their object, they would be likely enough to chuse a favourite of the Prince on whom to confer the grant. But, it is to degrade the Prince, it is to undervalue his intellect, it is to consider him in a light, which, from respect to His Royal Highness, I forbear to describe; it is to commit the greatest possible outrage upon his character to suppose that his consent was *inveigled* from him upon this occasion: it is to strip the act of its only possible apology, namely, the grateful remembrance of past private services; it is to do all this to ascribe the grant to the insidious influence of the ministers. And what has been said of the motives of Colonel M' Mahon in accepting the grant; the supposition of the *Morning Chronicle* that the Colonel would naturally advise his Royal Master thus: "Sir, you have said that, from filial tenderness towards your Royal Father, and, from dutious attention to your Royal Mother, you will make no changes in the ministry, at least, that you will not do it while there is the smallest chance of your Royal Father's recovery, lest, upon his being happily restored to the use of his Royal faculties, grief at seeing his

"chosen servants displaced should re-plunge him into that state from which, with the assistance of Divine Providence, we may be permitted humbly to hope to see him raised. Now, Sir, how stands the case? The ministers advise you to grant me the place of Paymaster of Widow's Pensions; worth about three thousand pounds a year more or less. Your Royal Highness, if you were to consent nothing but your own wishes, would abolish the place; but, to abolish the place under these circumstances would be to reject the advice of the ministers; to reject the advice of the ministers, would, in fact, be to turn them out of their places; and thus, your Royal Highness would wholly depart from that rule of conduct, which your amiable disposition has, upon the grounds just stated, led you to prescribe to yourself. And, therefore, Sir, whatever pain I may individually experience upon the occasion, I cannot, as a faithful servant to your Royal Highness, and as tenderly alive to your character for consistency, refrain from advising you to yield to the advice of your ministers."

—The words in the *Morning Chronicle* are not precisely these: but the sense, if I may be permitted to call it so, is exactly as I have here given it; and if the reader, or any body else, can find any thing more despicably hypocritical, I should be very much obliged to them if they would point it out to me; but, at present, I must regard this as the master-piece of its kind.—The truth is that the *Out* party are in a most forlorn condition. The present men have beat them in all ways whatever. The Prince, from whom the *Outs* expected so much, has left them for their rivals, whom he finds surrounded by all the old adherents of Pitt, by all the Anti Jacobins, by all the weak-minded and long-pursed part of the community, by all those most thinking people who think that Buonaparté eats children and drinks the blood of their fathers and mothers, by all the innumerable swarms of tax-gatherers and dependants of every description, making a good half of the talking part of the nation; while, on the side of the *Outs*, he sees nobody but their own greedy relations; the *independent part of the people* being all for that *reform* in the Commons House of Parliament, which would be still more destructive, if possible, to the *Outs* than to their opponents, the former having even greater quantities of sinecures in their possession

than the latter. Both parties wish to preserve the *system*; both parties are alike anxious to thwart and defeat every project of Reform; and, as long as this is the case, both parties will stand upon the same footing in eyes of the independent part of the nation, who will not be persuaded to stir one inch or to utter one word in behalf of either.—It was the height of indiscretion in the *Outs* to say a word against this grant to Colonel M'Mahon. He, to be sure, has his thousands; but have not they their tens of thousands; and did they, while they were in place, take any measure to relieve the people from any of these burthens? No: they disappointed the people, they mocked the people, they showed that they despised the people. They fell; and they fell like Lucifer, never to rise again. They would fain retrieve the ground that they lost; they would fain call in the people to their assistance; they would fain once more talk of Reform. But *talking* will, they are aware, no longer serve their turn; the people are not again to be gulled by promises and professions; nothing short of *actions* will satisfy them now; nothing short of real Reform, a real Reformation of the Commons House of Parliament, and such a Reform the *Outs* well know would strip them of those thousands and hundreds of thousands of the public money, which constitute the great object of their pursuit.—This the ministry know very well, and, knowing it, they are not at all afraid to advise grants like that to Colonel M'Mahon. They give such advice upon what is called their responsibility, and they know well the situation and the interests of the parties who alone, in the present state of things, can call them to account.—In the passage, which I have taken for my motto, I *told the fortune* of the *Outs*, and though they laughed at me then, I should suppose, in spite of their insatiation, they would now begin to think that I was right. More than four months ago, the *Courier* news-paper, and other prints of the same stamp, began to talk a new sort of language about the state of the King. They no longer appeared to have any hopes of his recovery. They gave the world the most melancholy and even disgusting descriptions. This shewed which way the tide was setting. Before the parliament separated, we saw Mr. SHERIDAN figuring away *against the principles of the Bullion Report*, and, I was well informed, at the time, that, the language of the old

adherents of the Prince was almost that of open hostility against those who questioned the wisdom of Lord Stanhope's Bill.—This was quite enough, and more than quite enough to satisfy any reasonable man, that the ministry and the Prince were resolved not to part; and the grant to Colonel M'Mahon only serves to confirm what ought before to have been believed.—But, amidst all this, what is to become of the country? "*The Country!*" say the people at Whitehall, "why, was it "ever in a more *flourishing* state? and, as "to the war, have we not taken one of "*Buonaparté's Great Praams?*"

THE GREAT PRAAM.—In another part of this Number, the reader will find the Official Report of Captain Carteret, relative to an engagement off Boulogne, which ended in the capture of a French Vessel, called a Praam. The statement of the Captain is circumstantial and clear, the latter a quality very well worthy of imitation by our land officers.—The affair, though little in itself, is of great importance if considered as showing what the French boats are capable of when engaged with our vessels of war. I am by no means disposed to under-rate the value of the exertions of our officers and their crews upon this occasion, where they appear to have discovered as much skill as courage, and a great deal of both. But, I cannot disguise from myself the fact, that these gun-boats have shown, that they are not such *contemptible* things as they have been so often represented to be. There were, it seems, *scores* of them, and *four* of our vessels; some of the latter small indeed, but one of them a *frigate*; and, from what we have frequently been told of these boats, one frigate would appear to be sufficient to destroy a score or two of them. This now seems to have been disproved. The boats make resistance. A frigate is, indeed, too much for one, or, perhaps, two of them; but, they *resist*; they make battle; and that is doing much more than was expected. It is right, therefore, for us to be upon our guard as to this matter; for, if even a score of them be a match for one of our ships of the line, we may be assured, that, in time, and sooner than may be thought, scores of them will not be wanted. They are things that require little time in the construction, and less skill in the management. They are a sort of floating batteries; and, if they should be found capable of resisting our vessels for

any length of time, the effect of them is a thing certainly to be feared, unless timely measures are taken to render this mode of attack abortive. What those measures are, however, I must leave to the wisdom of our War-Minister and our Commander in Chief, who understand, or, at least, ought to understand, these matters much better than I do. *How* Captain Carteret came to be able to know so exactly where "*that Personage*" (why so shy of naming him?) was, it is not for me to say; but, his account falls, in this respect, very short of that of our news-papers, who gave us an account of the very words and even gestures of "*that personage*," upon this occasion; and they told us, that he caused the guns of the batteries to be fired upon his own vessels, by way of punishing them for their retreat!—The Morning Chronicle of the 26th instant has published a *subricated* paper, entitled "*the French account of the Battle of Boulogne*;" an *Impositor Paper*, full as foolish as the one lately fabricated and published by the Courier. Our press is free to utter *falshoods* at any rate, provided they be of a *palatable* sort.

AMERICAN FRIGATE.—Last week there was, on foot, a rumour of the American Frigate, President, Captain Rogers, having been captured by the English Frigate, the *Melampus*, and taken into Halifax. The whole story, which was very circumstantial, has now been acknowledged to be false; but, the remarks of the hiring writers upon the subject ought not to be forgotten. On the 21st instant, the Courier newspaper (who praises the teacherous Smith, late American Secretary of State) said: "Nothing, we must say, could give us *more pleasure* than the capture of Rogers." And, on the 23rd instant, the same paper said: "A very *general satisfaction* was produced on Saturday, by the report of the capture of the "*American frigate President*."—It is but justice to the public to say, that this was *false*; and, that, so far from *general satisfaction*, *general apprehension* was the effect of the report. From these wishes and assertions, however, the American government and people will know what they ought to think of those, from whom they have proceeded. And, it may not be amiss for Mr. TIMOTHY PICKERING to be informed, that the very same writers, in England, who applaud his and ROBERT SMITH's attacks upon Mr. MADISON; these very same persons express their joy at the

supposed capture of an American Frigate and at the disgrace of the American flag. As to Robert Smith, he seems to be lost to every sentiment of honour and of common honesty: he has no character to lose; he manifestly cares nothing for his country. But, Mr. Pickering is an honest man; a man who, I believe, sincerely loves his country, and would, as he has done before, stake his life in defence of her liberties. I knew him very well; I had many opportunities of knowing his sentiments; I always saw in his actions proof of great public spirit and of the strongest attachment to his native country and to public liberty; and, as I am convinced, that he is still the same excellent man, I beg him (if this should happen to have the honour to meet his eye) to observe, that his present writings are applauded and fostered in England, by those, and those only, who are the bitterest enemies of public liberty all over the world, and who hate America chiefly because her institutions and the happiness of her people are living and permanent evidences against their intolerant and tyrannical principles. The instance I have given above ought to suffice: it ought to be sufficient for Mr. Pickering to know, that his letters are carefully republished and his efforts highly praised by that same hiring print, which openly exulted at the news of the capture of an American Frigate and the disgrace of the American Flag.

SICILY.—There was a time when a war, such as we are, and have long been, carrying on in this island, would have attracted a good deal of public attention. But, I do not know how it is, though we maintain, at an enormous expence, an army of from 12 to 20 thousand men in Sicily, the public seem to know little and to care less about what is there going on.—To read the letters, or pretended letters, in our news-papers, as relating to Sicily, one would naturally be led to suppose, that we were there in an *enemy's* country, instead of being there for the purpose of defending the country *against an enemy*.—I will take a little specimen from my friend the Courier of last night: "You will perhaps be surprised to hear that a Greek vessel, with a British licence, and which was brought into this port the 15th of May, by three Sicilian privateers, after the Owner (Mr. R. Campbell) and the crew had been turned *adrift at sea* and left to the mercy of the waves, has been condemned,

"and thus *British licenses declared useless and null*. During the night of the 19th and 20th inst. five of the first Barons in the land, viz. Princes Belmonte, Villanosa, Villafranca, Augio, and Jaci, who *have been considered firmly attached to the British interest, and highly respected by the people*, were seized in their beds and carried on board a Sicilian Corvette, which sailed with them immediately for the desert Island of Pantelleria. A dispatch has been laid before the King for his signature, giving to the Cav. Castiani, the liberty of ordering away any foreigners who have not been ten years established in the country, whom he should think unfit subjects. The King required forty-eight hours to reflect thereon, and during this interval Lord Wm. Bentinck fortunately arrived. He is to be presented at Court to-morrow; we hope that his instructions are *strong and positive*."—Now, what can all this mean? British licenses declared null! The friends of England seized in their beds and packed off to a desert Island! Hopes of Lord Wm. Bentinck having strong and positive instructions! About *what*, I should be glad to know? Why, our government used to be upon a most cordial footing with the king and queen of Sicily, who were amongst the most zealous of their allies during the Anti-jacobin war. All the world must remember how cordially they co-operated at the time of the counter-revolution at Naples in 1799, when Lady Hamilton and her husband and Lord Nelson were in the Bay of Naples with the King and Queen of Sicily. All the world knows, how cordially they then co-operated; and, what can have disturbed their harmony now? There are men of the very same school, nay, mostly the very same men, in power in England now that were in power then. I can, for my part, see nothing that should render it probable that the *Queen of Naples*, whom the newspapers sometimes describes as disliking us, should dislike the Wellesleys and the Jenkinson and the Percevals, whom, on the contrary, I should suppose to be, of all men, the most likely to stand high in her esteem. Indeed, I can see nothing for her to object to, either in the members or system of our government.—It is, however, a strange state of things that we are got into. At Cadiz our minister is complaining that the *people* write and talk against our King and government and arraign their motives; and, at Palermo, if these newspapers

speak truth, our minister is expected to complain of the conduct of the *court*. And, yet, in both cases, we are keeping up armies to defend those who are accused of using us ill!—As to the *fate* of Sicily, the reader will, perhaps, recollect, that the Emperor Napoleon finally decided upon it on the 27th of Dec. 1805, in a proclamation to his army, dated at Schoenbrunn. In a few weeks after that, the king, queen and courtiers, together with the English army, under Sir James Craig, who had been sent to defend the country against the French, or to assist in doing it, thought it prudent to betake themselves to the shipping and to get off to Sicily. Napoleon said that the Dynasty of Naples had ceased to reign; and, he is a man very apt to make good his sayings. They have, however, not yet ceased to reign in Sicily; and, it is possible, that they may not. But, the question is, should we *refuse peace*, unless Sicily were preserved to that family? Are we prepared to say, that we will, on no account, sheath the sword unless Sicily be left in the hands of the reigning people? This is the question; because, if we are not prepared to say this, the court of Palermo play a ticklish game; and, if we are prepared to say it, we may safely count upon a war of a comfortable duration.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
27th September, 1811.

PAPER SYSTEM.

Article translated from a German Print, published in the London newspapers on the 24th Sept. 1811.

The financial measures of which the English Ministers procured the adoption in Parliament, during its last session, are of a character so singular, that they cannot escape general attention. We perceive in them,—*The creation of a paper-money*, by giving bank notes a forced circulation (1);—*The abolition of the law which imposed on the Bank the obligation to recommence its payments in specie two years after a peace*. This is a necessary consequence of

(1, 2) See Lord Stanhope's Bill on the circulation of gold and that of bank notes, agreed to on the 8th of July by the House of Lords, and on the 19th by the Commons, and the debates which took place in Parliament on that occasion, in different numbers of the Journal de l'Empire.

the preceding measure; for bank notes become representative signs, are no longer susceptible of conversion into specie; a thing, besides, impossible, when we consider the numerous issues of notes that will take place in rapid succession (2);—*The depreciation of the Coin.* The pound is actually coined at 16s. instead of 20s. a measure evidently adopted, in order to place gold and silver on a level with the existing value of bank notes, which are at a discount of 20 per cent. The export of gold and silver is thus hoped to be prevented; for, according to the old proportion between gold and notes, 5*l.* in notes may be purchased for 4*l.* sterling in gold.—*The solemn declaration*, that England, being no longer able to pay off her debts, must confine herself to securing the payment of the interest; which is, in effect, saying to the English,—If you mean to receive the interest of the funds lent to Government, you must accept of paper money (3).—The necessary result of these data is,—that the English Ministers have changed their system of finance, and propose that the system of loans should give place to that of paper money.—All enlightened men have foreseen that the infallible and combined system upon which the French Government pursues its attack on English monopoly, must sooner or later sap the system of loans in its very basis,—public credit. Its predictions have been strikingly accomplished; the facts which we have enumerated leave no doubt of it, and equal the most brilliant victories which could have been obtained. The acknowledgments torn from the English Ministers themselves are real *spolia opima*; for they are a conquest gained over what the English hold most dear,—their credit.—But what were the events which convinced Ministers that their credit began to fail, and that it was time to abandon a system which no longer had any support? The Ministers are silent; let us endeavour to penetrate the darkness in which they love to wrap themselves.—It is well known that the English Government employed the house of Goldschmit, of London, to negotiate its loans in the Stock Exchange, and to exchange them for money. Goldschmit advanced to Government considerable sums in money, and in bills of exchange, payable at the times when he depended on receiving from Government the

funds which he had advanced. But whether the loan proved unsuccessful, or Government was under the absolute necessity of otherwise employing the funds destined for the payment of their banker, Goldschmit failed to receive them at the time agreed upon, and found it impossible to pay his bills of exchange, and satisfy the bankers who had assisted him with their advances. There was only one resource left him; that was, to expose the inability of Government, and to demand a delay; but what a scandal, what humiliation, for the ministry! Goldschmit preferred taking the shame of the event upon himself, in order to save, if possible, the honour of the Government at the expense of his personal credit.—The English Ministers, having escaped, as it were, by a miracle from a danger so imminent, perceived that there would be too much risk in any longer making the movements of the machine of politics depend upon springs which were worn out by long friction. A second embarrassment of the same sort with that from which the heroic devotedness of Goldschmit delivered them might prove fatal, because the bankers would be more cautious in their advances, and it was not probable that a second Codrus would step in to save them.—The matter then was, to replace the borrowing system by another. There are only three modes of providing for the wants of a state. 1st. By a good organization of the system of contributions and imposts: but this system, pursued by France, would have been insufficient for a government whose pretensions are so greatly beyond its natural resources: to adopt this system, the safest of all, it would be necessary for England to renounce her usurping claims. 2nd. By loans; but they require credit, and England has just experienced that the most extensive credit has its limits. 3rd. By the creation of a paper money. As this was the only expedient that remained to the English Government, it had no other choice left, and Parliament adopted this system contrary to its own convictions.—Such has been at all times the financial career of weak Governments: they borrow when their expenses exceed their ordinary income, and they create a paper money when they can no longer find credit for their loans. For some months the English Government will experience no great difficulty in meeting its enormous expenditure; but is there in all Europe, and even in England, one rational being who does not foresee where

(3) See the debates in Parliament when the Budget was brought forward.

such a system must end? Is it not evident that the paper money drives specie out of circulation; and that this exclusion, with the always increasing wants of a Government bent on chimerical enterprizes, must indefinitely augment the issues of paper money, and thus accelerate its fall? Have not the Ministers themselves announced it, when, to this question, "What will set bounds in future to the issue of notes?" they replied, "Our wants!" (4).—If, on the one hand, paper money may lend an apparent strength to Governments, it does nothing more but augment their embarrassment for the future, and they arrive by rapid strides at the fourth financial catastrophe,—bankruptcy. The eternal laws, which secure the preponderance of the real over the chimerical, will not permit, for the first time, an exception in favour of England: she will be reduced to bankruptcy, by the very extent of her efforts, sooner than any other nation. *Lord Stanhope* may maintain as long as he pleases, "that to consider gold as the only legal money, is an idea worthy of barbarous times." *Sheridan* may exclaim, "it is only in countries where there is no credit, that paper must be replaced with specie." These declamations will not restore to bank notes that credit which they have lost since the Bank ceased to pay in specie.—England seems to reckon upon bankruptcy as a last resource. Let her not hope for safety in this expedient! *National bankruptcy is the situation in which a nation, deprived of all means of credit, is reduced to its own physical force; it is a resource which brings into play all the springs inherent in a machine, but which at the same time destroys all such as were only fictitious and imaginary. It is in such a moment that a nation shows all its physical power, and all that it is entitled to pretend to. Deprived of her credit, England will be obliged to combat with her naked arms,—that is, with all the force which her territory can furnish; and then the contest will not be long doubtful between a nation of fourteen millions of men, and ninety millions of men inhabiting the Continent.—England cannot console herself by the example of Revolutionary France. France then numbered about 30 millions of inhabitants, and had all her resources within herself; she exercised a natural*

(4) See the exposition of the situation of the Bank of England, in the *Journal de L'Empire* of the 14th of April.

preponderance upon the Continent, and even then required a tutelary hand to draw her out of the crisis in which she was placed. England, on the other hand, excluded from the Continent, is unable to do without it.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ENGLAND.—*Capture of a GREAT French PRAAM.—Letters from Capt. Carteret to Adm. Foley, dated, Naiad, off Boulogne, 21 Sept. 1811.*

7 o'clock, Morning.

SIR,—Yesterday morning, while this ship was lying at an anchor off this place, much bustle was observed among the enemy's flotilla, moored along shore close under the batteries of their bay, which appeared to indicate that some affair of unusual moment was in agitation. At about noon, *Buonaparté*, in a barge, accompanied by several other officers, was distinctly seen to proceed along their line to the centre ship, which immediately hoisted the imperial standard at the main, and lowered it at his departure, substituting for it a Rear Admiral's flag; he afterwards visited others, and then continued in his boat for the rest of the evening.—Since it is so much within the well known custom of that personage to adopt measures that confer supposed eclat on his presence, I concluded that something of that kind was about to take place. Accordingly, seven praams, each having twelve 24 pounders, long guns, with 120 men, and commanded by Rear Admiral Baste, weighed and stood towards this ship, being expressly ordered by the French Ruler, as I have since learned, to attack us. As the wind was S. W. with a very strong flood-tide setting to the N. E. while the enemy bore nearly south from us, it was clear that by weighing we could only increase our distance from him; so that our only chance of closing with him at all was by remaining at an anchor.—The *Naiad*, therefore, quietly awaited his attack in that position, with springs on her cable.—It was exclusively in the enemy's own power to choose the distance: each ship of his squadron stood within gun shot, gave us successively her broadsides, tacked from us, and in that mode continuously repeated the attack. After this had so continued for three quarters of an hour, ten brigs (said to have four long 24 pounders), and one sloop (said to have two such guns), also weighed, and joined the ships in oc-

casionally cannonading us, which was thus kept up for upwards of two hours without intermission, and returned; I humbly hope, with sufficient effect by this ship.—At slack water the Naiad weighed her anchor, and stood off, partly to repair some trivial damages, but chiefly, by getting to windward, to be better enabled to close with the enemy, and get within shore of some, at least, of his flotilla. After standing off a short time, the Naiad tacked, and made all sail towards them; but at about sunset it became calm; when the enemy took up his anchorage under the batteries eastward of Boulogne, while the Naiad resumed her's in her former position.—In this affair not a British subject was hurt, and the damages sustained by this ship are too trifling for me to mention or report. I have indeed to apologize for dwelling so long on this affair, but my motive is the manner in which I understand it has been magnified by the enemy, and the extraordinary commendations which have been lavished on the Frenchmen engaged in it by their Ruler. It is fitting, therefore, that his Majesty's Government should know the real state of the case, and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may rest assured, that every officer and man on board the Naiad did zealously and steadily fulfil his duty.—I have the honour to be, &c. PHILIP CARTERET, *Capt.*

Afternoon.

Sir—This morning, at seven o'clock, that part of the enemy's flotilla which was anchored to the eastward of Boulogne, consisting of seven praams and fifteen smaller vessels, chiefly brigs, weighed and stood out on the larboard tack, the wind being S. W., apparently to renew the same kind of distant cannonade which took place yesterday. Different, however, from yesterday, there was now a weather tide. The Naiad, therefore, weighed, and getting well to windward, joined his Majesty's brigs Rinaldo, Redpole, and Castilian, with the Viper cutter, who had all zealously turned to windward in the course of the night, to support the Naiad in the expected conflict. We all lay to on the larboard tack, gradually drawing off shore, in the hope of imperceptibly inducing the enemy also to withdraw farther from the protection of his formidable batteries.—To make known the senior officer's intentions, no other signals were deemed necessary, but "to prepare to attack the enemy's van," then standing out, led by Rear-Admiral

Baste, and "not to fire until quite close to the enemy."—Accordingly the moment the French Admiral tacked in shore, having reached his utmost distance, and was giving us his broadsides, the King's small squadron bore up together with the utmost rapidity, and stood towards the enemy under all the sail each could conveniently carry, receiving a shower of shot and shells from the flotilla and batteries, without returning any, until within pistol-shot, when the firing on both sides his Majesty's cruisers threw the enemy into inextricable confusion. The French Admiral's praam was the principal object of attack by this ship: but as that officer in leading had of course tacked first, and thereby acquired fresh way, and was now under much sail, pushing with great celerity for the batteries, it became impossible to reach him without too greatly hazarding his Majesty's ship. Having however succeeded in separating a praam from him, which had handsomely attempted to succour his Chief, and which I had intended to consign to the particular care of Captains Anderson and McDonald, of the Rinaldo and Redpole, while the Castilian attacked others, it now appeared best preferably to employ this ship in effectually securing her.—The Naiad accordingly ran her on board. Mr. Grant, the Master, lashed her alongside; the small arms men soon cleared her decks, and the boarders, sword in hand, completed her subjugation. Nevertheless, in justice to our brave enemy, it must be observed, that his resistance was most obstinate and gallant, nor did it cease until fairly overpowered by the overwhelming force we so promptly applied. She is named La Ville de Lyons, was commanded by a Mons. Barbaud, was severely wounded, and has on board a Mons. La Coupe, who as Commodore of a division, was entitled to a broad pendant. Like the other praams she has twelve long guns, (24-pounders French), but she had only one hundred and twelve men, sixty of whom were soldiers of the 72d regiment of the line. Between thirty and forty have been killed and wounded.—Meanwhile the three brigs completed the defeat of the enemy's flotilla; but I lament to say that the immediate proximity of the formidable batteries whereunto we had now so nearly approached, prevented the capture or destruction of more of their ships or vessels.—But no blame can attach to any one on this account; for all the Commanders, Officers, and crews did bravely and skil-

fully perform their duty. If I may be permitted to mention those who served more immediately under my own eye, I must eagerly and fully testify to the merits of, and zealous support I received from Mr. Greenlaw, the First Lieutenant of this ship, as well as from all the excellent officers of every description, brave seamen and Royal Marines, whom I have the pride and pleasure of commanding.—I have the honour herewith to inclose reports of our loss, which I rejoice to find so comparatively trivial, and that Lieutenant Charles Cobb, of the Castilian, is the only Officer who has fallen.—I have the honour to be, &c. P. CARTERET, *Captain*.

A List of Officers and Men belonging to his Majesty's ships and vessels undermentioned, killed and wounded in action with the enemy's flotilla off Boulogne, on the 21st Sept. 1811.

NAIAD, Captain Carteret.—John Ross, seaman, killed.—James Draper, seaman, ditto.—Lieutenant William Morgan, Royal Marines, slightly wounded.—Mr. James Dover, Midshipman, ditto.—Richard Lovet, Sail-maker, severely wounded.—William Black, seaman, ditto.—John Wise, Quarter-Master, ditto.—John Leece, seaman, ditto.—John Tully, landman, ditto.—Daniel Francis, landman, ditto.—William Jones, Captain of the after guard, slightly wounded.—William Hodges, seaman, ditto.—John Holston, seaman, ditto.—James Wall (2), seaman, ditto.—Daniel Harley, seaman, ditto.—Edward Humphry, seaman, ditto.

REDPOLE, Captain Macdonald.—None killed or wounded.

CASTILIAN, Captain Brainer.—Lieutenant Cobb, First Lieutenant, killed.—John Collett, landman, severely wounded.

RINALDO, Captain Anderson.—Mr. John Swinard, Pilot, wounded.

FRANCE:—Decree relative to the naturalization of Frenchmen in foreign countries.—August 26, 1811.

Napoleon, by the grace of God, and the Constitutions, Emperor of the French, &c. to all present, and to come, greeting:—Different questions having been submitted to us with regard to the condition of Frenchmen established in foreign countries, we have thought it right to make known our intentions on that subject.—By our Decree of the 6th of April, 1809,

we have already pronounced with regard to such Frenchmen as have borne arms against their country; and those who, residing with a Power with whom we go to war, do not quit its territory; or who, being summoned by us, do not obey that order.—But no law has yet been laid down either with regard to Frenchmen naturalised in foreign countries, with or without our authority, or with regard to such as may have already entered, or choose to enter, in future, into the service of a foreign Power.—And as it is not our wish to confound those of our subjects who are induced from legitimate motives to naturalize themselves abroad, with those whose conduct will assume the character of felony, we have resolved, by these presents, to complete and make known this important branch of legislation.—For these reasons, on the report of our Grand Judge, Minister of Justice, and our Council of State, being heard.—We have decreed and ordered, and do decree and order as follows:—

TITLE I. Of Frenchmen naturalised abroad with our permission.

Art. 1. No Frenchman can be naturalised abroad, without our authority.—2. Our permission shall be granted by letters patent, drawn up by our Grand Judge, signed with our hand, countersigned by our Secretary of State, inspected by our Cousin the Prince Arch Chancellor, inserted in the Bulletin of Laws, and registered in the Imperial Court of the last place or domicile of the person to whom they relate.—3. Frenchmen thus naturalised abroad shall enjoy the right of possessing, of transmitting, and of succeeding to property even when the subjects of the countries where they shall be naturalised do not enjoy those rights in France.—4. The children of a Frenchman born in the country where he is naturalised, are aliens.—5. Frenchmen naturalised abroad even with our permission, can at no time carry arms against France, under pain of being indicted in our Courts, and condemned to the punishment enacted in the Penal Code, Book 3d. cap. 75.

TITLE II.—Of Frenchmen naturalized abroad without our permission.

6. Every Frenchman naturalized abroad without our permission, shall incur the loss of his property, which shall be confiscated; he shall no longer enjoy the right of succession, and all the succession falling

in to him shall pass to the next heir, provided he is domiciliated in France.—By the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th, it is provided, that by a process instituted in the Courts of Justice, such persons shall lose their titles if they have any, together with the property attached to them, which shall devolve to the nearest heir, being French, the rights of the wife being secured, which shall be regulated as in the case of widowhood.—11. Those who are naturalised abroad without permission, and against whom the above process has taken place, it found in the territory of the Empire, shall, for the first time, be arrested and conducted beyond the frontiers; if they return, they shall be condemned to a period of imprisonment not less than a year, nor more than 10 years.

TITLE III.—Of Individuals already naturalised abroad.

12. Individuals naturalised abroad at the period of the publication of this decree may, within a year, if on the Continent of Europe; within three years, if beyond that Continent; within five years, if beyond the Cape of Good Hope and in the Indies, obtain our confirmation according to the forms prescribed in the present decree.

TITLE IV.—Of Frenchmen in the service of a Foreign Power.

13. No Frenchman can enter the service of a foreign Power without our special permission, and except under condition of returning, should we recall him either by a general proclamation or a direct order.—14. Those of our subjects who shall have obtained this permission, cannot take the oaths to the Power which they serve, without a proviso of never bearing arms against France, and of quitting the service, even without being recalled, should that Power happen to go to war with us.—15. The permission of entering the service of a foreign Power shall be granted by letters patent, according to the forms presented in Act 2d.—16. They cannot act as Ministers Plenipotentiary in any treaty where our interests come into discussion.—17. They must not wear a foreign cockade in countries in subjection to us, nor there appear in a foreign uniform; they shall be authorised to wear the national colours when in the Empire.—18. They may nevertheless wear the decoration of foreign orders, when they shall have received them with our consent.

—19. They may not enter France but with our special permission.—20. Frenchmen in the service of a foreign power can never be accredited as Ambassadors, Ministers, or Envoys at our Court, nor received as charged with any kind of mission that would render it necessary for them to appear before us in their foreign costume.—21. Frenchmen entering the service of a Foreign Power, without our permission, and remaining in it after war is declared between France and that Power, shall be considered as having borne arms against us, from the circumstance alone of their having continued to form part of a military corps destined to act against the French empire or its allies.—22. Our Ministers are charged, each in his own department, with the execution of the present decree.—**NAPOLEON.**

FRANCE.—*Decree relative to Books and Printing in the Hanseatic Towns.*—24 Aug. 1811.

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation, &c. &c. &c.—An account having been given of the state of printing and vending of books in the departments of the Hanseatic Towns, of Tuscany, and the Roman States, wishing to reconcile the rights which are guaranteed by our laws and decrees of the literary property of the authors with the interests of our subjects, the booksellers and printers of the above-mentioned departments, and to prevent the latter from being troubled on account of editions of the aforesaid works which they may have published anterior to the reunion, and ruinous distracts between them, upon the report of our Minister of the Interior, our Council of State agreeing, we have decreed, and do decree as follows:—

Art. 1. Editions printed anterior to the 1st of January, 1811, in the departments of the 22d, 29th, and 30th military divisions, of works printed in France ulterior to the same epoch, and constituting a part of private literary property, shall not be considered counterfeit, provided they are stamped before the 1st of January next.—2d. Consequently Editors, Printers, and all Booksellers, or others, in any way trading in books in the above designated departments, who may be proprietors or in possession of any of them, are bound to declare to the Prefect of their department the number of copies they possess of the

said editions. The Prefects will transmit a copy of these declarations to our Director General for Bookselling.—3d. These copies must be presented in each department, and by each Printer or Bookseller, prior to the 1st of October, to the Commissioner delegated for that purpose, and the first page in each of them carefully stamped, after which they may be freely sold throughout the empire.—4th. The Booksellers shall be bound to pay the authors or proprietors the twelfth part of the copies declared by them to be in their warehouses, or at their disposal, and that too every six months in proportion to the sales they make, which shall be determined by the number of copies that remain of those they produced.—5th. On the 1st of October the stamps shall be sent back to our Director General for Bookselling; after which time all copies of the above mentioned editions, that shall be found without the stamp, will be considered spurious, and those upon whom they are found subject to the punishments settled by the laws and our regulations.—6. Our Grand Judge, Minister of Justice, and our Minister for the Interior, are charged, each in as much as concerns him, with the execution of the present Decrees, which shall be inserted in our Bulletin of the Laws.

(Signed)

"NAPOLÉON."

SPAIN.—*Decree of the Cortes, relative to SEIGNIORIES, and feudal rights.*—5 Aug. 1811.

The General and Extraordinary Cortes of the kingdom, desirous of removing the obstacles which may have been opposed to the good government, increase of population, and prosperity of the Spanish Monarchy, decree:

1. That henceforward all jurisdictional Seigniories, of whatever class or condition, shall be incorporated with the nation.—
2. The appointment of all magistrates and other public functionaries shall be proceeded in, by the same orders, and in the same manner, as in the townships of royal jurisdiction.—
3. All public employments of the above description remain suppressed after the publication of the present decree.—
4. The words vassal and vassalage are abolished, and all payments, whether real or personal, which owe their origin to a jurisdictional title, with the exception of those that proceed from free contract in the exercise of the sacred rights of property.—
5. The territorial seigniories re-

main henceforward in the class of other rights attached to private property, if not of such a description, that, by their nature, they ought to be incorporated with the nation.—6. All contracts, bargains, and agreements, which have been made in regard to rents, dues, &c. between those called lords and vassals, shall be considered as contracts between one individual and another.—7. The privileges called exclusive, privative, and prohibitive, and having the same origin as seigniories, such as those of the chase, of fishing, of ovens, mills, water-courses, forests, &c. are abolished; the free use of them remaining to the inhabitants, in conformity to the municipal laws established in every township.—8. Those who have purchased the above prerogatives for a valuable consideration, shall be repaid such capital as appears in the deed of purchase; and those who enjoy them as a reward for great and acknowledged services, shall be indemnified in another way.—9. The nation will acknowledge and pay these capital sums when they are ascertained in the proper Courts, and will pay an interest of 3 per cent. upon them, till the capital is liquidated.—10. At whatever time the possessors shall present their claims, they shall be heard; and the nation will be bound by the result of them, as is specified in the preceding article.—11. Henceforward no one can call himself lord of vassals, exercise jurisdiction, appoint judges, or exercise any of the claims and privileges comprehended in the present decree; and he who does so, shall lose the right of indemnification in the cases that have been specified.—The present decree shall be communicated to the Council of Regency, who shall take the necessary measures for its due execution, causing the same to be printed and circulated.

SPAIN.—*Official News from the French Armies there.*—13th, 28th, and 30th August, 1811.

ARMY OF THE SOUTH.

Report from the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia to his Serene Highness the Prince of Neuchâtel and Wagram. Baza, Aug. 13.

I had the honour to state to your Serene Highness, in my report of the 7th, that the English army having repassed the Guadiana, and abandoned the Spaniards, I availed myself of the opportunity to proceed against the army of Murcia.

Gen. Blake, a few days after his arrival at Cadiz, had again embarked with some thousand men, which he landed at Almeida, and joined the army of Murcia, which was entrenched at Venta del Baul. —General Godinot, commanding a division of reserve, consisting of the 12th Light Infantry, 55th and 58th of the Line, 27th Dragoons, and two squadrons of the 12th and 21st Regiments, had orders to set off in the night of the 6th, from Jaen and Ubeda, to repair by Quaesada and Pozo Alcon to Baza, in order to fight the right of the enemy's army, occupying the position of Pozo Alcon, and the passage of Rio Barbata, and afterwards march upon the rear of the enemy, if he determined to defend the Camp of Baul. —General Leval, commanding the 4th corps, had orders to put the column which was to leave Grenada in motion on the 7th. General Soult, commanding the cavalry of the 4th corps, had also the command of the advanced guard. General Latour Maubourg was charged with the command of the reserve of cavalry, and with the issuing orders to the advanced guard, in case of need. I left the 9th Infantry of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and several detachments of French infantry, the 3d of the Spanish line, and the 12th dragoons, at Grenada, to form the garrison of that place, and to manœuvre in the direction of Moteil, against a division of the enemy, commanded by Count Montejo, who occupied different passes on the Rio Grande, and made frequent incursions into the neighbourhood of Grenada; the command of the column was given to M. Merblea, Colonel of the 12th dragoons. —On the 8th, in the morning, I left Grenada, and joined at Diestma the advanced guard of the 4th corps. General Soult had begun his march. In approaching Guadix, he reconnoitred, and charged a corps of 900 cavaliers, who occupied that city, and who were driven at the point of the sword to Gor. Many were killed, and some prisoners taken. —On the 8th at night, I reached Guadix, and ascertained that the two Spanish divisions commanded by Blake, which had landed at Almeida, had united with the insurgent army of Murcia, on the 4th and 5th August, at Venta del Baul and Baza. This increased the force of that army to 21,000 fighting men; 2,500 of whom were cavalry. —On the 9th, I pushed the advanced guard in front of the entrenched camp of Baul; a false attack, and several demonstrations

that were made, kept the enemy's troops in position during the whole day. —The position of Venta del Baul was very strong: the ravine was deep, wide, and of difficult access; the windings which it forms are in many places broken and rugged, and difficult to be penetrated by troops: yet General Gazan found out in the evening a passage, and dispositions were made for attacking and carrying the camp next morning at day break. But the enemy, informed of the reverses which his right had just experienced, retired in the night, and took through Baza the road to Murcia. —The movement of General Godinot had completely succeeded. On arriving at Quesada, he came up with several bands of Guepillas, amounting to 800 infantry and 300 cavalry. Adjutant Com. Remond remained at the head of the sharp-shooters, and soon dispersed them; the division continued its march on Pozo Alcon; at the passage of Rio Guadiana el Menor, it joined the advanced posts of the division of General Quadra, who occupied Pozo Alcon; the excellent disposition made by General Godinot, and the cavalry charge of Colonel Lallenant, forced the enemy to give way and to retreat. Colonel Delany, of the 12th infantry, was sent with a battalion of his regiment, and a squadron of the 21st dragoons, in pursuit of this troop, which threatened marching upon the rear of Godinot's division; he charged it with vigour, killed many, and made many prisoners. —However, the advanced guard of General Godinot made continual progress. At the passage of Rio Guadaleña, it joined the advanced posts of one of the divisions of Blake, which had been sent to the assistance of General Quadra, and had arrived about two hours. It drove them to Rio Barbata, where the whole division, formed in three lines, was posted. —General Godinot immediately gave orders to attack it: with this view, Adjutant Commandant Remond, having with him the sharp-shooters, and battalion of the 12th, supported by General Regnoux's brigade, descended the ravine, passed the river, and attacked the enemy with impetuosity, notwithstanding the warmth of their fire. Not a single man of the division would have escaped, if that of General Quadra, which had again united in part, had not obliged General Godinot to send against it all his cavalry, and a part of Regnoux's brigade. However, these dispositions had all the

success that was to be expected : the two divisions of the enemy were forced to retreat, and were completely routed. The field of battle remained covered with the dead, and with arms thrown away—each troop saved itself as it could in all directions. In the pursuit we killed numbers, and made 400 prisoners. At night, General Godinot took up a position in front of Zugar, in the road of Baza.—On the 10th, in the morning, General Godinot's column, and that of the centre, which had followed the high road, united in front of Baza. General Latour-Maubourg had orders to take the command of all the cavalry, and to pursue the enemy. At noon, the rear-guard was joined beyond Cullar. General Soult had the advanced guard, with the 10th Chasseurs, the 1st of the Lancers of the Vistula, and the 27th Dragoons. On arriving at Los Vertientes, he found 2,000 of the enemy's cavalry in position, who covered the retreat of the rest of the troops. His dispositions were immediately made to attack them, and a general charge took place.—The Spaniards were overthrown, and so completely routed, that 200 cavaliers, among whom were several Officers, remained dead on the field, and 300 were taken prisoners, with all their horses. The fall of night, and the extreme fatigue of the horses, who had travelled that day twelve Spanish leagues, prevented our deriving all the advantage we should have done from this success; but a panic had seized the Spaniards, the troops that remained, dispersed in the night, and tried in all directions to gain the province of Murcia.—General Freire, who commanded the army, was wounded in the charge, and saved himself by flight. The other Generals did the same.—On the 11th, at day-break, Gen. Latour-Maubourg arrived with the cavalry at Velez el Rubio, from whence he sent off parties to the different *debouchés* that lead to Murcia, particularly to that of Lumbreras, three leagues from Lorca.—The loss which the enemy sustained in these different affairs, is very considerable—several thousands of men have been killed; a great number wounded, are wandering in the mountains, where the greater part will perish. Seven or eight thousand men have disbanded themselves, and crowd back to their homes,

cursing the chiefs of the insurrection, and those who, by deceitful hopes, led them to their ruin—hitherto we have collected but 6 or 700 prisoners, among whom are 30 Officers. We have also received 500 deserters, the greater part French or foreigners, who, being prisoners of war, had been forced to serve. The regiment of Walloon Guards has been entirely destroyed and its colours taken. It is thought that of this army, which, since the arrival of Blake's division, was in a condition to make a fine defence, not seven thousand men will enter Murcia—all the rest are dispersed. I hope that the different columns which I have sent in pursuit of them to the *debouchés* of Vera and Almeria, where they wish to embark, will bring in a good number.—Our loss in these affairs is 30 men killed, and 150 wounded.—General Leval informs me this instant of large captures made of ammunition, arms, equipage, and provisions. He hopes to make further captures, and he tells me that prisoners and deserters are coming in every instant. General Soult's advanced guard is at Lobreras, from whence he sends out strong parties to Torre de Aguilas, where the enemy's troops must pass, who have thrown themselves on the right to enter Murcia. It is probable that a part of these troops will be cut off, as other columns are in pursuit of them.—I am, &c.

Marshal DUKE OF DALMATIA."

ARMY OF THE NORTH.

Report of the Count D'Orsenne, General-in-Chief of the Army of the North, to the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram.—Camp of Astorga, Aug. 28.

Monseigneur.—By my dispatches of the 22d and 23rd, I informed you of the motives that determined me not to delay acting against the army of Galicia. On the 24th, the troops I had collected for this expedition, were in a line of operation on the Elsa, the right leaning upon Leon, and the left at Castro Gonzalo.—The enemy had his advanced guard at St. Martin des Torres, and occupied the bridge of Cebrones; 6000 men were at Baneza, 15,000 at Puente d'Orbigo, and their reserve of 3 or 4,000 men at Astorga.

(To be continued.)

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SICILY.—While I was, in my last, making a few cursory remarks upon the language, which our venal prints were beginning to hold with regard to our dear allies in the Anti-jacobin war, the Court of Sicily; at that time, when I was, with as much freedom as it was prudent to attempt to exercise, endeavouring to prepare the minds of my readers for what I expected soon to see take place; at that very time, as it now appears, Lord William Bentinck (a son of the late Duke of Portland and a brother of the present Duke) was actually arrived in England from Sicily, whither he had, but a few weeks before, been sent, as Commander in Chief of our army there and as our minister plenipotentiary, and where, as was seen in my last, he was expected to be the bearer of "*strong and positive* instructions." The cause of his speedy return has not yet been publicly stated in plain terms; but, our venal prints have given us the *supposed* cause; and, upon their suppositions, taking into view the probability of the sources whence the suppositions really proceed, and the motives from which they have been promulgated amongst "this *most thinking* people," some observations present themselves, and to these I beg leave to solicit the reader's attention.—As a preparation, however, for these observations, it may not be amiss for us to refresh our memories as to matters, which the length of the war and the multitude and magnitude of its events, may well be supposed to have almost obliterated from our minds; and which are, nevertheless, necessary to be remembered, in order to give us clear notions, and to enable us to judge correctly, of what is now going on, and, which is of more importance, of the events, which every one must now anticipate.—Our connection with the Court of Sicily, I shall not, at present, attempt to trace farther back than the year 1805; but, the time will come and must come, when the previous part of that connection, when the events of 1799, when the deeds of the Bay of Naples and the part which Lord Nelson took therein, when the truly noble conduct of Sir

Thomas Troubridge and Captain Foote, when the fate of the Neapolitan Patriots, when, in short, *all* the acts of that time, in their *unvarnished* colours, will be consigned to the volume of history, and handed down to the impartial judgment of future times. In waiting, with all the patience that we can command, for the day when this sacred duty may be safely performed in a manner responsive to the demands of truth and justice; in waiting for that day, which, let us hope, is at no great distance, we will, because we must, content ourselves with tracing back our connection with the Court of Sicily to the year 1805.—In the month of September of this last mentioned year, the Emperor Napoleon being then at war with Austria and Russia, which war was terminated at Austerlitz, the Court of Sicily (then of the *Two Sicilies*) entered into a treaty of *neutrality* with the Emperor of France. The former stipulated to observe a strict neutrality during the war; and, especially, not to suffer any Russian or English troops to land in Naples, and not to commit its own troops to the command of any foreign power or officer. In consequence of the conclusion of which treaty, which was ratified on the 8th of October, 1805, the Emperor of France, withdrew his troops from the territory of Naples, part of which he had, by way of precaution, occupied from the commencement of the present war with England. But, on the 20th of November, only about six weeks after the ratification of the treaty, an English and Russian squadron came into the Bay of Naples (the memorable theatre of the deeds of 1799!) and there landed a body of troops, amounting to about 24,000 men, 14,000 Russians under General Lasey, and 10,000 English under Sir James Craig. These troops, the landing of whom was not opposed, marched into the interior, in order, as was alleged by Russia, to make a diversion in favour of Austria; but, their landing was a signal for warlike preparations on the part of the Court of Naples, who thus, once more, seemed resolved to enter the field against Napoleon. Scarcely, however, were these preparations begun, when Napoleon, having subdued his two great enemies at

Austerlitz, dispatched an army, with his brother Joseph at its head, to drive the Neapolitan Court and its allies "into the sea." The effect of this was the flight of the Court of Naples to Sicily, preceded by the English army, who were utterly unequal to the task of resisting the mighty force of France for a single week. It was now, and probably for the last time, that the Court of the Two Sicilies crossed the *Bay of Naples*, that Bay which had been the scene of their triumph, in 1799, the never-to-be-forgotten 1799.—Since that time, the kingdom of Naples has owned the sway, first of Joseph Buonaparté, and afterwards of Prince Murat, now the king of Naples, and contending for the sway over Sicily also.—Our army went, as we have seen, to the island of Sicily, where it has been, with its augmentations, from the early part of the year 1806 to the present time.—The reader need hardly be reminded of the several attempts, which have been made by the army to recover the Neapolitan territory or to annoy the conqueror, but all which are well known to have wholly failed in their object, though upon one occasion, the battle of Maida, much skill as well as courage appear to have been displayed by sir John Stuart (who succeeded sir James Craig at Sicily) and by the officers and troops under his command.—From the time of the abandonment of Naples, our connection with the Court of Sicily became, of course, more close. That court was, in a measure, ruined. They had indeed a part of their dominions left; but, they had lost their palaces, their goods, all the absolute possessions of a Court, and, what is of more consequence, the far greater part of their revenues. Having, in this beggared situation, a war to carry on for the preservation of the remaining part of their dominions, they naturally looked to England for the greater part of the means necessary for that purpose; and, as the men who then ruled, like those who still rule this country, regarded, apparently, the preservation of Sicily as being of importance to us, the Court of Sicily obtained, and has ever since received from England a large annual *subsidy* for the purpose of enabling that Court to keep on foot an army of a certain strength for the purpose of assisting us in the defence of the island.—We shall see, in the publications, upon which I am about to remark, that this subsidy is regarded as the effect of the most pure *disinterestedness*, of the most sublime gene-

rosity, and, therefore, without entering here into the question of how far our government would be justified in expending the resources of England in the way of *gift* to the Court of Sicily, without any view to the *interest* of England; without entering prematurely upon that important question, we ought here to look back a little to the *cause* of the Court of Sicily being driven out of Naples and being reduced to the necessity of fighting for their last stake in Sicily, and to see what part we bore in the *producing* of that *cause*.—The Emperor Napoleon, in his order to his army, dated at Schoenbrunn, said, that the Court of Naples had been treacherous, that they had *broken their treaty of neutrality*, and that, *therefore*, they should cease to reign. Now, did the Russians and English land with the approbation of the then Court of Naples, or did they not? If they did, the charge of the Emperor Napoleon was *just*; and, if they did not, that Court lost their continental dominions on *our account*; they lost those dominions because we *violated the neutrality of their territory*; and which territory, be it well observed, we abandoned without a battle in its defence. A battle, with our trifling force, would have been useless; but, at any rate, we fought no battle in defence of the kingdom of Naples; and, be it also observed, that we gave up the contest against the remonstrances of the Court, whom, in fact, we left to *follow* our army to the island of Sicily. We wanted not the *will* to defend Naples against the French; but we wanted the *power*. The effect was the same to the Court of Sicily; and, whether we landed with the approbation of that Court, or against their will, the ruin that ensued was, it is clear to me, equally attributable to that landing. Therefore, when our writers are talking so loudly of our *generosity*, of the great *favours* which we have conferred on the Court of Sicily, and of their *ingratitude*, those writers must, surely, have wholly forgotten all the facts that I have now, with too much prolixity, perhaps, endeavoured to recall to the mind of the reader. Let it not be imagined, however, that I wish to be the defender or the apologist of the Court of Sicily. No, reader, I pray you not to imagine that; not to suppose, for one single moment, that I have any feeling of friendship for that Court. But, *truth* ought to be spoken of every one, be he who or what he may: the devil, according to the old saying, ought to have his due.—

After this preface we may enter upon our remarks on the venal publications that are now putting forth.—We have long heard, in a sort of half-whisper, of certain *misunderstandings* in Sicily. These hiring-vehicles have hinted at jealousies and want of cordiality; but, until now, we have not had it openly avowed, that the Court of Sicily, our old dear friends and Antijacobin associates, were at *enmity* with us; nay, that they were actually our enemies even in a warlike sense. This, however, we are now told, and we are also told of the proper *remedy* to be applied, which remedy is neither more nor less than a *seizure of the Sicilian Dominions for our own use*, lest they should fall into the hands of the French. We are told, by the same venal writers, who talk so much of our *disinterestedness* and *generosity*, that we ought to seize upon the country, of which we have so disinterestedly and generously come to the defence.—But, it is now time to hear the venal writers in their own words. I could quote several of them, but I shall, in the first instance, take the Courier of the 28th of September.—After adverting to the fact of Lord W. Bentinck's return, the writer proceeds thus: "The PEOPLE of Sicily are known to be *well-disposed to this country*, and to be grateful for the assistance we have afforded them, without which they would long since have been *invaded by the enemy*. The KING of Naples may have, and we believe has, *good intentions*, but the cares of Government are *too burdensome* for him, and he commits them to *other hands*. In the QUARTER to which we allude there has always been a *strange jealousy* of the English. Upon some minds obligations produce a feeling of hate instead of gratitude; and the presence of the objects conferring them is goading and painful. Such minds eagerly receive impressions unfavourable to those objects—an observation, the truth of which has been sensibly experienced in our alliance with Sicily. The PARTY to whom we allude seems to have felt as the Tyrant of old did, when in speaking of a person who had done him great service, he exclaimed—"He has conferred upon me too great obligations for me to love him."—Our commerce has been subject to vexatious regulations—our military and naval force neither welcomed with the cordiality it deserved, nor furnished with the facilities which it had purchased with its treasures and

its blood. If any errors were committed, they were magnified: while serious vices, however signal, were under-rated, or received with reluctant acknowledgment. At first, it is said, we remonstrated gently, more "in pity than in anger,"—but remonstrances were unattended to, and it was remarked that such of the Sicilian Nobility as had been the strongest in their attachment to us were coldly received, and their visits gradually dispensed with. Of these noblemen some have been *banished*. It was in this state of affairs that Lord W. Bentinck arrived at Palermo; and as may well be conceived, was instructed to speak a *decisive language*.—"We have afforded you, we are still affording you the most powerful and DISINTERESTED assistance"—"Co-operate with us heartily in a work of which you are to receive the EXCLUSIVE benefit." It may be supposed that we accompanied this open language with the demand of CERTAIN PLEDGES of the good faith of the Sicilian Government; that we required the removal of those Counsellors who were known to be hostile to our interests, and who would paralyse any efforts that might be made for the safety of the kingdom. The manner in which this was received, and the language held in reply to our remonstrances, might, we speak only from conjecture, have been deemed by Lord W. Bentinck so offensive and affronting as to convince him that his immediate departure was the only step he could take consistently with the duty he owed to the Government of which he was the representative.—What course will be adopted by his Majesty's Ministers, we cannot of course be acquainted with—but there is one clear principle: "If our Ally, by treachery, or negligence, or supineness, will not use the means he has in his power to prevent his territories from falling into the hands of our enemy, and thereby increasing that enemy's means of annoying US, he can have no just cause of complaint against us if we no longer consider and treat him as a friendly power."—Are there no thunderbolts! No, not for fellows like this; but there surely are stones, horseponds, pumps, blankets and broomsticks! What! and are our senses to be insulted in this manner! Will the public tolerate this gross, this abominable, insult! Will they bear to be told, first, that we have placed an army in Sicily from motives of the

most pure "DISINTERESTEDNESS;" that we have done all that we have done, and are doing in Sicily, purely for the purpose of serving the Sicilians; that they are to have the "EXCLUSIVE benefit" of all our exertions; will the public bear to be told this, and then, in the very next breath, be told, that the defence of the island is necessary to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, and "thereby increasing THAT ENEMY'S MEANS OF ANNOYING US!" Will the public bear this? If it will; if it will patiently hear this; why, then, all that I can say, is, that it matters very little what befalls such a public. And, indeed, nothing but severe suffering; nothing but rods of scorpions, can bring such a public to its senses, and make it distinguish between truth and falsehood.—Before we proceed any further with our remarks, it is necessary to observe, that, in all the hireling prints, there has been, within these few days, published a long extract from a work of CAPTAIN PASLEY, on the state of things in Sicily and on the policy proper for us to pursue with regard to that country and its Court. This extract, which I have inserted in another part of this Number, recommends the seizure of the island, unless the Court, for the preservation of the INDEPENDENCE of the country, will give up the command of the whole of their own army to us! I beg the reader's attention to this extract; for he may be quite sure, that the Court of Sicily has read it long ago, and that it has not failed to produce a suitable effect upon their minds.—CAPT. PASLEY seems to have been the leader of those, who have now found out, that the Court of Sicily are not our friends. He has forgotten, if he ever knew, the history of our former connection with the Sicilian Court, when they reigned in Naples as well as in Sicily; he does not advert to, nor does he seem to have the least recollection or knowledge of, the events, which finally drove the Court of Sicily from their continental dominions, and that gave an English army a footing in Sicily; he appears to consider the island as having been attacked, or likely to be attacked, by the French, and that, under such circumstances, without our having had any hand in producing the embarrassments and dangers of the Court, we flew to their assistance; he talks of our *disinterestedness* and of the *gratitude* due to us, in precisely the same style as all the venal writers, and he surpasses them all, I think, in bitterness

against our dear Antijacobin ally. Having painted the conduct of the Court of Sicily in as black colours as he is well able, he comes to the *remedy*. He describes the state of the army of Sicily; he tells us what we are able to do, and what we ought to do; and the Courier of the 1st instant approves of his recommendation. It says: "In a preceding page we have inserted a long extract from *Captain Pasley's work* on our military policy and institutions. He enters very largely into the subject of our relations with Sicily: and it *may be wise to adopt the policy he recommends.*"—This being the case, let us see what this, his recommendation, is, and what are the grounds, upon which he endeavours to justify it, whether in point of equity or policy. He speaks with great, and, I dare say, deserved, contempt of the Sicilian Troops; says that we should derive no assistance from them in case of an actual attack upon the Island; that our alliance with Sicily is upon the worst possible footing; that, to remedy this, we ought to request the court of Sicily "to appoint the *British General, in Sicily, the Commander in Chief of their army*, and also to place its *Commissariat and Paymaster's offices* in the hands of our Commissaries and Paymasters; that the Sicilian Troops now look upon the British Troops with *envy*, and, perhaps, with *hatred*;" that even this "*modification*" of the terms of the alliance would be very disadvantageous for Great Britain, "for that nothing can be more *unfair* and *unjust*, than that the *whole* of the resources of the great and rich island of Sicily should be solely applied to the *pomp and pleasures of its court*, and to the charges of the *civil administration*, without leaving, at least, some surplus of revenue FOR US; that, by such an arrangement, however, we should find ourselves much more secure in Sicily as a MILITARY STATION." He then says, that by way of objection to these alterations, it *may possibly* be urged by the court of Sicily, that there is a *treaty*, that we cannot, with justice, infringe this treaty, and that, the proper time to have made the arrangements now proposed was when we entered into the treaty in question. Anticipating this objection, he says, that the court of Sicily, to set up this treaty with effect, must be able to show that they have not violated, or departed from, *their part of the contract*. But, he says, that

this they cannot show; for, that they have stipulated to keep constantly on foot a well-disciplined regular army of a certain strength, and that they have not done this; that their army is not well-disciplined, clothed, or paid; "that *their conduct to their troops has been shameful and oppressive*, as both officers and soldiers *have no scruple in openly asserting*; that we have, by this court of Sicily, always been deceived by *false musters*; that, this being the case, we are no longer bound by the treaty, and that the least thing we can do is to *withdraw our Subsidy*, and leave them to maintain their own army in the best way they can out of their own resources." He then proceeds to say, that this would be a better thing for us than even the punctual fulfilment of the present treaty; for, that we should, with the subsidy money, be able to raise a better army than that of Sicily is, and that the court of Sicily would, in this case, "forfeit all claim to our NATIONAL GENEROSITY." Anticipating, that this step on our part might induce the court of Sicily to *make peace with Napoleon*, he says, that this would be the most fortunate thing in the world for us, for that "we shall have a much better chance of success in Sicily in fighting there as the enemies, than in fighting as the allies, of the Sicilian government." He says, that the French cannot come to their aid without our permission; that the Sicilian army would be easily beaten by us; that WE MIGHT ARM THE PEOPLE OF SICILY IN OUR FAVOUR. Therefore, he says, hostilities on the part of the court of Sicily are by no means to be dreaded; but that, on the contrary, "they would give us a RIGHT once more to TAKE POSSESSION OF SICILY FOR OURSELVES, which would be attended with the most BENEFICIAL EFFECTS TO OUR POWER AND PROSPERITY; and, that we ought not to have the SMALLEST SCRUPLE in adopting this VIGOROUS measure, if the court of Palermo, by their MISCONDUCT, give us JUST REASON for so doing;" and the "misconduct," which would give us this "just reason," he explains to mean, a refusal of "our MODERATE and REASONABLE request, that WE should COMMAND an army that we ourselves PAY."—Reader, is it necessary to say any more of this, than just to observe, that this is the language of all the hireling prints in

England; of all these, who for so many years, have been the advocates of the war in Sicily?—As to the conduct of the Sicilian Court, our dearly beloved Antirepublican friends, I shall leave that to be described by their associates; I shall leave that to the Antijacobins, and shall be more apt to give them credit in this case than in almost any other; but, I must say, that it is somewhat surprising, that souls, so formed by nature for harmonious intercourse, should have permitted any thing to produce hostility between them; and, in spite of present appearances, I am inclined to think, that they will make all up again; that they will shake hands and be friends again, and hang together as to all practical purposes, just as the opposing parties of a certain assembly do, though they hate one another like poison. I think they will "rally" round the good old cause, and bury their hatred to one another in their greater hatred of Jacobins, or reformers.

—But, all this while, the people of England, their blood and their taxes, seem to pass for nothing. We are told of the generosity of defending the court of Naples; we are told of these fine acts of generosity on the parts of our government; but, to hear these writers, one would imagine, that they gave the money out of *their own pockets*. The fact is, however, that the people of England pay, in subsidy, to the Court of Sicily, 400,000*l.* a year, and have done this for several years last past. Four hundred thousand pounds a year, while there are twelve hundred thousand paupers in England and Wales; while the taxes are so heavy as to be paid with the greatest difficulty; and while it is notorious that this subsidy causes an issue of bank notes that adds very greatly to the depreciation of the paper money.—This is a matter that never seems to enter into the heads of any of those who inveigh against the conduct of the Court of Sicily. These writers make no scruple to assert that that court are our enemies; but, such is their contempt of the people of England, that they do not seem to think it at all necessary to say a word in the way of excuse for those, who give nearly half a million a year of our money to our enemies; and that, too, if what these writers now say be true, long after it was well known that they were our enemies. But, the fact is, that this set of politicians, the whole set of them, despise the people of England more than they do any other of God's creatures.

—Upon reading the above passages, in which the *oppression of the Sicilian troops* is spoken of, one cannot scarcely forbear laughing outright. We are not told indeed in *what manner* they are oppressed; we are not told precisely what *sort of punishment* is inflicted upon them; whether any of them have *pins* thrust up under their nails when suspected of shamming illness. It would have been, worth while, I think, just to give us a specimen or two of their treatment; but this, I suppose, was avoided from pure “*delicacy*,” from a kind wish to spare our tender feelings. Thank you, gentle souls; but, another time, do not suffer your tenderness to get the better of truth. Let us have the picture full before us, tell us plainly what it is that they *do* to the Sicilian soldiers.—The idea of *arming the Sicilian people* against their *government* is not less amusing, especially when we recollect that one of the principal grounds of the Anti-jacobin war, was, that the French Convention invited any people who were oppressed to rise against their government. These are precious avowals, and really one would almost think that the object was to show to the whole world, that the French Convention was right in all they did as to foreign governments.—But, of all the notions inculcated in these writings, the most amusing certainly is that of compelling the government to give up its army into our hands, to put all the forts and military posts into our possession, and to make us masters of a part, at least, of the revenue; and all this for what? Why, for the purpose of preserving the *INDEPENDENCE* of the country! Oh, impudence unparalleled! And yet these same men affect to laugh at the idea of Denmark and Prussia and Saxony being *independent*; and they scruple not to abuse Napoleon, to call him upstart Despot and remorseless Tyrant, because he is supposed to dictate to these states a system of commercial laws, a fact of which there is little doubt, but of which they have no proof. They call him *treacherous* because he has entered Spain with an army and is endeavouring to subdue it; and, in almost the same breath, they openly recommend the seizure of Sicily by our army, who, be it observed, entered Sicily as *allies*, and have remained there under the sanction of a *treaty*. One of our venal prints (the most venal of all), the *Times*, recommends the sending of the king and queen of Sicily to *Naples*. These are the words, used by that print on the 28th of

September: “We think, though, as we have before stated, our means of judging are very scanty, that it would not be an impolitic scheme to *land the King and Queen* of the two Sicilies on the *continental part of their Majesties’ dominions*, in order that they, and particularly the latter of them, might head the *partisans* which they possess there, and *rescue Naples from the grasp of Murat*. A Regency could govern the island in their absence.”—When the queen of Sicily reads this, as I dare say she will, I wonder whether she will look back to 1799, when she and Lady Hamilton and her husband and Lord Nelson were at Naples and in the Bay! I wonder whether she will recollect ELEONORA FONSECA!—In justification of this measure, which is nothing short of a sentence of death against the king and queen of Naples, the same print, of the 30th of September, offers the following arguments: “Thus much is very clear, that if one party is *for the French*, the other must be *against them*; and the inference is no less obvious, that as we were called to Sicily to *protect that island from the French*, we must *unite* with that party which is most likely to be sincere in acting *with us* for the attainment of so desirable an object. Our view is the *independence of Sicily*, and has only relation to the *external politics of the country*. With the internal ones, we have neither the right nor the wish to interfere; except they, themselves, are perversely thrown across our path, and then they must be *cleared out of the way*. If the Court and people fight with each other, so let them; it is not our concern, provided we have placed in our hands *the means of securing our own safety*, and repelling the common enemy. But if either Court or people *think of calling in the French* to aid their party politics, the *faction* that does that immediately becomes *French to us*, and must be *rooted out*, not for our advantage merely, but for the *preservation of the island*. We seek to impose no new King on it, as *Buonaparte* does: we seek to levy no *tyrannical conscription*: we are only struggling to let it have the power, SO DEAR TO HUMANITY, of *directing its own affairs*, and acting as an *independent State*. This power we must assist it in retaining as long as it can; and, at all events, we must take care, that if it is relinquished, it may not be put into the hands of our *enemies*.”—So dear to humanity! Oh, detestable hypocrite! And you want, do

you, to assume the command of the Sicilian army and to appropriate the revenues of the country, in order to enable Sicily to *direct its own affairs*! You would not do as Buonaparté does, eh? No, you would send the king and queen of Sicily to Naples there to be torn in atoms, while he gives the Bourbons of Spain a princely establishment in France. You would set up *no new king*, not you indeed: you would only just take the country for yourself. Your object is to secure the *independence* of Sicily, and to secure that object you only want to have the army, the forts and the revenue in your hands, and to "*root out*" all those who would oppose this "*moderate*" wish. You say, that those who wish to call in the French become French to you; but you will not give the world *proof*, or something like proof of such a wish? "If the Court *think* 'of calling in the French,' but, how are you to know their *thoughts*; and, was there ever before heard of such intolerable tyranny as that of proceeding to punish people for *presumed thoughts*? This charge of wishing in favour of the French is a sweeping one. There is no case that it will not suit; no object that it will not reach. We here see nothing but hypothesis; nothing but suspicion thrown out: if one party are for the French; if either court or people *think* of calling in the French. So that, whether it be the *presumed wish* of the one or the other, we are thereon to found a right of "*rooting* that party out." This, if it produce no effect upon the people of England, will not fail to produce effect in other parts of the world.—Before I dismiss this subject, I cannot refrain from saying a few words upon the proposition that these writers make of seizing upon the island of Sicily, for our own use.—The rabble of politicians, whether in high or low life, are always eager for new acquisitions of territory, very seldom reflecting whether they are likely to produce good or evil, and they are sure to have on their side all that numerous tribe, who are continually gaping for the taxes, and to give them a chance of getting at which every new acquisition of territory is admirably calculated.—But, if this seizing proposition were to be adopted, what effect does the reader imagine it would have upon the minds of the Spaniards, some of whom have already been charged with the *crime* of having apprehensions upon the score of our sending reinforcements to Cadix, and of our having a design to place their troops and their

provinces under the command of our own officers? Does the reader suppose, that a seizure of Sicily, and, of course, a virtual dethronement of the king, would tend to diminish the apprehensions of those Spaniards? Say, that we stop short of this, and content ourselves with the "*moderate and reasonable*" demands, suggested by Captain Pasley and approved of by the venal English prints; namely, with a surrender of the Sicilian army and a part of the revenues into our hands; say, that we content ourselves with these "*moderate and reasonable*" terms, is it likely, that the confidence of the Spaniards will thereby be completely restored? —Well; but shall we be able to keep Sicily, to "*preserve its independence*;" shall we, even if we seize the island, be able to accomplish this amiable and disinterested purpose for any length of time? Shall we be able to beat the Sicilian army and arm the peasantry against the government and, at the same time, defend the island against the French; shall we be able thus to "*preserve the independence*" of Sicily without an army of *fifty or sixty thousand* men and an annual expenditure of ten millions in Bank Notes? Do these projectors think of these things? No, they think of nothing but what they suppose will be pleasing to those whose very wishes they vie with each other in anticipating.—Upon this subject the Morning Chronicle, which is supposed to speak the sentiments of the OUTS, holds a strange language. It is always blaming the ministers for want of VIGOUR in their transactions with Sicily. Not a word about *justice or consistency*; not a word in favour of the people of Sicily; but hints at the misconduct of the Court towards us, and a call for *vigorous* measures. The venal prints, fighting under the flag of Captain Pasley, have acted a more candid part; they have told us what they mean by vigorous measures. They would demand the Sicilian army and part of the revenues to be given up to us, and, if this "*moderate and reasonable*" demand was refused, they would "*root out*" the refusing party, and, if the Court were that party, they would toss them down upon the strand of the Bay of Naples, where they would have as good a chance as if tossed into a tyger's den amongst a dam and her young ones. This, at any rate, is frank: it is speaking out: we know what the parties mean; whereas the Morning Chronicle keeps dinning in our

ears nothing but a sort of mysterious call for *vigour*.—This is, however, the general tone of the OUTS, who, upon all occasions, find fault of the ministers for their want of *vigour*; which, being fairly interpreted, means, that they would, if they were in place, do the *same acts* that the ministers do, but that they would do them in a more *vigorous* manner. We never hear them complain of the *injustice* of any of the acts of their rivals; never of any waste of the public money; never of any encroachment on the liberties of the people. All that they complain of is, a *want of vigour*. Let them look at the acts of our government for the last twenty years; let them look into the Statute Book for that period, and they will, I think, see no marks of a want of *vigour*. We have heard much talk about a *vigour beyond the law*; but, really, those laws are of themselves sufficiently *rigorous*.—To hear these eternal complaints of a want of vigour, who would not suppose, that our government had, for a long while, neglected the use of its powers, and had been so very lenient and indulgent as to have suffered the people to run riot with ease, riches, and licentiousness! Ah! these complaints of a *want of vigour* in their rivals ought to make us cautious how we give any encouragement to the OUTS.—This charge of a want of *vigour* has been set up against all the old governments that have fallen before the republicans of France. “Louis XVI. was a *weak-minded* man; he was *too lenient*; he yielded *too much* to his people.” And the same charge has gone round. All the fallen kings “wanted *vigour*,” according to the Anti-jacobin notions. They were pretty vigorous, however, you will find, if you examine the acts of their days of power. There was no want of vigour in France, while the *lettres de cachet* and the *Bastille* were in vogue. The kings of Prussia were very vigorous men; and so were and are the Czars of Muscovy. Even the Stadtholder gave unquestionable proofs of vigour when he called in the Prussian army, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, to put down the Dutch Patriots. And, though last not least, our august allies, the Court of Sicily, were not wanting in *vigour* when they were upon the continent. In short, they have all been quite vigorous enough, except as *against the French armies*, in which case they have, indeed, shown a lamentable deficiency in this seemingly *prime* quality of regular government.—It

seems never to have occurred to any of these complainants of a want of vigour, that it was possible, that some of the fallen governments might have been *too vigorous* before they were attacked by the French; that, when the French came, they found their vigour all exhausted. It seems never to have occurred to them, that there were any means, other than those of *force* and *punishment*, by which the fallen governments might have convinced their subjects of the utility of resisting the French armies. No such thought seems ever to have occurred to them. They can see clearly enough all the tyranny of *Buonaparte's* system. They can rail against him in a most manly strain. The Courier of the 3rd instant, in speaking of his present tour through his maritime dominions and of his rigorous measures as to commerce, says: “There is one consolation arising out of this increase of severity, that as it *punishes his own subjects most*, it renders him more and more odious, and may *accelerate his downfall*.” Intoxicated by power, he appears always to forget that *tyranny has its limits*; that there is a period *beyond which the oppressor cannot oppress*, and the oppressed *will not endure*. He flatters himself perhaps that his authority is now perfectly consolidated, and his despotism secured. Just so do ALL TYRANTS; Caligula never thought himself so safe and firm as on the very day he was dispatched.”—Very good; but let the observations be *general*. Let them apply to all tyrants in every part of the world, and of every sort, whether open and bold in their tyranny; or whether their tyranny be marked by the *basest hypocrisy* and by all the *malice of cowardice*; let not these just observations remain unapplied to the *shamming, cheating, smiling, cut-throat-tyranny*, which merits as great, and a much greater, degree of hatred, than a tyranny without disguise, for the latter is, in reality, much less cruel than the former.—To return, for a moment, to the subject of Sicily, I beg the reader not to believe, that I feel any *partiality* for the king or queen of that country; I beg him to believe, that I am, at best, indifferent as to what our government may do respecting them. My concern is for the people of Sicily and the people of England, the latter of whom have long been paying enormous sums of money for the purpose of maintaining over the former that very government which we are, by

our venal writers, now told is an intolerable tyranny, and which these writers openly purpose to "root out."—What we shall next hear of from Sicily no man can guess. It is quite impossible to conjecture how the thing may go on; but of this we may be well assured, that, in the end, the *cause of freedom will be benefited* even by the intrigues and cabals in the Island of Sicily.

SPAIN AND HER COLONIES! — But, here, reader, is a scene opening upon us! A declaration of independence on the shores of the gulph of Mexico! And, at almost the same moment, the Cortes of Spain declaring, that "Spain is not the patrimony of any family!" The work of revolution has but just made a serious beginning. The Anti-jacobins may sharpen up their pens anew; for they will have a sufficiency of employment. But, I imagine, they will not again be able to persuade the people of England out of voluntary loans and contributions in order to preserve to themselves "the blessed comforts of religion," and to keep "the gloomy despair of atheism" out of their families. No, no: this will not do again. If it were to succeed, it would be quite useless; for, with all the power we possess, we should not be able to prevent revolutions in a world that is resolved upon revolution.—I have not room here to enter into any particular observations upon the great public acts above-mentioned; but, I cannot help remarking, that the moment we hear, that a part of the Spanish Colonies have declared themselves *independent* and have promulgated the principles of freedom, at that very moment we hear of Commissioners appointed by our government to *mediate* between them and Old Spain! We must have, as the old saying is, "a finger in the pye." Why could we not have let these people alone? What need had we to proffer our *mediation*? And, what can that mediation mean, unless it be to *bring the Colonists back to their former state*? Vain pursuit! Never will they again acknowledge subjection to Spain; and if the rulers of Spain (be they who they may) are wise, they will at once acquiesce in the separation; and cultivate an intercourse with the new state, or states, as fast as freedom shall spread itself over those fair but long-degraded regions. Spain, supposing her to be undivided at home and without an enemy in Europe, has not the power to subdue any

considerable force raised against her in South America. What, then, can she be expected to do in her *present state*? The war of Napoleon in the Peninsula will, then, in all probability, give freedom to South America; and we see, that it has already drawn from the rulers of Spain (his rivals) an abolition of the odious feudal tyrannies, and a declaration that Spain is not the patrimony of any family. Whatever, therefore, may have been his intentions, which, indeed, appear to have been merely those of a conqueror, the war which he has waged and is waging in Spain may be safely said to have produced great good to mankind. Our resistance of him (without entering into our motives) has also been of use in the same way. Between us we have given the South Americans time and opportunity to break their bonds; and, let us hope for a similar result in Old Spain; a hope which must, I think, be uppermost in the heart of every man who is not the enemy of his species. I am aware, however, how the souls of the Anti-jacobins suffer under the apprehension of seeing Spain and South America exhibit examples of freedom. I think I see them now scowling over the "RIGHTS OF MAN," promulgated from the borders of the Mexican Gulph. In vain do they look round them for the means of forming another crusade against republicans and levellers. The heroes of Pilnitz are no where now to be found. All the Anti-jacobins can do is to sit and curse the voice of freedom that is, in every direction, forcing its way through the shattered and shaking fabric of tyrannical power, and calling upon the slave to throw off his chains, whether fastened on him by rude force, or, by slow and unseen degrees, drawn round him by the hands of *hypocrisy and fraud*.

COL. M'MAHON.—A gentleman, upon whose word I can rely, requests me to state, in correction of an error in my last, that Col. M'Mahon "has been out of the army for the last sixteen years; that, as to his services, he shared fully with the other British Officers, as a *Subaltern* in the 44th Regiment throughout the seven year's campaign in America, at the head of which fell General Agnew and Major Hope, and afterwards as a *Captain* under the command of Lord Moira; and that his conduct was universally such as became an officer and a gentleman."—As

to the general conduct and character of Mr. M'Mahon, it was unnecessary for his friend to say a word; for I did not throw out the most distant hint against either, as, indeed, with truth, I could not, having never heard any thing to justify such a hint. With regard to the error relating to Mr. M'Mahon's having received pay as an officer in the army, the fault is not mine. "Men should be what they seem;" and, as he bore the name of Colonel, I reasonably concluded that he was a Colonel. This was not, however, made by me a circumstance of much weight; for, as I observed before, his services were of a sort to be utterly unknown to the public, and, therefore, to the public he ought not to have come for a reward.—As to his services as a *Subaltern* and *Captain*, during the unfortunate and disgraceful war against the American States, no man will, I am sure, pretend, that he had a fair claim, at his age, to any rewards other than those which the military service itself provided for him; and, when he chose to quit the army, he, of course, forfeited that claim. But, surely, no man will pretend that the present grant has had eye to the services here spoken of! No: it is too monstrous, even for these times, to suppose, that a man, who, as *Captain*, chose to quit the army, sixteen years ago, in the middle of a war, is to be rewarded for past services with a grant for life equal to the pay of twenty captains in that same army.—Much, however, as I lament the granting of this place, I lament it most of all because I cannot help looking upon it as a symptom of what we have to expect in future.

INVASION.—This, in all probability, will soon become a copious subject. In another part of this Number the reader will find some documents relating to a threatened, or talked of, or surmised intended invasion of *Jersey* and *Guernsey*. I have no time to make any remark upon these at present, and shall content myself with a decided expression of my opinion, that, if we have a timely reform of the *Commons' House of Parliament*, we may laugh at all Napoleon's threats of invasion; but, if we have not that reform.....what then? Why, then we may LAUGH AT THEM TOO!

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
4th October, 1811.

P.S. I have not room to notice the Essex Meeting in the present Number.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SICILY.—Representation of the Deputation of the Kingdom of Sicily, to his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies.—Palermo, 9th July, 1811.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY;—By a Royal Dispatch of the 30th of June last, your Majesty did command this Deputation to state, why they have submitted to your Majesty, in their Representation of the 13th of May last, a Paper signed by forty Barons, by a Guardian to a Minor, and by two younger Sons of Barons, respecting the tax on payments of one per cent. assessed by your Majesty by your Royal Edict of the 14th February, together with the observations the Deputation may find it incumbent to make thereon.—In obedience to your Royal commands, the Deputation humbly state to your Majesty that only the desire not to withhold any thing from your Royal knowledge, has induced them to submit the said Paper, and to expose ingenuously, how, and by whom, it was presented.—Meanwhile, the Deputation is of opinion, that the said Paper is not entitled to any further course; because your Majesty's Edict, levying the tax of one per cent. on payments, contains no encroachments on the laws of the kingdom, and on the privileges granted to it by your august predecessors.—May God preserve your Majesty and the Royal Family for many happy years.—Your Majesty's most humble subjects, the Deputies of the Kingdom, (Signed,)

The Prince BUTERA.

R. Archbishop of PALERMO.

The Prince CUTO, Deputy Senior.

The Prince CAMPO-FRANCO.

B. SERIO, Bishop of Ermopoli.

The Marquis CALLENTINI.

The Prince SCORDIA.

The Canon LORENZO DI ANTONI.

The Chevalier GASPARE PALERMO.

The Prince TORREMUZZA.

The Canon PAOLO FILIPPONI.

The Prince VALDINA, Prothonotary to the Kingdom.

ANTONIO DELLA REVERE, Secretary.

SICILY.—Article in the Gazette, respecting the Arrest of the Nobles.—19th July, 1811.

We learn from Palermo, that on the night of the 19th inst. the following Nobility were arrested by order of the Sicily.

lian Government, and were immediately afterwards sent on board the Sicilian ship of war the *Tartar*, to be conveyed to the Island of Favignana, &c. Their names are, the Princes of Belmonte, Villa Franca, Aci, Castel Nuovo, and the Duke of Angio.—The arrest and exile of these Noblemen has given rise to a report, which is wholly destitute of foundation, which is injurious to the English character, and calculated to diminish the authority of the British residing in this island. The report is, that these proceedings were instituted at the desire of the British Government, and that the Admiral and English Chargé d'Affaires, residing in Palermo, had taken a principal part in the execution of it. It was also asserted, that an English ship of war was employed on this occasion. Such a representation is known to be utterly false and absurd, by the inhabitants of Palermo, who were eye-witnesses of the transaction; it will also be acknowledged that such an interference would be both opposed to the established conduct of the British Government, and to the duties of its principal agents in this Island.—Be the rumours on this subject what they may, we are empowered from the highest authority to contradict them, and to declare that the English had not only no participation in the business, but not even the smallest knowledge of it. The inventors and propagators of such vile calumnies could have no other object than to promote discord between the two nations, and to disunite the hearts of the Sicilian people from their best friends.

SICILY.—*Royal Edict.*—19th July, 1811.

It having been represented to his Majesty, that on several occasions the undermentioned subjects have shewn manifest proofs of turbulence, and of a disposition to interrupt the public tranquillity, having taken the advice proper on such occasions, and after mature deliberation on the consequences of such disobedient conduct, he has resolved in his sovereign pleasure to order the arrest and exile to different Islands of the following persons:—The Prince of Belmonte Vintimiglio, the Prince of Villa Franca, who is also suspended from his functions of Colonel of the 1st Regiment of Royal Dragoons, &c. the Prince of Verulsterra, the Prince of Villarmosa, the Prince of Aci, who is also dismissed from his post of Adjutant General of the King, &c. &c. FERDINAND.

JERSEY.—*By the States of the Island of Jersey, in the year 1811, the 21st day of September.*

The States have been this day convoked, at the instance of his Excellency Lieutenant General Don, Lieutenant Governor and Commander in Chief of this island, his Excellency has communicated to the States a letter from the Secretary of State, acquainting him, that the enemy meditates an attack upon this and the adjoining islands. The Commander-in-Chief also communicates to the States the orders he had given in consequence of this information, both respecting the troops of the line and the militia, and the different preparations he had made in the event of an attack. The States could not avoid observing, that in the wisdom of the measures his Excellency had taken, with so much promptitude, for the event of an attack, nothing necessary for such a crisis has escaped his vigilance and foresight; and they offer him their most sincere acknowledgments for this new proof of his attention, and of his indefatigable zeal for the safety of the country, in addition to so many others which had already acquired for him by the justest title, the love and gratitude of the inhabitants. The States feel themselves infinitely flattered by the confidence which the Right Honourable Secretary of State has in the loyalty and approved zeal of the inhabitants of this island; and they pray his Excellency to assure him that this confidence shall never be disappointed. Their ancestors, who, in the most stormy times have given proofs of their attachment to their Sovereigns, and of their inviolable fidelity, have given to their descendants an example which they will ever follow from duty and from inclination. The greatest sacrifices will cost them nothing in the imitation of so fine a model; to preserve them to themselves, and to transmit to their posterity the precious happiness they enjoy under the mildest and most happy of Governments. His Excellency is, without doubt, persuaded that the States will eagerly enter into his salutary views, and second his efforts to put the place in the best possible state of defence. Animated by these sentiments, and regarding the fortress on the mount of St. Hilier as a most important point of defence; and considering that the advancement and completion of the works of that fortress, are most essential to the preser-

vation of the island in general, they offer their services to his Excellency, to be employed in whatever manner he may think they can be useful towards this object, and they invite their fellow citizens to assist, by their bodily labour, their horses, carts, and waggons, when they shall be called upon by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The States repose with the most perfect confidence, on the paternal care of the Government for the protection and the necessary aid for the defence of the island in this critical period; and they have no doubt that his Excellency the Commander in Chief will make such representations on that head as circumstances shall appear to require. This act shall be printed and published.

JEAN DE VEUILLÉ, *Secretary.*

REGULATIONS.

The States of the Isle of Jersey have thought proper, in the present conjuncture to establish the following Regulations, which shall be printed, published, and stuck up:—Art. 1. In case of alarm or attack, which alarm or attack shall be considered as lasting till the troops are released from duty, it is expressly ordered to the tavern keepers to keep their houses shut, and not to distribute liquor to the regular soldiers or the militia, or to any one, without a written permission from an Officer commanding a detachment either of regulars or militia, under the penalty of a fine not exceeding 300 livres and the forfeiture of the licence.—2. It is equally enjoined to all other persons not to sell or distribute liquors to the Regulars or Militia; or to any one else, without the permission required by the foregoing article, on pain of a fine not exceeding 300 livres for each offence.—3. In case of alarm or attack, the soldiers or other persons employed in the service of the Militia are forbidden to enter taverns, public houses, or private houses, to procure liquor, without the permission of their commanding Officer, under pain of being considered disobedient, and punished according to the nature of the case.—4. Constables are required always to keep a sufficient quantity of candles, in order to illuminate the churches without delay in case of alarm in the night.—5. In case of alarm in the night, it is enjoined to the inhabitants of St. Helier and St. Aubin to place candles in the windows of their houses to give light to the streets.—6. The States, with a view of encouraging

the vigilance of the guards about the island, and of rousing the attention of all persons to the safety of the country in these critical times, have agreed to grant the sum of 1,000 livres to the first man, whether chief of a guard, sentinel, or other, who shall descry an enemy's fleet destined for attacking this island, and who shall take the necessary steps to inform his Excellency the Commander in Chief, as soon as possible; that is, if he is a Chief of a Guard, by sending without delay an intelligent man of his guard to carry the news to the Commander in Chief; if he is a centinel by informing his Chief of the news, in order that the latter may send off a dispatch: and if he is any other person, by taking prompt and effectual measures to let the intelligence be known as soon as possible at head-quarters.—7. The States considering also that it is of essential importance to the defence of the country in case of attack, to remove from the coast, and to put out of the reach of the enemy the horses and cattle of the inhabitants, have thought it their duty to enjoin women, old and young persons, who shall not be otherwise employed in opposing the enemy, to drive away as quick as possible the cattle from the coast, to convey them into the interior, and to carry off as much forage and provisions of all kinds as they can. The States promise and engage to be answerable to the proprietors for the value of the cattle thus sent into the interior, in case of accident or loss, or the cattle being taken and employed for the public service: and the States declare at the same time to those who neglect or fail to use these means of preserving their property, by putting it out of the reach of the enemy, that they shall not be attended to in requiring indemnification in case of accident or capture.—8. A reasonable reward will be given by the States to those who have the misfortune to be wounded in the defence of the country: and a pension to the widows during their widowhood, and to the children of those who may be killed: the whole according to circumstances, the exigency of the cases, and the situation of the families.

JEAN DE VEUILLÉ, *Registrar.*

GUERNSEY.—*Proclamation.*—By his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir John Doyl, bart. and K. C. Lieutenant-Governor of Guernsey, and commanding his Majesty's Forces in Guernsey and Alderney. Sept. 20, 1811.

Whereas certain intelligence has been received of an intended attack of the enemy upon this Island, Lieutenant General sir John Doyle, feeling the most perfect reliance upon the zeal and courage of the Loyal Inhabitants in the defence of every thing that is dear to them, and upon the gallantry and discipline of the Troops, can have no doubts as to the issue of the contest. But in order to prevent the confusion incident to an invasion, by individuals unattached to Corps, not knowing their exact point of Rendezvous, it is hereby directed that all Strangers, as well Subjects of his Majesty as Foreigners, who are not enrolled in any Regiment or Corps of Militia, do forthwith send in their names and places of residence to the Office of Colonel Sir Thomas Saumarez, the Inspector of Militia, in order that in the event of an alarm, their services may be made available to the general cause.—The Alarm Post of persons of this description, will be the Exercising Ground at Fort George.—The Constables are earnestly requested to enforce the Ordinances of the Royal Court respecting the notice required to be given by all owners of Hotels, Lodgings, and Public Houses, of the lodgers who may be resident with them.—Persons having on hand any quantity of Flour and Provisions for sale, will be pleased to give in a return of the quality and quantity, in order that the same may be purchased by the Deputy Commissary-General, should circumstances render it necessary.—And whereas it appears that Fuel has been frequently stolen from the furnaces for heating shot around the Coast, notice is hereby given, that any person detected in the commission of such an offence, will be prosecuted, not as an ordinary thief, but as a traitor to his country.

SICILY.—Publication in the *COURIER Newspaper* of the 1st of October, 1811, containing an Extract from a Work of Capt. Pasley.

Our connection with the Sicilian Government is reported to be so precarious, as to render a state of open hostility with it preferable to that in which, *without any of the benefits of alliance*, without any of the *cordiality or co-operation of friendship*, we have all the expences of a subsidy; we employ a force (capable of making ourselves masters of the Island), in *defending it for the lawful sovereign*, we pay him a large sum for the purpose of enabling him

to increase the means of defence, and yet we are told that our assistance has created *no feeling of gratitude*, and that proposals and plans obviously calculated for the improvement of the defence of the Island, are either received in the outset with suspicion, or thwarted in their execution, or altogether rejected. This will scarcely be believed, except upon the supposition of *treachery on the part of the Sicilian Government*; and yet *what could be gained by treachery towards this Country?* Subjugation by the enemy, dependence upon Buonaparté—the *lowest degradation*, and the *vilest slavery*. But folly and supineness, and misplaced confidence on the part of a Government, may enable men, (who have traitorous views) to subvert that government without any participation on the part of the person at the head of it. Look at the example of Prussia!—However, without meaning to compare that unfortunate and abused Monarch with the Sicilian Government, we shall quote some extracts from a Work published by Capt. Pasley, in which our past, present, and future relations with Sicily are treated with considerable ability.—“Nothing (see page 347, second edition) can be more precarious than our present footing in that Island. By the late operations of the combined armies in the Spanish peninsula, the absolute necessity of having the chief command, when we act in concert with an allied force inferior to ourselves in the art of war, has been fully proved. Now, the native Sicilian army, although composed of old soldiers, is, on account of the vices of its military constitution, and of a discontented spirit arising from bad usage, still less to be depended upon than the rawest levies that ever took the field in the Spanish peninsula; the officers at its head are more jealous of us, and will prove, when put to the test, infinitely more untractable than any of the Spanish chiefs, for they are without the patriotic and manly spirit which checks these selfish feelings in the latter,* and a total inde-

* “The men highest in office and command, or, at least, in influence with the Court of Sicily, are equally foreign by birth, both to that Island and to Great Britain, it is their interest to keep us as much in the back ground as possible, lest we should look into the management of our own money, the countries from whence these men sprung, and whither they will naturally wish to retire, in order to enjoy

pendence of command, with a most complete want of concert, at present exists between the Sicilian and the British troops. Hence, that we should derive any effectual resistance from our allies, in case the island were attacked, is a perfect chimera; nor can we, as things now stand, diminish our force, for the purpose of attacking the

the rich harvest of their diplomatic and official labours, which they have reaped out of the taxes levied both in England and Sicily, being subject to Buonaparté; it is natural that they should seek opportunities to do him some service in order to make their peace with him.—At a time when we were paying a large subsidy to the government of Naples, as our secret friends, they kept their friendship so very secret, that it looked like the bitterest enmity. They refused us even the most paltry accommodations, which could have put them to no possible expense or trouble. They would not permit a British Captain of a Man of War, anchored in Naples Bay, the trifling convenience of repairing a boat with his own carpenters and with his own materials, in their dock-yard, nor would they even allow him to make use of a raft in the Mole for that purpose; and the only reason alleged by the Minister of Marine for his refusal was, that this insignificant act of civility would give offence to the French party, so completely were they the friends or vassals of France. Soon after the time alluded to, they took the preliminary step for excluding us from the ports of Sicily, by putting Malta in quarantine; a thing which can be accounted for by no public reason, except their fear or love of the French, and hatred of us. It was certainly a hostile act; and the odium of it was not diminished, when we knew, that all the ports of Sicily were at that time swarming with French privateers, and heard that a British squadron had been actually refused the common refreshments of water and vegetables at Palermo. This squadron had not come from Malta, consequently the quarantine, had it been a just one, could not have applied to it. This state of affairs cannot be called neutrality. In my humble opinion, it was open war against us, for the refusal of water may cause the destruction of a fleet. But as the British Commander was told, the Government of Naples and Sicily were our secret friends; and this it seems gave them a right to do us as much mischief as they pleased.”

enemy in some other point, with any degree of prudence. In short, all things considered, our present alliance with the Government of Sicily, is upon the very worst terms which the imagination of man could have contrived for ourselves, for the people of that island, and for its King, as far as he takes any interest in the preservation of the remaining part of his dominions.—Having sufficiently lamented these evils, let us now enquire into the proper mode of remedying them.—The first step is to point out to the Court of Palermo, the total insecurity of the Island under the present circumstances, and to request they will for the common good of the allied Powers, appoint *the British General in Sicily, Commander in Chief of their army*; at the same time placing *their own Commissariat and Paymaster General's* departments, under the direction of the gentlemen who are at the head of the same departments in *the British army*; if the Sicilian Government accede to these requests, we shall subsidize them on the only terms we ought ever to subsidize a foreign Power; by having the chief command of their army entirely in our hands, and by providing for all its wants ourselves, *without allowing a single guinea of our subsidy to enter the Treasury of our Ally*. By these means although the improvement of many of the Officers, who have grown grey under the present vicious system, may be despaired of; the great body of the Officers, and all the soldiers, when they find themselves *well-treated*, may recover, or acquire a proper spirit, and become zealous in the cause; and the conditions of all ranks being bettered, the envy and perhaps *hatred*, with which *the Sicilian now look upon the British troops* may give place to attachment, and a necessary emulation may be excited in the minds of the former.—Should our alliance with Sicily be *modified* in this manner, the terms, although better than they are at present, would still remain very disadvantageous to Great Britain; for nothing can be more *unfair, and unjust*, than that the *whole resources of so rich and great an island as Sicily*, should be solely applied to the *pomp and pleasures of its Court*, and to the charges of its *civil administration*; without leaving, at least, some surplus of revenue for us, who have been, and are still, providing the whole of the troops necessary for its defence. By such an arrangement, however, we should find ourselves much more secure in Sicily, *as a military station*.

—But as it is likely from their former diplomatic transactions with us, that the Court of Palermo may have formed a very poor opinion of our firmness and penetration, it is by no means improbable, that they may endeavour to evade or baffle us in our requests, or that they may even give us a downright refusal. They may tell us for instance, “that they are not convinced by our arguments, as to the necessity of the measures which we propose; that the proper time to have made such stipulations was when we first entered into an alliance with them; that we are now bound by a treaty which we cannot in justice infringe; that no alteration can be made without mutual consent; and that they, as one of the high contracting parties, do not admit of the propriety of any.”—Such a refusal on the part of the Court of Palermo, although very pernicious to the defence of Sicily, would, in point of justice, be perfectly correct; provided they, themselves, have at all times preserved good faith towards us: but treaties are binding upon two parties; and they, on their side, by the articles of their treaty with us, engaged to keep, constantly on foot, a well-disciplined regular army of a certain strength. If on enquiry into the present and past state of their army, we should find that its discipline is bad, that the soldiers have not been properly clothed, fed, and paid, and that the just claims of the officers have not been attended to; so that, upon the whole, *their conduct to their troops has been shameful and oppressive*; as both officers and soldiers have no scruple in publicly asserting; if we further find that they have always deceived us by false musters, never at any time keeping on foot the number of troops engaged; a thing which I have heard from the best authorities in the British army, and which is talked of as a matter of notoriety all over Sicily; then it will be absurd in us to admit of any refusal on the part of the Court of Palermo to our proposals, for they having failed in their engagements to us, we shall be no longer bound to adhere to ours; and, consequently, the least thing which we can do, is to withdraw our subsidy, and to leave them to maintain their army the best way they can by their own resources.—We may then by means of the money thus saved, in a short time, raise a much more efficient army of our own, than we should ever be able to make out of theirs, were it put under our command. Hence the refusal of our demands,

by the Court of Palermo, would be very much to our advantage; for they would thereby forfeit all claim to our *national generosity*, which they have already so much abused: It may be said, that should we withdraw our subsidy, in consequence of such a refusal, the Court of Palermo might feel themselves so much aggrieved by this just and necessary measure as to *make peace with Buonaparté, and call the French into Sicily*. This rash step, by which they would insure their own destruction, would be the most fortunate thing for us that could happen; for, as I have before observed, in treating of the state of that Island, we shall have a *much better chance of success, by fighting there, as the enemies, than as the allies, of the present Government*. This would be the case even if the French had an army of 30,000 men in Sicily; but it must be recollected, that they are at present blustering on the opposite shore, and before the Sicilian Government could profit by the assistance of French troops to drive us out of their Island, which they must beg our permission to let them cross over, which we, it may be presumed, shall not be weak enough to grant. As for the *Government of Sicily making war against us*, without the assistance of the French, by their own resources alone, unless they have been most egregiously duping us for the last five years, that is a thing absolutely impossible; for, by their own account, they have never been able to maintain their troops without our subsidies, so that the moment they declare against us, *their army must disperse without a battle, for want of pay*. Admitting, however, that their poverty was a mere pretext, in order to delude us out of our money; and that Sicily might have been very well able to support an army without our assistance, to say nothing of the peasants, whom we might easily arm in our favour. The regular native army in Sicily is not now, and never has been, *strong enough to match us in the field*. And any hostilities, therefore, on the part of the Court of Palermo, are by no means a thing to be dreaded; on the contrary, *they would give us a right once more, to take possession of Sicily for ourselves*, which would be attended with the most beneficial effects to our national powers and prosperity: **NOR OUGHT WE TO HAVE THE SMALLEST SCRUPLE IN ADOPTING THIS VIGOROUS MEASURE**, if the Court of Palermo, by their MISCONDUCT, give us **JUST REASON** for it.—Unless they even know, and feel, that we

are prepared for acting in this way, it will be impossible for us ever to depend upon their sincerity. It is absurd to suppose that any allied government in this world will not either shake us off or betray us, when it fancies it to be for its interest so to do; unless it is fully convinced, that we are not merely powerful, sincere, and good-natured friends, but that our enmity, when provoked, is terrible, and our vengeance destructive. If the Court of Palermo, after having received nearly two millions sterling of British money, without having fulfilled the stipulations by which they bound themselves, when they became our allies, should think proper to treat with contempt our moderate and reasonable request, that we should command an army which we ourselves pay; and should aggravate the whole by going over with their booty to the French, they would certainly commit a most gross violation of the law of nations and of the faith of treaties; and if we meanly and tamely allowed them to offer us all these insults and injuries with impunity, our own conduct would be contrary to every principle of reason and justice, and would make us the laughing-stock of the whole world."

SPAIN.—*Decree of the Cortes, relative to the admission of others than Nobles as Officers in the Army and Navy.*—17th Aug. 1811.

D. Fernando the VIIth, by the Grace of God, King of Spain and of the Indies, and, during his absence and captivity, the Council of Regency, authorised to act in his name, to all to whom these presents shall come: Know, that in the General and Extraordinary Cortes, assembled in the City of Cadiz, the following resolution was decreed:—The General and Extraordinary Cortes in the present situation of affairs, taking into consideration the pleasing necessity of giving every possible proof of the estimation, united by the heroic exertions which all ranks of Spaniards have made, and are now making in every possible way, in the critical circumstances of the country, against their unjust oppressors; and being desirous that the road to honour and glory should be laid open to the children of so many gallant men, that they may combine, with the bravery they inherit from their fathers, the knowledge to be acquired in these Military

Schools, admission to which has hitherto been confined to the descendants of the Nobility, decree—1st, That in all Schools and Seminaries, by land and sea, Spaniards of respectable families be admitted, provided they conform to the established regulations.—2nd, That they be also admitted as Cadets into all the corps of the army, provided they possess the qualifications requisite, without being obliged to produce any proofs of Nobility, and into the Royal Navy, the regulations, both general and particular, on this subject being suspended.—The Council of Regency will take the necessary steps to enforce this Decree, causing it to be printed, published, and circulated.

SPAIN.—*Heads of the New Constitution.*—August, 1811.

On the 19th of August, 1811, appointed for the reading of the two Sections of the Constitution which have been finished by the Committee appointed to draw it up, (and the occasion attracted a great number of auditors,)—Senior Arguelles delivered a most eloquent and erudite discourse, explanatory of the object of the Constitution, its principal bases, and the documents which had been consulted in preparing it.—Senor Perez de Casto, read in succession the two Sections, consisting of 242 articles, and including the following.

Preliminary and fundamental Principles.

Spain belongs to the Spanish people, and is not the Patrimony of any Family.—The Nation only can make Fundamental Laws.—The Roman Catholic and Apostolic Religion, unmixed with any other, is the only Religion which the Nation professes or will profess.—The Government of Spain is an hereditary Monarchy.—The Cortes shall make the Laws, and the King shall execute them.

Spanish Citizens.

The Children of Spaniards, and of Foreigners married to Spanish women, or who bring a capital in order to naturalize themselves to the soil, or establish themselves in trade, or who teach any useful art, are Citizens of Spain.—None but Citizens can fill municipal offices.—The rights of Citizenship may be lost by long absence from the country, or by condemnation to corporeal or infamous punishments.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XX. No. 15.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1811. [Price 1s.

"The Members of the Cortes" (or Representatives of the people) "can neither accept for themselves, nor solicit for any other any employment from the King, not even any honour, as there are no gradations of rank amongst the Members of the Cortes. In the same manner, they cannot, during the time that they are Members, nor for a year after their functions have ceased, accept for themselves or solicit for any other, any pension or honorary distinction, that may be in the gift of the king."—Spanish Constitution, just published. Title VI. Articles 129, and 130.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPANISH CONSTITUTION.—Look at the Motto, English reader; look at the motto! And, when you have looked well at it, I pray you to bestow, for some few moments, the use of those *thinking* faculties for which you are so renowned, upon the subject of the war, which we have been and are, at such an enormous expence, carrying on in Spain. I beg you to look back to the out-set of this war; to call to your mind what were the objects then professed by those who were the advocates of the war; and to consider above all things what we are now fighting for in that country.—It is not my intention now to enter upon an analysis of the *New Constitution of Spain*; but, I have here given you a specimen of it. I have here given you quite sufficient to awaken your curiosity, and to excite in you a most lively interest. The whole of the Constitution is in the same spirit; it is a most able composition; it contains proof of extensive knowledge and of profound reflection. The Junta at Seville did, as you will remember, publicly invite the friends of freedom, in all parts of the world, to give their assistance in suggesting a fit constitution for Spain. I believe that MAJOR CARTWRIGHT sent in *his* plan; and, really, there does appear good reason to suppose, that the *excellent Major's plan* has been adopted with very few alterations; and, where the Cortes have at all deviated from his plan, it has been to render their government more of a republican cast.—But, I shall say no more upon the subject at present. My intention is to lay before the people of England an Analysis of this famous instrument, which, the reader may be well assured, will produce more effect, will be productive of greater and more lasting consequence, than any thing that has taken place, even during the last twenty eventful years.—In the meanwhile, let

it be borne in mind, that we are now fighting in Spain for the establishment of this Constitution; or, we are fighting against the government of Spain; and, another thing is as clear as day-light, namely, Spain must have this Constitution, or Napoleon will have Spain. So that the Anti-jacobins are reduced to this dilemma: either they must wish to see this free, this republican (for so it is all but in name) Constitution established in Spain; or they must wish for the success of Napoleon in his endeavours to subdue that country.—Not a word do we see, in the venal prints, nor even in the Morning Chronicle, in the way of comment upon this Constitution; though, as one would imagine, the subject is of full as much importance to us as is that of Mr. Lancaster's schools or of the adventures of Mr. Trotter. Not a word do they utter upon the subject. Both the parties seem to be dumb-founded, and well they may, if they only look at the passage taken for my Motto.—Their silence, however, must not be suffered to answer its intended purpose. The evidence here afforded in support of the necessity of freedom to the defence of nations must not thus be smothered. I invite these prints to a declaration of their sentiments upon this important subject; and, if they decline the invitation, their motive will not be equivocal. To say the truth, the subject is equally thorny for both parties. If they condemn the Constitution, they not only condemn the principles of real freedom, but they condemn that for which we are fighting, and, of course, they might as well propose, at once, for us to join Napoleon against the Spaniards. If they approve of the Constitution; if they say it provides for a form of government for the establishment of which the sweat and blood of the people of England ought to be expended, then let them recollect, that they have represented us as traitors because we ask for only a very, very small part of

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what this Constitution gives to the people of Spain.—Thus hampered, they will, I dare say, preserve a sulky silence; but, that ought not and will not prevent us from making such remarks as the occasion so loudly calls for; and, indeed, I trust, that the demonstrations of approbation which we shall give of this signal recognition of the soundness of our principles will not be confined to the mere efforts of the press, but will call forth from all the friends of freedom and reform those other marks of approbation, which, on great occasions, they have been accustomed to give.—The public must have observed, how cold the venal prints have lately been in their language relative to Spain; and, indeed, in some cases, they have begun to carp at the conduct of the Cortes. They have begun to complain of a want of cordial co-operation on their part; they have talked in a huffish sort of style of the indifference of the result to us: We have seen, too, that there really has been some coldness between some of our persons in authority and some persons in authority in Spain. General Graham has come away without any sufficient cause having been assigned for it; and, I cannot help pointing out to the reader again, that the Spanish General Lacy, who wrote and published the answer to General Graham, has been since that selected by the Spanish government to be entrusted with a most important command.—I am sorry to see all this at this time; and hope that we shall see harmony restored; for, it would be lamentable indeed, that there should a coolness take place between us and the Spanish government, just at the moment when they have most solemnly pledged themselves to fight for a free Constitution!

SICILY.—Lord William Bentinck is, it is said, gone off to embark again for Sicily. The cause of his sudden return home has not yet been publicly stated. But, as it were by the way of a pulse-feeler, the venal prints of the 9th instant have given, under the shape of an extract of a letter from Palermo, the following statement of the propositions said to have been made by him to the Sicilian Court.—“Palermo, Aug. 27.—On Lord Wm. Bentinck’s arrival here, it is understood he was instructed to demand and insist on three things—1st, That 10,000 Sicilian troops should be sent to Spain and Portugal.—2d, That Lord Bentinck should be appointed to the command of

“the Sicilian Army, and be a Member of the Privy Council.—3d, that English troops should be admitted to garrison Palermo.”—Pretty well this! If this is not calculated to insure what the Times calls the independence of the Island, I am sure I do not know what is!—But, the most curious move of all would be, the sending of the native Sicilian army to Spain and Portugal, while the English army were left to defend Sicily. This makes part of the system, I suppose, which appears to have been founded upon the new discovery, that men are likely to fight better in defence of a foreign country than of their own country. This discovery is certainly a new one; for, until of late years, it has always been the notion, that men would fight best for that country, in which they were born and in which were their kindred, parents and children.—But, is it certain, that the Spaniards would like to have the assistance of the Sicilian troops? I should doubt of it very much indeed; and, in fact, I do not believe it, especially as I see in the New Constitution, an Article directly pointed at a jealousy respecting the employment of foreign troops, or the admission of such troops into the country.—If we take the command of the Sicilian army that remains, send the rest of the army away, put our Commander in Chief into the King’s Council, and garrison Palermo, where the king’s palace is, with English troops, we do, in fact, take the whole thing into our own hands. Under such circumstances, no one would pretend to talk of any will that the Court of Sicily would have. I do not believe that this will be done; for, how completely would it silence us in future as to the acts of Napoleon with regard to the weak powers of the North of Europe? In the very newspapers, which contain this paragraph, we are told that Napoleon has a design to garrison the island of Zealand with French Troops, and we are told that he is a tyrant for this. The design is described in all the most odious colours that can be well imagined. But, if we do what is proposed, in this paragraph, with respect to Sicily, what will our newspapers say then? Will they still call him a tyrant for insisting to put his garrisons into the strong posts of weaker states?—In this absence of all authentic information, however, it is, perhaps, useless to spend our time in speculations as to what may or may not happen. Time will tell what is at present kept from

our knowledge; and, in the meanwhile those who wish to be prepared for the forming of a correct opinion of all our transactions with the Sicilian Court, from the memorable year 1799 to the present time, will do well to read first of all CAPTAIN FOOTE'S VINDICATION. This gentleman, a Captain in our navy, was the person, who, on the part of the king of England, signed the *Capitulations* with the Neapolitan Patriots, previous to the return of the king and queen from Sicily in that year, and previous to the executions of the persons, for whose lives he had become the guarantee, on condition of their surrendering the forts that they possessed. Finding that a Mr. HARRISON, who had published what he called "*genuine Memoirs of Lord Nelson*," had attacked his conduct, Captain Foote, wishing to avoid an exposure of the transactions in the Bay of Naples, wrote to Mr. Harrison to correct his error in a second edition. This was not done, and, therefore, Captain Foote resolved to vindicate his conduct through the means of the press. In the meanwhile a "*Life of Lord Nelson*" was preparing by the Rev. J. S. CLARKE, with whom Captain Foote got into a correspondence, and to whom he appears to have communicated all his papers, in the hope that this reverend gentleman would have done justice to him and to truth. In this, however, he was disappointed; for, as appears from one of Mr. Clarke's letters, all that he wanted with Captain Foote and his papers was to prevent, if possible, those facts from being believed that Captain Foote's papers established as true. This will clearly appear from a perusal of the correspondence, but particularly from the following passages in one of the letters: "From what has been said in the *foreign journals*, and by *Helen Maria Williams*, "and very recently by Belsham in the "11th and 12th volumes of his History "of England, it is not only necessary to "mention Lord Nelson's conduct, but to "enlarge upon it, and, IF POSSIBLE, "to do away what DEMOCRATS, for "bad purposes, have asserted."—He promised Capt. Foote, that he should see the *proof sheets* as they came from the press; but, this promise he did not keep. Captain Foote complained of unfair treatment, and told him, that he should publish a vindication of his own conduct including the correspondence with Mr. Clarke.—This he has since done, subjoining to it all the authentic documents in support of his

statements; and his book is to be had of *Mr. Hatchard in Piccadilly*.—This book should be read by every person in the kingdom. Nor will the *impartial* reader be disposed to overlook the book of Miss WILLIAMS, published by *Messrs. Robinsons in Paternoster Row*. Mr. BELSHAM's history should also be read. I have not read it yet; but the Reverend Mr. Clarke's recommendation is a quite sufficient proof of its merit in this respect.—What, however, must the *English Journals* have been at? How comes it to pass, that these facts never got into them? I have looked into the *Annual Register* for 1799; and I find, that, not only is the *truth wholly suppressed*; but that *falsehoods* the most gross are substituted in its place. This might have arisen from the want of information; but, what a stain is this whole affair upon the English press?—Mr. Fox, whose mind was always on the side of humanity, did mention the matter, in the House of Commons, on the 3rd of February, 1800, in the words as quoted by Captain Foote. He stated the case briefly, and in terms far short of what Captain Foote's account would have justified. He stated it in order to obtain an answer in contradiction; but *no answer* and *no explanation* was given.—What *means* have been made use of, since that time, to keep the facts from the English people, I shall leave the reader to guess; but, I repeat, that, in order to arrive at a correct opinion of our transactions with the Court of Sicily, and in order to form a sound judgment as to what is likely to result from what is now said to be going on, we must, at least, read the work of Captain Foote and Miss Williams, making what allowances we may find necessary for the political principles of the latter. As to Captain Foote's book, it is a mere vindication of his own character and conduct. He appears to be as warm a loyalist and as stout a hater of Jacobins as any that can be found; but, he could not, as he says, bring his mind to submit to have his character blasted in order to save that of another.—There is (quoted by Captain Foote from the *Life of Lord Nelson*) a letter to LORD NELSON from LORD KEITH, which ought to be written in letters of gold. It was dated from Corsica on the 29th of June, 1799, just before the executions began, and it says: "For God's sake, do not let those "good people carry their heads too high. "They will find it more easy to improve "the government when in it than to get

"into it. Therefore; let them return on any terms that are tolerable: and, even did it depend on the king, and he were to grant *solid privileges* to his people, it *certainly would be better to govern freemen than slaves.*"—This does great honour to the heart as well as to the understanding of Lord Keith, and points him out as a man entitled to the respect of the nation. —If this sober, this wise counsel of Lord Keith, this counsel so worthy of a British Admiral, had been followed, how different might the lot of the Court of Sicily have been at this day, and how different our situation with regard to that court!—But, how came the Reverend Mr. Clarke to insert this letter of Lord Keith? Why, he dared not leave it out; for, Lord Keith was the superior officer on the station to Lord Nelson. It was, in some measure, necessary to Lord Keith's character; and, *Mr. Mc. Arthur*, who was the *associate of Mr. Clarke in the compilation of the life of Lord Nelson*, was, I believe, the *Secretary of Lord Keith*, and has, I believe, ever since, been intimately connected, or at least, acquainted, with his Lordship. I do not mention this in order to hint at any *partiality* shown towards Lord Keith; for the insertion was called for by truth and justice; but, I mention it to shew, that, as far as the Biographers were concerned, other motives might, and in all likelihood, had, their influence; but, at any rate, it is manifest, that they had more scruple to run even the risk of barely touching by inference the reputation of Lord Keith, than they had to make a complete and direct sacrifice of the reputation of Captain Foote; though, from the beginning to the end, he appears to have acted the part of an intelligent and zealous officer and of a man of humanity and honour, with feelings always alive to the fair fame of his country. —Reverting, for a moment, to the affairs of Sicily at this time, it is *possible* that facts may have been discovered sufficient to warrant the suspicion of a design on the part of our allies, the Court of Sicily, to throw themselves into the arms of the French. This is *possible*, though no proof has been produced of it; and, if this should prove to be the case, it will then become a very delicate question, *what we ought to do*. It will form a point of more difficulty than any that has yet arisen. For, though we may have the *power* in our hands to compel what is suggested in the above paragraph, and what Captain Pasley and our newspapers re-

commend, to exercise that power will be running great risks as to the effect which it is calculated to produce in the minds of the people of other countries, especially in the minds of the Spaniards, whose friendship it is *now* so important to us to preserve. And, then, as I before pointed out, the expence will become enormous; for, we must not only maintain a sea and land force sufficient to make head against the French, but also sufficient to watch any movements amongst the people of Sicily themselves. That the people would have no *reason* to repent their change of rulers is probable; but, in such cases, men are not always under the guidance of reason; and, indeed, they seldom are, otherwise history would not inform us of, so many long and bloody wars about the right of succession. So that, in any case, present appearances, with regard to Sicily, are, in a military and naval point of view, any thing but promising; though, considered politically, they may, in the opinions of some men, be of a different aspect.

MILITIAS' QUARRELING.—It appears from the Dublin newspapers, that two regiments of Militia, the *Limerick* and the *Nottingham*, quartered in the Barracks in that city, have had a serious misunderstanding. It is stated, in these papers, that there were 400 of the Irish who encountered 1500 of the English. Wounds appear to have been given on both sides, and, it is said, that some lives were lost; but, that peace was at last restored; that the Irish were moved away from those quarters, and that, since, perfect harmony, has been shown between the corps, who have shaken hands, and given to each other assurances of unalterable friendship. —This is a matter of no small account; for, from such beginnings, the most important consequences have often ensued; and, it is the duty of every one, who has an opportunity of addressing the public, to suggest any thing that appears to him likely to tend towards the averting of such consequences.—The most effectual step would certainly be, in my opinion, to *undo* what has been done as to the *interchange* of the Militias, leave the Irish in their country and keep the English at home. But, perhaps, it is useless to talk of this now. The interchange has taken place; and it might be difficult to attempt to undo it all at once.—One thing, however, may always be done; one

thing is at all times in season; and that is to **CONCILIATE** Ireland; an object of which I have never lost sight for one single moment of the last ten years of my life, being fully convinced, seeing as plainly as I could see any thing, that unless Ireland was conciliated, England must always be in imminent danger. The Irish are full of wit, eloquence, spirit, and bravery, and they are hardy beyond almost any people in the world, but by none of their other qualities are they so much distinguished as by their *kindness* and their *readiness to forgive*. Yet, they are hasty, impetuous, sanguine, rash, and (on the sudden) *vengeful*.—It requires but a very small portion of the knowledge of human nature to know, that such a people must either be *treated kindly* or actually *held down by sheer force*. The latter, in the present situation of the world, is impossible; and, therefore, if we were to leave justice wholly out of sight, sound policy calls upon us to do all that lies in our power in the way of *conciliation*.—Whether our government has done all that it was able in this way; whether it has pursued, either lately or formerly, a system of conciliation towards Ireland, towards that great, that powerful, that most vulnerable part of the kingdom, I must leave the reader to judge; but, of the conduct of the *hireling's newspapers*, in this respect, I cannot forbear to speak in terms becoming the nature of that conduct.—These prints, in both countries, have loaded the Irish Catholics with the foulest abuse that ever blackened paper. They have called their leaders, and all those who have recently appeared conspicuous in forwarding the intended petition, by every name descriptive of *bad men, bad citizens, and bad subjects*. They have accused them of acting under falsely alledged motives; they have accused them of a design to stir up the people to a resistance of the government and the law; they have accused them of a desire to separate Ireland from England; and, in short, they have branded them as *traitors*. This has been done in the *Courier* news-paper over and over again.—To accuse the Catholics in this way is to accuse *Ireland*; for, Ireland is, at least, *three-fourths* Catholic. And, yet these malignant writers seem surprized, that the Irish should be irritated against England. It may be unjust, and it certainly is unjust, to suppose that these hireling prints speak the voice of the *people of England*; but, the people of Ireland can-

not know that, and they are not, therefore, to blame for mistaking the object of their resentment.—The *Courier* news-paper seems now, however, to be alarmed a little at the natural consequences of its own labours. It quotes, from an Irish paper, the *Dublin Morning Post*, of the 3rd of October, the following angry paragraph upon the subject of the verdict of *justifiable homicide* on the killing of the Irish soldiers a little while ago at *Thatcham*.—"Is there *common justice* for an Irishman, or when will the inhabitants of England cease to insult their long-suffering, though brave protectors? The day seems to be far distant, for the insolent inhabitants of England are as *ungrateful to the People of Ireland*, as they were cruel to the natives of Africa in resisting the Abolition of the Slave Trade. The people of England are debauched by opulence; and, though the British name would seem to be preserved from utter extinction by Irish valour, their arrogance is equal to their corruption! Yet that arrogance may be humbled, if they should persist in thinking that Irishmen are *passive as Britons*, or that forbearance is cowardice, or that their indignant silence results from a *conviction of their inability to obtain justice even by the tedious forms of Law*? No, no; the Irish seem at this awful moment to be destined by Providence to sustain the glorious character of being the *arbiters of the fate of Europe*! The People of Ireland cry aloud for justice on the slayers of the brave man, who voluntarily left his native land to protect that country, where he was so basely slaughtered. The People of Ireland feel the greatest indignation against those unfeeling Englishmen, who solemnly—on their oaths—at a public inquest—in the face of the world, declared that a wanton murder (as it afterwards appeared to be) was a *justifiable act*. Brutal—infatuated men, do you seek to irritate Ireland, or do you not dread the consequences of injustice? How stands the fact according to your own Newspapers?—That *corrupt portion of your public Journals in the pay of the Treasury*. Your Newspapers that *flatter your corrupt vanity to the destruction of the British name*! Your Newspapers that vilify Ireland, because you are prejudiced and ungrateful! Your Newspapers that *palliate those abominable crimes which cannot in decency be named*! Your Newspapers

"found your guilt too flagrant to be denied, and you have thus proved your criminality. Be unjust, and suffer manslaughter to escape *if you dare!* By your own statements, which you cannot deny, you are condemned already."

—This is indeed strong and violent language. It certainly is not justifiable as applied to the people of England. But, who have we to thank for it but those venal prints, which have so outrageously calumniated the people of Ireland, and which have never hesitated to brand with the name of *traitor* every Irishman who dared to utter a complaint, in however mild a way it was done? Such abuse, such contemptuous treatment would move stocks and stones to resentment; and, of all the people in the world, the Irish are the farthest from stocks and stones.—The Courier has now discovered, that there is a point beyond which it may be dangerous to goad the Irish people with abuse; and, therefore, in copying the above paragraph, on the 8th instant, it assumes a softened tone, and (Oh! admirable!) becomes the preacher of *mutual forbearance!* After having complained of the violence of the above quoted paragraph, it proceeds thus: "These comments would inculcate 'a belief that there is no community of interests between the two countries: that English interests are not Irish interests, and that it were possible for Ireland to be prosperous and free for a day, a moment, without being connected with England. Let this delusion pass away—*Good God!* that while the sword and sceptre of Europe are in one hand against us, that we should not be united! that we should still be squabbling about places, and disputing about dogmas. The instinct of brutes unites them in a common danger. The reason of man seems to render him an easier prey—Let us put an end to this system of exasperation and recrimination." Aye, put an end to them by all means; but, how? Why by you and your like ceasing to accuse the Irish petitioners with treasonable designs; by your ceasing to abuse the Irish people, and to speak of them as men to be kept in awe by the sword. If the people of Ireland are taught to believe, that there is no community of interests between the two countries, whose fault is it but yours and those who act and think like you? Ah! you may exclaim "*Good God!*" but, if we are *dis-united* at this perilous season, who is to be blamed but you and your like, who

have done all that was in your power to produce deep and implacable animosity in the breasts of the Irish! The writer whose "*violence*" you censure, accuses you; he accuses the *hireling news-papers* of England. Why do you not answer him upon that point? Why do you not attempt to *defend yourself?* An exclamation of "*Good God!*" is no defence; and, unless you can offer something better, you may as well keep your piety for the use of your closet.—You complain about "*squabbling* about places and disputing about dogmas;" but, whose fault is that? Do you remember La Fontaine's *Sister Jane*, the aged Nun, who, having been gay in her youth, exhorted the young girls when they came to the grate, to shun the blandishments of men, and who received for answer, that, when they had done as she had done, they would do as she did? Oh! Sir, there is nothing so easy as for those who are in place to exhort those who are out of place not, for God's sake, to "*squabble* about places." The same may be said about dogmas, by those who object to the granting of any thing that is asked by others as to religious toleration.—But have the news-papers ceased to calumniate the Irish Catholics? No: they assault them with as much bitterness as ever, as will be seen by a paragraph quoted from a Dublin Newspaper in this same number of the Courier.—"To the confusion of the Faction, we rejoice in stating, that the late differences between the Limerick and Nottingham Regiments of Militia, have been happily accommodated. These Regiments met yesterday morning in Stephen's-green, and delighted every honest mind by their cordial reconciliation. During this gratifying scene, the Bands of each Regiment played the National Tunes of the other. This is as it should be; henceforth their weapons will be drawn only against the common Enemy; and the Faction, who so brutally crueld in their dissention, have now to mourn their re-union. May such tears be ever shed by the eternal adversaries of Ireland, the AGENTS OF HER ETERNAL FOE!"—Thus even the reconciliation of the Soldiers of the two countries who had unfortunately disagreed, must be seized on by the implacable malignity of these men as a suitable occasion for calumniating their political opponents and for representing them as *traitors*. If any thing disastrous happens, they are accused of rejoicing at it, and if any

thing fortunate, they are accused of mourning over it; and, in both cases, they are marked out as worthy of being treated with all possible severity. This is the way to *conciliate* is it? And, observe, too, that these writers have no hesitation in proclaiming to all the world, and, of course, to our ever-watchful enemy, that there is, in Ireland, a party who are considered as his "*agents*." They have no hesitation in doing this, and yet they have the cool insolence to express their sorrow at the existence of *disunion*! This cool insolence is even better calculated to foment animosity than their outrageous abuse; and, in short, the abused and insulted party, must be far too low to merit the name of men, if they did not show their resentment against their calumniators.—It was the *government* who adopted the measure of an interchange of Militias; if any evils have arisen, or shall arise, out of it, the fault, if any, lies with the government. The least, therefore, that justice demands is to forbear to impute the blame, or any part of it, to those who are looked upon as opponents of the government, and who had no hand in the adoption of the measure. Yet do the venal prints continually throw out insinuations, upon this score, against the political opponents of the government; against the "*factions*," that is to say, in their sense of the word, against every man, who dares to utter a complaint upon any subject connected with politics, and especially if he goes so far as to call for a redress of *any grievance*, however modest and humble may be his language and his mode of proceeding.—Thus treated how is it possible for men of any spirit not to become desperate; and, from desperate men what are we to expect but desperate deeds? Infinite is the mischief which these prints have done. They find themselves beaten at argument, and then they fall to abuse. Those whom they thus answer feel as they naturally must feel; and thus is animosity, the animosity inspired by *injustice*, which is the most lasting of all, kept constantly alive in bosoms where it seldom long remains inactive, and when it discovers itself either in words or acts, the same men who have occasioned it are the first to recommend the severest punishments of those words or acts. And, after all this they have the astonishing effrontery coolly to express their *lamentations* over that *want of union* which is found to prevail!—As to the *remedy* for all the evils which belong to Ireland, it is, as

it always has been, my conviction, that nothing will put an end to those evils, but putting the *Catholics* upon the same footing with the *members of the Church of Scotland*. The measure which has been so much in agitation would do something; and I should say "so far so good;" but I will not lend my hand to deceive the public. I do not think that that measure would do *much*, and every one whom I know, conversant in Irish affairs, thinks the same. I have before, upon various occasions, shown, that to do, what I propose, would be attended with little cost, and with no injury at all to the established Church; but, suppose it were to weaken the established Church, and suppose that to be an evil, that evil is to be set against the evil of continuing the dissensions in Ireland, which render that part of the kingdom so vulnerable at a time when it is impossible to say what hour it may be attacked by a powerful foreign enemy. I may be deceived; my remedy might be insufficient for the purpose; but, no man will, I think, deny that something ought to be attempted to put an end to those dissensions, the existence of which is notorious, and the consequences of which may be so fatal.—But, at any rate, it would cost nothing for the venal writers to abstain from an abuse of the Irish Catholics, which, I repeat, compose *three fourths* of the people of Ireland; it would cost the nation nothing for them to abstain from the indulgence of their malignity in that way; it would cost nothing for them to cease to speak, upon all occasions, so contemptuously as they do of the claims and the character of the Irish Catholics; it would cost nothing for them to refrain from exulting at every measure, hostile in its operation to that numerous class of people; it would cost nothing for them to cease, in short, to represent the Catholic body as *fools* and their leaders as *traitors*. This would cost nothing, at any rate; but, I must confess, that it is more than I can, after long observation of their conduct, hope to see. All the fact and argument is against them; they have nothing left but to give up the contest or resort to calumny; and, in such cases, I have seen them uniformly adopt the latter course. They charge the Catholics with having *other views* than those which they *profess*. What can be more unjust and more irritating than this? There is no such thing as *answering* such an accusation, and there is no such thing as *hearing it with patience*. The party thus accused must necessarily be filled with re-

sentment; and, is it any wonder if they really, do, even on the ground of this accusation, conceive projects which they did did not before entertain? To make a woman faithless the ready and infallible way is to shew that you suspect her; and, to make a man aim at accomplishing any thing hostile to the government, what is so likely as a false accusation of his intending so to do? But, all these arguments, and ten million more, if I could add them, would, I am afraid, have no weight with the conductors of a venal press.

ESSEX ELECTION.—The state of parties in this country is worthy of particular attention. For many elections past, the two *settled*, regularly drilled parties, have divided the county between them, as they used to divide the city of Westminster, till the people there were resolved no longer to be the tools of party.—The *Whigs* (as they still call themselves) used to put in one member; and the *Pittites* the other. There was no disposition in either party to have a contested election. The thing was a matter of *amicable convention*, and was settled by the respective leaders over a bottle at some inn, or at some country house.—Thus the *people* of the county, the *freeholders at large*, had no more to do in choosing the members of the county, than the *people* of any rotten borough have in choosing the members for the said rotten borough.—To put an end to this, and, at the same time, to give the freeholders of Essex an opportunity of making a stand for *Parliamentary Reform*, Mr. BURGOTNE declared himself a candidate upon that ground. This was *throwing open* the county; it was putting an end to the snug thing that had been going on for so many years, it was what the *Whigs* in particular complained of as *disturbing the peace* of the county. Oh! impudent assertion! To give the freeholders an opportunity of exercising their elective rights was to *disturb the peace of the county*!—But, why did the *Whigs* dislike it most? For a very good reason. Mr. BURGOTNE stood, and yet means to stand it seems, upon the very principles that the *Whigs* had always professed; and, he had the candour to tell them, that, if any one of them would *pledge himself to endeavour to obtain a parliamentary reform*, he, Mr. BURGOTNE, would resign his own pretensions, and join in supporting that man. Nothing could be more fair and public-spirited than this. He asked for nothing more than the sup-

port of *reform*, that very reform, to which stood *pledged* these very *Whigs*, by declarations the most solemn. I have now lying before me their *Declaration to the People of England*, issued in 1791, signed by twenty-seven Members of Parliament, amongst whom were Charles Grey, Lord Lauderdale, Lord Kinnaird, William H. Lambton, George Tierney, Arthur Pigott, William Baker, Samuel Whitbread, Dudley North, Thomas Erskine, Lord John Russell, T. C. Corwen, R. B. Sheridan, William Smith, Ralph Milbank, Henry Howard, Richard S. Milnes, H. Haworth, W. Powlett Powlett. These gentlemen and their associates declared their objects to be, “1. To restore the freedom of election” and a more equal representation of the “people in Parliament. 2. To secure to the people a more frequent exercise of their right of electing their representatives.”—These were the objects which the *Whigs* professed to have in view; and these are the objects that Mr. BURGOTNE has in view. He tells the county of Essex: “I do not want to be elected myself; I am not anxious that you should vote for me; but I am anxious that you should vote for these objects; and, if no one amongst those who have professed to have them in view, will now distinctly *pledge* himself to pursue them, *I will*, and I will stand forward as a candidate, and give you an opportunity of approving of such a pledge.” Nothing can be more fair or more consistent. The way is clearly open for any *Whig* candidate, who will act upon the principles, which his party have so long professed to the people; but, if no one will do that, and if any one of them becomes a candidate without giving the *pledge*, Mr. BURGOTNE will oppose him.—Thus, then, stands the case with the *Whigs*: they must, in Essex, give the *pledge for Reform*; or, they must see Mr. BURGOTNE beat them; or, they must be content to let the *Pittites* put in both the *Members*. They are unable to carry a Member without the aid of the *Reformers*. Mr. BURGOTNE divides their numbers and takes the better half from them. If such division takes place, the *Pittites* will put forward two of their own candidates; and, it is very probable, may carry them both.—The question is, then; will the *Whigs* give the *pledge*? I think they will not; for, from their conduct of late years, it is clear, that they prefer the success of the *Pittites*; that they prefer being beaten by their rivals in all sorts of ways; that, in short,

they prefer any thing to reform.—Let us hope, however, that the *Freeholders* of Essex will reflect a little upon their situation; that they will feel the deep shame of having been so long made the tools of interested factions; and that they will, at last, act as becomes men sensible of their rights and alive to the interests and honour of their country. They will, at the next election, have an opportunity of doing this; and, if they neglect it, the fault will be their own.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate. Friday,
11th October, 1811.

P. S. A Correspondent asks me, *where* I have read of the use of *Horse Chesnuts* as food for Merino Sheep. I stated, in my Preface to Mr. Livingstone's Book (to which Preface my Correspondent refers) that I had read of it in *Lusteyrie's* History of the Introduction of the Merinos into the different States of Europe; and, if my correspondent cannot come at the French, he will find a *Translation* of that very useful and interesting work at Mr. *Harding's* in St. James's Street, and at page 156 he will find the passage that I particularly allude to.—I beg him to excuse me for not answering his question sooner. I had mislaid his letter.

KING LAMBERT.

The following account of the establishment of a New Kingdom is taken from the American Newspapers of July, 1811.

Know all men by these presents that I, Jonathan Lambert, late of Salem, in the state of Massachusetts, United States of America, mariner, and citizen thereof, have this 4th day of February, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and eleven, taken absolute possession of the islands of Tristan de Cunha, so called, viz.: the great island, and the other two known by the name of Inaccessible and Nightingale islands: solely for myself and my heirs for ever: with the right of conveying the whole, or any part thereof, to one or more persons, by deed or sale, free gift, or otherwise, as I or they (my heirs) may hereafter think fitter or proper.—And as no European, or other power whatever, has hitherto publicly claimed the said islands by right of discovery, or act of possession, therefore be it known to all nations, tongues, and languages, that from and after the date of this public instru-

ment, I constitute my individual self the sole proprietor of the above-mentioned islands, grounding my right and claim on the rational and sure principles of absolute occupancy, and as such, holding and possessing all the rights, titles and immunities properly belonging to proprietors by the usage of nations.

In consequence of this right and title by me thus assumed and established, I do further declare, that the said islands shall for the future be denominated the islands of Refreshments, the great island bearing that name in particular, and the landing place on the north side, a little to the east of the Cascade, to be called Reception, and which shall be the place of my residence. The isle formerly called Inaccessible shall henceforward be called Pintard Island, and that known by the name of Nightingale Island, shall now be called Lovell Island.—And I do further declare, that the cause of the said act set forth in this instrument, originated in the desire and determination of preparing for myself and family a home where I can enjoy life without the embarrassments which have hitherto constantly attended me, and procure for us an interest and property, by means of which a competency may be ever secured, and remain, if possible, far removed beyond the reach of *chicanery* and ordinary misfortune.—For the above purpose I intend paying the strictest attention to husbandry, presuming when it is known in the world that refreshments may be obtained at my residence, all vessels of whatever description, and belonging to whatever nation, will visit me for that purpose, and by a fair and open traffic, supply themselves with those articles of which they may be in need. And I do hereby invite all those who may want refreshments to call at Reception, where by laying by opposite to the Cascade, they will be immediately visited by a boat from the shore, and speedily supplied with such things as the Islands may produce, at a reasonable price.—And be it further known, that by virtue of the aforesaid right, and authority above mentioned, I have adopted a flag* which shall

* This flag is formed of five diamonds, transversely from corner to corner, and four half diamonds, placed on the center of the top, bottom and both sides. The two upper and two lower diamonds are blue next the staff or halyard, and red on the uppermost side; the centre white, the four half diamonds bear the letter W.—

for ever be the known and acknowledged standard flag of these islands. And that a white flag shall be known, and considered as the common flag for any vessel or vessels in the merchants service, which may now, or hereafter, belong to any inhabitants of these islands.—And lastly, be it known, that I hold myself and my people, to be bound on the principles of hospitality and good fellowship and the laws of nations (if any there are) as established by the best writers on that subject, and by no other law whatever, until time may produce particular contracts or other engagements.

J. LAMBERT.

Witness to this signature,

ANDREW MILLER.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—*Heads of the New Constitution.—*
August, 1811.

(Concluded from page 418.)

The King.

The person of the King is inviolable and sacred.—He shall sanction the Laws enacted by the Cortes.—He may declare war and make peace.—He shall appoint to Civil and Military Employments on the proposal of the Council of State.—He shall direct all diplomatic Negotiations.—He shall superintend the Application of the Public Revenue, &c.

Restrictions on the Kingly Authority.

The king shall not obstruct the meeting of the Cortes in the cases and at the periods pointed out by the Constitution, nor embarrass or suspend the Sitzings, &c.—All who may advise him to any such proceedings shall be holden and dealt with as traitors.—He must not travel, marry, alienate any thing, abdicate the crown, raise taxes, nor exchange any town, city, &c. without having first obtained the per-

Note.—Captain Lovell observes, that having left the above mentioned Jonathan Lambert, accompanied by two persons from Rio de Janeiro, on Trista de Cunha Island about the 1st of January, he proceeded on his voyage, and on his return to the island, after the space of 34 days, Mr. Lambert had cleared about fifty acres of land, and planted various kinds of seeds, some of which, as well as the coffee tree and sugar cane, were furnished him by the American minister at Rio de Janeiro. The above seeds had sprung up, and looked very promising.

mission of the Cortes.—Don Fernando VII. is declared by the Cortes King of Spain, and after his decease, his legitimate descendants shall succeed to the throne.*—The King shall be a minor until he has completed the age of 18 years.—The eldest son of the King shall be called Prince of the Asturias, and, as such, shall, at the age of 14, take an oath before the Cortes, to maintain the Constitution, and to be faithful to the King.—During a minority, a Regency shall be formed, which shall superintend the education of the young Prince, according to the orders of the Cortes. The Regency shall be presided by the Queen Mother, if she be in life, and shall be composed of two of the oldest Deputies of the Cortes, who shall be replaced from year to year, and of two Counsellors of the Council of State, chosen in the order of their seniority.—The Cortes shall fix the salary proper for the support of the King and his Family, and shall point out the places destined for his recreation, &c.—The Infantes may be appointed to all employments, but cannot be Magistrates, nor Members of the Cortes, and must not leave the kingdom without the permission of the said Cortes.—There shall be eight Secretaries of State, including two for South and North America; they shall be responsible for the affairs of their respective departments, and the remuneration which they shall receive, shall be determined by the Cortes.—A Council of State shall be formed, consisting of forty Members: four of this number are to be Grandees of Spain, of acknowledged merit and virtue; four Ecclesiastics, of which two shall be Bishops; twelve Americans; the remaining twenty Members to be chosen from among the most respectable Citizens of the other classes of the community. This council shall meet every year on the 1st of March, and shall sit during three months. This period can only be extended on the request of the King, or for some reason of great urgency. In such cases the Session may be prolonged, but not beyond one month.—The election of the Cortes shall take place conformable to the mode prescribed by the Constitution, and one Deputy shall be chosen for each 70,000 souls.—The Sitzings of the Cortes shall be opened by the King, or in his name, by the President of the Deputation of the

* The particular Regulation of the Succession appears to be, for the present, reserved by the Cortes.

Cortes, which ought to remain permanent, in order to watch over the fulfilment of the Constitution.—The above are the chief Articles of the Report which has been presented to the Cortes. It is ordered to be printed, and when the copies are received from the press, will be fully discussed.

SPAIN.—*Execution of the alledged Traitors at Figueras.*

On the 25th August the Military Commission charged with the trial of the authors and accomplices in the treason that delivered Figueras to the enemy, condemned to death and to forfeiture of property the following:—*Jean Marqués*, Confidential Clerk of the Keeper of the Magazine Blouquier.—*Jean Floretta*, Servant of the said Blouquier.—*Jean Jouyné*, procurier.—*Genis Pons*, and *Pierre Pons*.—All the five living at Fort Fernando de Figueras, and convicted of Treason: the three first, present at the trial, were executed: the two latter were declared contumacious.—The said Commission has acquitted of the said crime the undermentioned:—*Amon Francois Blouquier*,—*Therese Pons*,—*Magdeleine Pons*,—Sister of Genis and Pierre Pons.—And *Marianne Floretta*, servant of Blouquier.—However, considering that in the absence of sufficient proofs, they afford at least reason for suspicion; these four individuals have been placed under the special superintendence of the superior Police, until the pacification of Upper Catalonia, and they were present at the execution of the condemned.

SPAIN.—THE WAR.—*Address of General Doyle to the Catalonians. Maturo, July 5, 1811.*

Catalonians.—Suchet has spread a report that Buonaparté has begun to treat for peace with Great Britain, and that he was so anxious it should take effect, that he had sent Talleyrand to London, and was himself gone to the vicinity of the coast to facilitate a prompt communication.—Remember, valiant and unconquerable Catalonians, that it is scarcely a year since this same Suchet asserted, that the British Government, in conjunction with the Spanish, had made peace with France; and in consequence of it, he recommended the Catalonians to retire to their houses, since there would no longer be any war. And what were the means he adopted to give publicity and weight to this infamous

treachery? He published a proclamation, and forged the signature of Captain General O'Donnell,—an act till then unheard of and unknown. But this treason, this vile intrigue, did not produce the effect Suchet had promised himself; in place of retiring to their homes, more than 10,000 youths joined the ranks of the army.—I deceive myself much, or Senor Suchet wishes (now that no other resource remains to him) to impede the general rising of this indefatigable principality, which never can be effected by his saying France is treating for peace with England;—he foolishly judges, that you, Catalonians, will allow yourselves to be seduced, and think, that the great efforts you now make, and will continue to make, and which the enemy so greatly fears, must be useless. He says the English are treating for peace, because he knows it would increase your difficulties in receiving succours; Senor Suchet calculates this consideration ought to discourage you much. Catalonians, he tells you nothing of French perfidy, or of the little faith you should place in their promises or information. Your own ground furnishes you with undeniable proofs of the impossibility of joining the words "good faith" with the French nation. Courage, then, Catalonians: England will never abandon you, but on the contrary redouble her efforts, because you redouble your own. A general effort, then, O, Catalonians; and do not hearken to the French, the French party, or the timid! (Signed) DOYLE.

PORTUGAL.—THE WAR.—*Extract of an official dispatch from his Excellency Lord Wellington to his Excellency Don Miguel Forjas. Sabugal, August 8, 1811.*

I have continued to move the troops upon their left, since my dispatch of the 1st inst. to your Excellency.—General Silveira informs me, under date of the 28th of July, that the troops of Bessieres, and those under the command of General Santocildes, continued to maintain the same positions which they respectively occupied according to his letter of the 21st of July.—I know that a part of the fifth army still remained in Zafra, on the 2d inst. and that a division only had set out in the direction of the county of Niebla.—All the information which I have received, agrees in stating, that Marshal Soult has gone in the direction of Gra-

nada.—I have received a communication from Valladolid, mentioning that Marshal Bessieres had gone to France, and that General Dorsenne had now the command of the North of Spain.

Extract of an official Dispatch from Lord Wellington, to Don Miguel Pereira Forjas, dated head-quarters, Fuente Guinaldo, August 14.

The enemy has made no alteration in regard to the respective positions which their different corps occupied, since my last dispatch of the 8th inst.; the army of Portugal was in the same positions in the valley of the Tagus, and near Placentia, on the 12th inst. The army of the north, and the fifth corps, remained as they were on the 12th inst.—It appears very certain that Soult has marched in the direction of Granada, with a large corps of troops.

WELLINGTON.

PORTUGAL.—THE WAR.—*A Dispatch, of which the following is an extract, was yesterday received at the Office of the Earl of Liverpool, addressed to his Lordship by General Lord Viscount Wellington, dated Fuente Guinaldo, August 31, 1811.*

The enemy have made no movement of any importance since I addressed your lordship on the 14th. On that evening a detachment of about 1,200 infantry and cavalry, arrived at Gafa, which is on the South side of the mountains which separate Castile from Estremadura; and on the following morning they surprised a small picquet in St. Martin de Trebejo, under Lieutenant Wood, of the 11th Light Dragoons, whom they made prisoner with ten men, and went off that evening to Moralego, and on the next morning to Monte Hermoso.

HAYTI.—(*St. Domingo.*) *New Constitution, 1811.*

An Extraordinary Council being convened to determine on the changes the State ought to undergo, the said Council consider that the Constitution of the 17th February, in the year 4 (1807), which was made without social compact, and during the storms of civil war, is not adapted to the present condition of the Island, on the following grounds:—That the Constitution mentioned, although suited to the tempestuous circumstances of the country, had many acknowledged im-

perfections. It secured such means of enjoyment as the deplorable situation of things permitted, but none suited to the more favourable condition of affairs, which by the grace of the Chief Magistrate, and his sublime and brilliant talents, are approaching to order, prosperity, and happiness.—That in the flourishing state of agriculture, commerce, and navigation, re-establishing morals, religion, and advancing to the highest discipline the public force, such a prospect of security and permanence is afforded which justifies the establishment of a firm and stable Government to insure that prosperity.—The said Council judging for such reasons, that it is necessary to invest the Supreme Authority with all that constitutes the grandeur, dignity and power of Majesty, has resolved:

1. That the establishment of an hereditary Throne is the best expedient for fulfilling this purpose.—2. That the throne shall descend in the male line, to the constant exclusion of females, and that the Sovereign shall be selected from that illustrious family, unceasingly elevated to glory and to the good of the country, and that the Chief of that family shall be the person on whom the Sovereignty shall devolve, as a mark of national gratitude, as on him the political existence of the country has depended.—The nation, by us, the organs of its will, thus confers this high distinction upon that Prince who has maintained its glory, and to whom its liberty, its independence, and its happiness may be safely confided.—It being proper to create great public Authorities from among the Officers who have devoted themselves to the honour and prosperity of the State, as well for the splendour of the throne as for the reward of their distinguished services, the following law is sanctioned by the said Council.

TITLE I.—Of the Supreme Authority.

1. The President Henry Christophe, is declared to be King of Hayti, under the name of Henry. This distinction, its prerogatives, and immunities, shall be hereditary in his family, in the line of the male and legitimate descendants, according to seniority, and to the exclusion of females.—2. All the Royal Acts shall be done in the name of the King, and published and promulgated under the Royal Signet.—3. In defect of male children, the heirship shall pass to the nearest relation of the King, or to the highest rank.—4. Notwithstanding

this law, the King may adopt the children of any Prince of his kingdom, whom he may think fit to appoint his heirs.—5. If the King should have male children subsequent to such adoption, his own offspring will have the prior right.—6. On the decease of the Sovereign, until the accession of the heir, the affairs of the kingdom shall be governed by the Ministers and the Royal Council, who, being formed into a General Council, shall decide by a majority of votes, the Secretary of State registering the decisions.

TITLE II.—*Of the Royal Family.*

7. The Consort of the King is declared Queen of Hayti.—8. The Members of the Royal Family are to receive the titles of Princes and Princesses, and are to be addressed Most Serene Highnesses. The presumptive heir is to be called Prince Royal.—9. Those Princes are Members of the Council of State as soon as they come of age.—10. Neither the Princes or Princesses shall marry without the King's permission.—11. The King himself is to appoint the Officers of his Palace, in a way suited to the dignity of his crown.—12. There shall be established under the same authority, Palaces and Castles in such situations of the Kingdom as his Majesty shall point out.

TITLE III.—*Of the Regency.*

13. The King is a minor until he be 15 years of age. During his minority a Regent shall be nominated.—14. The Regent shall be 25 years of age at least, and shall either be chosen from the nearest relation of the King, to the exclusion of females, and in defect of such relations, from the Grand Dignitaries of the kingdom.—15. Should the King not have appointed a Regent, the Grand Council shall select a person according to the preceding law.—16. Until the King become of age, the Regent shall be invested with all the attributes of Royalty.—17. But the Regent is not to conclude treaties of peace, alliance, or commerce, or to make declaration of war, until he shall have taken the advice of the Grand Council, the majority of the votes of which on such subjects he is to carry into effect.—18. The Regent is not empowered to nominate to the Grand Dignities of the kingdom, nor to the rank of Generals and Admirals.—19. All the acts of the Regent are to be in the name of the young King.—20. The guardianship of the King is entrusted to his mother; and if he have no mother, to

the Prince the deceased King shall have appointed to this duty. Neither the Regent or his children are to have the guardianship of the young King.

TITLE IV.—*Of the Grand and Privy Councils.*

21. The Grand Council is composed of the Princes of the Blood, and of the Princes, Dukes, and Earls to be chosen by his Majesty, who shall himself determine the number.—22. The President of the Council is the King himself, and in his absence, such noble person as he shall name.—23. The Privy Council is to be chosen by the King from the Grand Dignitaries of the State.

TITLE V.—*Of the Grand Officers of the Kingdom.*

24. The Great Officers of the kingdom are the Grand Marshals of Hayti, and are chosen from among the persons holding the rank of Generals, according to their merit.—25. Their number is to be assigned by the King himself.—26. The places of the Great Officers are to be held during life.—27. Unless they shall be removed by a Royal Order, or from incapacity, and in such cases they shall preserve their title, their rank, and the half of their revenue.

TITLE VI.—*Of the Ministers of State.*

28. The King shall nominate four Ministers of State, the Minister of War and of the Marine, the Minister of the Finances and of the Home Department, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice.—29. The Ministers are Members of the Council, and have votes.—30. The Ministers rendering account of their services in person to his Majesty, and receive his commands.

TITLE VII.—*Of Oaths.*

31. On the King's coming of age, he is to make oath on the Evangelist in the presence of the great Authorities of the Kingdom.—32. The Regent is to do the same on assuming his functions.—33. The great Officers, the Ministers, and the Secretary of State, are to deliver their oath of fidelity into the hands of the King.

TITLE VIII.—*Of the Promulgation of the Laws.*

34. The promulgation of all the Acts of the Kingdom is as follows:—"By the Grace of God and the Constitutional Law of the State, we King of Hayti do declare, greeting."—These public Acts are to conclude as follows:—"We command and

order that these Presents under our Seal be directed to all Courts, Tribunals, and Authorities, that they may be transcribed in their Registers, that they themselves, and all others in the Kingdom, may observe and obey the same. The Minister of Justice is to promulgate this law.”—

35. The Decrees of Courts of Justice are in the following form:—“By the Grace of God, and the Constitutional Law of the State, do declare greeting. (Then follows the Decree.) We command and order all Officers to put in execution the said judgment, to all our Law Agents to sign their name to it, and to all Military Commanders to employ their force, if required, to secure obedience to the same.—In witness whereof,” &c.

[To be signed by the President and Chief Secretary.]

The above Constitutional Law of the Realm is dated from Cape Henry, in the 8th year of Independence, 1811, and is signed by all the Public Authorities composing the Council of State.

FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN.

ARMY OF THE NORTH.

Report of the Count D'Orsenne, General-in-Chief of the Army of the North, to the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram.—Camp of Astorga, Aug. 28.

(Concluded from page 416.)

Bonnet's, Dumoustier's, and Roguet's divisions received orders to pass the Elsa on the 25th, at four in the morning, and to proceed, the first by the Leon road to Astorga on Puente d'Orbigo—the second from Valencia de Don Juan on Baneza—the 3d by Benavente to the same point, and the reserve, at the head of which I was, marched from Valderas, to proceed to Cebrones, passing by Villquesjida.—The different movements were executed with much unity. General Abadia, who had been informed but a few hours before, had only time to evacuate his position, retiring upon Astorga. Disturbed by the unexpected march of our troops, he retreated with the greatest precipitation. His advanced guard, which was on the height of St. Martin, shewed a determination to defend itself. I ordered the Horse Chasseurs, and light Chasseurs of the Guard to drive them away. Some squadrons of Galician Hussars maintained themselves obstinately, but they were charged by our brave men, who killed or wounded some sixty, and made several

prisoners. My light cavalry, after the action, pursued the enemy beyond Palairos, where he took up a position at the same time that General Dumoustier entered Baneza, Roguet, Cebrones, and Bonnet established himself in front of Orbigo. I arrived at Baneza, where I learned that General Abadia intended to collect his army under Astorga, and wait for me. I gave orders in consequence to all my troops to proceed thither.—On the 26th, my advanced guard arrived there at seven a. m. and the divisions of the army at eight. The enemy, after having evacuated the place in the night, continued his retreat, taking the road of Galicia. I then ordered General Bonnet to pursue him with two brigades of infantry and 600 horse beyond Villafranca, keeping the two roads that lead from Astorga to that town. Roguet took up a position in front of Astorga, and during Bonnet's march pushed forward strong parties to watch the débouchés of Asturias.—Dumoustier had orders to be ready to act as occasion required.—General Bonnet established himself the same day in front of Ravanal. On the 27th, he came up with the enemy, 5,000 strong, on the heights of Reigo de Ambroso, and in spite of a heavy firing carried this strong position at the point of the bayonet. General Abadia, who beheld the defeat of his troops, retired hastily by the mountains of Orensee. On the 28th, early in the morning, we entered Villafranca. We found there, and at Ponferrada, 2,500 muskets, 400 uniforms, 15,000 pounds of rice, and 120,000 cartridges.—The enemy lost 300 killed and wounded, and 200 prisoners.—We had no one killed—General Corsen, Col. Bartel, and two chasseurs were wounded.—All the reports confirm the entire dispersion of the army of Galicia, and the impossibility of its resuming the offensive for a long time, which fulfils completely the object I had in view. I am, &c.

COUNT D'ORSENNE.

*To the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram.
Camp of Astorga, Aug. 30.*

The information I receive from all parts, confirms more and more the total dissolution and dispersion in the mountains of the different corps of this army. The greatest privations oblige the soldiers to return home—hence these assemblages which for a moment threatened the tranquillity of this province, are dispersed like a cloud.

COUNT D'ORSENNE.

ARMY OF PORTUGAL.

"Five divisions of the English army have passed the Tagus, and directed their march to the Coa; two divisions remain on the left bank of the Tagus. This movement, at this season, is very fatal to the English. It increases diseases which have fatigued them much for some time. The heat, which is very great this year, is more prejudicial to the English, who are little used to it, than any other nation! Our army is in good cantonments, and is recovering from its fatigues. It has received a great quantity of horses to remount its artillery entirely.

FOURTH GOVERNMENT.

General Roguet, Commandant at St. Andero, suffered himself to be surprised on the 14th August. An hour before day-break, a column of 800 insurgents marched upon the city, after having travelled all night, carefully avoiding the different posts of the provinces; it thus arrived at the skirts of the town, whilst a second column of 1,800 men proceeded against the important post of Torre Lovega. The guard before the Hospital of St. Andero was the first attacked, and fought with courage; the day having dawned, the enemy was attacked in his turn, beat, and pursued; upwards of 300 men remained on the field, the rest were driven beyond the mountains of Presillas, where more were killed.—The column which attacked Torre Lovega was not more fortunate; the garrison defended itself bravely, and more than half the insurgents were killed.

FRANCE.—*Decree relative to the Naturalization of Frenchmen. Trianon, 26 Aug. 1811.*

Napoleon, by the grace of God, and the Constitutions, Emperor of the French, &c. to all present and to come, greeting:

Different questions having been submitted to us with regard to the condition of Frenchmen established in foreign countries, we have thought it right to make known our intentions on that subject.

By our decree of the 6th of April, 1809, we have already pronounced with regard to such Frenchmen as have borne arms against their country; and those who, residing with a Power with whom we go to war, do not quit its territory; or who, being summoned by us, do not obey that order.

But no law has yet been laid down either with regard to Frenchmen naturalised in foreign countries, with or without our authority, or with regard to such as may have already entered, or choose to enter, in future, into the service of a foreign Power.

And as it is not our wish to confound those of our subjects who are induced from legitimate motives to naturalise themselves abroad, with those whose conduct will assume the character of felony, we have resolved, by these presents, to complete and make known this important branch of legislation.

For these reasons, on the report of our Grand Judge, Minister of Justice, and our Council of State, being heard,

We have decreed and ordered, and do decree and order, as follows:

TITLE I.—*Of Frenchmen naturalised abroad with our permission.*

Art 1. No Frenchman can be naturalised abroad, without our authority.

2. Our permission shall be granted by letters-patent, drawn up by our Grand Judge, signed with our hand, countersigned by our Secretary of State, inspected by our Cousin the Prince Arch-Chancellor, inserted in the Bulletin of Laws, and registered in the Imperial Court of the last place of domicile of the person to whom they relate.

3. Frenchmen thus naturalised abroad shall enjoy the right of possessing, of transmitting, and of succeeding to property, even when the subjects of the countries where they shall be naturalised do not enjoy those rights in France.

4. The children of a Frenchman born in the country where he is naturalised, are aliens.

5. Frenchmen naturalised abroad even with our permission, can at no time carry arms against France, under pain of being indicted in our Courts, and condemned to the punishments enacted in the Penal Code, Book 3d, cap. 75.

TITLE II.—*Of Frenchmen naturalised abroad without our permission.*

6. Every Frenchman naturalised abroad without our permission, shall incur the loss of his property, which shall be confiscated; he shall no longer enjoy the right of succession, and all the succession falling in to him shall pass to the next heir, provided he is domiciliated in France.

By the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th, it is

provided, that by a process instituted in the Courts of Justice, such persons shall lose their titles if they have any, together with the property attached to them, which shall devolve to the nearest heir, being French, the rights of the wife being secured, which shall be regulated as in the case of widowhood.

11. Those who are naturalised abroad without permission, and against whom the above process has taken place, if found in the territory of the Empire, shall, for the first time, be arrested and conducted beyond the frontiers; if they return, they shall be condemned to a period of imprisonment not less than a year, nor more than 10 years.

TITLE III.—Of Individuals already naturalised abroad.

12. Individuals naturalised abroad at the period of the publication of this decree, may, within a year, if on the Continent of Europe; within three years, if beyond that Continent; within five years, if beyond the Cape of Good Hope and in the Indies, obtain our confirmation according to the forms prescribed in the present Decree.

TITLE IV.—Of Frenchmen in the service of a Foreign Power.

13. No Frenchman can enter the service of a foreign power without our special permission, and except under condition of returning, should we recall him either by a general proclamation or a direct order.

14. Those of our subjects who shall have obtained this permission, cannot take the oaths to the power which they serve, without a proviso of never bearing arms against France, and of quitting the service, even without being recalled, should that power happen to go to war with us.

15. The permission of entering the service of a foreign Power shall be granted by letters patent, according to the forms presented in Act 2d.

16. They cannot act as ministers plenipotentiary in any treaty where our interests come into discussion.

17. They must not wear a foreign cockade in countries in subjection to us, nor there appear in a foreign uniform; they shall be authorised to wear the national colours when in the Empire.

18. They may nevertheless wear the decorations of foreign orders, when they shall have received them with our consent.

19. They may not enter France but with our special permission.

20. Frenchmen in the service of a foreign power can never be accredited as Ambassadors, Ministers, or Envoys at our Court, nor received as charged with any kind of mission that would render it necessary for them to appear before us in their foreign costume.

21. Frenchmen entering the service of a Foreign Power, without our permission, and remaining in it after war is declared between France and that Power, shall be considered as having borne arms against us, from the circumstance alone of their having continued to form part of a military corps destined to act against the French empire or its allies.

22. Our Ministers are charged, each in his own department, with the execution of the present decree.—(Signed)

By the Emperor, **NAPOLEON.**
Count DARU, Secretary of State.

SPAIN.—Head Quarters at Valladolid.
Ordinance.

We the Marshal of the Empire, Duke of Istria, Colonel General of the Imperial Guards, General in Chief of the Army of the North of Spain;

Considering that the measures of clemency by which we had flattered ourselves that the people would be brought back to submission, and thus avoid the evils produced by a more protracted resistance, have had no other effect but to increase the audacity of the insurgents and their partisans:

Considering that measures of rigour must be so much the more severe the longer they are deferred, and that we have not adopted them until we have been convinced that they are the sole means of maintaining the tranquillity of the country:

Upon the report of the Intendant General, we have ordered and do order as follows:—

Art. 1. There shall be formed by the municipalities in the towns, and by the magistrates in the villages, a list of all the individuals who have quitted their homes, and who do not reside in places occupied by French troops. *(To be continued.)*

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XX. No. 16.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1811. [Price 1s.

" Captain Harris of the Iris, just arrived at Liverpool, has DEPOSED, that, on the 30th, when he left Lisbon, a Telegraphic message had been received of the defeat of the French, after two days' hard fighting; with the loss of 20,060 in killed and wounded."—*COURIER news-paper*, 14th Oct. 1811.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALavera's WAR.—Long as the people of this country have been accustomed to be abused with falsehoods as to these wars; manifold as these falsehoods have been and gross and impudent as they have been in their manner and extent; still, I think, that the last ten days have, in this respect, surpassed all former periods. A little while ago there were published, in the *Moniteur*, two articles upon the subject of the *Impostor Paper*, which had been circulated through our venal prints, under pretence of its having been copied from an American news-paper, and upon the letters between Napoleon and his brother Joseph, pretended to have been intercepted in Spain. In these articles the *Moniteur* goes into a description of the ways in which the people of England are cheated and kept in ignorance by means of a servile press; and, its observations were so cutting, because so true, that one might have hoped, that, for the future, shame would have had some power in restraining the fabricating fingers of these venal men. One might have hoped, that, when they saw proofs of the contempt, which, from all foreign nations, they were, by their miserable forgeries, daily bringing upon themselves and their country, they would have desisted from the disgraceful practice. But, nothing of this sort has any effect upon them. They seem wholly insensible to shame; and they still affect to laugh at the hood-winked state of the people of France, while they themselves are continually labouring to hoodwink and cheat the people of England, and while their publications are the scorn and contempt, and they themselves know that they are the scorn and contempt, of all Europe and all America.—This much I could not refrain from saying by way of preface to the analysis that I am about to endeavour to give of the falsehoods which have appeared in these prints, during the last ten days, upon the subject of the military operations of the hostile armies on

the border of Spain and Portugal and near the city of Rodrigo.—These fabricators of falsehoods had, for more than a month before, been telling the people of England, that our Commander had *safely blockaded* Rodrigo. At one time they said he had laid siege to it; and, at another time, they actually asserted, that he had *taken* it. Then again he had left it in his rear, and was upon high march towards Salamanca. But, the very least they taught us to expect was, a blockade of Rodrigo, which set the enemy at defiance, and which it was, in short, impossible for him to raise.—At the same time, we were told, that our Commander was daily receiving great reinforcements from the sea-ports; that his army amounted to 47,000 British troops, and that the Portuguese part of the army (equal, it was said, in quality to our own) amounted to upwards of 30,000 regulars, making an army of 77,000 exclusive of the large bodies of militia, which were under arms in all parts of Portugal. And, to this was added, that the Spaniards had recently gained such advantages over the French, that the latter, harassed in all quarters, beset with enemies from every hill, hedge, ditch, and brake, and wasted exceedingly by sickness, were not in a state to force their way into Rodrigo; and that, therefore, in a short time, without any loss of lives, that important city and fortress must fall into our hands.—Having thus prepared the public to expect the fall of this place sooner or later during the campaign; having made such a representation as, if believed, must necessarily lead the public to rely upon the capture of one of the most important fortresses in the Peninsula, and having, indeed, so represented the state of the hostile armies, that every one who credited the representation must have been in daily hopes of hearing of some great achievement, and, if a battle did take place, must have made sure of decisive victory; having thus stuffed the heads of the "most *thinking* people of all Europe," in a preparatory way, there remained nothing but

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to come to the account of the promised and expected victories, and, in doing this, very little time was lost.—On the 10th instant, the important news was announced to the public, through the channel of the news-papers, but especially the *Courier*, in the following words:—"Intelligence of the *highest importance*, has been brought to Liverpool by a vessel from Oporto. The following is the account from Liverpool:—" *Liverpool, October 8.* The Briton, Ward, is arrived at Hoylake from Oporto, sailed from thence the 2d instant; reports that an account was received there just as they sailed, that a general engagement had taken place on the 25th or 26th September, between the British army under Lord Wellington, and the French army, in which the latter were defeated with great loss, and was driven six leagues beyond Ciudad Rodrigo."—In addition to the above letter we have received the following from the *respectable* Proprietor of the *Liverpool Advertiser*:—" *Liverpool, October 8.* Sir, The brig Briton, Captain Ward, has just arrived here, in five days from Oporto, bringing a Mr. James Welsh, of this town, passenger, who gives the following account, which he received from Colonel Fagan, who obtained it from Colonel Trant, Governor of that place: Lord Wellington has had a battle with the French, and has killed and taken prisoners 20,000 of the enemy. The battle was fought five days before about six leagues from Ciudad Rodrigo. Captain Ward further says that the account came to Oporto on Thursday morning last, just before he sailed, and was fully believed by the inhabitants there, *who were rejoicing on the occasion.* I think the account will prove true, though possibly not to the extent. I am, Gentlemen, yours, &c. THOMAS BILLINGE."—This was the first publication upon the subject. The *Courier* adds a paragraph of its own, in which the *truth* of the news is insisted upon. *Truth!* why, after such solemnity of statement, who, that did not know these people, could have wanted any thing in confirmation of what had been said?—On the next day, the 11th instant, the former accounts were backed up by the following:—" *Liverpool, October 9.* DEFEAT OF MARMONT.—The Briton, Ward, arrived here yesterday from Oporto in six days. Mr. Welsh,

a passenger, has favoured us with the following grateful information, which was communicated to him by Colonel Fagan, on the authority of Colonel Trant, governor of the place. On the 25th ult. six leagues from Ciudad Rodrigo, Lord Wellington defeated the French army under Marmont and killed and took prisoners 20,000 men.—This was accompanied with a column and a half of observations in the *Courier*, the jet of which was, that the news was *likely to be true.* Every thing was here said that the writer could think of calculated to make the public believe the news to be true. He went into reasoning to show that, if the French advanced for the relief of Rodrigo, it was not only reasonable to suppose that a battle must take place, but, that it would be *his duty* to fight them in opposition to such an enterprize. This was acting a *friendly* part towards him with a vengeance! The passage I allude to was in these words:—"Taking all these circumstances into our consideration; hearing, from previous accounts, that Marmont was on the advance, and a convoy coming from Salamanca; having no reason to believe that Lord Wellington had INVESTED Ciudad Rodrigo MERELY TO RETIRE THE MOUNTAIN MARMONT ADVANCED; an advance which it was of NO USE TO PRODUCE IF WE DID NOT FIGHT HIM; finding from reports at Lisbon that a battle was expected; and last of all receiving from Oporto an account that a battle had been fought, and that accounts brought by the Captain of a British vessel, and by a passenger in that vessel, an inhabitant of Liverpool, who SOLEMNLY DECLARES, that he had it FROM A BRITISH OFFICER, WHOSE VERACITY IT WERE IMPOSSIBLE TO QUESTION; taking all these circumstances into consideration, we have no doubt that the intelligence is correct. The statement of the enemy's loss may be exaggerated; the account may not be correct to the extent, but that a battle has been fought, and our arms been successful, we repeat, we have no doubt."—This was not only inculcating a belief in the news; but, in his eagerness to inculcate such belief, the writer reasons in a way completely to commit, as far as he is able, the reputation of the General, whose praises it is his main object to sing forth in the promulgation of this news.—On

the 12th instant, the same paper gave the public the following additional assurance:

—“**SECOND EDITION.** *Courier Off-ice, four o'clock.* A gentleman **HIGH IN OFFICE**, has received from *one of the first Merchants of Liverpool*, a letter of which the following is the substance: That he *sincerely congratulated him on the news from Oporto*; that he did not give implicit credit to it in the first instance; but that he had since seen the Captain of the vessel, who had assured him that he was **AUTHORISED BY THE BRITISH CONSUL AT OPORTO TO USE HIS NAME**, and to state that the intelligence of Lord Wellington's Victory *came from him.*”

The conclusion of the Letter is the most important. “And I have now to add, **THAT A FRESH ARRIVAL, THIS MOMENT, BRINGS A CONFIRMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE.**” —After this it would have seemed to be a complete proof not only of *jacobinism*, but of *treason*, to doubt. Yet, as if this were not enough, the same writer, having had the Sabbath to repose and to reflect on his moral duties, came out with the following: —“We had hoped in this day's Paper to have been able to have communicated official intelligence from Portugal, confirming the accounts brought to Liverpool. But no dispatches have yet been received, nor any later accounts either from Oporto or Lisbon, than those we inserted on Saturday. There is, however *another vessel*, the *Iris*, arrived at Liverpool, from Lisbon, the Captain of which, whose name is *Harris*, has **DEPOSED**, that on the 30th, when he left the Portuguese Capital, a *telegraphic message* had been received of the *defeat of the French after two days hard fighting with the loss of 20,000 men in killed and wounded, and 5,000 on the side of the allies.*” —So it was with **PETER**. Having told a lie, and being closely taxed and in danger of detection, “he began to curse and to swear, saying, I know not the man: and, instantly the cock crew.” And, so it was here; for scarcely had Captain Harris's *deposition* got forth, when out came the official intelligence, telling us, that the French had advanced, had relieved Rodrigo, and had compelled our army to retreat, with some loss; instead of our having fought the army for two days, completely defeated him, killing and wounding 20,000 of his army. —Now, I ask the reader, whether any thing more

disgraceful than this conduct in our press was ever heard of in the world? It was not the *Courier* only, but the *SUN*, the *MORNING POST*, and all the prints of that description, making, at least, four fifths of the daily London Papers. And this is what they call *serving the cause*, is it? This is the way for a writer to give proof of his *loyalty*? It is truly an infamy on the nation. What must foreigners think of a country where such publications are tolerated and encouraged? What must they think of our morals, our taste, and our understandings? For my part, I have long thought and often said; that a press, conducted as ours is, is the greatest scourge a nation can endure. The taste of the people becomes vitiated through it; the public mind is debauched; and, at last, there grows up a love for lies, while *truth is coarseness and libelling.* —Having pointed out these shameful publications to the indignation of those who retain a hatred of falsehood, and which I thought it absolutely necessary to do, let us now take a look at the real intelligence, as contained in the *Gazette*, which, I shall publish at full length in my next. —The Dispatches of Lord Talavera are dated from the places farther in the rear than the position which he held at the date of his former Dispatches. It appears that the French, perceiving that he had invested Rodrigo, and wishing to throw into it supplies, marched against him and compelled him to retreat, while they effected their object of relieving Rodrigo; and that, having done this, they again distributed their army in nearly the same way in which it was distributed before. —This appears to be the *true*, not the *venal*, not the *lying*, not the *hireling*, history of the transaction. The dispatch of the viscount gives a pretty minute, though not a very clear, account of the different movements and rencontres, none of which seem to have been of much importance: mere skirmishes between an army whose object was to retreat unbroken and one who does not appear to have been very desirous of a battle, though superior in numbers. —But, the closing paragraph of the dispatch ought to be read attentively; because it not only states the *reasons for our retreating*, but also glances at the *utility of our having invested Rodrigo.* This is very material indeed; and, in fact, it is all that is of much consequence in the dispatch. Let us, therefore, take the words: —“The enemy having collected for the object of relieving Ciudad Ro-

"drigo, the army of the North which
 "were withdrawn from the attack which
 "they commenced on General Abadia,
 "in Galicia, in which are included 22
 "battalions of the Imperial Guard, and
 "General Souham's division of Infantry,
 "composed of troops recently arrived in
 "Spain from the army of Naples, and
 "now drawn from the frontiers of Na-
 "varre, *where they had been employed in op-*
"erations against Mina, together with five
 "divisions, and all the cavalry of the
 "army called of Portugal, composing al-
 "together an army of *not less than sixty*
"thousand men, of which six thousand
 "were cavalry and 125 pieces of artillery;
 "I could not pretend to maintain the
 "blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, *nor could*
"any efforts which I could make, prevent, or
"materially impede the collection of the sup-
"plies, or the march of the convoy for the re-
"lief of that place. I did all that I could
"expect to effect without incurring the risk of
"great loss for NO OBJECT, and as the
 "reports, as usual, were so various in re-
 "gard to the enemy's real strength, it
 "was necessary that I should see their
 "army."—The Morning Chronicle finds
 fault of the *obscurity* of this passage, and cer-
 tainly it is less clear than the importance of
 the subject rendered desirable. The first
 part, however, of it leaves us to infer, that the
 French armies were drawn away from their
 hostilities against the Spaniards by our in-
 vesting of Rodrigo; and that, therefore,
 we are to look upon that as the price of
 the efforts before Rodrigo. Then, when
 those armies were so drawn away, there
 was no longer *any object* in investing Ro-
 drigo. If this be not the meaning of the
 passage, I must confess that I am unable to
 dive into it, and shall leave it to be got at
 by some of those who have had "the ad-
 "vantage of a liberal education," and who,
 of course can repeat fifty or sixty words
 of Latin and Greek as glibly as any magpie
 or parrot in the United Kingdom.—The
 Courier, however, as we have seen, in the
 above extracts, has taken care to shut the
 door, as far as it is able, against every rea-
 son for *not fighting* upon this occasion.
 "Having," says he, "no reason to be-
 lieve that Lord Wellington had invested
 "Rodrigo *merely to retire the moment Mar-*
mont advanced, an advance which it was
 "no use to produce if we did not fight him,
 "we have no doubt that a battle has been
 "fought."—What a slap in the face was
 here! What a salutation from a friend! I
 have more than once observed how unfortun-

nate Lord Talavera is in his literary friends;
 and, if we wanted a complete proof
 of it here it is. It must be a reputa-
 tion like that of a Marlborough or a Na-
 poleon to withstand the efforts of friend-
 ship like this.—And so, Mr. Courier,
 you could see "no reason to believe that
 "Lord Wellington had invested Rodrigo
 "merely to retire the moment Marmont ad-
 "vanced;" and you could see "no use in
 "producing the advance if we did not fight
 "him!"—Come, now, do not eat your
 words. Stand to this. You have said it,
 and that, too, within these seven days;
 therefore, stand to it. It is now your
 affair; and I leave it to you, with this in
 your ear: that before you laugh at any
 act imputed to a general whom you are
 incessantly extolling, take care; another
 time, to ascertain that he has not com-
 mitted that very act.—It was truly
 amusing to observe the Courier, when, on
 Wednesday night, it brought out the offi-
 cial dispatch, announcing that that very
 thing which he had ridiculed upon a sup-
 position that it could not have taken place,
 really had taken place; it was truly
 curious to observe his change of manner
 and of tone. Only the day before, when
 he was tooting forth the letter of the man
 "high in office," the "solemn declaration"
 of one British Captain, and the "deposition"
 of another, he was all life and talk; but,
 now, out he comes, dull as a clod; his
 long ears, that were, the day before,
 pricked up like a brace of bayonets, now
 flap his jowls; and, instead of the inces-
 sant noise which we heard from him be-
 fore, he, with seeming difficulty, faintly
 brays out this laconic introduction to the
 official dispatch:—"Lord Wellington
 "retired to Sabugal after one or two smart
 "skirmishes. The following supplement
 "to last night's gazette was published this
 "morning."—And not another word!
 Well; it is a symptom that there are some
 small remains of shame. The Sun and
 the Morning Post have no scruple to
 come round, smack, at once, and to com-
 mend as a proof of the greatest skill and
 courage, that which they but the very day
 before laughed at, when they had no idea
 that it had taken place. The Courier is
 not quite so bad as these; and, though I
 dare say he will now be able to find out a
 reason, and a very good reason "for invest-
 "ing Rodrigo merely to retire the moment
 "Marmont advanced;" though I dare
 say he will now find out that there was
 great "utility in producing the advance

"if we did not mean to fight;" though I dare say he will now lose no time in making these discoveries; still, he has taken *one day* to do it in; and, considering who and what he is, that is more than was to be expected; and I beg leave to point it out to the reader as something worthy not only of notice but of commendation.—Leaving Lord Talavera's "friends" to settle amongst themselves these questions as to the reasons for "*investing Rodrigo and retiring the moment that Marmont advanced*," and the "*utility of producing that advance without fighting*" when it was produced, let us now look a little at what he himself says about the relative force of the armies. And here we see a striking instance of what it is to be cursed with fools and parasites for partizans. He says, that the enemy had a force of 60,000 men, 6,000 of whom were cavalry, and that the enemy had an artillery of 125 pieces brought into the field. He says, that he was *unable* to meet this force without "*incurring the risk of great loss*." Very well; and I dare say that this was the case, though he does not give a statement of his own numbers. But, how does this square with the representations of those writers in England, who have set themselves up as his "*friends*?" They have told us, within these fifteen days, that he had, under his immediate command, 47,000 British Troops; and we see that he has many corps of Portuguese. Now, this is so nearly to the amount of the force of the enemy, that the people of England, had, under this representation, a fair claim to a battle, and even a successful battle upon the advance of the French with an army of 60,000 men; because our Commander had the great advantage of having chosen his position, having entrenched his ground, and having had time to provide every thing for the occasion; and we were told, through his "*friends*" of the press, how well he was supplied with cannon, ammunition, provisions, and stores of all sorts. But, if he had no such force as 47,000 British Troops besides large bodies of Portuguese; then the case is wholly altered; and, my real belief is, that he had not much more than *half that number of effective men*; though we have been so often told to the contrary, and though my belief is, that, as to the Portuguese, he has not, to bring into the field, 10,000 men. If this be so, then, how was he to face 60,000 men, and disciplined troops,

too, commanded by the most experienced and intrepid generals that Europe ever saw? Aye, but this defence of his conduct cannot be made by the venal writers, who call themselves his "*friends*;" for they have said, that he had 47,000 British troops besides many thousands of Portuguese equal in valour and discipline to British Troops, and, in so saying, they have condemned him beforehand.

* * * Owing to a mistake in estimating the space, we are obliged to leave out matter and break off thus abruptly.

SPANISH CONSTITUTION.—The plan of the New Spanish Constitution I have inserted entire in this Number to the exclusion of some other matter that I very much wished to insert; but, it was desirable to have the whole of this important document in an *undivided* state. I request the reader's particular attention to it. I shall hereafter have to offer some observations on it; but, in the meanwhile, I beg the reader to notice the principle upon which it sets out, a principle, for inculcating which in the shape of a toast, the Duke of Norfolk has reason to remember. The provisions also for the election of the Cortes; the right of suffrage, and many other points deserve particular attention; but, I have no room for any thing more at present.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate. Friday,
18th October, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH CONSTITUTION.

Plan of a Political Constitution for the Spanish Monarchy, presented to the General and Extraordinary Cortes, by their Constitutional Committee.

INTRODUCTION.—In the name of Almighty God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the Author and Supreme Legislator of Society.—The general and extraordinary Cortes of the Spanish Nation, convinced, after the most minute examination and mature deliberation, that the ancient fundamental laws of this Monarchy, accompanied with suitable provisions, to resume their regular and permanent execution, are adequate to accomplish the great object of promoting the glory, prosperity, and welfare of the whole nation, decree the following Political Constitution, for the good government and right administration of the State.

TITLE I.—OF THE SPANISH NATION, AND OF SPANIARDS.

CHAPTER I.—Of the Spanish Nation.

Art. 1. The Spanish Nation is formed by the union of all Spaniards in both hemispheres.

2. The Spanish Nation is free and independent, and neither is nor can be the patrimony of any family or individual.

3. The Sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, and to the same belongs exclusively the right of establishing fundamental laws, and of appointing the most suitable form of government.

4. The end of Government is the happiness of the nation, since the object of political society can be no other than the welfare of the inhabitants of whom it is composed.

5. The nation is obliged to preserve, and to protect, by wise and just laws, the civil liberty, the property, and the other legitimate rights of all individuals who can claim it.

CHAPTER II.—Of Spaniards.

6. Spaniards are, 1st, All men born free, or made free, in all the dominions of Spain, and their sons.—2d, Strangers who have obtained letters of naturalization from the Cortes.—3d, Those who, without these letters, have lived ten years in a state of freedom, according to law, in any town of the Monarchy.—4th, The sons of each of these classes, born in the Spanish territories, and who exercise any trade in the place of their residence.—5th, Freed men, who have acquired their freedom in Spain.

7. The love of their country is a principal obligation on all Spaniards, as well as justice and benevolence among each other.

8. Every Spaniard is bound to be faithful to the Constitution, to obey the laws, and to respect the established authorities.

9. Every Spaniard is also obliged, without a distinction, to contribute, in proportion to his means, to the expences of the State.

10. Every Spaniard is also obliged to defend his country by arms, when he is called upon by the law.

TITLE II.—OF THE TERRITORY OF SPAIN, HER RELIGION, AND GOVERNMENT, AND OF SPANISH CITIZENS.

CHAPTER I.—Of the Territory of Spain.

11. The Spanish Territory comprehends, in the Peninsula, with its dependencies, and the islands adjacent, Arragon, Astu-

rias, Old Castile, New Castile, Catalonia, Cordova, Estremadura, Galicia, Grenada, Jaen, Leon, Murcia, Navarre, the Vascongada Mermees, Seville and Valencia; the Balearic and Canary Islands. In North America, New Spain, with New Galicia, Guatimala, the internal Provinces of the East, the internal Provinces of the West, Island of Cuba, with the two Floridas; the Spanish part of the Island of St. Domingo, and the Island of Porto Rico, with the others adjacent to those, and to the continent in both seas. In South America, New Grenada, Venezuela, Peru, Chili, the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, and all the adjacent Islands in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. In Asia, the Phillipine Islands, and their dependencies.

12. A more convenient division of the Spanish territories shall be established by a constitutional law, as soon as political circumstances will permit.

CHAPTER II.—Of Religion.

13. The Spanish Nation professes the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman, only true Religion, to the exclusion of all others.

CHAPTER III.—Of the Government.

14. The Government of the Spanish Nation is a limited hereditary Monarchy.

15. The power of making laws resides in the Cortes jointly with the King.

16. The power of executing the laws resides in the King.

17. The power of applying the laws to civil and criminal cases, resides in the tribunals established by law.

CHAPTER IV.—Of Spanish Citizens.

18. Spanish Citizens are those who derive their origins, in both lines, from the Spanish dominions of both hemispheres, and who have acquired their freedom in any place within the same dominions.

19. He is also a Citizen who, enjoying already the rights of a Spaniard, shall obtain from the Cortes the real letters of Citizenship.

20. For a Foreigner to obtain these letters from the Cortes, he must be married to a Spanish woman, or have introduced and established in Spain some useful discovery, or branch of industry, or acquired property which pays a direct contribution, or established himself in business with a considerable capital, in the opinion of the Cortes.

21. The legitimate sons of foreigners domiciliated in Spain, are also Citizens, who, having been born in the Spanish de-

minions, have never left them without the permission of Government; and having attained the age of 21 years complete, have acquired the right of Citizen in some place of the same dominions, by exercising in it some profession, office, or useful art.

22. For those Spaniards who, by either side, derive their descent from Africa, the path of virtue and desert lies open, by which they may acquire the rights of Citizens. In consequence of this, the Cortes are empowered to grant letters of Citizenship to those who have rendered eminent services to their country, or have distinguished themselves by their talents and good conduct; but upon this condition, with respect to these last, that they are born in lawful wedlock of free fathers; that they are themselves married to a free woman, and acquired the rights of Citizenship in the dominions of Spain; that they exercise some profession, office, or useful art, with means sufficient to support their family, and to give a good education to their children.

23. None but Citizens can hold care employments, or chuse others to fill them, in cases specified by the law.

24. The privilege of a Spanish Citizen is lost:

1st. By acquiring naturalization in a foreign country.

2d. By accepting an employment under another Government.

3d. By a sentence imposing ignominious or infamous punishment, should it not be afterwards repealed.

4th. By having lived ten successive years out of the Spanish territories, without a commission, or permission from the Government.

25. The exercise of the same rights is suspended:

1st. In virtue of a judicial interdiction, by reason of phrensy or madness.

2d. By being in a state of insolvency, or in debt to the public revenues.

3d. By receiving wages as a servant.

4th. By having no employment, or visible means of procuring a livelihood.

5th. By being involved in a criminal process.

6th. From the year 1800 all those who enter anew upon the rights of Citizens must learn to read and write.

26. The rights of Citizenship can be lost or suspended only by the reasons specified in the two preceding articles, and by no other.

TITLE III.—OF THE CORTES.

CHAPTER I.—*Of the manner of forming the Cortes.*

27. The Cortes are formed by the union of all the Deputies who represent the nation, named by the citizens after the form prescribed.

28. The basis of national representation is the same in both hemispheres.

29. This basis is composed of the population of inhabitants, who, in both lines, are natives of the Spanish dominions, and of those who have obtained from the Cortes letters of citizenship, as also those comprehended in Article 21.

30. To compute the population of the European dominions, the last Census of 1797 shall be had recourse to, till another can be taken, and a corresponding one shall be formed, to ascertain the population of the provinces beyond the seas.

31. For every 70,000 souls of a population, composed as is stated in the 23d Article, one shall be deputed to the Cortes.

The population being distributed over the different provinces, if in any there should be an excess of more than 35,000, one Deputy more shall be elected, as if the number amounted to 70,000; but if the surplus should not exceed 35,000, this is not to take place. If the population of any province should not amount to 70,000 souls, it shall be joined to the rest, in order to complete the number requisite for the nomination of a Deputy. The island of St. Domingo to be excepted, which is to send a Deputy, though the population should not amount to the number required.

CHAPTER II.—*Of the number of the Deputies to the Cortes.*

34. For the election of Deputies to the Cortes, Electoral Juntas shall be held throughout the different parishes of the different provinces.

CHAPTER III.—*Of the electoral parish Juntas.*

35. The Electoral Parochial Juntas, shall be composed of all the free citizens and residents in the bounds of the respective parish, among whom the secular ecclesiastics are to be comprehended.

36. Those Juntas shall be held always in the Peninsula, the islands and territories adjacent, the first Sunday of the month of October of the year preceding the holding of the Cortes.

37. In the provinces beyond sea, they shall be held the first Sunday of the

month of December, five months prior to the meeting of the Cortes, it being understood that in both cases previous notice shall be given by the Magistrates.

The remaining articles of this chapter, to the 58th inclusive, prescribe the mode of choosing the Parochial Electors, of whom one is elected for every 200 householders.—The Parochial Junta in the first place elects *Compromissarios* (arbiters), who in their turn choose the Parochial Electors.—If the population of the parish require one Parochial Elector, eleven *Compromissarios* must be previously chosen, in order that they may nominate him.—If the population require two Electors, the number of *Compromissarios* must be twenty-one, and so on.—The *Compromissarios* are chosen by each householder going up to the table at which the President and Secretaries of the Junta are placed, and declaring the names of the persons for whom he votes, which are taken down by the Secretaries. Those who obtain the majority of votes are immediately proclaimed *Compromissarios*—on hearing the Proclamation they withdraw, before the Junta breaks up, to another apartment, and choose by a majority of votes the Elector or Electors. No Citizen is permitted to excuse himself from these duties. The qualifications for a Parochial Elector are the being a Citizen, above 25 years of age, a householder and resident in the parish, married or a widow. Before the proceedings of the election commence, mass is celebrated in the Parish Church, and at the conclusion of the business, Te Deum is chanted. [No person must appear at the Election armed.]

CHAPTER IV.—Of the District Electoral Juntas.

59. The Electoral Juntas of Districts shall be composed of the Parochial Electors, who shall assemble in the chief place of each district, in order to nominate the Elector or Electors, who shall repair to the capital of the province, in order to choose the Deputies to the Cortes.

The succeeding articles of this Chapter, to No. 77, prescribe the duties and regulations of these Juntas.—The number of District Electors must be triple the number of Deputies to be elected.—They are chosen by ballot.—The qualifications are citizenship—25 years of age—a householder resident in the district, either in the secular or ecclesiastic state.

CHAPTER V.—Of the Provincial Electoral Juntas.

78. The Electoral Juntas of the Provinces, consisting of the Electors of their Districts, shall assemble in the Capital, in order to choose the necessary number of Deputies to be sent to the Cortes, as Representatives of the nation.

According to the following articles, &c. five Electors choose one Deputy by ballot.—The *suplentas* (substitutes for the Deputies) are chosen in the same manner. The number of *suplentas* for each Province, is one-third of the number of its Deputies. The qualifications of a Deputy of the Cortes, are the full possession of the rights of Citizenship, the age of 25 years, to be a native of the Province, or domiciliated in it by a residence of seven years. The Deputy may be called a secular or lay person. A certain income is also to be necessary, but that is to be fixed hereafter by the Cortes.—The Secretaries and Councillors of State, and persons employed in the Royal Household, cannot be members of the Cortes.—All foreigners, even though naturalized, are excluded.—No person having an employment under the Government, can be elected for a province in which he exercises his office.

CHAPTER VI.—Of the Meeting of the Cortes.

104. The Cortes shall meet every year in the capital of the kingdom.

105. When the Cortes find it convenient to remove to another place, they have the power to do so, provided the distance be not more than twelve leagues from the capital, and that two thirds of the Deputies present consent to the removal.

106. Theittings of the Cortes each year shall last for three months successively, commencing the first day of the month of March.

107. The Cortes may prolong their Session for another month only in two cases:—1st. At the request of the King; 2dly. If the Cortes think it necessary, by a resolution of two-thirds of the Deputies, approved by the King.

108. The Deputies shall be re-elected every two years.

109. If war, or the possession of any part of the kingdom by the enemy, shall prevent all or any of the Deputies of one or more provinces from being present at the time, the defect shall be supplied by the former Deputies of the respective provinces casting lots among themselves, till the proper number be completed.

110. The Deputies to the Cortes may be re-chosen repeatedly, but without being obliged to accept of the trust.

111. When the Deputies arrive at the capital, they shall present themselves before the Permanent Deputation of the Cortes, which shall cause their numbers, and that of the province that elected them, to be inscribed in a register in the Secretary's Office of the Cortes.

112. In the year when the Deputies are to be re-elected, on the 15th of February, the primary Junta shall be held with open doors, the President being one of the permanent Deputation, and the others belonging to it, acting the part of Secretaries and Registrars.

113. In this first Junta all the Deputies shall produce their powers, and two commissions shall be appointed by a majority of votes: one consisting of five persons, to examine the powers of all the Deputies; and the other of three, to examine those of the Commission of five.

114. On the 20th of the same February, the 2d preparatory Junta shall be held also with open doors, in which the two Commissions shall give information respecting the legality of the powers, having presented copies of the acts of the provincial elections.

115. In this Junta, and in the others which may be necessary until the 25th, the doubts which may arise respecting the legality of the powers, and the qualifications of the Deputies, shall be settled definitively by a majority of votes.

116. In the year following that of the re-election of the Deputies, the first preparatory Junta shall be held on the 20th of February, and until the 25th, such as may be deemed necessary to determine in the manner and form expressed in the three preceding articles, the legality of the powers of the Deputies that may have been last presented.

117. Every year, on the 25th of February, the last Preparatory Junta shall be held, in which all the Deputies, laying their hands on the Holy Evangelists, shall take the following oath:—

Do you swear to defend and pursue the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Religion, and to admit no other into the kingdom? A. I swear.—Do you swear to persevere, and cause to be pursued religiously, the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, sanctioned by the General and Extraordinary Estates of the Nation, in the year of —? A. I swear.—Do you swear faithfully to discharge the trust which the nation has reposed in you, having respect in every thing to the welfare and prosperity of the

nation? I swear.—If you act this, may God reward you, and if not, may he demand it at your hands.

118. Subsequently they shall proceed to elect from among the same Deputies, by a secret scrutiny, and a simple majority of votes, a President, a Vice-President and four Secretaries, when the Cortes shall be regarded as formed, and six constituted, and all the functions of the permanent deputation shall cease.

119. On the same day a deputation of 22 members, and two of Secretaries, shall be nominated, to inform the King of the Cortes being constituted, and of the President whom they have chosen, that he may signify if he will assist at the opening of the Cortes, which shall take place on the 1st of March.

120. If the King be out of the capital, this communication shall be made in writing, and the King shall return an answer in the same manner.

121. The King shall assist in person at the opening of the Cortes, and if any impediment should arise, the President shall do it on the day appointed, as on no account can this be postponed. The same formalities shall be observed at closing the Session of the Cortes.

122. The King shall enter the hall of the Cortes without a guard, and only accompanied by those persons specified in the ceremonial for the entrance and departure of the King, as is presented in the regulations for the internal Government of the Cortes.

123. The King shall make a speech, in which he shall propose to the Cortes what may appear to him proper, and the President shall reply to him in general terms. If the King be not present, he shall send his speech to the President, that the President may read it to the Cortes.

124. The Cortes cannot deliberate in presence of the King.

125. As little can they deliberate when the Secretaries of Dispatches are present, to make any proposals in the name of the King.

126. The Sitzings of the Cortes shall be public, and only in the case of some extraordinary circumstances, that imposes reserve, shall there be a secret sitting.

127. In the discussions of the Cortes, and in all that relates to its government and internal arrangements, the regulations which the General Extraordinary Cortes have formed shall be observed, without prejudice to such reforms as succeeding

Cortes may think it expedient to introduce.

128. The Deputies shall be inviolable as far as regards their opinions, and at no time, in no event, and by no authority, can they be called to account for them. In criminal actions which may be brought against them, they can only be judged by the tribunal of the Cortes, in the manner and form prescribed for the regulation of its internal government. During the sitting of the Cortes, and for a month after, the Deputies cannot be arrested for debt.

129. During the period of their deputation, reckoned from the time that the nomination was admitted in the permanent sitting of the Cortes, the Deputies can neither accept for themselves, nor solicit for another, any employment from the King, not even any honour, as there are no gradations of rank among the members of the Cortes.

130. In the same manner, they cannot, during the period of their deputation, nor for a year after their functions have ceased, accept for themselves, or solicit for another, any pension, or honorary distinction, that may be in the gift of the King.

CHAPTER VII.—*Of the Faculties of the Cortes.*

The faculties of the Cortes are—

1. To propose and decree the laws, and interpret and abrogate them, if necessary.

2. To receive the oath of the King, the Prince of Asturias, and the Regency.

3. To resolve any doubt of fact or right which may occur in the order of the succession to the throne.

4. To elect a Regency or Regent of the kingdom, when the constitution requires it, and to appoint the limitations within which the Regency or Regent are to exercise the royal authority.

5. To make a public acknowledgment of the Prince of the Asturias.

6. To appoint a tutor to the minor King, when the constitution requires it.

7. To approve before ratification the treaties of offensive alliance, of subsidies, and of commercial regulations.

8. To permit or prohibit the introduction of foreign troops into the kingdom.

9. To determine the creation and suppression of places in the tribunals established by the constitution, as well as the creation and suppression of public offices.

10. To fix yearly, upon a proposition from the King, the amount of the land and sea forces, and determine those which

shall be maintained in time of peace, and their increase in time of war.

11. To give orders to the army, the fleet, and the national militia, in all their branches.

12. To fix the expences of the public administration.

13. To establish the annual contributions and imports.

14. To borrow loans on interest, in cases of necessity, upon the credit of the nation.

15. To approve the allocation of the contributions among the provinces.

16. To examine and approve the accounts of the expenditure of the public money.

17. To establish custom-houses and places for receiving duties.

18. To adopt the most convenient methods for the administration, conservation, and application of the national property.

19. To determine the value, the weight, the law, impression, and denomination of money.

20. To adopt the system which shall be judged most proper of weights and measures.

21. To create and promote every species of industry, and remove the obstacles which may obstruct them.

22. To establish a general plan of public instruction throughout the Monarchy, and approve of that which may be presented for the education of the Prince of the Asturias.

23. To approve of the general regulations for the police and welfare of the kingdom.

24. To protect the political liberty of the press.

25. To render effective the responsibility of the Secretaries of State, and of Dispatches, and other Public Officers.

26. Lastly, It belongs to the Cortes to give or refuse their consent to all cases and acts which may be necessary for the Constitution.

CHAPTER VIII.—*Of the Formation of the Laws, and the Royal Sanction.*

132. Every Deputy shall have power to propose to the Cortes, in writing, the projects of laws, and explaining the grounds on which they are founded.

133. Two days at least after a project of law shall be presented and read, it may be read a second time, and the Cortes shall deliberate whether it shall undergo another discussion.

134. It being allowed a discussion, if

the importance of the subject, in the judgment of the Cortes, requires that it should pass through a Committee, it shall be so.

135. Four days at least shall have elapsed after its having been allowed a discussion.

136. The day appointed for the discussion having arrived, it shall embrace the project in the whole, and in each one of its Articles.

137. The Cortes shall decide when the business is sufficiently discussed; and having decided that it is so, it shall be determined whether there is ground or not for putting it to the vote.

138. It being determined that there is ground for putting it to the vote, it shall be proceeded to immediately, admitting or rejecting the project in whole or in part, or varying and modifying it according to the observations which may be made in the course of the discussion.

139. The voting shall be carried by the plurality of voices; and in order to proceed to it, it shall be necessary that the number of the members of the Cortes present shall at least exceed by one the half of the whole number of the deputies.

140. If the Cortes reject the project of a law in any stage of its examination, or determine that it shall not be put to the vote, it cannot be proposed anew in the same year.

141. If adopted, it shall be extended by a duplicate in the form of a law, and read in the Cortes; which done, and both originals being signed by the president, and two secretaries, they shall be presented immediately to the King by a deputation.

142. The King has the sanction of the laws.

143. The King shall give his sanction by this formula, signed by his own hand—"Let it be published as law."

144. The King shall refuse his sanction by this formula, which must also be signed by his own hand. "Let it be returned to the Cortes," accompanied, at the same time, with a statement of the reasons which have induced him to refuse it.

145. The King shall be allowed thirty days for exercising this prerogative. If in that time he shall neither have given nor refused his sanction, it shall *ipso facto* be understood that he has given it, and shall be acted on accordingly.

146. Whether the King shall give or

refuse his sanction, one of the two originals, with the respective formula, shall be returned to the Cortes for their information. This original shall be recorded in the archives of the Cortes, and the duplicate shall remain with the King.

147. If the King shall refuse his sanction, the subject shall not be resumed in the Cortes during that year, but may again become the subject of discussion in the sittings of the year following.

148. If in the Cortes of the following year the subject shall be proposed anew, and the same Bill received and adopted, on its being again presented to the King, he shall have it in his power either to give, or refuse his sanction a second time, in the terms prescribed by articles 143 and 144, and in the latter case, the subject shall not again be resumed during that year.

149. If the same Bill shall be proposed a third time, and passed by the Cortes of the following year, it shall be understood, *ipso facto*, that the King is to give it his sanction, which he shall do on its being presented to him by the formula, as expressed in article 143.

150. If before the expiration of the period of thirty days, in which the King is to give or withhold his sanction, the day shall arrive on which the Cortes are to terminate their sittings, the King shall give or refuse it within the first eight days of the sessions of the following Cortes; and if this period shall elapse without his having given it, it shall be understood, in that case, as given, and he shall give it accordingly, in the form prescribed, returning to the Cortes, with his sanction, the original that is to remain with them.

151. Though after the King's having refused his sanction to a Bill, there may pass one or more years without the same subject being resumed, yet provided the Bill be again brought in during the time of the same deputation which at first adopted it, or during that of the two deputations that immediately follow it, shall always be understood as the same Bill with respect to the King's sanction, as stated in the three preceding Articles; but if, during the period of the three said deputations, it shall not be again introduced, though it may afterwards be proposed in the same terms, it shall be considered as a new Bill with respect to the regulations, as already stated.

152. If the second or third time that the Bill is proposed within the period pre-

vided for by the preceding article, it shall be thrown out by the Cortes, at whatever time it may afterwards be brought in, it shall be considered as a new Bill.

153. Laws shall be annulled or amended with the same formalities, and by the same steps, as enacted.

CHAPTER IX. *Of the Promulgation of the Laws.*

154. The law being published in the Cortes, notice shall be given thereof to the King, that measures may be immediately taken for its solemn promulgation.

155. The King, in promulgating the laws, shall use the following formula:—"We, (the name of the King) by the Grace of God and the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, King of the Spains, to all who shall see and hear these presents, know that the Cortes have decreed, and we sanction the following (here the literal words of the law:) wherefore we order all Tribunals, Justices, Chiefs, Governors, and other authorities, as well civil as military, and ecclesiastic, of whatever description or dignity, that they observe, and cause to be observed, obeyed, and executed, the present law, in all its parts. You will make known the same, that it may be carried into effect, and will see that it be printed, published, and circulated."—(Addressed to the Secretary of the proper Department).

156. All the laws shall be translated by order of the King, by the respective Secretaries of State, directly to all and each of the supreme tribunals, and those of the provinces, and the other chief and superior authorities, who shall circulate them to the subordinate.

CHAPTER X.—*Of the permanent Deputation of the Cortes.*

157. The Cortes before separating shall nominate a Deputation, which shall be called the permanent Deputation of the Cortes, composed of seven members of their own body, three from the European Provinces, and three belonging to those beyond seas, and the seventh shall be chosen by lot between a Deputy of Europe and another from beyond seas.

158. At the same time the Cortes shall nominate two Supplementary Members for this Deputation, one belonging to Europe and another from beyond seas.

159. The permanent deputation shall continue from one ordinary Cortes to another.

160. The powers of this deputation

are;—1st, to watch over the due observance of the Constitution, and to give an account to the next Cortes of any infractions they may have noticed.—2d, To invoke an extraordinary Cortes in cases prescribed by the constitution.—3d, To discharge the functions assigned them in Articles 111 and 112.—4th, to give notice to the supplementary deputies to attend instead of the regular, and if the death or absolute impossibility should occur of the ordinary and supplementary deputies of any province attending, to give the necessary orders to the said province to proceed to a new election.

CHAPTER XI.—*Of the Extraordinary Cortes.*

161. The Extraordinary Cortes shall consist of the same Deputies that form the ordinary, during the two years of their deputation.

162. The permanent Deputation of the Cortes shall convene them, and fix the day of their meeting in the three following cases.—First, when the Throne shall become vacant.—Second, when the King shall in any way be disqualified for the Government, or shall wish to abdicate the Throne in favour of his successor.—Third, when the King in difficult circumstances, and for business of importance, shall think it expedient that they assemble, and lend their assistance to him, as well as to the permanent Deputation of the Cortes.

163. The Extraordinary Cortes shall not go beyond the object for which they have been convoked.

164. The Sessions of the Extraordinary Cortes shall commence and terminate with the same formalities as the Ordinary.

165. The Sitting of the Extraordinary Cortes shall not prevent the election of new Deputies at the prescribed time.

166. If the Extraordinary Cortes shall not have concluded their Sittings on the day fixed for the Ordinary, the functions of the former shall cease, and the Ordinary shall continue the business for which they had been convoked.

167. The permanent Deputation of the Cortes shall continue in the functions that have been pointed out in Articles 111 and 112, in the case comprehended in the preceding Article.

TITLE IV.—OF THE KING.

CHAPTER I.—*On the Inviolability of the King's Person, and of his Authority.*

168. The person of the King is sacred and inviolable, and not subject to responsibility.

169. To the King shall be given the title of Catholic Majesty.

170. The power of executing the laws resides exclusively in the King, and his authority extends to every thing conducive to the preservation of the public order in the interior, and the security of the State abroad, conformably to the Constitution and the Laws.

171. Besides the prerogative inherent in the King, of sanctioning and promulgating the laws, the following, as leading functions, also belong to him:—1. To carry into effect the decrees, regulations, and instructions, which he institutes for the due execution of the laws.—2. To take care that throughout the whole kingdom justice be duly and promptly administered.—3. To declare war, and make and ratify peace.—4. To nominate the magistrates, of all the civil and military tribunals on the proposition of the Council of State.—5. To provide for all employments, civil and military.—6. To present to all the bishoprics and ecclesiastical dignities and benefices, in the gift of the Crown, on the proposition of the Council of State.—7. To command armies and fleets, and to nominate their Generals.—8. To dispose of the armed force of the country, by distributing it as may be most expedient.—9. To direct all diplomatic and commercial relations with other Powers, and to nominate Ambassadors, Ministers, and Consuls.—10. To superintend the coinage of money, on which his bust and name shall be placed.—11. To direct the application of the funds destined to the several branches of the public administration.—12. To pardon criminals as regulated by the laws.—13. To submit to the Cortes propositions of laws, or of reforms which he may think conducive to the good of the nation, for their deliberation, in the form prescribed.—14. To nominate and dismiss at pleasure the Secretaries of State, &c.

172. The Restrictions on the Royal Authority are the following:—1. The King cannot impede, on any pretext, the assembling of the Cortes at the periods, and in the cases provided for by the Constitution, nor suspend nor dissolve them, nor in any manner obstruct their sittings and deliberations. Whoever shall advise or assist him in any attempt for these purposes, are declared traitors, and shall be prosecuted as such.—2. The King cannot absent himself from the kingdom without the consent of the Cortes: and, if he

does so, it shall be understood that he has abdicated.—3. The King cannot alienate, cede, renounce, or in any way transfer to another the royal authority, or any of his prerogatives. If for any reason he wishes to abdicate the throne in favour of his immediate successor, it shall not be in his power to do so, without the consent of the Cortes.—4. The King cannot alienate, cede, or exchange any province, city, town, or place, or any part, however small, of the Spanish territory.—5. The King cannot make an offensive alliance or special treaty of commerce, with any foreign power, without the consent of the Cortes.—6. The King cannot bind himself, however little, by any treaty, to give subsidies to any foreign power, without the consent of the Cortes.—7. The King cannot cede or alienate the national domains, without the consent of the Cortes.—8. The King cannot exact taxes or contributions, under any name whatever, or for whatever object, either directly or indirectly, without the Cortes having always previously decreed them.—9. The King cannot grant exclusive privileges to any individual, or any corporation.—10. The King cannot seize the property of any individual or corporation, or disturb them in the profession, use and enjoyment of it; and if, in any case, it shall be found necessary for an object of acknowledged public utility to take the property of any individual, it shall only be done by giving, at the same time, a suitable indemnification, and a fair exchange, on a valuation, by qualified and honest men.—11. The King cannot deprive any individual of his liberty, nor of himself inflict any punishment. The Secretary of —, who signs the order, and the Judge who executes it, shall be responsible to the nation, and punished as guilty of an attack on personal liberty, only in cases where the happiness and safety of the State require the arrest of any person, shall the King be empowered to issue orders to that effect, but on condition only that within forty-eight hours he shall submit the question to the investigation of some tribunal or competent judge.—12. The King before contracting marriage, shall give notice to the Cortes to obtain their consent.

173. The King, on his coming to the throne, and if he shall be a minor, on his entering on the government of the kingdom, shall take an oath before the Cortes, according to the following formula:—

"We (here his name) by the grace of God, and the constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, King of the Spains, swear by God and the holy Evangelists, that I will defend and preserve the Catholic Apostolic Romish religion, without permitting any other in the kingdom; that I will observe, and cause to be observed, the constitution and laws of the Spanish Monarchy, having as my only object in all that I shall do, its prosperity and advantage; that I shall not alienate, cede or dismember any part of the kingdom; that I shall never exact any proportion of fruits, money, or other thing, unless the Cortes shall have decreed them; that I shall never take from any one his property; and that I shall respect above all, the political liberty of the nation, and the personal liberty of every individual. And if in what I have sworn, or in any part of it, I shall do the contrary, I ought not to be obeyed, and let that which I shall do to the contrary be null and of no effect. So help and defend me God! and if not, may he require it at my hands."

CHAPTER II.—*Of the Succession to the Crown.*

In this chapter the Committee proposes the same as the whole nation, and the Cortes have since proclaimed and sworn solemnly in favour of S. D. Fernando VII. actual King of the Spains, and of his descendants and lawful successors; but the Cortes have reserved them for a separate discussion of the inferior details of this chapter.

CHAPTER III.—*Of the Minority of the King, and of the Regency.*

Art. 185. The King is a minor till he is 18 years of age.

186. During the King's minority, the kingdom shall be governed by a Regency.

187. The provision shall be the same when the King is incapable of exercising his authority, from whatever cause, physical or moral.

188. If the incapacity of the King shall continue for two years, and the immediate successor, or shall be more than 18 years of age, the Cortes shall have it in their power to appoint him Regent of the kingdom instead of the Regency.

189. From the death of the King till the Extraordinary Cortes assemble, if the Ordinary are not met, the provisional Regency shall be composed of the Queen mother; if there is one of the two Deputies of the permanent Deputation of the

Cortes, the oldest by election in the Deputation, and of the two senior Counsellors of the Council of State, viz. the Déan, and he that is next to him. If there is no Queen mother, another Counsellor of State, the third in seniority, shall also enter the Regency.

190. The Queen mother, if there is one, shall preside in the provisional Regency; and in case there is none, the Member of the permanent Deputation of the Cortes who is the oldest in the order of their election for the said Deputation.

191. The Provisional Regency shall dispatch no other business but such as admits of no delay, and shall neither remove nor appoint to employments, except for the time being.

192. The Extraordinary Cortes having assembled, shall nominate a Regency, composed of three or of five persons.

193. To be qualified to be a Member of the Regency, it is necessary to be a native of the kingdom.

194. That Member shall preside in the Regency whom the Cortes shall designate, should they not think it expedient to establish a regulation of taking the Presidency by turns.

195. The Regency shall exercise the authority of the King in such terms as the Cortes may deem proper.

196. Both Regencies shall take an oath according to the formula prescribed in Article 173, adding the clause, that they will be faithful to the King and the permanent Regency; shall add besides, that they will observe the conditions that the Cortes have imposed on them for the exercise of their authority; and when the King shall arrive at the age of majority, or his incapacity shall cease, they will deliver into his hands the government of the kingdom, under pain, in case of a moment's delay, of having its Members seized and punished as traitors.

197. All the Acts of the Regency shall be published in the name of the King.

198. The Tutor of the King in his minority shall be the person whom the deceased King shall have nominated in his will. If more shall have been appointed, the Queen mother shall be tutress so long as she remains a widow. In default of her, the tutor shall be nominated by the Cortes.

199. The regency shall take care that the education of the minor King shall be suitable to the great object of his high dignity, and that it be conducted con-

formably to the plan that the Cortes shall approve.

200. The Cortes shall fix the members of the Regency.

CHAPTER IV.—Of the Royal Family, and of the Title of the Prince of Asturias.

201. The first born son of the King shall be called Prince of Asturias.

202. The other sons and daughters of the King shall be called Infantes of the Spains.

203. In like manner the sons and daughters of the Prince of Asturias shall be, and should be called Infantes of the Spains.

204. To these persons precisely shall be limited the title of Infante of the Spains, without the possibility of its being extended to others.

205. The Infantes of the Spains shall enjoy the distinctions and honours that they have done hitherto, and may be nominated to any employment, except those of judicature, and the deputation of the Cortes.

206. The Prince of the Asturias cannot leave the kingdom without the consent of the Cortes; and if he leave it without their consent, he shall, thereupon, be excluded from the succession to the throne.

207. The same shall happen if he remain out of the kingdom for a longer time than that prescribed in the permission; or if, on being required to return, he does not do so within the period which the Cortes may ordain.

208. The Prince of the Asturias, the Infantes, and Infantes, and their children and descendants, cannot marry without the consent of the King and the Cortes, under pain of being excluded from the succession to the throne.

209. An authentic copy of the certificates of birth, marriage, and death, of all the persons of the Royal Family, shall be remitted to the Cortes, and in the suspension of its sittings, to the permanent deputation, in order that it may be placed in their archives.

210. The Prince of the Asturias is to be acknowledged by the Cortes with the formalities which the regulations of their interior governments shall prescribe.

211. This acknowledgment shall be made in the first Cortes holden after his birth.

212. The Prince of the Asturias, after arriving at the age of 14 years, shall take an oath in the presence of the Cortes, in

the following form:—"I ———, Prince of the Asturias, do swear by God, and by the Holy Evangelists, that I will defend and maintain the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman religion, without permitting any other in the kingdom; that I will preserve the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, and that I will be faithful and obedient to the King. So help me God."

CHAPTER V.—Of the Maintenance of the Royal Family.

213. The Cortes shall assign to the King the annual revenue of his household, which shall be conformable to the high dignity of his person.

214. There shall belong to the King all the royal palaces which his predecessors have enjoyed, and the Cortes shall point out the lands which may be proper for his recreation.

[The following Articles, to 221 inclusive, relate to the appropriations for the maintenance of the different members of the Royal Family, pay of the Regency, &c.—The allowances for the King and the Royal Family are fixed at the commencement of each reign, and cannot be altered during that reign.]

CHAPTER VI.—Of the Secretary of State and Dispatch.

222. The Secretaries of Dispatch shall be eight, viz. the Secretary for the dispatch of the affairs of State; the Secretary for the dispatch of the affairs of the Government of the Kingdom; the Secretary for the dispatch of the affairs of Grace and Justice; the Secretary for the dispatch of the affairs of Finance; the Secretary for the dispatch of the affairs of War; the Secretary for the dispatch of Marine affairs; and two Secretaries for the universal dispatch of ultra Marine business; one for the affairs of North America and its Isles, and the other for those of South America, its Isles, and the provinces of Asia. This regulation of two Secretaries, for the universal dispatch of affairs abroad, is thus fixed for the present, but future Cortes will make such alterations as experience or circumstances may require.

223. By a regulation approved by the Cortes, each Secretary will have prescribed to him those affairs which shall belong to his department.

224. All the orders of the King shall be issued under the seal of the Secretary of the Department in which the subject of such orders are referable. No tribunal or

authority shall give execution to an order in which this requisite is wanting.

225. The Secretaries of the Dispatch shall be responsible to the Cortes for any orders which they may give contrary to the Constitution of the laws, and their having been ordered by the King shall be to them no excuse.

226. The Secretaries for the Dispatch shall prepare the estimates of the expences of the public Administration, each according to what may appear to be necessary for his respective department, and shall tender an account of the expenditure which has taken place in the mode which shall be prescribed.

227. When the Cortes shall be of opinion that a case has occurred in which the responsibility of any of the Secretaries of Dispatch ought to be rendered effective, they shall, before proceeding to any other business, come to a decree, declaring whether or not there be ground for an accusation.

228. This decree being passed, the Cortes shall transmit to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice all documents concerning the subject which is to come under cognizance of that Court, which shall substantiate the facts, and decide the cause according to the laws.

229. The Cortes shall fix the salaries of the Secretaries of Dispatch.

CHAPTER VII.—*Of the Council of State.*

230. There shall be a Council of State, consisting of 40 Members.

231. This Council shall be composed precisely in the following manner; viz. four dignified Ecclesiastics, and no more, of whom two shall be bishops; four Spanish Grandees, and no more, possessing virtue, talents, and the necessary information. The remaining members shall be chosen from among persons who are employed or have been employed in diplomatic situations in the army, in offices of Finance and the Magistracy, and who have distinguished themselves by their talents, knowledge, and services. The Cortes shall not propose for these places any individual, who, at the time of appointment, may be a member of the Cortes; at least twelve of the members must be from the ultra marine provinces.

232. All the Counsellors of State shall be appointed by the King, on the proposal of the Cortes.

233. For the formation of this Council a Committee of the Cortes, consisting of twelve members, shall prepare a triple list of the respective classes of Counsellors in the proportion stated above. From this list the King shall choose 40, taking the Ecclesiastics from their class, the Grandees from theirs, and the other members from their respective classes.

234. The Cortes shall keep this list always complete, filling up the blanks which may arise from appointments to offices, or from the decease of any of the persons included in the list.

235. The Council of State is the Council of the King, who shall consult its opinion on all important points, and particularly in giving or refusing the Royal assent to laws, in declaring war and making treaties.

236. This Council will propose to the King three names for filling up each vacancy in Ecclesiastical Benefices, or Judicial Offices.

237. The Counsellors of State cannot be removed without good cause made out to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court of Justice.

238. The Cortes shall fix the salaries of the Counsellors of State, it being understood that none shall be allowed to any Ecclesiastic, who, in consequence of his dignity, may have his residence in the Capital, nor to any Grandee.

239. The Counsellor of State, on entering into office, shall take an oath before the King to preserve the constitution, to be faithful to the King, and to counsel him to what may seem to them to be conducive to the public welfare, without any secret view, or private interest. (Signed.)

DIEGO MUNOZ TORRERO,

President of the Committee.

AUGUSTIN DE ARGUELLES.

F. S. R. DE LA BARCENA.

Dr. MARIANO MENDIOLA.

PEDRO MARIA RIC.

FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ DE LA HUERTA.

ANTONIO JOAQUIN PEREZ.

JOAQUIN FERNANDEZ DE LEYVA.

VICENTE MORALES DUAREZ.

JOSE DE ESPICA.

ALONSO CANEDO.

ANTONIO OLIVEROS.

ANDRES DE JAUREGUI.

EVARISTO PEREZ DE CASTRO.

Secretary to the Committee.

Cadiz, Aug. 17, 1811.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"The officers of the army may depend upon it, that the enemy, to whom they are opposed, are not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding *what has been printed in GAZETTES and NEWS-PAPERS*, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, opposed to large; nor has the experience of any officer realized the stories, which *all have read*, of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry or dragoons."—(Signed) WELLINGTON. —Circular Letter to the Officers of the English Army in Portugal, which see in another part of this Number.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALavera's Wars. —In my last, at page 490, I broke off this subject abruptly, because there was not room for the whole of my Article, without dividing the *Plan of the Spanish Constitution*, which I wished to avoid by all means. —Before I resume it, I think it necessary to refer to a passage, published in the Register of the 20th of July last, and to which passage, I am informed, an interpretation has been given, which I am sure it does not bear, and which I well know not to have been my meaning. It relates to Lord Wellington, and after noticing, that his brother had lately called him a "*dis-tinguished warrior*," it proceeds thus:—"If he be not, it shall not, if I live, be for want of one to give, and put upon record, a full account of all his operations: not a lying account; not a hireling account; not a base and abominable string of frauds upon the people of England, which serve to cheat some of them and to furnish others of them with excuses for their villainies, but, which, so far from deceiving the rest of the world, are the scorn and contempt of all foreign nations; not an account of this sort, but a *true* account; an account which will place all the actors, on both sides, in their proper light; that will hold up the skilful and the brave to the admiration of posterity, that will show what misfortunes, disgraces, and miseries proceed from putting power in the hands of a *fat-headed fool*, and that will damn to everlasting infamy those who have sought to disguise their cowardice by the means of blustering and lies, be they on which side they may." —The words in *italics* have, I am informed, been, by some persons, and those pretty closely interested in the matter, represented as intended to apply to Lord Wellington. Now, not only did I not mean so to apply them; but, they do not, in

any way that they can be viewed, bear that construction. They have no reference to him at all; they do not point at him, but, on the contrary, they point, if they point at all, *away* from him, he, as it is well known to me as well as to all who ever saw him, being, not a *fat-headed* but a *lean-headed* man. However, notwithstanding the evident marks of the non-application of the words, I have no scruple solemnly to declare, *that I had him not in my eye in using them; that I did not mean him; and that I never either heard him called, or called him, or thought him, a fool, in my life.* —From the beginning of the war in Portugal I have been endeavouring to guard the public against the falshoods, the endless falshoods of the venal press; and, I have several times observed, that this press, while it was incessantly extolling the General, was, in fact, doing its best to demolish his reputation, by *swelling out his numbers*, and by *diminishing the force of the enemy* and speaking *contemptuously* of that enemy. It is curious enough, that those representations of mine should, at last, have been seconded by the General himself: whether the venal crew will pay more attention to him than to me I cannot say; but, I should not be much surprised, if they were now to turn round upon him and retract all their former extravagant praises. —The Circular, from which I take my motto, has appeared in all the London news-papers, and has evidently been inserted by pretty good authority. With regard to the censure it contains on Col. COCHRANE, the censure is not very harsh, and the offence is one which will always be looked at with a very lenient eye. Over-zeal and unrestrained courage, though they may sometimes be productive of loss, are, upon many occasions, the very things which are decisive of victory. —The mention of the marvellous "*stories*," that is to say, *lies*, which "*all have read*," in *Gazettes and news-papers*, is very important. He, pro-

bably, alludes to the *Gazette* in Portugal; but, as to *news-papers*, he must have our *Courier* and *Morning Post*, and others of our prints, in his eye; and herein he confirms my repeated complaints against them. This is, on his part, an act of self-defence, and the same in behalf of his army; for, if these "*stories*" were believed, how were the public to account for the continuation of the war? How were the public to avoid being surprized, that the French were not wholly defeated and chased out of the Peninsula long ago? But, this inference from such "*stories*" fell particularly heavy upon the reputation of our Commander; for, if it were true, that whole armies of the enemy were to be driven back by detachments of our Light Infantry or Dragoons, how was he to answer to his country for retreating, at any time, or under any circumstances, before that same enemy?—The *Courier*, perceiving how this circular letter bore upon him, had, as I thought, kept it wholly out of his columns; but, upon looking at the *back* of the paper, I found it crammed in there, where, of course, it would escape the observation of the greater part of his readers. This trick is well worthy of observation. The document was the most important that has come from Portugal for a long while, as containing very useful information; as containing an expression of our *Commander's opinion of the enemy*; and, as containing his official protest against the exaggerated accounts published in this country; and yet, this very document the *Courier* crams into a back page, usually, and, indeed, always, appropriated to articles upon which the Editor sets the least value, and which he does, in fact, put in generally as mere matter *to fill up with*. But, to publish the document was to promulgate his own shame; it was to promulgate Lord Wellington's condemnation of what I had so often condemned. —Indeed, if this writer of the *Courier* and many others, had met together and deliberated upon a plan for the real destruction of the reputation of the man, on whom they were lavishing the most extravagant encomiums, they could not have acted otherwise than they have done. *Before* a battle they have always given him a superiority of numbers; they have invariably represented him as amply supplied with every thing; they have always greatly diminished the number of his sick; they have fabricated "let-

ters from the army" contradicting the reports of great prevalent sickness; they have denounced, as enemies to the country, those who gave true statements of the ravages of disease in our camps or garrisons; they have always had the army "in high health and spirits," even in the most sickly times; and, though last not least, they have constantly spoken of our army as having the cordial support of all the people of the Peninsula of every description. On the contrary, they have represented the French, *before* every approaching battle, as having inferior numbers; they have represented them, upon all occasions, as destitute of provisions and supplies of all sorts; they have told us that sickness and desertion were constantly making dreadful ravages amongst the enemy, and have, at times, reduced their numbers almost to nothing; and, never have they ceased to assert, that the whole of the inhabitants of the Peninsula detested and abhorred the French, and lost no opportunity of annoying them. —Well, now, if this was believed; and believed it must have been by a great majority of the public, in what a situation must that belief place our Commander and his army in the eyes of that public, when the latter saw, that, though advantages were occasionally gained, they were soon taken away again; and that, at almost every encounter, a retreat, or, at least, a retrograde movement, on our part, was the consequence? The premises point directly to the conclusion, and to the only possible conclusion, that was, and must have been, drawn by every man capable of reasoning. —And, with regard to the French, if these stories were believed, if it was believed that their numbers were always inferior, that they were destitute of supplies of all kinds, that they were wasting hourly with sickness, and that every one of the people had a knife ready for their throats; if all this was believed by the public, what must naturally have been the conclusion of that public, when they saw, that our army was still obliged to retreat before those French? —But, this has been the constant practice of the venal part of the English press from the commencement of the Anti-Jacobin war to this day, which press has always swelled out our own force *before* a battle, and diminished that of the enemy; it has always painted our prospects in the most flowery colours; and, observe, if any man has had the courage to endeavour to give a check to the sam-

guine and fallacious hopes thus endeavoured to be excited, that man has been reproached with *wishes* corresponding with his opinions; he has been called the friend of the enemy; and, in short, denounced as a traitor in his heart, who only wanted the occasion to become so in act as well as in inclination. — A remarkable instance of this *hope-exciting* work, on the part of the English press, was seen at the time when the Duke of York was about to invade Holland in the year 1799. Upon that occasion the public prints teemed with the most confident predictions of the *deliverance* of the United Provinces and the restoration of the Stadtholderian Government, which, so far from being regarded as an enterprize of difficulty, was represented as a merely holiday march. Mr. MALLET DU PAN, who, at that time, published the British Mercury, under the avowed patronage of the ministry, said, in his No. of the 30th of September, 1799: "To an army of *forty five thousand men*, full of emulation, from the general to the last soldier, to a squadron commanding the Zuyder Sea, to the support which there are hopes of obtaining from a great portion of the inhabitants, and to the ancient and unalterable attachment of the Dutch Regular Troops to the Stadtholder; to all these what do the Batavian Directory, the revolutionary faction, and their extravagant guardians on the banks of the Seine oppose? Why, about *twenty thousand French*, commanded by a *Printer's Boy of Limosin*; by that *BRUNE* who juggled and pillaged Switzerland; who received his military and political education in the tennis-courts of the French Revolution." — Such were the pictures that were exhibited to the English public at the out-fit of that ill-fated expedition; such were the prospects held forth to them. How that expedition ended we all know, and, though I was not in England at the time, I venture to say, that the public mortification was increased ten-fold by these flattering and fallacious representations. And, in what a light did pictures like this tend finally to place the Duke of York and the other commanders, consisting of numbers of English and Russian *Noblemen*; who were, at last, beaten by, and compelled to capitulate with, "a *Printer's Boy of Limosin*," who had had his education in a tennis court? — If, instead of giving the public this fallacious description, the writer had said: "The English and Russian army, though nu-

merous and brave, will have occasion to exercise all their force and all their skill; for, they have opposed to them twenty thousand, at least, of these same Frenchmen, who have conquered so many countries, and routed so many brave and well-disciplined armies, commanded by the greatest generals in Europe; and, these French troops, together with the Dutch, headed by the Patriots who were put down by the Stadtholder and the Prussians in 1787, are under the command of a man, whom nature formed for great exploits, and whom the soul-stirring Revolution of France has raised to the command of an army from being a Printer's boy at Limosin; a sure and certain sign, an infallible proof, that he is a man *not to be despised*." — Now, if this had been the language of the English press, at the time referred to, does not the reader see, that the disappointment of the nation, that the mortification, that the humiliation, which, at last, came upon it, would not have been nearly so great as they were? — Yes, he sees it very plainly; but, he also sees, that such language from the English press might not have had a tendency to render the Expedition very popular. Ave, there is the rub! In order to render the war popular; in order to excite hopes of its final success; with this view the means of the enemy are continually diminished, or kept wholly out of sight, while our own means are swelled very far beyond the truth. This may serve to keep the planners of wars and expeditions in countenance; but, is it, I ask, fair dealing with the army and its commanders? — To return, now, a little more closely to the subject before us, the numbers of our own army had, as I was observing in my last, been stated at 47,000 English Troops, and at 60,000 Portuguese, the greater part of whom was represented as being with or near our main army. What excuse then, with those who believed this statement, could there be for raising the blockade of Rodrigo at the approach of 60,000 of the enemy? Thus was the public left, by those venal writers, to draw a conclusion either most injurious to the reputation of our Commander or to the reputation of his army. — It is true, that these prints *praise him* still; they *applaud* what he has done; but, what is their praise worth, unless they were frankly to acknowledge, that what they before said of the strength of his army was totally false? Unless they were to do this,

their *opinions* are at war with their *facts*, and which are likely to have most weight I leave the public to judge.—They cannot *now* with any effect, unsay what they have said; for they would be believed by nobody; and, besides, they have other matters to attend to; they have to justify the *measures of the ministry*; they have to perform the task of making the nation believe, not only that the war is wise in itself, but that *care is taken to furnish ample means for carrying it on with success*. Here is the great difficulty. They must maintain this; and, to maintain this, and, at the same time, to justify the late movement of the General commanding, is a task far beyond their slender capacities. Hence it is, that they are continually sacrificing in effect, the military reputation of the General whom in words they are extolling to the skies. Nor is it the General who alone has ground of complaint against them: the whole army suffers in its character through these falshoods of the press; for, those sufferings, which would call forth the compassion of the nation, are kept wholly out of sight, and we are bid to believe, that the army, while suffering from sickness and from all sorts of privations, are in "*high health and spirits*," and are abundantly supplied with all sorts of necessities and comforts. What I have heard, and from very good authority; what I have heard from the lips of eye-witnesses, and what I have been informed of by letters, written by those whom I know to be incapable of falshood, would, if I were to state it, be treated as a malicious invention of my own. Indeed, I should be afraid to state it. But, I will say this, and which, indeed, I have said before, that, from every thing that I have heard, I do not believe, that we had a force actually fit for duty, half sufficient to face 60,000 men; and, if so, all the stories about the 47,000 British Troops, and the great numbers of Portuguese in our army, must have been falshoods, and falshoods, too, of a most cruel tendency as to the reputation of our own army.—There is another way, in which the press works against the army. We see everlastingly occurring accounts of the embarkation of "*troops to join Lord Wellington*." The public hear of this continually. One would imagine, that thousands go out to him every week. If the papers were looked over for the last year and a half, I am of opinion, that we should find accounts of 200,000 men having been sent out to him. All men,

who reflect, must know that those accounts are false; but how many men are there who do reflect? Very few, indeed; and the general impression upon the public mind is, that a very great army has been sent out to him; and that, as they have always been "*in high health and spirits*," he must have a great army with him now.—But, if we were to look closely into the matter, we should find, that, in the accounts of embarkations, parties of recruits have been taken for battalions; and battalions for brigades; and, that the very same parties have been, under different dates and descriptions, mentioned several times over, and that thus every party has, at last, been multiplied by ten or twenty. A similar deception has been practised as to the sending out of stores and horses and provisions; and, as the reader must have perceived, the public have a thousand times been told of the *cheapness of provisions at Lisbon*, leaving it to be inferred, that *our army had every thing in this way in great abundance*.—Is it possible to form an idea of falshoods more injurious to the reputation of the whole of that army?—The truth is, that, though great reinforcements have been sent out, great for us, they have been, compared with the scale of the war and the force and reinforcements of the enemy, but very trifling. The government, I may be told, *have done all they can*. I do not doubt that; but, what is that to the fact? How can that lessen the injurious tendency of the flattering falshoods of the public prints? The climate of Portugal is unhealthy, more so for us than for the French, who are natives of a more Southern climate, whose habits, both as to diet and drink, expose them less to the ravages of fevers, and who are, moreover, enured to the labours and privations of war, and have been taught by long experience numerous precautions and timely remedies, which are far more powerful in keeping an army on foot than all the skill of a medical staff. Our men are more loaded with flesh, are fuller of blood, are greater eaters of animal food, drink a great deal more strong liquor. They have few of them ever before been under a burning sun; they have in general been unused to long and painful marches; they have not known what it is to seek their bed in the open air. Sickness seizes hold of them; and though their hearts do not fail them, their strength does. When they are got into battle there is no doubt

of them; but, amidst all these disadvantages, there must necessarily be great difficulty in getting them there in numbers any thing nearly equal to their *numbers upon paper*.—Such are in part (for I have mentioned only a part) the falsehoods, by the means of which the venal press has laboured to the injury of the reputation of the whole army. Now, if that press had pursued a different course; if it had given a *true* account of the force of the enemy; if it had taken care to inform the public of the great reinforcements that have arrived from France; if it had spoken of the French as an army, of experienced soldiers; if it had described the French artillery as served with the quickness of lightning; if it had spoken of the French engineers as men of incomparable skill; if it described all these means as placed under the direction of Generals whose buoyant genius had forced them upwards, through all obstacles, from the lowest walks of life, who have lived in the midst of armies and almost in the midst of desperate battles from their boyish days, and whose fortunate exploits have given their soldiers an habitual confidence in them: if the English press had held this language, and had besides, spoken of the natives of Portugal and their dispositions *with truth*; if this had been the line of conduct of the English press, how differently would the nation have felt upon receiving the news, the other day, of the raising of the siege of Rodrigo! There would, then, have been none of the disappointment and mortification, which was so visible upon every countenance, and which, in spite of all the after explanations of the press, could not fail to excite sentiments more or less injurious to the whole of the army in Portugal.—But, there is yet one light, in which we have not yet viewed the effect of “the *stories*,” of which we have been speaking; and that is with regard to the *final result of the war*. If the war should end in victory; if it should end, whether by a peace or otherwise, in rendering Portugal independent of the French; if it should end in this way, then the “*stories*,” will have produced, as to that end, no evil consequence; but, if the war should end altogether differently; if our army should be forced back to Lisbon, and be compelled, at last, to quit the country, leaving it in the hands of the French; what will then be the feeling of the people of this kingdom, after all the “*stories*” that they have

been told? I am not speaking here of the feeling as to the *Commander and the Army*; but, how will the people feel as to their own safety? After being so long told, that our army in Portugal was superior to the French in numbers; that it had plenty of all sorts of supplies, while the French were destitute of every thing; that it was in high health, while the French were wasting with sickness; that in all the inhabitants it had so many warm friends, while the French had in those inhabitants, so many bitter and implacable enemies: after being so long told all this, what must be the feelings of the people of England upon seeing the French become masters of Portugal? Will not their minds revert to their *own situation*? Will they not begin to think of the consequences of a possible invasion of England or Ireland? And will they not feel apprehensions, which they never would have felt, if the real state of the armies in Portugal had been fairly represented to them? I put these questions to the plain sense of the reader; and, I am persuaded, he will not fail to join me in reprobating the conduct of those, who have so long been endeavouring to keep the public in the dark as to the state of the contending armies in the peninsula.—The “*stories*” now complained of by the Commander himself, and which have been constantly reprobated by me, are said to tend to “*keep up the spirits of the people*,” and I have been accused of endeavouring “*to damp their spirits*.” But, who does them really the most service; those venal writers who deceive them and provide for them probable disappointment and mortification; or I, who tell them the truth, and who prepare them for those reverses which may probably happen?—For the last twenty years this nation has been the sport of unfounded hopes. It has been remarked, that no nation is more suddenly elated, or more suddenly depressed; that none is so prone to be elated in prosperity, or to respond in adversity; and, it must be confessed, that the publications from the venal press are admirably calculated to give its full force and most mischievous effect to this national propensity. In short, and this is my decided opinion, that this nation has not had, for the last twenty years, any enemy so successful as the unprincipled part of the press.—I shall now offer to the reader a few general reflections upon the war in Portugal.—It appears evident to me, as it long has, that it is the policy of

Napoleon not to put a speedy end to the war in Portugal, if he could. He is not a man to permit a war to linger, unless it suit his purpose so to do. He is not a man to permit his generals to hang off from fighting, having a force superior to the enemy. Marmont would not have dared to stop the pursuit of our army on this last occasion, if it had not been agreeably to the orders of his Master. The truth is, and, I think, it must be evident to every man of common sense, that Napoleon makes sure of Portugal, whenever he shall please to bend his whole force against it; and, this being the case, the longer he can make it convenient to keep the stroke suspended the better for him, because the more destructive to us.—It is said, that we *defend* Portugal; but, it is very clear, that we are unable to defend it any longer than the enemy refrains from attacking us; for, even those who talk of this *defence* of Portugal, admit now, that, if pushed by the French, our army must again retreat to its lines at the mouth of the Tagus.—The effect that such a movement would have upon the Portuguese need hardly be pointed out: it will suggest itself to every man capable of the smallest degree of reflection; and, it will manifestly be very different from what it was in the former instance.—The war is of that sort, that our means are not calculated to meet. We cannot send an army to the peninsula able to meet the armies that Napoleon can send thither, which has been proved by experience. Our general now tells us in so many words, that he has not forces fit to meet 60,000 French; and, if he has them not now, *when* is he to have them? It is generally thought, I believe, that the reinforcements, which are now sent out, do little more than *keep the numbers up*; and, as to the Portuguese, is there much prospect of their becoming any better than they are, or of their increasing in numbers? From what cause, then, is our force to be augmented? And, if it cannot be augmented, the point is set at rest at once, for our Commander himself says, that he could not, “without risking great loss,” pretend to meet the French army that he saw opposed to him before Rodrigo. This, say the venal prints, was *true*; and, I have no doubt of the truth of it;—for, putting myself, for a moment, in the place of our commander, I can easily determine that nothing but sheer necessity, nothing but a moral certainty of being beaten, and routed, could have induced him to

raise the blockade upon the approach of the French army. To raise a siege or a blockade is, in fact, a sort of defeat; it is what a general always yields to with great reluctance; and, we may be assured, that nothing short of a decided, an overwhelming superiority of numbers would have induced our army to raise the blockade of Rodrigo. That we are not, then, in a condition to meet the French now is clear. And *when* shall we be? again I ask. If ministers are able to send out troops sufficient to meet the French, why do they *not* send them? And, if they are not able to send out troops sufficient to meet the French, why do they persevere in the war, which, in this case, must be hopeless, though it costs the nation such immense sacrifices? —One would think, that the experience we have now had of the war in Portugal ought to be sufficient to convince such men as Captain Pasley, that continental war is not our element. In other countries we have complained, that our allies were cold; that the people were not with us. But, in this case, we have the government of the country pretty nearly in our own hands; we have the absolute command of the native troops as well as of our own; we put our own officers into the Portuguese corps; and we say, that the people of the country are all for us, and that they all hold the French in the greatest abhorrence. Well, we have been thus situated with regard to Portugal *three good long years*; and, what have we done? We and our enemy have made the country the theatre of a most destructive and devastating war; but that is all. We have not taken one jot from the power of Napoleon, in whose grand drama, the war in Portugal seems to be an insignificant underplot, though it be quite sufficient to drain England of her men and money; to exhaust, fatigue, and, if finally baffled, dishearten her.—What would I do, then? Would I recommend the *withdrawing of our army from Portugal*? I would. What! would I *abandon* the people of Portugal after having been in the country so long? —In answer to this I will not ask, *whether* the people of Portugal have any claim upon us; nor will I enter into an inquiry as to what would be the effect to them of the change. I shall suppose, that they have a great claim upon us, and that they would suffer from falling under the absolute sway of the French. But, then comes the question, are we able to defend Portugal, to *keep the French out of it* (for that

alone is worthy of the name of defence) for any length of time? Are we able *finally* to secure its independence of France? This last is the only question for us to determine; and, if we determine it in the negative; if we make up our minds to the point, that we are unable finally to secure the independence of Portugal, then it is clear that the sooner we quit the country, *the better it will be for the Portuguese.*—Then, as to *ourselves*, the longer we continue the war, the more we shall be exhausted by it; and, as to the effect upon our *spirits*, shall we not be more discouraged by a *forced* than by a *voluntary* relinquishment of Portugal?—There is one use, indeed, that might possibly be made of a longer possession of Portugal: I mean as *an item in negotiating for peace*; but, as peace seems to be thought of now by nobody, this is hardly worth mentioning; and, let it be observed, that unless we resolve to make no peace without stipulating for the independence of Portugal, it will be better to be out of it than in at the time of entering upon a negotiation; for, to *surrender* it to France as part of the price of advantages to ourselves, would be an everlasting stain upon our character.—Such are my reasons against a further continuation of the war in Portugal; and, until they are shewn to be wrong; until they meet with something better than abusive reproach and vile insinuation by way of answer, I shall be perverse enough to think them unanswerable.

MALTA.—This Island, which was, at first, the ostensible object of the present war, seems to have almost wholly dropped out of sight. There is, however, apparently, something now going on there well worthy of the public attention. Many of the principal people have drawn up and signed a *Petition* to the Governor, **GENERAL OAKES**, which he has expressed his disapprobation of in a *Proclamation*. I subjoin both documents. The *Petition* was, it seems, signed by many more persons than those whose names are here put to it.—As to the merits of the case, I am not well enough acquainted with the state of the Island to say much about it; and I must, therefore, for the present at least, leave both documents to speak for themselves.—It is, however, a matter of some consequence, that this Island, so near to Sicily, should, at this moment, be agitated with any serious contest between the government and the people; and, it

certainly makes an important point in our affairs in the Mediterranean, where they were already in a very critical state. The Mediterranean is become a scene of great interest. The enemy are in great force upon its borders. We command the islands; but, our expence is enormous, while that of the enemy, who is *at home*, is very trifling indeed. The loss we sustain by the exchange of money is immense; and, yet, are there men, who, like Captain Pasley, are eager for an extension of our foreign expeditions and wars!

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
25th October, 1811.*

MALTESE PETITION.

To His Majesty the King of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland in Council.

Humbly supplicate,

We native Maltese, faithful subjects of your Majesty our elected and benign Sovereign, pushed on by the many facts that has occurred in these islands of Malta and Gozzo for the last ten years, totally opposite to that high idea which public fame, and the experience given us during the blockade of Valletta, made us conceive of the English nation, and induces us to take the boldness to humble, at the throne of your Majesty, what follows:—That rare confidence and total submission with which the Maltese shewed an inviolable attachment to the British government, remitting entirely their affairs to the disposition of your Majesty's officers, notwithstanding the full authority residing with the Maltese, gave them the strongest motives to hope an amicable correspondence. The Maltese nevertheless see themselves deluded in their hopes, and see that, from a sordid policy, their most sacred rights and greatest interests are unjustly sacrificed, and, without necessity, by an abusive capitulation, stipulated by the officers of your Majesty with the French garrison, without the least participation with the Maltese, at the expence of our substance constrained to lay down our arms in the country, when our enemies surrendered their's in the cities given up. We saw with the most sensible displeasure those our enemies, under our very eyes, loaded with the spoils of our nation, vaulting with pride at the universal desolation, after the nation, for the space of two years, had

suffered mortality, hunger, affliction, and unspeakable fatigue under the walls of Valletta. The privileges of the council, after giving up the city, was immediately suspended and suppressed; though, by the flattering promises of sir Alex. Ball to the representatives, in future to reunite them in case of need, increased the unhappiness of our condition. We then began to feel the fatal effects of the suppression of a people the most honest and considerable of the place. Violence in taking from the magistrates the free exercise of their jurisdiction, and removing the whole body at the sole caprice of Ball, without any formality of justice; deputations formed of very few people, amongst whom were likewise strangers put in to answer private objects, without the least formality or legality, and given to the press under the name of the nation, with the approbation of some late commissaries occupying public places set apart for the exercise of pity and commiseration; seizure of the youth, sprung from our remotest forefathers, with insult and grievance. The distance of your Majesty, and fear of the despotical Ball, has impeded, for a length of time, the present claims.—There are those who tax the faithful Maltese with unquietness as a people, which is a false imputation. Our patience, submission, and faith in the justice of your Majesty, during ten years, gives to our faith very strong arguments of facts, and not of words, which is fully sufficient to confound our calumniators.—Finally, many other facts of injustice upon which our prudence imposes silence, the which in a small part exist with one elected agent, Giovanni Ricarde, which form our utmost misfortunes, and justify enough our suspicions, and leave us without much confidence with regard to the future.—To dissipate then our fears, to increase always more those ties of attachment of our countrymen in a manner inseparable from the crown of your Majesty, we address ourselves to the same source, to have in consideration the state in which we find ourselves, and to turn a benign eye to our supplications, so that at last we may obtain the many times promised restitution of our ancient rights, to fill the hearts of a sincere people with gratitude, fidelity, and love. And your Majesty will have a people the most faithful and attached towards your Majesty's crown, and to defend our islands.—These supplications are reduced in general terms to the restitution

of our ancient sacred rights, violated by the last grand master of the order of St. John, enjoyed by us during the blockade of Valletta, expressly stipulated when we consigned our islands with unlimited faith to the officers of your Majesty, and taken from us by the *defunct* sir A. Ball, and newly solemnly promised us in the name of your Majesty by sir Charles Cameron.—The principal of these our rights is a free representation of the people, otherwise a popular council, with the right to send deputed memorials to your Majesty in council, when they are found to be lawful.

2d. Independent tribunals.

3d. Liberty of the Press; but not licence in things that might offend our Catholic Religion.

4th. A Jury in the manner in use in England, or according to our antient usage, with the right to appeal in every case from the sentence of the judge to the popular council.

5th. In fine, a Constitution wherein may enter the spirit of our free and legitimate Government with that of the Constitution of England, saving always our Catholic Religion.

To obtain our antient rights, we have acclaimed your Majesty for our Sovereign; we therefore supplicate in the name of justice, of all laws divine and human, and for the loss of about twenty thousand men, and for our sufferings in all the time of the blockade, that the restitution of our rights and privileges, for which the Maltese have been authorized by their antient sovereigns to give their consent in whatever change of government, which consent cannot be neglected without offence to justice. And which we do not expect from the just government of your Majesty, who was elected by our hearts.—The Maltese have recourse to your Majesty as in duty bound, and will never cease to supplicate and protest themselves faithful.

The underwritten,

Barone Vincenzo Azopardi,
Cavaliere Paolo Parisi,
Emico Testaferatta,
Gio Batta Cassar Desain,
Conte Ferdinando Teuma,
Marchesi Saverio Alessi,
D. Mario Testaferatta,
Nicolo Marchesi di Testaferatta,
D. Gregorio Augusto Testaferatta,
Conte Martino Preziosi,
Conte Gio Dr. Fenma Castelletti,
Daniele Bonnici,

Dr. Elias Vella,
 Vincenzo Alessi,
 Marchese Gio Ant. Apase,
 Pietro Paolo Bonnici,
 Dr. Francesco Alessi,
 F. Guis. Imbrol, for Pandolfo, deprived of sight,
 Gio Batta Bonnici Monpalaco,
 Guiseppe Gatt,
 Vincenzo Vella,
 Antonio Gallea,
 Luigi de Conti Teuma Catelletta,
 Vincenzo Borg,
 Dr. Tisico Gio Batta Falzon,
 Salvatore Elled,
 Sac Ant. Darmanin,
 Sar Franc. Seychet,
 Antonio Gallea,
 Chirurgo Gio Falson,
 Baldassare Lamotta,
 Franc. Farrugia,
 Guisc. Cilia,
 Franc. Borg,
 Antonio Parnis,
 Guisc. Erima,
 Franc. Russo,
 Antonio Manguir,
 Pietro Mallia Sacerdote,
 Gio Batta Lasperanza,
 Cancelliere Gio Franc. Bonella,
 Con Salvatore Corso,
 Salva. Xeri Can Cantone,
 Aloisio Xuere,
 Guis. Farrugia,
 Ant. Alea,
 Paoli Ealea Neg.
 Ignazio Falson,
 Nicola Ciantar,
 Francesco Cacuaana,
 Calcedonio Pace,
 Guis. Xichina,
 Salvatore Pace.

The foregoing is faithfully translated from an authenticated copy, extracted from its original in the Italian language.
Malta, August, 1811.

PROCLAMATION

By the Governor of Malta.

The King's Civil Commissioner observes with regret; that some weak and inconsiderate persons, deceived under specious pretexts, have suffered themselves to become the instruments of a few turbulent and factious individuals. They have been seduced to subscribe a paper, purporting to be an Application to the King for certain changes in the existing form of the Government of these Islands, but which is in

fact a scandalous libel upon that Government, as hitherto administered, and the vehicle of private malignity.—The acts of His Majesty's former Representatives are grossly and insidiously perverted; facts are misrepresented; and the revered memory of one, whose long administration, marked as it was by wisdom and mildness, and by the most distinguished benefits to these Islands, had been sanctioned by the gracious approbation of his Sovereign, is ungratefully and vindictively traduced by an unfeeling and disappointed faction.—Whilst His Excellency feels himself called upon thus to animadvert upon a proceeding no less dishonourable to the parties concerned, than it is disrespectful to the Government, he reflects with peculiar satisfaction that so small a number of individuals, and of those so very few of any respectability, have been seduced by the insidious arts so long and so industriously practised to mislead them. This consideration, added to the well-grounded confidence which the King's Civil Commissioner reposes in the loyalty and attachment of the Maltese at large, whose happiness has long been dear to him, and whose real interests His Excellency shall ever be solicitous to promote, enables him to exercise more generally towards a misguided few, the lenity, and forbearance, which have ever characterised His Majesty's Government in these Islands. Few, indeed, and prejudiced; must those Maltese be, who are insensible to the superior advantages they possess under the auspices of Great Britain; but if such there are, let them learn from the victims of French oppression who daily crowd to these shores, as to an envied asylum, how they ought to appreciate the prosperity and security which, under the powerful protection of His Majesty's Fleets and Armies, they so liberally enjoy.—If His Excellency has hitherto delayed publicly to notice this extraordinary memorial, he has been actuated by the desire of affording to those who might have been deceived, an opportunity of acknowledging their error; and several have accordingly come forward and avowed, in writing, the gross delusion under which their subscriptions were obtained to the document, and their total ignorance of its contents.—The Paper in question, such as it is, His Excellency is determined to transmit by the first opportunity to His Majesty's Ministers.

By Command of his Excellency,
 F. LAING, Acting Public Secretary.
 Palace, 23d August, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL. — (*Copied from the Times newspaper of the 21st Oct. 1811.*)—

The following is given as a copy of a letter intended to have been circulated by Lord Wellington among the Officers of the army under his command, but which circulation, from some unexplained cause, was not carried into effect.

Villa Formosa, May 15.

SIR;—Adverting to your report of the transactions of the morning of the 31st ult. in pursuit of the garrison of Almeida, I have to state, that nothing has given me more concern than the conduct of the hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Cochrane, of the 36th regiment. When the enemy had passed the bridge of Barba del Porco, the farther pursuit of those troops was useless; and every step taken beyond the point to which the Lieutenant-Colonel was ordered to proceed, was only a risk to the officers and soldiers under his command, from whence retreat was next to impossible.—The Lieutenant-Colonel did not know possibly, that the whole of the 2d corps d'Armée was at St. Felices, but a short distance from Barba del Porco; and, upon hearing the firing, formed on the Agueda to protect the retreat of these troops; he knew, however, that the garrison of Almeida, although perhaps in disorder, were a body far superior in numbers to those he had under his command; and he did not know what troops were in St. Felices to support them:—his advance, therefore, and his passage of the bridge, was an imprudence, to which all the losses of the day must be attributed.—The frequent instances that occurred lately of severe loss, and, in some instances, of important failures, by Officers leading the troops beyond the point to which they were ordered, and beyond all bounds; such as the loss of prisoners taken in front of the village of Fuentes, on the 3d and 5th; the loss incurred by the 13th Light Dragoons, near and at Badajoz, on the 25th of March; the severe loss incurred by the troops at the siege of Badajoz, on the right of the Guadiana, on the 10th inst. have induced me to determine to bring before a General Court-martial, for disobedience of orders, any officer who should in future be guilty of this conduct.—I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the officers and soldiers of the army to advance upon the enemy; but it is my duty,

and that of every General and other Officer in command, to emulate the spirit, and not to expose the soldiers to contend with unequal numbers, in situations where they cannot be supported, from which their retreat is not secure, and in which they run the risk of being prisoners to the enemy they had before beaten.—The desire of being forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British army; but that quality which I wish to see the Officers possess, who are at the head of troops, is a cool discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude how far they can and ought to go with propriety, and to convey their orders, and to act with such vigour and decision as that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity. The officers of the army may depend upon it, that the enemy to whom they are opposed are not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, opposed to large; nor has the experience of any officer realised the stories, which all have read, of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry or dragoons.—I trust that this letter, copies of which I propose to circulate to General Officers of Divisions, with directions to circulate it among the officers of the army, will have the effect of inducing them to reflect seriously upon the duties which they have to perform before the enemy, and to avoid the crime which is the subject of it, and which is really become of serious detriment to the army and public interest.

(Signed) WELLINGTON.

PORTUGAL.—*Dispatches from Lord Wellington, published in London 16th Oct. 1811.*

Dispatches, of which the following are a Copy and an Extract, were yesterday evening received at the Earl of Liverpool's Office, addressed to his Lordship by General Viscount Wellington, dated Quadrasayes, 29th September, and Frexada, 2d October, 1811.

Quadrasayes, Sept. 29, 1811.

MY LORD,—The enemy commenced their movements towards Ciudad Rodrigo with the convoys of provisions from the Sierra de Bejar and from Salamanca on the 21st inst. and on the following day I collected the British army, in positions from which

I could either advance or retire without difficulty, which would enable me to see all that was going on, and the strength of the enemy's army.—The 3d division, and that part of the General Allen's brigade of cavalry which was not detached, occupied the range of heights which are on the left of the Aguada, having their advanced guard, under Lieutenant Colonel Williams of the 60th, on the heights of Pastores within three miles of Ciudad Rodrigo; the 4th division were at Fuente Guinaldo, where I had strengthened a position with some works; the light division on the right of the Aguada, having their right resting upon the mountains which separate Castile and Estremadura; Lieutenant General Graham commanded the troops on the left of the army, which were posted on the Lower Azava; the 6th division and Major-General Anson's brigade of cavalry being at Espeja, and occupying Carpio Marialva, &c.—Mareschal del Campo Don Carlos D'Espagne observed the Lower Aguada with Don Julian Sanchez's cavalry and infantry. Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, with Major-General Slade's and Major-General De Grey's brigades of cavalry, was on the Upper Azava, in the centre, between the right and left of the army, with General Pack's brigade at Campillo; and the 5th division were in observation of the pass of Perales in the rear of the right, the French General Foy having remained and collected a body of troops in Upper Estremadura, consisting of part of his own division of the Army of Portugal, and a division of the Army of the Centre; and the 7th division was in reserve at Alamedilla.—The enemy first appeared in the plain near Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 23d, and retired again in a short time; but on the 24th in the morning, they advanced again in considerable force, and entered the plain, by the roads of St. Spiritus and Yenebron; and before evening they had collected there all their cavalry, to the amount of about six thousand men, and four divisions of infantry, of which one division were of the Imperial Guard; and the remainder of the armies were encamped on the Guadapero, immediately beyond the hills which surround the plain of Ciudad Rodrigo.—On the morning of the 25th, the enemy sent a reconnoissance of cavalry towards the Lower Azava, consisting of about fourteen squadrons of the cavalry of the Imperial Guard.—They drove in our posts on the right of the Azava; but having passed that river, the

Lanciers de Berg were charged by two squadrons of the 16th, and one of the 14th light dragoons, and driven back; they attempted to rally and to return, but were fired upon by the light infantry of the 61st regiment, which had been posted in the wood, on their flank, by Lieutenant-General Graham; and Major-General Anson pursued them across the Azava, and afterwards resumed his posts on the right of that river. Lieutenant General Graham was highly pleased with the conduct of Major-General Anson's brigade; and Major-General Anson particularly mentions Lieutenant-Colonel Hervey and Captain Brotherton of the 14th, and Captain Hay and Major Cocks of the 16th.—But the enemy's attention was principally directed during this day to the position of the 3d division on the hills between Fuente Guinaldo, and Pastores. About eight in the morning, they moved a column, consisting of between 30 and 40 squadrons of cavalry, and 14 battalions of infantry, and 12 pieces of cannon, from Ciudad Rodrigo, in such a direction, as that it was doubtful whether they would attempt to ascend the hills by Encina El Bodon, or by the direct road towards Fuente Guinaldo, and I was not certain by which road they would make their attack, till they actually commenced it upon the last.—As soon as I saw the directions of their march, I had reinforced the 2d battalion 5th regiment, which occupied the post on the hill, over which the road passes to Guinaldo, by the 77th regiment, and the 21st Portuguese regiment, under the command of Major General the Hon. C. Colville, and Major General Alten's Brigade, of which only three squadrons remained, which had not been detached, drawn from El Bodon; and I ordered there a brigade of the 4th division from Fuente Guinaldo, and afterwards from El Bodon the remainder of the troops of the 3d division, with the exception of those at Pastores, which were too distant.—In the mean time, however, the small body of troops in this post sustained the attack of the enemy's cavalry and artillery. One regiment of French dragoons succeeded in taking two pieces of cannon which had been posted on a rising ground on the right of our troops; but they were charged by the second battalion 5th regiment, under the command of Major Ridge, and the guns were immediately re-taken.—While this operation was going on on the flank, an attack was made on the front by another regi-

ment, which was repulsed in a similar manner by the 77th regiment, and the three squadrons of Major General Alten's brigade charged repeatedly different bodies of the enemy, which ascended the hill, on the left of the two regiments of British infantry; the Portuguese regiment being posted in the rear of the right.—At length the division of the enemy's infantry, which had marched with the cavalry from Ciudad Rodrigo, were brought up to the attack on the road of Fuente Guinaldo, and seeing that they would arrive and be engaged before the troops could arrive either from Guinaldo or El Bodon, I determined to withdraw our post, and to retire with the whole on Fuente Guinaldo. The 2d battalion 5th regiment, and the 77th regiment, were formed into one square, and the 21st Portuguese regiment into another, supported by Major-General Alten's small body of cavalry and the Portuguese artillery.—The enemy's cavalry immediately rushed forward and obliged our cavalry to retire to the support of the Portuguese regiment; and the 5th and 77th regiments were charged on three faces of the square by the French cavalry; but they halted and repulsed the attack with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. We then continued the retreat, and joined the remainder of the third division, also formed in squares, on their march to Fuente Guinaldo; and the whole retired together in the utmost order; and the enemy never made another attempt to charge any of them; but were satisfied with firing upon them with their artillery, and with following them.—Lieutenant-Colonel Williams with his light infantry, and the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Trench, with the 74th regiment, retired from Pastores across the Agueda, and thence marched by Robleda, where they took some prisoners, and re-crossed the Agueda, and joined at Guinaldo in the evening.—I placed the third and fourth divisions, and General Pack's brigade of infantry, and Major-General Alten's, Major-General De Grey's, and Major-General Slade's brigades of cavalry, in the position of Fuente Guinaldo, on the evening of the 25th, and ordered Major-General Crawford to retire with the light division across the Agueda; the seventh division to form at Albergaria, and Lieutenant-General Graham to collect the troops under his command at Nave d'Aver, keeping only posts of observation on the Azava; and the troops were thus formed in an

echelon, of which the centre was in the position at Guinaldo; and the right upon the Pass of Perales, and the left at Nave d'Aver. Mareschal del Campo Don Carlos d'Espagne was placed on the left of the Coa, and Don Julian Sanchez was detached with the cavalry to the enemy's rear.—The enemy brought up a 2d division of infantry from Ciudad Rodrigo, in the afternoon of the 25th, and, in the course of that night, and of the 26th, they collected their whole army in front of our position at Guinaldo; and not deeming it expedient to stand their attack in that position, I retired about three leagues, and on the 27th formed the army as follows: the 5th division on the right, at Aldea Velha: the 4th, and light divisions, and Maj. Gen. Alten's cavalry, at the Convent of Sacaparte, in front of Alfayates; the 2d and 7th divisions, in second line, behind Alfayates; and Lieut. General Graham's corps on the left at Bismula, having their advanced guard beyond the Villa Maior River, and Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton's cavalry near Alfayates, on the left of the 4th division, and having General Pack's and General M'Mahon's brigades, at Nebulosa, on their left. The piquets of the cavalry were in front of Aldea de Ponte, beyond the Villa Maior River; and those of General Alten's brigade beyond the same river towards Furcalhos.—It had been the enemy's intention to turn the left of the position of Guinaldo by moving a column into the valley of the Upper Azava, and thence ascending the heights in the rear of the position by Castillejos; and from this column they detached a division of infantry and fourteen squadrons of cavalry to follow our retreat by Albergaria, and another body of the same strength followed us by Furcalhos. The former attacked the picquets of the cavalry at Aldea de Ponte, and drove them in; and they pushed on nearly as far as Alfayates. I then made General Pakenham attack them with his brigade of the 4th division, supported by the Honourable Lieutenant-General Cole, and the 4th division; and by Sir Stapleton Cotton's cavalry; and the enemy were driven through Aldea de Ponte, back upon Albergaria, and the picquets of the cavalry resumed their station.—But the enemy having been reinforced by the troops which marched upon Furcalhos, again advanced about sun-set, and drove in the picquets of the cavalry from Aldea de Ponte; and took possession of the village.—Lieutenant-General

Cole again attacked them with a part of General Pakenham's brigade, and drove them through the village, but night having come on, and as General Pakenham was not certain what was passing on his flanks, or of the numbers of the enemy, and he knew that the army were to fall back still farther, he evacuated the village, which the enemy occupied, and held during the night.—On the 28th, I formed the army on the heights behind Soito, having the Sierra das Mesas on the right, and the left Reudo on the Coa, about one league in the rear of the position which they had occupied on the 27th. The enemy also retired from Aldea de Ponte, and had their advanced posts at Albergaria; and as it appears that they are about to retire from this part of the country, and as we have already had some bad weather, and may expect more at the period of the equinoctial gale, I propose to cannon the troops.—I cannot conclude this Report of the occurrences of the last week, without expressing to your Lordship my admiration of the conduct of the troops engaged in the affair of the 25th instant.—The conduct of the 2d battalion 5th regiment, commanded by Major Ridge, in particular, affords a memorable example of what the steadiness and discipline of the troops, and their confidence in their officers, can effect, in the most difficult and trying situations. The conduct of the 77th regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bromhead, was equally good, and I have never seen a more determined attack than was made by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, with every advantage of the assistance of a superior artillery, and repulsed by these two weak battalions.—I must not omit also to report the good conduct on the same occasions, of the 21st Portuguese regiment, under the command of Col. Bacellar, and of Major Arenschildt's artillery.—The Portuguese infantry were not actually charged, but were repeatedly threatened; and they showed the utmost steadiness and discipline both in the mode in which they prepared to receive the enemy, and in all the movements of a retreat made over six miles of plain, in front of superior cavalry and artillery.—The Portuguese artillery-men attached to the guns, which were for a moment in the enemy's possession, were cut down at their guns.—The infantry, upon this occasion, were under the command of Major-General the Honourable C. Colville; Lieutenant-General Picton having remained with the troops at El

Bodon; and the conduct of Major-General Colville was beyond all praise.—Your Lordship will have observed by the details of the action which I have given you, how much reason I had to be satisfied with the conduct of the 1st Hussars and 11th Light Dragoons, of Major General Alten's Brigade. There were not more than three squadrons of the two regiments on the ground, this brigade having for some time furnished the cavalry for the out-posts of the army, and they charged the enemy's cavalry repeatedly; and notwithstanding the superiority of the latter, the post would have been maintained, if I had not preferred to abandon it to risking the loss of those brave men, by continuing the unequal contest under additional disadvantages, in consequence of the immediate entry of fourteen battalions of infantry into the action, before the support which I had ordered up could arrive.—Major General Alten, and Lieutenant Colonels Cumming and Arenschildt, and the Officers of these regiments, particularly distinguished themselves upon this occasion.—I have also to mention, that the Adjutant-General, Major-General the Honourable C. Stewart being upon the field, gave his assistance as an Officer of Cavalry, with his usual gallantry.—In the affair of the 27th, at Aldea de Ponte, Brigadier-General Pakenham, and the troops of the fourth division, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Cole, likewise conducted themselves remarkably well.—His Serene Highness the Hereditary Prince of Orange accompanied me during the operations which I have detailed to your Lordship, and was for the first time in fire, and he conducted himself with the spirit and intelligence which afford a hope that he will become an ornament of his profession.—The enemy having collected, for the object of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo, the Army of the North, which were withdrawn from the attack which they commenced on General Abadia, in Galicia, in which are included 22 battalions of the Imperial Guard, and General Souham's division of infantry, composed of troops recently arrived in Spain from the Army of Naples, and now drawn from the frontiers of Navarre, where they had been employed in operations against Mina, together with five divisions, and all the cavalry of the army called of Portugal, composing altogether an army of not less than sixty thousand men, of which six thou-

sand were cavalry, and 125 pieces of artillery; I could not pretend to maintain the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, nor could any efforts which I could make, prevent, or materially impede the collection of the supplies, or the march of the convoy for the relief of that place. I did all that I could expect to effect without incurring the risk of great loss for no object, and as the reports, as usual, were so various in regard to the enemy's real strength, it was necessary that I should see their army.—I have had no reports from the North since I addressed your Lordship last, nor from the South of Spain.—General Girard had collected at Mérida, a small body of troops; but I imagine that he will break up this collection again, as soon as he will hear that General Hill is at Portalegre.—I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) WELLINGTON.

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded, on the 25th and 27th instant.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army, under the Command of his Excellency General Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. in an Affair with the Enemy, on the 25th of September, 1811, on the Heights of El Bodon.

11th Light Dragoons—8 rank and file, 12 horses, killed; 1 Lieut.-Colonel, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Quarter-Master, 3 Serjeants, 10 rank and file, 14 horses, wounded.

14th ditto—1 Lieutenant, 2 rank and file, 5 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

16th ditto—2 horses killed; 1 Serjeant, 7 rank and file, 1 horse wounded; 1 rank and file, 2 horses, missing.

1st Hussars, King's German Legion—1 Serjeant, 4 rank and file, 23 horses, killed; 2 Captains, 4 Serjeants, 1 Trumpeter, 27 rank and file, 29 horses, wounded; 5 rank and file, missing.

2d Batt. 5th Foot—5 rank and file killed; 1 Captain, 1 Serjeant, 12 rank and file, wounded.

1st Batt. 45th Foot—1 Serjeant missing.

77th Foot—4 rank and file killed; 14 rank and file wounded; 5 rank and file missing.

2d Batt. 83d Foot—5 rank and file killed; 1 Serjeant, 13 rank and file wounded; 1 drummer, 4 rank and file, missing.

1st Batt. 88th foot—5 rank and file missing.

94th Foot—1 rank and file missing.

Total British loss—1 Serjeant, 26 rank and file, 37 horses killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 3 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, 1

Quarter-Master, 10 Serjeants, 1 Drummer, 85 rank and file, 49 horses, wounded; 1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer, 21 rank and file, 3 horses, missing.

Total Portuguese loss—1 rank and file killed; 5 rank and file wounded; 1 Drummer, 1 rank and file, missing.

General total—1 Serjeant, 27 rank and file, 37 horses, killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 3 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, 1 Quarter-Master, 10 Serjeants, 1 Drummer, 90 rank and file, 49 horses, wounded; 1 Serjeant, 2 Drummers, 22 rank and file, 3 horses, missing.

N. B. The 14th and 16th Light Dragoons engaged near Espeja, on the left of the army. (Signed) CHARLES STEWART, Maj.-General and Adj.-General.

List of Officers wounded on the 25th of September, 1811.

11th Light Dragoons—Lieut.-Col. Cummings, slightly; Lieut. King, severely.

14th ditto—Lieut. Hall, slightly.

1st Hussars, King's German Legion—Captains Burgman and Poten, severely.

2d Batt. 5th Foot—Capt. Ramus, slightly.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of his Excellency Gen. Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. in an Affair with the Enemy, near Aldea de Ponte, on the 27th of September, 1811.

Royal Horse Artillery—1 Lieutenant, wounded.

3d Dragoon Guards—4 horses, wounded.

1st or Royal Dragoons—1 horse, killed; 3 rank and file, 7 horses, wounded; 1 rank and file, 1 horse, missing.

4th Dragoons—1 horse, missing.

12th Light Dragoons—2 horses, killed; 2 rank and file, 3 horses, wounded; 4 rank and file, 4 horses, missing.

1st Batt. 7th Fusiliers—9 rank and file, killed; 1 Captain, 3 Lieutenants, 1 Serjeant, 28 rank and file, wounded.

1st Batt. 23d Foot—1 Captain, 2 rank and file, killed; 1 Major, 1 Captain, 13 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file, missing.

1st Batt. 48th ditto—1 Captain, 1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer, 5 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file, missing.

5th Batt. 60th ditto (1 Company attached to the Hon. Major-Gen. Cole)—1 Captain, wounded.

Light Infantry Brunswick Oels (1 Company attached to 4th Division of Infantry)—1 rank and file, killed; 3 rank and file, wounded.

Total British loss—1 Captain, 12 rank and file, 3 horses, killed; 1 Major, 4 Captains, 4 Lieutenants, 2 Serjeants, 1 Drummer, 54 rank and file, 14 horses, wounded; 8 rank and file, 6 horses, missing.

Total Portuguese loss—1 rank and file, killed; 1 Serjeant, 10 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file, missing.

Total general loss—1 Captain, 13 rank and file, 3 horses, killed; 1 Major, 4 Captains, 4 Lieutenants, 3 Serjeants, 1 Drummer, 64 rank and file, 14 horses, wounded; 9 rank and file, 6 horses, missing.

N. B. One Serjeant and one Horse of the 18th Hussars (Orderly to the Hon. Major-General Charles Stewart), missing, supposed to be taken prisoner.

(Signed) CHARLES STEWART,
Maj.-General and Adj.-General.

Return of Officers killed and wounded, on the 27th of September, 1811.

Killed.—1st Batt. 23d Foot—Capt. C. Courtland.

Wounded.—Royal Horse Artillery—Lieut. Dunn, severely, not dangerously.

7th Fusileers—Capt. Willy, severely; Lieuts. Seton, Wallace, and Barrington, slightly.

23d Foot—Major and Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson and Captain Payne, severely.

1st Batt. 48th Foot—Capt. Turnpenny, slightly.

5th Batt. 60th ditto—Captain Prevost, severely.

Frexada, October 2, 1811.

Since I addressed you on the 29th of September, I have learned that the enemy retired from Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th, the Army of the North towards Salamanca, and it is said, Valladolid; and the Army of Portugal towards Banos and Placentia. —Girard's division of the 5th corps, which I informed your Lordship had been collected at Merida, has retired from thence, and has again been cantoned in the neighbourhood of Zafra.—I likewise learn that General Foy, who had advanced as far as Zarza Major, in the valley of the Allegon, with his own division, and one of the Army of the Centre, has retired towards Placentia.

SPAIN.—*Head Quarters at Valladolid.*

(Concluded from page 480.)

Ordinance.

2. All such individuals shall be bound to return to their homes in the course of

one month, in default of which, they shall be considered as forming part of the bands of insurgents, and all their property shall be confiscated; all persons owing them rents, and their debtors of every description whatever, are forbidden to make their payments in any other way but into the hands of the administrators of the national domains.

3. The fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, children, and nephews of such individuals are declared responsible, both in their property and in their persons, for every act of spoliation committed by the insurgents upon peaceable citizens, or upon their property.

4. If any inhabitant is carried off from his home, three of the nearest relatives of a brigand shall be immediately arrested, to serve as hostages; if this individual is put to death by the bands, the hostages shall be shot immediately; and without any form of process.

5. Every person who shall absent himself from his township, for more than eight days, (to commence from the publication of the present ordinance), without permission, shall be considered as having gone over to the bands; all his property shall be sequestrated, and sold after the expiration of three months; all his relatives within the degrees mentioned in the 3d Article shall be put under arrest.

6. No inhabitant can remove from his township, without being provided with a passport, which shall be given him for a limited time. This passport shall only be given upon the certificate of two resident householders in the township, who shall be sureties, that at the expiration of the time mentioned in the passport, he who is the bearer shall have returned to his township, or shall have shewn that he resided in places occupied by the French army. In failure of which, the two sureties shall be arrested, and put in prison.

7. Every inhabitant of towns where there is a Commissary of Police, shall provide himself with a card of security.

8. Domiciliary visits shall be made, in pursuance of the orders of Commandants of Towns, at periods which they shall deem proper: every individual unprovided with a card of security, shall be immediately arrested, and sent to prison; the public functionaries alone are excepted from this order.

9. In like manner those shall be arrested who have given an asylum to any individual unprovided with a passport or card of security.

10. Whoever shall be convicted of having held correspondence with the brigands, shall be punished with death.

11. All correspondence with the inhabitants of districts occupied by insurgents is prohibited; those who receive letters from such districts must give them to the Commandants of towns, or to Commissioners of Police, where there are such.

12. Infractions of the preceding article shall be punished with ten years imprisonment.

13. The Governors-General of the different Governments, and the Intendant-General, are charged, each in his own department, with the execution of the present ordinance, which shall be printed, published, and fixed up in all the usual places.

(Signed) Marshal, Duke of ISTRM.
By his Excellency the General in Chief.

(Signed) DE BROGLIE,
Auditor of the Council of State, Secretary-General of the Government.

Head Quarters at Valladolid, June 5.

General Orders.

It is ordered that all the Magistrates and Alcaldes of towns that are within four leagues distance of any fortress or post occupied by the troops of his Majesty the Emperor and King, do give immediate information of the movement or halt of any parties of brigands within their district, to the nearest French Commandants, and this under pain of military execution.—It is also ordered, that the Alcaldes and Magistrates of towns and villages do give information to every French detachment on its march on the high road, of all the concealed positions which the parties of brigands may have formed within their district.—Whenever a detachment of troops is attacked on the road, and the inhabitants of the town upon whose territory the attack took place have not given information of the concealed post or ambuscade to the Commander of the detachment, the town shall be given up to pillage, and the most culpable inhabitants shall be arrested, and delivered over to a Military Commission; and in case of any repetition of the same circumstance the town shall be burnt.—The ringing of bells on the approach of French troops is prohibited. The person who gives or executes orders for ringing of bells on such

occasions shall be shot.—The present orders shall be printed, and posted up on the principal gate of the churches of all the towns.—The Military Chiefs and Commandants of Fortresses are especially charged with the execution of these orders.—By command of Marshal the Duke of Istria, General in Chief of the army of the North of Spain.

Baron LECAMUS, Chief of the Staff.

THE BANK MEETING.

September 19, 1811.

To day a Half Yearly Meeting of the Proprietors of Bank Stock was held, when MR. CLIFFORD rose and made a variety of observations for the purpose of shewing that the extraordinary profits recently made, entitled the Proprietors to an increase of 5 per cent. on the present dividend. The dividend of 10 per cent. was now, by the *depreciation of paper*, of much less real amount than at the period when it was first declared. In justice to the Proprietors, therefore, the addition was imperiously called for, as well as upon the ground of the great augmentation of the profits upon all the different concerns of the Bank. He was prepared to shew that there was a large excess in the hands of the Directors, which he conceived ought to be divided among the Proprietors. MR. CLIFFORD then entered into a statement of the sums derived by the Bank upon the various items of the rise in the nominal value of the dollar token, the charges for managing the national debt, the profits on dead stock, lottery prizes, unclaimed dividends, &c. which he stated to be on the average, since 1806, 702,401l. a year. He then contended at considerable length, that the issue of notes had been excessive, and that until reduced, it would be unavailing to issue silver tokens, since the growing depreciation would always destroy the equilibrium between them and the paper, and the evil now so generally felt and complained of, the want of small change, must remain incurable. The emission of every single additional note operated to raise the price of bullion, and of all the necessities of life.—The price of the quarter loaf was now 16d.

(To be continued.)

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.—In the Letters, which I did myself the honour to address to the Prince Regent upon the subject of the dispute with America, I observed, that, in the present state of the matter, it was impossible to say, which of the two ships, the *Little Belt* or the *President*, fired the first shot. That point, however, now appears to have been settled by a *Court of Inquiry*, held at New-York, by order of the American Government, an abstract of the Proceedings of which Court will be found in another part of this Number.—From these proceedings it appears, that about twenty witnesses were examined, and that all of them, except three, were quite positive as to the fact, *that the first shot was fired by the Little Belt*. The three who were not quite positive as to this point, said, that they believed the first shot was fired by the *Little Belt*: but that they were not in a situation actually to see the flash, and to be quite sure of the matter. The rest swear that they both saw the flash and heard the report.—One would think, that, after this, there could be no longer any dispute about the fact; but, so far from such a conclusion having been drawn by our venal prints, they, on the contrary, treat the proceedings of this Court with perfect contempt, and all the witnesses who swore to the fact, they treat as perjured men.—The *Times*, with a degree of insolence rarely to be met with, even amongst writers secure of impunity, says: "It has, as we predicted, become a matter of *downright swearing*; and it is hard to say we do not believe so many men, who declare upon oath that our vessel fired the first gun: yet, in plain English, *we do not*; but are willing to attribute their deviation from truth to error, rather than to intentional falsehood."—This last part is even more insolent than the rest; for, *error* was impossible, where *twenty people* swore positively, that they saw the flash and heard the report; that they were all both eye and ear witnesses of the fact. "A matter of *downright swearing*!" And thus all these Officers and Petty Officers of a Frigate

are to be held forth as perjured wretches because their evidence does not suit the purposes of these writers.—The *Courier*, which yields to none now except the *Times*, says: "Notwithstanding the evidence of these persons, we still must adhere to our belief in the veracity of Capt. Bingham's statement. For, even putting out of our consideration the *improbability* that a sloop of war should commence hostilities within pistol shot of a large 44 gun frigate, we have Captain Bingham receiving from his commanding Officer, Admiral Sawyer, *just before he sailed*, most positive directions to be particularly careful not to give any just cause of offence to the Government or subjects of the United States." We cannot, therefore, believe that *he would*, the very first time he met an American ship, fly in the face of these orders; and for what purpose? to draw down hostilities upon his little ship from a large 44 gun frigate which he could not expect to take, and which could not do but the greatest injury both to his crew and vessel. But it will be said, are we prepared to believe *all the witnesses examined in America perjured*? We reply, and are we to give up Captain Bingham and his Officers, and believe them perjured? They declare, that after the second hail the American frigate fired, not a single gun, but a broadside; that the *Little Belt* did not fire the first."—Now, in the first place, I have never seen the proceedings of any Court, where the Officers of Captain Bingham were sworn. I have seen *his Letter*, indeed, giving an account of the affair; but, I have never seen the report of any trial upon the subject, nor do I believe that any thing of the kind has taken place.—The Letter of Captain Bingham is, indeed, in direct opposition to the oaths of the witnesses in America. But, is this letter to be opposed to those oaths, when we come to speak of the matter seriously? Is the bare word of one man, and that man too the party accused, to be set up against the clear oaths of twenty eye and ear witnesses? Such a thing was never heard of before; and the attempt bespeaks a total want of impartiality.—But, says the *Courier*, we

must either believe the American witnesses to be all perjured, or must believe Captain Bingham to be perjured. Even in this case, who would believe, what jurymen would believe *one* man's oath against the paths of *twenty* men? This, however, is not a fair way of stating the case; for, we have no *oath* of Captain Bingham; and, if we had, I should be inclined to impute it to *error*, as the Times does in the case of the American Witnesses; for, such an error *one* man might fall into, but for *twenty* men to fall into an error as to a fact of which they swear they were eye and ear witnesses, is impossible.—The Courier opposes to all these positive statements upon oath, *probabilities*. He says, that it is *improbable*, that a sloop of war should have attacked a frigate; and, then, he says, that, besides, Captain Bingham had such *positive Orders* from his Commodore not to do any thing to give just cause of offence to the American Government or People. If this reasoning were of any weight, who that transgressed any order or any law, would ever want a defence? According to this the more positive the law, and the more flagrant the violation of it, the stronger would be the presumption in favour of the inculpated person. Yet, in the existence of the Orders here referred to, does this writer find that whence he concludes, and would have his readers conclude, that a fact, attested by twenty eye and ear witnesses, is false.—There is another fact attested by these witnesses, namely, that the American guns were loaded with nothing but *round and grape shot*, while Captain Bingham, in his Letter (page 212 of this Volume) says, that *bills of old iron* were fired at him.—I do not wish to dwell upon this subject, and am quite willing to attribute Captain Bingham's statement to error; but, I must believe the oaths of twenty men in preference to the assertion of one man, however respectable he may be in point of character, and however anxiously I may wish that his assertion were correct.—By a contrary decision what should I do? Why, I should pronounce all the world to be liars, our own nation excepted; I should put all the rest of the world out of the pale of credence; I should assume, what would be intolerable even to think of, that, from the moment any nation came to have a dispute with England, that nation ought to be considered as totally unworthy of belief in any case whatever. In private life, who is so unbearable as the man *who is al-*

ways in the right? The pest is not more to be shunned than such a man. And, will not the same rule apply to nations? A war with such a nation must necessarily be a war of extermination; for, who is to make peace with those, who lay it down as a maxim, that those who are opposed to them are *never to be believed*?—The Times has applied to the officers on board the President, the remarks as to the little credit generally due to *American merchant Captains*. But, how wide is the difference? These Captains have been, for twenty years, carrying on a profitable commerce under forged papers and false manifestoes? To the disgrace of nations the revenue laws have given rise to a species of false swearing, which, from being so common, scarcely any man looks upon as perjury; and, it is well known, that a *white lie* and a *Custom-house oath* have long been terms almost synonymous. Is there any comparison between oaths thus taken and the oaths taken upon the occasion of which we are speaking? If these masters and lieutenants and midshipmen and petty officers swore falsely, it must be well known to the rest of the crew; and, will the reader believe, that any twenty men in the world, except they were taken from on board the Hulks, would, under such circumstances, be guilty of the crime of false-swearing; that they would, and without any interested object to answer, voluntarily thus expose themselves to be held in abhorrence by their comrades and their country? I think not; I think that no man of sense and of common candour will believe, or affect to believe this; and, therefore, I must conclude, that it is now a settled point, that the Little Belt *did fire the first shot*.—If this be so, then, what will those persons *now* say, who before so loudly cried out for *satisfaction*? The satisfaction now makes an item on the other side of the account. Let us hope, however, that, as satisfaction was really taken upon the spot, the matter will now rest, and be forgotten as soon as possible; and, very soon it would be forgotten, were there not such swarms of venal writers to fan the embers of ill-will, and by every species of contumely to work into enemies those who would fain be our friends.—In the same article where the Courier speaks of the American witnesses as unworthy of belief, he takes occasion to complain of the virulence against this country displayed by the American writers. "The American Editors are more than usually *coarse*

"and violent against this country, and particularly against our revered and afflicted Monarch, upon whose venerable head all possible scurrilities are accumulated."

—If this be true, it is, as far as relates to the King, very unmanly, and I am sure it is confined to a small portion of the public prints in America, where the great majority of the people are of too reflecting a turn to be pleased with any such like matter. But, unmanly as it is, it does not surpass what we have seen in the Morning Post and the Courier, the former of whom has distinctly asserted, that Buonaparté and his ministers boasted of being addicted to the horrid crimes of the *Vere Street gang*; and both prints have been, and are, in the constant habit of calling the empress of France the *mistress* of Buonaparté, and his son a *bastard*. This is full as unmanly as any thing that can have been said by the American editors respecting the King; and, though one bad act does not justify another, it does not become those, who are themselves guilty of such acts, to stand foremost as the accusers of others who are guilty in the same way.

—But, have the Americans had no provocation? Not to be scurrilous on the King, especially in his present unhappy state, I allow; but, have not the venal prints in England been guilty of scurrilities against their President? Is there a term of reproach which they have not conferred upon him? Is there an expression conveying contempt which they have not used as applicable to him? Have they not even broadly asserted, that he has betrayed his country to France? And, have they not appealed for the proof to the publications of Mr. Smith, who has notoriously been guilty of the most shameful breach of confidence, and who is an object of scorn with every upright man that has heard his name mentioned? And, is it after all this that they complain, that they find the face to complain, of the *coarseness and violence* of the American writers against this country? What, then, our venal writers are to abuse and insult whomsoever they please; they are to calumniate and vilify every one who acts in opposition to their views; and, if any one attempts to retaliate, he is to be accused of *coarseness and violence*. This is the way they deal with their domestic opponents: they do that with impunity; but, it is not so with regard to foreign nations, who, in one way or another, never fail to make England suffer for these outrages of its venal press.

—In the articles, upon which I have been observing, mention is made of a design on the part of the American Government to *lay an Embargo*, at which measure our writers affect to laugh. They say that America has tried it *before*, and was glad to abandon it.—They do not advert to the change that has since taken place in the situation of America; they do not perceive, that, since the year 1807, America has reared manufactories nearly equal to the supply of her own wants. LORD SHEFFIELD, at the last Lewes Wool Fair, fell into the same mistake. He there told his hearers, that America must deal with us for cloth; that she could obtain it in no other country; that, if she excluded our woollens for a year or two, she must make up for it by larger importations afterwards. How deceived he was! How little did he know of what had taken place in America during the last four years! How little did he know of the immense quantity of woollens, since that time, fabricated in the American States! The present non-importation law will tend to increase the manufacturing establishments in America; manufacturers will follow the manufactories; and capital will follow too, where capital is wanted. Of the raw material America will have a superabundance, and manufacturers are soon taught.

—The following paragraph, from the TIMES, three days ago, will afford a specimen of what is, and long has been, going on: "Yesterday se'nnight, a discovery was made at Liverpool, which is of considerable importance to our manufactories. In consequence of private information received by Mr. Miller, Superintendent of the Police, at Liverpool, that a man of the name of Hugh Wagstaff had arrived in Liverpool from Manchester, for the purpose of conveying implements used in manufactures to America, Mr. Miller found Wagstaff out, and watched his movements. He observed him go several times on board the American ship called the Mount Vernon, bound to New York. The information Mr. Miller had received stated, that the implements were in boxes; and yesterday se'nnight, he observed Wagstaff assisting in loading a cart with boxes, and then watched them to the water-side, and continued his observations till he saw some of the boxes put on board the Mount Vernon; the offence not being complete till the boxes were put on board. Mr. Miller then took Wagstaff into custody, and seized

"twenty-three boxes. On opening them, "they proved to contain *spindles, which are "used in the spinning of cotton.* The prisoner was taken before James Drinkwater, Esq. the Mayor, and has been committed "to Lancaster Castle, for trial at the ensuing Assizes, under the Act of 21 Geo. III. "chap. 37." Does the reader believe, that these spindles would have been purchased if there had not been hands in America to use them? The non-importation Act of America would have prevented the landing of the spindles; but, the shipper knew, doubtless, before-hand, that he could ship them without risk, and that a relaxation of the law would be obtained in his favour.—Well: the spindles will not go in this instance; but, is it to be believed, that prevention will take place in all cases? And, if that were possible, what then? Why then the *Spindle-makers would go* to the place where spindles are wanted to be made.—No: there is no longer any *dependence* on the part of America upon England for manufactures any more than there is a political dependence. The connection might have existed for some years yet to come, had it not been cut asunder by our disputes; but, it is clearly the wish of the American government, and not less clearly the interest of their country that the connexion should cease: or, at least, that it should not be so close as it was.—And, as to *exports from America*, who would suffer from a stop being put to them by an Embargo? Our revenue; our navy; our courts of admiralty; our half ruined West-India planters; and, which is not to be forgotten, our armies in Spain and Portugal and the miserable people of those countries. The provisions consumed at Cadiz, at Lisbon, at Oporto, at Corunna, for the last four years, have, in great part, gone from the United States, who have sent hither all sorts of salt meat, flour, Indian-corn, wheat, oats, and even *potatoes and hay!* A curious fact, and one quite decisive as to the state of Portugal, is, that hay has been carried from New-England to Lisbon, and has produced a good profit! As to oats, I have been credibly informed, that, in one instance, a cargo from Rhode Island brought the owner *thirty-times* the original cost, besides paying freight and insurance.—That many persons in America would also suffer from an Embargo, there can be no doubt. It would ruin many merchants and ship-owners; it would injure the owners of wharfs and houses in the sea-ports; but, this is the

only way of effectually checking the growth of those sea-ports, and to do that is, I believe, an object of policy with the American government, an object, too, the accomplishment of which, in my opinion, the freedom and happiness of their country calls for at their hands.—We should hear very dismal stories about wheat and flour and beef and pork and butter and fish being a *drug*. If they were a drug one year, they would not be so the next year. Less of them would be raised. Fewer hands would be employed in raising them, and more in making implements, furniture, and wearing apparel. Instead of employing a part of the population to raise food to send to England to feed manufacturers who make goods for American use, the Americans would employ that same part of their population in making the goods at home. And would not this be better? Would not this make her more independent than she was before? Here, therefore, we see the grounds of the policy of the American government; and, to me, very sufficient grounds they appear.—It is clear, then, that every thing which tends to weaken the connexion with England must be desired by the American government, upon the ground of national policy; and, besides, it is to be observed, that the party who are opposed to the men at present in power are, in fact, an *English* party; so that to all the other motives for cutting up the connection with England, there is that of crippling for ever this party, which, while it is in open hostility to the government party, is suspected, and with but too much reason, to be, in heart, not less hostile to the freedom of the American People.—Yet, surely, all this may take place in America without giving offence to us? The Americans have a right to do what they please in their own country. "Their ships will rot." Well, let them rot: that is nothing to us. They will not then excite our envy. But if we will not suffer them either to navigate the sea or to rot at home in quiet, we may, at last, smart for our conduct. The Americans have no navy worth speaking of, nor have they, perhaps, the pecuniary means of making a great navy; but *Napoleon has*; all he wants is *seamen*, and America possesses a good hundred thousand of the best in the whole world. It would be a lamentable thing to see the ships of France manned and commanded by Americans; but, it is far from impossible; for, if we will not suffer the

Americans to navigate the sea, those of them who live by the sea will, assuredly go to man the ships of France. Wisdom, in case of a war with us, would dictate to the Americans to swell out their army and navy as little as possible; but, it would, at the same time, dictate to them to do all in their power towards completing and augmenting the fleets of France; and, in this way, they might and would become most formidable enemies to us. With their assistance Napoleon would not be long in sending his fleets to sea. The moment a war was declared against America, American officers and seamen would flock to the French navy, where they would be received with open arms, and would meet with all sorts of favours, Emolument, honours, distinction, revenge; all would unite to push them into the French service, and would urge them to deeds of valour when there. When, therefore, our venal writers are cutting their jokes upon the warlike means of America, they, as usual, forget that there are two lights in which the matter may be viewed. The state of America is changed. Her own resources have now rendered her independent of England. She wants to live in peace; but, if you force her into war; if you will make it a question of who can do the other the most mischief, the mischief you can do her is neither great nor lasting, while that which she can do you may be mortal. —Under these circumstances, the vapouring of the TIMES and the COURIER might as well be spared. Their abuse of the American President can do no good. If, with a curse, they could, as I make no doubt they would, take away his power and enslave his country, then there might be some sense in what they are doing. But, they cannot take a particle from his power or his character; and the people of America will continue to be an eye-sore to tyranny, in spite of all the execrations poured out on them by the venal press of England.

SPAIN.—*French Account of the late operations.*—The French papers have brought us an official report of the Duke of Ragusa of the late affair with our army near Rodrigo. —This account does not, as to the event of the partial actions that took place, differ materially from our own official account. Both agree, that our army had blockaded Rodrigo, and that, upon the approach of the French, the blockade was raised. —The French give

an account more in their own favour than we do; but, it does not materially differ as far as relates to what took place. The great difference is, as to the *views* of the opposite armies, and the *consequences* expected to result from these operations.

—Our Commander's account says, that he found himself unable to meet the French, and that, therefore, he retired, having by his blockade of Rodrigo, compelled the French to draw a large army to that spot, by which means he made a diversion very favourable to the Spaniards. The Duke of Ragusa says, on the contrary, that the Spaniards complain of us for having left them exposed. This may not be true; but, one thing is, I think, clear from these dispatches, and that is, that the French might have pursued us further if they had been so inclined. —This was, indeed, clear enough before; for, if we could not face them in a fortified camp, how were we to face them when compelled by them to quit that camp? Our Commander speaks as plain as man can speak, upon this occasion. He says, he could not pretend to meet the French with their superior force. Indeed, it was absolutely necessary for him to say this; for, what else could account for his retiring from a spot, which he had taken such pains to strengthen? If he had not explicitly stated his inability to meet the enemy upon this occasion, what would have been said of him here; and especially after all the flourishing accounts that our newspapers had given us of his wonderful army and of the immense magazines that had been conveyed to it from Oporto. —The French Commander had, on his part, too, something to explain. He had to account for *not having pursued our army further*. He had forced us out of an entrenched camp; he had made us retreat a good distance; he had relieved Rodrigo before our eyes; and, as all this proved his great superiority of numbers, why did he not pursue us? Why did he not push us back again to the lines of Torres Vedras? —His reasons are as follows, and they are interesting in the extreme. He says to the Minister of war: "About the beginning of September, I learned that seven divisions of the English army were all assembled on the Coa; that they blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo; that they were collecting fascines and gabions at Fuente Guinaldo; that the works of their entrenched camp at Fuente Guinaldo were already advanced, and that even the besieging equipage had

"arrived there from Oporto. I then proposed to General Dorsenne, to join him with a part of my army, in order to raise the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, to supply it with provisions for a long time, to take the entrenched camp of the enemy, his magazines, and park of besieging artillery, and, in short, to give him battle, and pursue him as far as was compatible with the general plan of operations which your Highness communicated to me in your last letter in cypher; a plan which embraces all these regions. I have now the satisfaction of announcing to your Highness, that our arms have been completely successful." And, at the close of his dispatch, he says:—"We should have followed the enemy to the lines of Lisbon, where we should have been able to form a junction with the army of the South, which, completely entire, has in its front only the division of General Hill, had the moment been come which is fixed for the catastrophe of the English."—From these passages, it appears clear to me, that the intention of the French is not to put a speedy end to the war in Portugal. This was my decided opinion before, because it appeared to me, for the reasons, which I have several times stated, that it was the best line of policy that the French could pursue, to keep Portugal as a drain upon England, and to nail all our efforts to that one spot. But, now we have what seems to amount to clear proof that this is the policy upon which they are acting.—The proof does not consist in Ragusa's saying so; but in his actions, which say so much plainer than his words; for, here we hear him stating to the Minister of war: "I marched against the English; I drove them out of their entrenched camp; I threw part of them into great confusion." And, why, then, his master would have said, did you not pursue an army which you had thus fleeing before you? He would have answered that question with his head, if he had not had orders to act upon a plan which forbade such pursuit; and, it was as necessary to him to state, in his dispatch, that he did act upon such a plan, as it was necessary to our Commander to state, that want of force disabled him to meet the French and compelled him to retreat.—Our venal prints affect to laugh at these parts of Ragusa's dispatch, and treat them as empty excuses for not having been able to do more than he did. But, is Napoleon to be amused with empty excuses? Was it to him that a man would

have talked of these plans of procrastination, if such plans had had no existence? No: and the reader must be convinced, that if Ragusa had not had instructions thus to act, he would have resorted to other representations as a justification for his not pursuing further an army that he says he had driven out of its entrenched camp.—The point, therefore, appears to me settled, that it is the wish of the French to protract the war with us in Portugal. This war has been, by some persons, said to cost us 100,000*l.* a day. Round numbers are generally to be distrusted. This would amount to 36,000,000*l.* a year, which is so far beyond the bounds of credibility, that no man of common sense can believe it, the sum being almost twice as much as the cost of the whole army in all parts of the world. But, that the war is very costly no one can doubt; that it swallows a vast deal of the resources of the nation; and that it is weakening her exceedingly and precipitating the fate of her finances.—One answer to this is, that, if the army were not in Portugal, it would be somewhere else abroad. I think it had better be no where else abroad; but, if it *must* be, then it is a question with the French, whether Portugal is not the precise place where it is likely to do her the least harm. She, in this case, will say: 'England has an army and she will send it somewhere or the other to annoy me. Now, which is the place where she will do me the least mischief with that army.' And, though I do not see where else we could do Napoleon more mischief with this army, neither do I see where we could do him less. If the army were driven out of Portugal, it might go round and give him annoyance in some parts of Spain. It might, at last, be put *afloat*, for menacing or attacking the empire of Napoleon in various places, and thereby giving him great annoyance. If, however, he were able wholly to destroy or capture our army in Portugal, then it might possibly, though I do not say it would, be his interest to do that without delay; but, if that is not in his power; if a pursuit of it could only end in sending it back to its lines at Lisbon, he is to consider, whether it be better for him to keep it employed in Portugal or to set it loose to be employed else where. And, next, if, upon the whole, he finds it good policy to leave it in Portugal, he has to consider, whether it be best to shut it up in the lines of Lisbon, or to keep it employed at a distance thence.

The latter is certainly the wise plan, as long as its presence and operations do not materially affect his proceedings against the Spaniards; for, within the lines of Torres Vedras our army would be far less expensive to us; there would be a much less waste of life; our provisions and magazines would all be upon the spot, instead of being, as they now must be, carried to such a great distance and at an expence so enormous. The further, therefore, he can keep our army from its lines and its shipping, the better for him and the worse for us, so long as he is, at all times, able to keep it at what distance he pleases, which, at present, appears to be the case. To hem it up within those lines would be bad policy, not only because it would be maintained cheaper there; but, because his army, which would then be in an exhausted and desolated country, could scarcely be supported at all, and, if at all, with the utmost difficulty. So that, as it appears to me, not only is it his interest to make no attempt, at present, to drive the English army out of Portugal, but that it is also his interest, not to force it within its lines; but, to let it remain at as great a distance as possible from those lines all the winter.—Napoleon, while he occupies the whole of the forces, that we can spare, in Portugal, finds himself uncontrolled master in the North of Europe, which he is settling to his mind, and which he might not be able so easily to do, if we were not so wholly engaged in the South. He finds, with a *tenth* part of his army, full employment for all that we are able to send out; because, if we were able to send out a greater force, there would be no earthly excuse for the ministers.—What, then, is, *in the end*, to be expected? I put this question to the readers' serious consideration; for, it is the *end* that we are to look to, and not to partial affairs during the contest. The end of such a war is but too easily foreseen, though, perhaps, few persons, comparatively, see it in all its bearings. But, of this every man must be certain; that, if we are, *at last*, compelled to give up the contest in the Peninsula, *the longer we support it the more fatal will be the consequences*. If the American war had been given up at the end of *one* year, would it not have been much better than it was to give it up at the end of *six*? It is the *end* that tells who is the victor: all the intermediate exploits are forgotten: if they live in the page of history, they produce no

effect upon the nation that is living; and, when a people find their cause fail at the end of a long and sanguinary and arduous contest, their discouragement never fails to be great and lasting.—The withdrawing of the army from Portugal now would, doubtless, have the effect of discouraging the nation; but that effect would not be nearly so great as that of a compulsory evacuation at a year or two or three from this time, if we could suppose it possible for us to continue the war there for so long a duration. We should then have no hope but merely that of defending ourselves; and, in the meanwhile the *fleets* of Napoleon would have become formidable, notwithstanding all the silly jeering that they now call forth from the wise men who conduct most of our journals. We shall *then* begin to think of *peace*; and, what sort of a peace are we then to obtain? What sort of a close shall we then see to a war that arose out of a dispute *for the possession of the Island of Malta*? How many crowns has that war already laid low! How large a portion of Europe has it put into the hands of our enemy! Day by day it proceeds in consolidating his fearful power; and yet are there men who hope, or profess to hope, to see it end in the diminution of that power!—What are we to do then? This is a question to which no thinking man will give a hasty answer; but, if we are convinced, as I am, that the contest in the Peninsula only tends to weaken us, without finally discomfiting the enemy, it is certain, that the sooner we cease that contest the better it must be for us.—If, indeed, we had the power to send out an army in force equal to any army that Napoleon could send, the aspect of the thing would be wholly different; but, this we are not able to do; our General now tells us, at the end of three years, that, with all the aid he derives from the native troops and the universal good disposition of the people, he is not in a state to face that *part* of the French army that is brought against him, though they are assembled from a distance, and though they find him in a situation perfectly prepared. What can we want more to convince us? What can we want more to show us, that the struggle is beyond our strength?—As to the *people* of the Peninsula, whatever may be said to the contrary, they make but small exertions compared with the object. They are like all other people who see two foreign armies contending on their soil:

that is to say, they are, as far, at least, as efficient action goes, always *for the strongest*. You see no convulsive movement there as you saw in France in 1792; you do not see the towns and villages pouring forth their young men ready to perish or triumph in their country's defence. Object not, that the Spaniards and Portuguese have to fight against disciplined armies; for so had the volunteers and the national guards who fought under Kleber and Dumourier; so had the same men, veritable sans-culottes, when they won the immortal victories under Jourdain and Pichegru. There was no want of either skill or courage in their opponents; generals rocked in the cradle of war and soldiers inured to all its hardships were opposed to them; thousands upon thousands and tens of thousands fell, and often France saw reverses; but the spirit of the *people* of France supplied all deficiencies, surmounted all difficulties, triumphed over all misfortunes and miseries. Those who saw, as I did, the youth of France rushing forth to meet the army of the Duke of Brunswick; those who saw the sons of opulent farmers and tradesmen, promiscuously mixed with ploughmen, journeymen, apprentices, and school-boys, urged forward by their fathers and mothers and sisters to combat the invaders of France; those and those only can have an adequate idea of what the spirit of a *people* is capable of performing. I well remember, and I never shall forget, seeing the volunteers of Abbeville march off for the army of Luckner; but, though the recollection is strong in my memory, a just description of the scene is far beyond the powers of my pen. They poured out of the town like bees out of a hive. There were more women than volunteers. The shouting; the cheering; the waving of handkerchiefs; the strewing of boughs and flowers; the varied marks of encouragement! It was impossible not to say to oneself: "This people can never be subdued."

—If I could see any signs of a spirit like this in the Spaniards and Portuguese, I should say the same of them; but, alas! I see no such sign; and, therefore, I can see no reason to hope, that they will not finally succumb to the numerous and valiant and skilfully-commanded armies of France. We are prone to think well of those, be they who or what they may, who are opposed to our enemies; but, it is but a poor mark of patriotism to become the dopes of our own wishes.—I have

now given my reasons, as amply as I think it necessary, for a speedy abandonment of the contest in the Peninsula, as far, at least, as it is, on our part, a *land war*. In my opinions I am quite sincere, though I may be in error. I shall be glad to hear and even to give publicity to any arguments that can be offered on the other side; but, if, in answer to me, nothing but senseless abuse be offered, I shall retain my opinions until I am contradicted by events.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 1st Nov. 1811.*

THE BANK MEETING.

September 19, 1811.

(Concluded from p. 544.)

If he had a guinea and were to purchase bullion with it in the market, he might afterwards buy Bank of England paper, and by this circuitous means procure the loaf of bread for 13½d. This was a sufficient illustration of the fact of depreciation, and the interests of the Proprietors of Bank Stock were injured no less than the interests of the public. Mr. Clifford stated that the dollar token was now sold at 6s. 1d. and declared his conviction that the Bank note, which was now worth only 15s. would soon be worth less, and that the present condition of the affairs of the Bank bore a strong resemblance to the South Sea Scheme, and if the Directors continued to act on their present wild and absurd principles, the bubble must at length burst in the same way. (*Considerable disapprobation and hisses.*) Mr. Clifford said if they doubted it, he would give them a stanza of a ballad written in the year 1721, about the South Sea scheme, than which nothing could be more appropriate to our present situation:—

Five hundred millions notes and bonds
Our stocks are worth in value,
But neither lie in goods or lands,
Nor money let me tell ye:
Yet, though our foreign trade is lost,
Of mighty wealth we vapour,
When all the riches that we boast
Are flimsy scraps of paper.

On putting the question the motion was *not seconded*, and was consequently lost.

MR. PEARSE, the Governor, did not mean to enter into any refutation of the principles advanced by the Gentleman who brought forward the motion, as he was convinced the *general opinion of Bank Proprietors* was such as to render any such

refutation altogether unnecessary; neither would he attempt to follow him through his various calculations, of which many, if not all, were evidently founded on erroneous data. With respect to what that Gentleman had said respecting Bank Dollars being worth 6s. 1d. he could assure him that the value of one of these dollars was not more than 5s. 2d. He could only answer the charge which had been brought against the Bank Directors, for neglecting to lay before the meeting of proprietors such a statement as would enable them to see the different sources of the profits derived by the Bank, by saying, that hitherto the Proprietors had always *reposed such confidence in the Directors*, as to entrust them with the duty of deciding what sum the Bank could with safety divide from their profits (*applauses*); and it had not been thought proper to deviate from the uniform practice on this occasion.—Mr. CLIFFORD observed, that he had not stated the intrinsic value of the Bank Dollar at 6s. 1d. but its value in Bank Paper, and the admission of the Governor proved his argument.—Mr. PEARSE then moved, that it was the unanimous sense of the Meeting that the usual Dividends should be made at this time.—The DUKE OF NORFOLK wished to trespass for a few moments on the attention of the Meeting before the Resolution should be agreed to. He had lately been through various parts of the country, and every where, but particularly in those parts of England bordering on Scotland, he found the people complaining of the great distress to which they were put for the want of small change. He wished to know, therefore, whether it was the intention of the Bank Directors to put into circulation such an additional quantity of tokens as might be fully adequate to the wants of the people.—Mr. PEARSE said, he was happy to have it in his power to inform the Noble Duke, that the Bank had a considerable quantity of silver in their possession, which they destined for coining, and that no less a sum than 500,000*l.* had already been put into circulation—considerable sums had been sent to the different large towns throughout the country, in proportion to their reputed populations; and very large sums also had been distributed among the different London Bankers, so much as 500*l.* weekly. They intended in this way to continue coining till the wants of the country were completely supplied; but it was to be recollected, that the process of coining was

such as to require a considerable time before this could be effected.—Mr. CLIFFORD asked, whether, when they issued the additional tokens, the Directors meant to diminish the number of notes, if not the issue of tokens would increase the scarcity of change?—Mr. PEARSE answered, that it was impossible to give an answer to that question.—The DUKE OF NORFOLK expressed his satisfaction for the communication made by Mr. Pearse, and wished to know what mode of conveyance was proposed for distributing this money throughout the country? He had been lately at a considerable town nearly a hundred miles distant, when he was informed the expence of conveyance amounted to 3 per cent.—Mr. MAC AULAY said, he believed he could give the Noble Duke some information on this subject. He had been at Manchester lately, where 6000*l.* had been received in change, which was deposited in the Town Hall, and given out to the inhabitants as it was wanted; and the expence of conveyance, including freight, insurance, and every other outlay, amounted only to 25s. on the 100*l.*—The Resolution was then put and carried *nemine contradicente*, after which the meeting adjourned.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES. (*From American Prints.*)
Abstract of the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, relative to the Affair between the Little Belt and the President. Held at New York, Sept. 1811.

The Court of Enquiry on the conduct of Commodore RODGERS, in the action between the President and Little Belt, has now closed the testimony in the case.

This Court consists of—Commodore STEPHEN DECATUR, President, Captain CHARLES STEWART, Captain ISAAC CHAUNCEY—and WILLIAM PAULDING, Jun. Esq. Judge Advocate.

Of the evidence furnished to this Court, on the oaths of the several witnesses examined, we present a brief outline, in the order it was adduced; and leave the public, in a case where doubt is impossible, and conviction irresistible, to make its own comments. Whenever the proper leave is obtained, the proceedings, in their official shape and extent, shall be given to our readers.—The first witness examined was—

Charles Ludlow, Master Commandant and acting Captain of the President.—He was on board the ship at the time of the

action with the Little Belt, on the night of the 16th of May last. The Little Belt had her top-sails aback. From his position he was uncertain which fired the first gun; but the second was from the President, and was instantly followed by three cannon and musketry from the Belt. Commodore Rodgers ordered to fire low, and with two round shot. After a short pause the Belt recommenced firing, as did the President. The Belt soon appeared ungovernable, and lay bow on towards the President, when Commodore R. observed that some accident must have happened to her, and ceased firing. Her gaff was down, and her main-top-sail-yard on the cap; and mizen, too, he thinks. The action continued fourteen or fifteen minutes, including the interval. There was nothing but round and grape-shot fired, or on deck, on board the President. The ship was not on fire, or any part of her, and did not sheer off after the action. Another broadside would probably have sunk the Little Belt. Did not know or believe any part of the Commodore's official account was untrue or incorrect.

John Orde Creighton, First Lieutenant.—Was stationed at the 4th division of guns, on the upper deck. Commodore Rodgers hailed first, then a second time, when a shot was fired, as he believes, from the Little Belt, no gun having been fired or provocation given on board the President. The orders of Commodore R. were to keep the guns at half cock, and guard against accidents. After receiving the Little Belt's broadside, was ordered to fire. The Belt was silenced in five minutes, and the President ceased. The Belt renewed the fire, and Commodore R. returned it, and silenced the Belt again in five minutes. Boarded the Little Belt the next morning; Commodore Rodgers sent a friendly message, expressing regret for the occurrence, and offers of assistance. Captain Bingham said he took the President for a Frenchman. President was not on fire, and did not sheer off. Nothing but round and grape was fired or on deck. Another broadside would probably have sunk the Belt. Commodore's account confirmed.

Henry Caldwell, Commandant of Marines.—Heard the hailing; was looking at the Little Belt and saw the first shot proceed from her: on which Commodore Rodgers said, "*What is that?*" and he answered, "*She has fired into us.*" Orders were then given to fire. Belt silenced in five minutes. Commodore R. was anxious to stop his fire, and did so. The Belt renewed

the action, and in six or seven minutes was silenced again, when Commodore R. was anxious to prevent mischief, and stooped his fire. No fire or sheering off. Commodore's account confirmed.

Raymond H. Y. Perry, junior Lieutenant and signal officer.—Was on the quarter deck, near Commodore Rodgers's elbow. The Commodore hailed; got no reply—hailed a second time, and got none. Heard a gun, and was looking at the Belt, which fired it, previous to any gun or provocation from the President. The Belt was silenced in five minutes, and orders were sent to every division of guns on board the President to cease. The Belt renewed the fire, and the President also. In six minutes the Belt was silenced again, and the Commodore was very anxious to stop the firing on board the President. No fire or sheering off. The Belt was in a very dangerous situation, and would, probably, have been sunk by another broadside. Heard hailing from the Belt, and understood they said their colours were down; and so reported. Commodore Rodgers hailed, "Have you struck your colours?" and was answered, "I have, and am in great distress." Lights were on board the President during the night. Commodore Rodgers's statement confirmed.

Andrew L. B. Madison, Lieutenant of Marines.—Was on the gangway. Heard the Commodore hail first, then wait fifteen or eighteen seconds, time enough for a reply, but got none, and hailed again; when the Belt fired a gun from her gangway. Saw the flash, and heard the report; no gun or provocation had been offered by Commodore Rodgers. In six seconds a gun was fired from the President, when instantly the Belt fired three guns, and then her broadside and musketry. Belt silenced in six or seven minutes. Firing stopped in the President. In two or three minutes Belt renewed the action, and in four or five minutes was again silenced: when Commodore Rodgers ordered his fire to cease, and appeared anxious to prevent damage. No firing or sheering off of the President. Commodore's report confirmed.

Captain Caldwell confirmed the account of the first and second guns and broadside, as given by the other witnesses.

Jacob Mull, sailing-master.—Was on the quarter deck. Commodore Rodgers hailed, and got no answer, but "*halloo.*" After sufficient time hailed again, and got no reply, but a shot, without provocation. In three or four seconds returned the shot,

and got a general fire from the Little Belt. Thought the Belt a heavy frigate until next day. Action continued fourteen or fifteen minutes, including three or four minutes' interval. Little Belt could have fired again, but President could have sunk her. Commodore's official account is true.

Lieutenant Creighton thought the Little Belt a frigate (excepting her feeble defence) until next day. Captain Bingham told him the President's colours were not hoisted, but he recollected the pendant. It is the usage as before stated by another witness, for the President to be prepared for action on coming along-side an armed vessel. Thought the Little Belt displayed bad management or want of conduct in her defence.

Joseph Smith, midshipman, acting as master's mate.—Commanded the 4th division of guns. Heard Commodore R. hail, and no reply for five seconds. Heard second hail, and was looking at the Little Belt when the first gun was fired by her, before a shot or any provocation was given from the President. The Commodore fired one gun, then the Little Belt three, and action continued. Thought the Little Belt a frigate. The duration of the action, and orders to cease, as before stated. The last order to stop firing was received by three different officers. Commodore R.'s statement confirmed.

Henry Dennison, acting chaplain.—Was on the quarter-deck. Little Belt was 70 or 80 yards distant. Heard Commodore R. hail, and the reply, and the second hail—then a gun, he thinks from the Belt, as he felt no jar in the President, and no gun or provocation had been given by Commodore R.—Account of Commodore R. confirmed.

Michael Roberts, boatswain.—Was on the fore-castle, saw the flash and heard the gun from the Little Belt, before any shot or provocation had been given from the President. Had not seen the Commodore's account.

Richard Carson, midshipman.—Was on the fore-castle and gangways. Commodore R. hailed, and was answered by repeating his words; second hail was answered by a shot. Was looking at the Belt and saw and heard the gun, before any provocation from Commodore Rodgers. Gun from the President was followed by the Belt's broadside, as stated by others. Commodore's account confirmed.

Matthew C. Perry, *Silas Duncan*, and *John*

McClack; midshipmen, gave their evidence to the same effect.

Thomas Gamble, second Lieutenant.—Commanded the first division of guns. Commodore Rodgers hailed, "*Ship a hoy!*" Was answered "*halloo!*" Asked "*What ship is that?*" Received his own words repeated in reply. Hailed again, "*What ship is that?*" Then a gun from the Belt. Heard no gun or provocation from the President—swears no gun was fired from his division. Nothing but round and grape fired after the action commenced. Commodore's orders as before stated; when firing ceased finally. Belt was in a favourable position for firing, but another broadside from the President probably would have sunk her. Saw no colours on the Belt, and took her for a frigate of 36 or 38 guns. No firing on board or sheering off by the President. Statement of Commodore Rodgers confirmed.

John Neese, Captain of the first gun.—In the first division on the gun deck, was looking at the Little Belt, and saw and heard her first fire.

All the other Captains of the guns testified exactly the same as Neese.

Lieutenant Creighton testified farther, that when the Belt was silenced the second time she luffed up towards the Commodore, instead of keeping away, as she should have done to fire at the President, and would have done if her rudder had been free. Commodore R. expressed much humanity and anxiety to stop the firing. Lieutenant C. also testified to the offers of assistance from Commodore Rodgers to the Little Belt the next morning.

Here the examination closed, having as we understand, embraced every deck officer, as well as captains of guns, now on board the President, who were present during the action. The hours when the chase and action took place, with the courses steered, and some technical sea terms, are omitted as unessential to the material objects of the inquiry.

NAVAL COURT MARTIAL.—On Thursday, October 17, a Court-martial was held on board His Majesty's ship *Gladiator*, on Captain ROBERT PRESTON, of His Majesty's ship *Ganymede*, of 22 guns, which was continued by adjournment till the 23d.

MEMBERS OF THE COURT.

Capt. Paterson, President.

Capt. Bissett.
— R. Hall.

Capt. Phillimore.
— Rushworth.

Capt. P. Browne.
Capt. Halliday.
Hon. Capt. Rodney.

Capt. R. Elliot.
— Lumley.
— Sneyd.

M. Greetham, Esq. Judge Advocate.

Upon charges exhibited by the Admiralty of Cruelty, Tyranny, and Oppression, contained in the following letter, which had been forwarded to their Lordships by the Ship's Company of the *Ganymede*:—

" *Portsmouth Harbour, Sept. 23, 1811.*

" For the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the Petition of the *Ganymede* Ship's Company,

" Humbly sheweth,

" That your petitioners, from grievances which they labour under, through the cruel treatment they receive from the Captain and Officers belonging to the said ship, we your petitioners, humbly solicit your Lordships, that you will be pleased to remedy the same, by a change of ship or officers, as your Petitioners wish to be true to their King and Country, and are willing to serve in any ships your Lordships may think proper. Honourable Sirs, in granting this your Petitioners will ever pray. Your Lordships most obedient humble servants at command."

It appeared to the Court, that upon the receipt of the above letter the Lords of the Admiralty directed a Court of Inquiry to be held on board the *Ganymede*, to ascertain the authenticity of the letter. This Court consisted of Admiral HARGOOD, Captains OTWAY and HALLIDAY. Upon turning up the hands, the letter was unanimously declared to have been written with the consent of the whole ship's company; and a seaman (*Mac Gouvie*) delivered another letter to this Court, which was to the same effect.—The Court of Inquiry expressed a wish, that any twelve of the crew would step forward as prosecutors in the charges. This, however, they declined; and in a letter they afterwards wrote to Admiral HARGOOD, signed by nearly all the ship's company, they stated their wish to prosecute in a body.—Upon the above documents and recital appearing before the Court-martial, Admiral HARGOOD, and Captains OTWAY and HALLIDAY were called, and proved their truth.

John MacGouvie, Wm. Lowrie, George Townsend, and 17 other seamen, were examined in support of the allegations contained in the above letter. Their evidence went to prove, that Captain Preston was

more in the habit of adopting the summary punishment of starting* than the witnesses had known to have ever prevailed on board other ships; and to have frequently uttered very intemperate language.

Capt. *Senhouse*, being ordered to proceed to sea, was examined, and deposed, that Captain P. had been his most intimate friend and messmate; that he was possessed of gentlemanly manners, not habituated to blasphemous expressions, nor inclined to cruel, or oppressive, or tyrannical manners.

Sir *Home Popham* sworn.—Capt. P. asked, As, you have commanded several of His Majesty's ships, and been several years in the Navy, I would beg leave to ask, whether you have not found it generally both expedient and salutary to the service, in the exercise of your own discretion, as a summary punishment, to give four dozen lashes, and sometimes more, and to what extent, at the gang-way, for offences contrary to the discipline and subordination of your ship; and whether such punishments have not been essentially necessary for the good of His Majesty's service?—The Court was cleared, and agreed, that as the information required by questions like the above was *irrelevant* to the charges, and contained matters of opinion unnecessary to the Court, for the purpose of forming their judgment, that the above question should not be put to the witness.

The prosecution being closed, Captain P. begged the indulgence of the Court till the next day, to make his defence: when Mr. MINCHIN having been taken ill, Mr. WEDDELL, a Solicitor, read it. Captain P. lamented that the Lords of the Admiralty should have brought him before the present Court, upon charges which were anonymously asserted, and equally directed against his officers as himself. When he assumed the command of the *Ganymede*, he found his crew in a bad state; he had to restore them to that degree of discipline and subordination so essential in ships of war; he had certainly practised a summary mode of punishment (that of starting), but there was no degree of severity mixed with it; and he conceived he was justified in the practice, by

* Starting is ordering a boatswain's mate to take a rope's end, and lay on the party until ordered to stop by the commanding officer.

the custom in all other ships and by the salutary effects it produced in all delinquents: he never punished from caprice, nor from any feeling but that of the good of the service. When men properly conducted themselves, he was their friend and benefactor: in sickness, they often had had his personal attention, were fed from his table, and participated in all the indulgencies the service would admit of.

Lieut. *Sparshott*; Mr. *Telfer*, surgeon; Mr. *Rian*, boatwain; Lieut. *Waring*, R. M. and several other officers were sworn, who deposed, that they knew of no instance in Capt. P.'s conduct which could be designated tyrannical or oppressive.

The Court, after deliberating some considerable time, agreed, "That the charges had not been proved against the said Capt. R. Preston, and did adjudge him to be *acquitted*; but the Court, however, farther agreed, that they could not help feeling it their duty, to express their sense of the *singularity* of punishment, in many instances, on board the *Ganymede*, and to strongly recommend to Captain Preston a future change of conduct *in that respect*."

AUSTRIAN PAPER MONEY.—*The Regency of Lower Austria has published the following Circular.*

1. On the 16th of this month, Redemption-bills of 10 and of 5 florins shall be issued, in order to withdraw from circulation the bank-notes of 50 and of 25 florins.—2. The above two sorts of redemption-bills are severally to pass in exchange for bank-notes of 50 and of 25 florins; but the holders of bank-notes of a lower denomination are permitted to exchange them for redemption-bills of 10 or of 5 florins, provided they present, in one or more sorts, 50 or 25 florins in bank-notes, for 10 or 5 florins in redemption-bills.—3. From the date of the 16th of September, the exchange of bank-notes of 50 and of 25 florins, for bank-notes of a lower denomination, shall cease to take place.—4. From the 15th of October next, bank-notes of 50 and of 25 florins are put out of circulation. From that date, they shall no longer be received at the Treasury, nor in payments to individuals.—5. However, permission is given, till the 31st of December, to carry the above two sorts of bank-notes to the office, created by the patent of the 20th of June last, under the name of Redemption-bill Office, and to exchange them for redemption-bills of 10

and of 5 florins; but this exchange must be entirely terminated on the 31st of December: and after the expiration of this period, the said office shall no longer receive any note of 50 or of 25 florins; because, from the first of January, 1812, these two denominations of bank-notes are, by supreme order, declared null and of no value.

FRANCIS COUNT DE SAURAU, *Governor.*
Vienna, Sept. 3, 1811.

FRANCE.—*Maritime Decree, issued at Hamburg, 17th Sept. 1811.*

In the name of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, &c. the Commission of the Government, established by the Decree of the 18th of December, 1810, considering the Decree of his Majesty, dated 26th of December, 1810, ordering that a maritime administration and navigation police should be established in the Hanseatic departments, conformably to the laws and regulations in existence in France, upon the report of the Counsellors of State, Intendant of the Interior and Finances, decrees as follows:—Art. 1. There shall be taken throughout the Hanseatic departments, a particular account of French citizens who are destined to navigation.—Art. 2. The offices for maritime inscription are provisionally established at Hamburg, for Hamburg and Luneburg; at Travemunde, for the arrondissement of Lubeck; at Stadte, for the arrondissement of Stadte; at Bremerlehe, for the department of the mouths of the Weser; and at Varel, for the department of the Upper Ems.—Art. 3. There are comprehended in the maritime inscription, —1. Sailors of every description, whether navigating armed or merchants' ships.—2. Those who navigate, or are fishermen.—3. Those who sail in barges or boats, upon the coasts or in the roads, rivers, or canals, comprehended in the maritime districts.—Art. 4. There shall be included in the maritime inscription every citizen, aged 18, who has fulfilled one of the following conditions:—1. The having performed two long voyages, or to the Grand Fishery.—2. Having been at sea eighteen months.—3. Having been employed in the coasting fishery two years.—4. Having served two years apprenticeship to the sea.—Art. 5. All foreign sailors residing in the territory of the Empire, who have married French women, and sailed in French merchant ships, are subject to

the maritime inscription.—Art. 6. The already mentioned sailors are bound to present themselves at the office of Maritime Inscription, in the district where they reside, and have their names inscribed.—Art. 7. Carpenters, sail-makers, &c. exercising their professions in the maritime ports and places, shall be called to the military posts in the event of war, preparations for war, or of extraordinary or considerable works. There shall be kept an exact registry in the offices of inscription, and they shall be exempt from all other requisitions than those relative to the maritime service.—Art. 8. Every French citizen comprehended in the maritime inscription is exempt from all other services, than those of the Navy, Marine, Arsenals, and the National Guard, in the arrondissement of their districts.—Art. 9. Every sailor who has attained the full age of 50 years, is, by right, exempt from the requisition for the ships or arsenals of the Empire; without, however, losing the power of continuing the employment of fishing, or even serving in the ships of the State.—Art. 10. There shall be granted to enrolled sailors, pensions, according to their rank, age, wounds or infirmities. These pensions will be fixed according to their services on board the ships and arsenals of the empire, and the merchants' vessels.—Art. 11. The length of service in the three departments, either in the merchants' service, or on board ships of war, shall be computed agreeably to article 205 of the Imperial Decree of the 4th of July, 1811, as if it had taken place on board French ships, and give the same right to half-pay and pensions upon the invalid marine chest.—Art. 12. The widows and children of sailors shall have the same claims to assistance and succours, as those of military men who died in the service.—Art. 13. All Captains, &c. navigating the rivers, or on the coasts of the 32d military division, will, from hence to the 1st of November next, provide themselves with a *role d'équipage*, at the maritime office of inscription.—Art. 14. Every Captain, &c. who, after the 1st of November, sails upon the rivers, coasts, &c. of the 32d military division, and has not conformed to the dispositions of the present decree, shall be punished with eight day's imprisonment, without prejudice to still greater penalties, should there be occasion to inflict them.

Given at the palace at Hamburgh, Sept. 17. (Signed)
The Marshal Prince of ECKMÜHL.

SICILY.—*General Orders, issued at Messina, 3d Sept. 1811.*

Lieutenant General Maitland informs the army, that the Commander of the Forces has already sailed for England; and that his Lordship has undertaken this voyage from the most urgent political motives, which highly interest the honour of Great Britain, and the prosperity of Sicily.—In the absence of the chief of this army, Lieutenant General Maitland finds himself more than ever obliged to be assiduous in cultivating the good-will and opinion of his brother officers; and requests from the soldiers the most solicitous attention to the fulfilment of their duties. He trusts that he will receive throughout the district the experienced assistance of the General Officers, and that the entire army shall be united and ready for every emergency that the vicissitude of events may produce.—The four following persons, namely, Orazio Ballautinio, Antonio Barese, Vincenzo Smirida, and Giovanni Grillo, who have been imprisoned for holding correspondence with the enemy in Calabria, have been set at liberty by order of General Maitland, on his return from Palermo.—These persons have been liberated, not because there wanted sufficient proof against them, but because the General would not condemn to death, immediately after having assumed the command of the British army, four men, who were arrested by his predecessor, whose departure prevented the pending sentence.—He avails himself of this occasion to exercise an act of clemency, which will not be renewed at any other time. He is resolved to use his utmost means to put an end to the system of *espionage*, and of treachery, which has been for so long a time, and in a manner so notoriously practised by persons of evil intentions, and equally enemies of the Sicilian people and the British. He is resolved, in consequence, to watch attentively persons of this description; and is determined from this time forward, to bring before a Council of War, those, whoever they may be, who shall be thus found holding communication with the enemy, and thus placing in danger the British army and this Island; and immediately the sentence of that Council shall be executed. J. CAMPBELL, Adj. Gen.

SPAIN.—THE WAR.—*French Official News from the Armies in Spain.*

ARMY OF THE SOUTH.

On the 20th of August, general Godinot came up with, at Torbiscan, the rear-guard of Montijo, and overthrew it; on the 21st he found a part of the division in position at Velez de Benaudella; he immediately caused it to be attacked; it was routed with the bayonet: a great number were killed, and night alone favoured the escape of a few. Montijo got off with 12 men only.—In the meanwhile Colonel Dulong entered Motril, and pursued the other part of the enemy's division, which had retired to Pinos del Rey; the Adjutant General Remond, detached from Grenada to assist the operations of Godinot, arrived at the same time with one battalion and two squadrons; six companies detached by General Godinot also made their appearance; in an instant the village was penetrated and carried; the enemy, pursued to the summit of the mountain La Cruz, was precipitated from it, with the bayonet, into frightful ravines. The loss of the enemy cannot be calculated; a very few escaped under the cover of night. This division was composed of the regiments of Alpuxares, of Cuenca, of Burgos, of a number of united bands, and 300 horsemen.—The Duke of Dalmatia having ordered Count D'Erlon, commanding the 5th corps in Estramadura, to direct an expedition towards the mouth of the Guadiana, for the purpose of completely clearing that country of the bands of Ballasteros, who has still about 3,000 men left; General Quiot, and the Adjutant Commandant Foreister, were charged with this expedition. Ballasteros, after an action of little importance, made off in all haste, and embarked at Ayamonte for Cadiz. Two hundred Spaniards were sabred in this expedition, and a detachment of 78 cavalry with their horses were taken. The chief of squadron Millet has distinguished himself.—General Cassagne occupies Ronda in force; his moveable columns do not permit any band to gain a moment's footing in the mountains. Every day brigands are arrested, who are delivered up to justice.

DISTRICT OF THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE.

The Duke of Dalmatia seems satisfied with the spirit which prevails in the provinces of Malaga and Granada. He has returned to Seville. The Duke of Belluno pushes his operations before Cadiz.—General Darmagnac has advanced with his division upon Cuenca, to second the op-

erations of Marshal Suchet against Valencia.—Colonel Reizet, of the 13th dragoons, has surprised, with a detachment of his regiment, the band of Chavo. He shot 120 of these banditti and took their horses.—The insurgents of Murcia attribute all their defeats to being abandoned by Lord Wellington: they breathe the most bitter complaints against the English.

ARMY OF PORTUGAL.

Ciudad Rodrigo, Sept. 30, 1811.

Report of the Marshal Duke of Ragusa, Commander in Chief of the Army of Portugal, to his Highness the Prince of Wagram and Neufchatel, Major General.

MONSIEUR,—I had the honour of acquainting your Highness, that after having raised the siege of Badajoz, and driving the English army beyond the Guadiana, it was settled between the Duke of Dalmatia and myself, that I should advance towards the Tagus, leaving one division on the Guadiana; that the army of the South should leave the 5th corps in Estremadura; that the Duke of Dalmatia, with his troops, should march against the Spanish divisions which had quitted the English army, and against the insurgent army of Murcia; and that, while he should destroy them, and clear the provinces of Cordova, Granada, Malaga, and Murcia, I should keep in check the English army. We had taken our measures in case the English General should make a diversion, and again advance upon Badajoz; but the English General, deaf to the Spaniards, abandoned the army of Murcia to its fate, and passing the Tagus, advanced to the Coa. It was then supposed to be his plan, to march to the assistance of the army of Galicia.—As soon as General Dorsenne was informed of this new combination, he marched upon Astorga, beat the Gallicians, dispersed them beyond Villa Franca, and repaired the fortifications of Astorga. We hoped that this movement would induce the English to advance upon Salamanca; but they remained unconcerned at this event, as they had been at the disasters of the Murcian army.—About the beginning of September, I learned that seven divisions of the English army were all assembled on the Coa; that they blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo; that they were collecting fascines and gabions at Fuente Guinaldo; that the works of their entrenched camp at Fuente Guinaldo were already advanced, and that even the besieging equipage had arrived there from Oporto. I then pro-

posed to Gen. Dorsenne, to join him with a part of my army, in order to raise the siege at Ciudad Rodrigo,—to supply it with provisions for a long time,—to take the entrenched camp of the enemy, his magazines, and park of besieging artillery,—and, in short, to give him battle and pursue him as far as was compatible with the general plan of operations which your Highness communicated to me in your last letter in cypher; a plan which embraces all these regions. I have now the satisfaction of announcing to your Highness, that our arms have been completely successful.—I set out with five divisions of my army, and arrived on the 22d, by the pass of Banos, at Tamames, where I formed my junction with the four divisions of General Dorsenne. I admired the good condition of a convoy of 1,500 carriages, laden with provisions, which had been collected and organized with an activity and an order that are extraordinary. The two armies put themselves in motion. We drove in all the enemy's posts, and on the 24th introduced the whole convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo. This fortress is, therefore, supplied with provisions for a long period.—Count Dorsenne gave up to me the troops of the garrison which belonged to my army corps, and replaced them by those of the army of the North.—On the 25th we put ourselves in march. Two leagues from Ciudad Rodrigo we perceived the English rear-guard. General Montbrun, commanding our advanced guard, charged the enemy with that rapidity and boldness which he has so frequently displayed; and took from them four pieces of cannon. We made ourselves masters of the ridge, and maintained ourselves there in spite of all the efforts of the English, who were obliged to commence a retreat. General Montbrun pursued them for two hours; his fire was so lively, that he expended all his ammunition. The loss of the enemy was considerable; he never stopped till he reached the camp of Fuente Guinaldo; but our advanced guard alone was there: our divisions of infantry were a march in our rear. Had not this been the case, the English army was lost: we had the mortification of seeing its divisions precipitate themselves in all directions towards their entrenched camp. If I had then only 15,000 men at hand, the English army would have been caught in a flagrant

fault, and beaten in detail, without being able to reunite. The division of the English General Cole was still at Pajo; while the light division of General Crawford was at Martiago; but our infantry only arrived during the night; and at day-break we perceived the entrenched camp entirely lined with enemy's troops. General Dorsenne and myself made the necessary dispositions for attacking, on the 27th in the morning: but the English General did not think proper to await us; he abandoned his camp during the night, retiring from Alfayates and Sabugal. We entered into Fuente Guinaldo next day, and caused to be conveyed to Ciudad Rodrigo a great quantity of fascines, and other materials collected for the siege. I caused the enemy's lines to be destroyed; his retreat was conducted in three columns. General Montbrun went in pursuit of him by the route of Casillas de Flores. General Watier, with the cavalry of the army of the north, took the direction of Albergeria; he came up with the rear-guard of the enemy at Aldea del-Ponte, and immediately charged them. The division Sonham having arrived, the action was glorious for the arms of his Majesty, and the enemy was driven back with great loss and confusion. The rear-guard continued to retreat upon Sabugal. We have taken the baggage of the Prince of Orange and of General Crawford. The confusion was so great in the English army, that an Aide-de-Camp of Lord Wellington, while endeavouring to rejoin that General, threw himself into our ranks. We have made two hundred prisoners. The army of Portugal has had one hundred and twenty men made unfit for service; the enemy's loss amounted to between seven and eight hundred men. Assure his Majesty that the Spanish insurgents have felt the greatest indignation on seeing themselves thus abandoned in the North, as in the South; and this contrast between the conduct of the English and the promises which they have incessantly broken, nourishes a national hatred which will break out sooner or later.—I must mention with praise Generals Montbrun and Boyer, Capt. Hubert, of the 22d Chasseurs, lieutenant Merel, of the 15th Light Dragoons, as well as my Aides-de-Camp Jardot and Favier.

(To be continued.)

"The *Inquisition* is incompatible with the *liberty of the press*, which has been decreed with the applause of the whole nation: for that Tribunal once re-established, no public writer could be free from alarm, even should he abstain from every topic of religion. While discussing any political question, or explaining the very rudiments of the science of Government, he would expose himself to the risk of being accused and punished by that Tribunal. We all know, by unfortunate experience, how easy it is to torture the meaning of an expression, and to represent as scandalous an insulated proposition, which, joined with the context, would appear perfectly innocent. We all know with what cunning policy our kings have availed themselves of the *Inquisition*, to prohibit useful works, which were guilty of no other offence than that of exposing the abuses of despotism. We have not forgotten how many wise and patriotic men have been persecuted as impious or irreligious; while the arm of the *Inquisition*, powerless in reaching the infamous minion of power, the audacious insulter of religion and morals, suffered the chair of the Holy Ghost to be profaned with the praises of such a monster, and the purity of the altars defiled by placing upon them his abominable picture. Neither have we forgotten, that the doctrines of the *Sovereignty of the nation*, of its authority to dictate laws, and of the delegated power of monarchs, have, by a base abuse of texts of holy writ, been condemned as anti-christian, and their propagators persecuted, and immured in the dungeons of the *Inquisition*. With such recent facts before his eyes, where is the writer so rash or thoughtless, who would think of instructing the people while such a tribunal existed? The *Inquisition* and the *Liberty of the Press*! It is quite sufficient to mention them, to shew that they are placed in the most determined state of mutual hostility."—TORTADO's Speech in the Cortes of Spain.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AUSTRIAN PAPER-MONEY.—In page 509 of the last Number will be found an Official-paper, issued in Lower Austria, on the 3rd of September last, which is very well worthy of the attention of the English reader at this time.—They have a great quantity of Bank Notes in that unfortunate country. Formerly these notes were at *par*; that is to say, they were as good, in the purchase of commodities, as Gold and Silver; every florin in Bank Notes was equal in value to a florin in silver. This is not the case now, and has not been for a good while past. The Bank Notes became, gradually, of less and less value; they depreciated; they became lower and lower in comparison with Gold and Silver; and, at last, naturally arrived at a state of open and notorious discount.—What has been the consequence? Why simply this: the government, or the Bank (for I do not know which it is) is now prepared to put an end to these Bank Notes, by redeeming them. They are to be taken up by "*Redemption Bills*," which bills will be paid, it is said, to their real amount in Gold and Silver.—Why not pay off the Bank Notes themselves, then? the reader will ask. Oh! I will tell you why: The man, who has a Bank Note for fifty florins, is to get a Redemption Bill for ten florins in exchange for it; he, who has a Bank Note for twenty-five florins, is to get a Redemp-

tion Bill for five florins in exchange for it; and so on; and, after the 31st of December, those who hold Bank Notes are to get nothing at all for them, and they are to be suffered to pass no more.—Here are pretty sufficient reasons for the scheme. The holders of Bank Notes will only lose 4 florins out of 5; that is all;—This is no "new way of paying old debts." It is what the French did with regard to their *Assignats* and *Mandats*; and, it is what must always be done first or last, when a paper-money once becomes depreciated; for, the bare fact of depreciation proves the want of ability *ever* to pay off to the full amount. A *bankruptcy* does indeed, take place, and the creditors receive a *poundage*.—The sight of this Austrian Circular naturally forces the mind back to the causes of the humiliation of the haughty Dynasty who govern that unhappy country. Twenty six years ago, the House of Austria was contending for the free navigation of the Scheldt; it had begun to open the port of Antwerp, and to construct vessels there; it had erected Ostend into a sea-port of considerable consequence; it was aiming at the subjugation, or, at least, the oppression, of the United Provinces. The Dutch were compelled to submit, for the sake of safety, to all sorts of humiliations; and they, at last, secured their safety only by throwing themselves into the arms of France. Hence is to be dated the attachment of the Dutch to the French; and, indeed, from that

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time, they became "*Frenchmen in heart*," a phrase, which, having recently proceeded from the lips of the Mayor of Amsterdam, has given such offence to the wise-
 acres, who, for our sins, conduct the press of England.—The House of Austria, with its half million of soldiers and with English money to aid, took the lead in the coalition against the republicans of France. A nation rose up and humbled those immense armies; and that same Belgium, which had so lately been the scene of the Austrian power and arrogance, received, with open arms, its republican invaders, whom it hailed as its real deliverers. That city of Brussels, which had seen the Austrian minister treat the Dutch Plenipotentiaries like scavengers, opened its gates to the French, hailed their arrival with joy unbounded, and revelled in the defacing and destroying of every vestige of its former subjection.—Ambition, revenge, shame, pushed on the House of Austria to recover its lost ground and fame. At every plunge it got deeper in disgrace; till, at last, that baughty House, which had set out in the war with a declared resolution to dictate a government to France, had to yield its very capital and its palaces to Frenchmen, and to accept, as a boon at their hands, of leave to reign over a part of its former dominions, driven out of Germany and stripped of its most elevated titles. Reduced now to comparatively a petty patrimony, which it holds by a precarious tenure, its voice is become nothing in the affairs of Europe; and, amongst its own beggared subjects, it is compelled to act a part as humble almost as even those subjects can wish; and, to crown all, it is forced, by the French, to be *at war* with England, with whose aid it so long carried on war against those French.—Such, to the House of Austria, have been the consequences of the coalitions against France; such, to that House, have been the consequences of erecting itself into a dictator as to the internal affairs of the French nation.—If the French had met with no opposition in the making of their revolution; if they had been suffered to arrange their government in their own way; if their internal enemies had not met with countenance and encouragement from without; if war had not, in short, been made upon them; how different might have been the situation of the House of Austria at this day! The example of France might, indeed, have done much; and, it would have been next to impossi-

ble, that, with a free people on their confines, the people of Belgium should have remained in their former state. But, what then? The House of Austria would have lost Belgium; and, has it not lost it now? It would have lost Belgium; but it would have lost it without defeat and disgrace. It might still have retained the *title* at least of Emperor of Germany and King of the Romans; and it certainly would have avoided those pecuniary distresses that now press upon it.—It is curious enough, that the Rulers of Austria and Prussia, who combined against the republicans of France, because, amongst other things, they had siezed upon the *property of the Church*, should both have been driven by their necessities to seize upon the Church property in their dominions; that is to say, to commit themselves, that which they warred against as sacrilege in the people of France; and that the war, which was to ruin France through her finances, should have ended in leaving her rich, and in reducing these her principal opponents to beggary.—These are great lessons for princes and statesmen. They are well calculated to make a deep impression; but, after all that we have seen, it is, perhaps, too much to hope, that the dictates of reason will at last prevail over the dictates of passion.

SPAIN.—*The War*.—For more than a week the public were entertained with accounts of a great victory gained over the French by *Ballasteros*, whose name, connected with the word victory, was posted up at the news-paper offices, and exhibited, in large characters, on the placards in the news-cryers hats. Many columns, in our public prints, were filled not only with the account of the victory itself, but with reflections on the *important consequences* to which it was likely to lead.—What has turned out to be the fact? Why, that *Ballasteros* has been *defeated*; that, in his attempt to make his first movement, he was met, driven back, pushed out of St. Roque, wherein he had taken shelter, and compelled to seek refuge under the guns of Gibraltar! There the last advices left him and his army, destitute even of water to drink, and receiving wherewith to cool their tongues from the tanks of Gibraltar, while the miserable inhabitants of St. Roque, driven from the town, were lying upon the bare earth on a spot called the *neutral ground*, but which, it was feared, would not long afford a

neutrality to them.—Thus, upon every occasion, the news favourable to the Spaniards finally turns out to be false; or, at least, in hardly any case, does it turn out to be true. Who, then, will now be persuaded, that the contest will not end in the submission of all Spain to the sway of Napoleon? The kingdom of Spain is large, and though subdued, it is not settled in a day; but, as to the work of subjugation, there really appears very little remaining to be done. We are told of Spanish troops here and Spanish troops there; but, we find them uniformly making off at the approach of the French; and, it is manifest, that, by degrees, the mass of the inhabitants must become anxious for repose, and will be inclined to accept of any change of rulers, rather than endure a prolongation of the war, which so severely oppresses and distresses them. By the expenditure of vast sums of money, we may keep up a sort of lingering war upon the borders of the sea; but, what end will that answer? It will not secure, nor tend to secure, the independence of Spain or France. It will not operate at all in favour of peace; nor would it better the terms of a peace to be made with France, who would treat with the utmost contempt any endeavour to consider Spain as any thing other than the dominions of its new king Joseph.—I, therefore, see, in the war in Spain, nothing but a drain upon this country, without the smallest chance of any ultimate benefit. If, indeed, we could see any probability of ultimate success, it might then be advisable to continue the contest; but, we have now the experience of three years before us; we have seen with our eyes enough to convince us, that there exist not the means of final success; and, therefore, the sooner we abandon the undertaking the better. By prolonging it we do, indeed, cause some expence and some mortality to France; but we, at the same time, weaken ourselves in a degree tenfold to what we weaken her.—In the meanwhile the rulers of Spain are divided amongst themselves: it is yet a serious question, whether they shall not restore the *Inquisition*, which was, at the outset, abolished by the French! Can any man believe, that, with this before their eyes, the people of Spain will enter heartily into a war against the French? Is it not much more likely that they will look upon them as their *real deliverers*!

CARACCAS.—Here a scene has been

opened, which will not, in all human probability, close till the new world has undergone a revolution as complete as that of the old. Twenty years ago, an old Frenchman used, in speaking of the revolution, to say to me: "*Ah, monsieur! elle fera la tour du monde.*" And, really, it does seem, that it will make the tour of the world; for, so far from its career having been stopped by the exaltation of Buonaparté and the establishment of a regal government in France, that event seems to have extended the principle of *change*. So far from its having given the world a disgust with respect to revolutions, it seems to have called forth a spirit of liberty before unknown to the world. It has been supposed, that the establishment of a *regal* government in France would prove an effectual check to the revolutionary spirit; that men would reason thus: "see what has happened in France; the people there made a revolution in order to establish a republic; but, the end has been, that they have got a kingly government, as they had before!" Men do not reason thus from that event; or, at least, their reasoning does not stop here. They go further; and, at last, they feel nothing to discourage them in their endeavours to effect a change, where they find themselves oppressed. Besides, France has acquired such immense power; she has acquired so much glory; she has been raised to such a height; that men lose sight of the miseries she underwent in the progress from her former to her present state. The example, too, of so many men, raised from the lowest walks in life, to the most exalted ranks and dignities, has great influence on the minds of men in general; and, the knowledge which the world has of the bettered condition of the people of France, the diffusion of property which the revolution has produced, the more equal distribution of power and consequence, have had a wonderful effect.—These things seem to be wholly overlooked by those who express their surprise, that the French should find imitators in any part of the world; but, these things are well worthy of the serious consideration of statesmen in all countries which have not yet been shaken by revolution; and which statesmen, if they act wisely, will take care to adopt, in time, such measures as will effectually prevent the people from wishing for any change in forms established.—These reflections naturally suggested themselves upon read-

ing the account of General Miranda's progress in oversetting the old Government in Terra Firma. He understands such matters very well; he was one of those men who headed the insurrection against the Old governments of the Continent of Europe, which he assisted to pull down; and now that he has ample room for the exertion of his talents, there is little doubt of his using them to the utmost of his power. He has proclaimed the *Rights of Man* in terms still stronger than those rights were proclaimed in France at the outset of the revolution; the absolute sovereignty of the people is laid down as the basis of government in Old Spain. Here are altogether nearly 20 millions of people shaking off kingly authority, and claiming the right of governing themselves; and this, too, after all the experience of France, which, therefore, does not operate as a check to revolutions.—There can be little doubt that the insurrection will extend itself from the Caraccas to Mexico, and continue in its route till it joins the American States in the Floridas, where it will naturally stop upon finding a system of self-government already established. To the southward, we see the same spirit at work at Buenos Ayres; and, though we are told, that the Prince Regent is sending troops from the Brazils to assist the old government, there is no ground to expect that such a project can succeed; and, indeed, it is by no means impossible, that the old government in the Brazils may be shaken by the spirit of revolution that is now agitating the New World.—It is curious to remark how the work of revolution is now singularly favoured. The old government of Spain is overset by Napoleon, whose object is to establish a new dynasty there in a branch of his own family. England, in order to prevent this, espouses the cause of the old government of Spain; she joins the adherents of that government, and declares her object to be to preserve the integrity of the ancient monarchy. Nearly the same takes place with regard to Portugal. The Peninsula becomes the theatre of a great and dreadful war between these two powers, who alone are able to do any thing for or against the Provinces of South America. These Provinces seize this opportunity of shaking off the yoke of the old government. That old government has no power to prevent their success, and England, kept fully occupied by France, in Europe, has no power to prevent it. The

only force that could be sent against the insurgents is safely bound to the soil or the seas of Europe. And thus, the New World is left to follow its own taste, to form and fashion its governments according to its own will.—The interesting question to an English reader, is, how these changes will affect us. How they may affect us internally; what moral effects they may produce upon us, it is, perhaps, very difficult to say; but, it is by no means difficult to foresee, that, in a few years, they must have a wonderful effect upon our exterior relationships. With free and independent governments along the whole coast of North America and round that of the gulph of Mexico and in Terra Firma, it would be exceedingly great folly for us to expect to retain possession of any part of the West India Islands; all the force we have would not be sufficient to preserve Jamaica, if the American governments were once to attack it. Their force would be at home; ours would have to be sent and fed from this kingdom. And, besides, the fleets of France would necessarily become so formidable, by the time I have my eye upon, as to engage the attention of the greater part of our maritime force.—To prevent the change, the stupendous change, which I am here contemplating as probable and likely, there appears to me to be required nothing short of an union of the whole of the forces of France and England; and, the consequence of that would be, that England would become a member of the French empire; so that we should by an endeavour to prevent revolutions in distant countries and the loss of colonies, really lose our own independence.—There is one other way that might retard the revolutions in South America, and that is by making peace with Napoleon, recognizing his sovereignty in Spain and Portugal, and leaving him, with his fleets and armies, to reduce the insurgent colonies to obedience.—This we might do, but this is what we shall not do. We shall carry on the war in Europe till America is completely emancipated; and, let the war in Spain then terminate as it may, it will not be in the power of Europe to bring the Americans back to obedience.—I perceive, that amongst the grounds, which Miranda has alledged for the assertion of independence in the Caraccas, he states the incapacity of the old government of Spain, with the assistance of England, to resist Napoleon. He says

to the people: "Your old government is gone: it is no more: your choice, therefore, lies between independence and subjection to France." This may be said to be merely his opinion; but, it seems to have been adopted by the people, and to have formed one of the chief grounds of the revolution.—If Napoleon should finally succeed in subduing the still resisting part of the Peninsula, and should, at a peace, see his brother seated quietly upon the throne of Spain and Portugal and recognized, as the lawful sovereign; will it then be his interest to endeavour to resume the governments in South America and the Islands? In my opinion, it will not. The attempt would waste his means, and tarnish the glory of his arms. Nature seems to say, that the New World can no longer be dependent upon the Old; and a wise government in Spain and Portugal would not fail to profit from the experience of England, and to see, that, as it is impossible to retain the sovereignty of South America, it is better so to part from it as, in future, to have the people of those countries for its friends than its enemies.—Upon looking back; upon taking a view of the events of the last twenty years, what a change strikes the eye! What a change has grown out of the correspondence between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin! The sovereigns of Europe combined to prevent *change*; and those of them who have escaped death in the conflict have seen half the world completely revolutionized. The king of Spain in particular refused to acknowledge even the king of France as acting under the new constitution. And that very king of Spain, now accepting of support at the hands of those who have revolutionized France, may hear, if he hear of any thing, that those who call themselves the *king's friends* in Spain, have proposed a new constitution, upon the model of that, which he so despised in the year 1791, only rather more democratical.—To attribute this change to this or that partial cause; to talk of this or that error in the old governments; to talk of the Jacobin and anti-Christian conspiracies; to talk of this or that defeat or victory; is to reason very childishly. There is a great moral cause at work: there is a change in the mind of man, of which the leaders in revolutions have been merely the *expositors*. The writings of Paine and Condorcet have been the effect and not the cause of this change, which has been gradually taking place, which

gradually advances in its progress, and which cannot be arrested in that progress any more than human power can arrest the progress of nature in any of her operations. The fault of the fallen governments has been, that they have not perceived these truths. They saw a resistance to their authority growing up amongst their subjects, and, ascribing it to a want of a sufficiency of rigour on their part, they have added to their former rigour. This, in some cases, produced an immediate effect contrary to what was expected; and, where the people had not the power of themselves to oppose their government, they had only to put up their prayers for the arrival of the French, whom they received with open arms as their deliverers. The French, in many cases, treated the people worse than their former masters; but, it was only a part of the people that they thus treated: they spared their partizans; and as to the great mass, they would, of course, feel nothing of any ill-treatment from the French, who relied upon them for the duration of their power. When we hear of the complaints of those who have been subdued, or have yielded themselves up to the French, we ought to bear in mind, that we hear only *one side*. We hear those who formerly enjoyed rank and opulence; we hear the complaints of a degraded and harshly treated nobility and clergy; we hear the complaints of pillaged and ruined merchants; but, though those complaints may be very just and must excite compassion in our breasts, we ought to bear in mind, that we do not hear the mass of any people; and we may be assured, that we never shall hear any complaints from those who had nothing to lose, and to whom no change could be for the worse.—This is what we should always bear in mind, because it would prevent us from being deluded into hopes of security to be derived from the discontents of the nations now under the sway of our enemy.—If the government of England had reasoned in this way, the fatal expedition to the Helder would never have taken place. From the complaints of the merchants and other opulent men, who were smarting under the revolution in Holland, it was concluded that the whole country was discontented; it was concluded, that, having felt the miseries attendant upon French fraternity, the Dutch people would gladly return to their old government, if they had the means. Nothing of this happened: the Dutch volunteers

fought against our army with a degree of bravery for which their countrymen were by no means famed ; and, as to *the people*, those who have written accounts of the expedition, state that our army was every where received with as much hostility as the people dared to discover, and that the latter buried and even destroyed provisions rather than *sell* them to our men. Here was, one would have thought, a lesson sufficient to awaken reflection. But, that lesson, and many others of the same sort, seem to have produced upon us very little effect. We still hear the same old story about the discontents of the Dutch and other nations now united to France ; and, which is the serious part of the business, we may yet see expeditions founded upon such stories. —As to the Caraccas, however, if we were mad enough to entertain the wish, we have not the power, to send out expeditions. And, besides, here is a revolution, not only unconnected with the French, but even with a view to keep the country out of the power of the French. Here is a revolution going on with which the French have nothing at all to do. It is, in fact, a rising of men against what they think unjust authority ; and this is what has been taking place all over Europe: Whether it be better or worse for mankind that *rank and birth* should fall into contempt is a question which is beyond my humble capacity to answer ; but, it is a fact, that they have fallen and are daily falling into contempt. What has been and is going on, is an insurrection of talents and courage and industry against birth and rank. Men have not, at bottom, been contending about *forms of government*. Writers and orators have ; but the mass of nations do not enter into the theories ; they look to the practical effects. They have been seeking such a *change* as will render their lives more happy and less humiliating, with very little regard as to *names and forms*. The fall of the old governments might have been prevented by *timely concession* ; but, who has been able to point out one single act of this sort, on the part of any government in Europe ? How gladly, when it was *too late*, would they all have conceded ! How gladly would the French Princes have sanctioned that constitution, which, in their manifestoes from Coblenz, they treated with so much contempt ! How gladly would the Stadtholder have conceded all that the Prussians, in 1787, enabled him to refuse to the people of

Holland ! How gladly would the Emperor have conceded to the people of Belgium all those things, and more than all, for having humbly asked for only a part of which, many of the people had been treated as rebellious subjects ! —These are great *lessons* ; but, if we are to judge from the past, there can be little ground to hope that they will produce any salutary effect.

SICILY.—From what we see in the public prints, there appears to be a desire to prepare the public mind for the dethronement of the King of Sicily, or, at least, for some such event. The *Courier* of the 7th instant says :—“ There seems to be a general expectation of some *revolution* taking place in Sicily, *if it has not already taken place*. We are perfectly at a loss to explain the policy of the Sicilian Government. It seems wholly at war with common sense. For what can be more astonishing than that a Government should feel any other sentiment than that of *detestation* of an enemy which has deprived it of so large a part of its power : or any other sentiment than that of *gratitude* for a Nation which has preserved to it all that it yet possesses of its ancient territories. But if we may credit the accounts from Sicily, the direct contrary is the fact, and the British are regarded by the Court with *jealousy, distrust, and every other sentiment but that which they merit*. We say the Court, as *contradistinguished from the people*, for the latter are enthusiastically attached to this country, and feel as they ought for the protection we have afforded them.” —The reader remembers, I suppose, that one of the grounds of the war with the Jacobins of France, was, that they attempted to *divide the people of other nations from their governments* ? The reader, if he was old enough to read at the time, can scarcely have forgotten, that this was one of the heaviest of the charges against the poor Jacobins, at the out-set of the war for “ social order.” —What a change ! Where will it all end ? —But, this writer does not go so far as a writer in the *Times* of the 4th of October, who not only recommends the acting upon this principle with regard to Sicily, but with regard to all the other old governments of Europe ; and, thus we, who began the “ just and necessary war” of 1793, lest the French should succeed in assisting people against their governments, are now to set about

that same work ourselves.—The passage I allude to is as follows:—"The people of Sicily groan under the burthen of oppressions which it is not right that men should bear. Their whole system of laws and government is only one dark tissue of error and exaction. The Tribunal of Patrimony, an iniquitous tribunal, and iniquitously administered, makes the name of property a mockery: the corn laws starve the people, in the hearts of vallies that were once the granary of the Roman Empire. The presence of the English, our fidelity to our contracts, our freedom of speech, our contempt of every thing that offers itself in the shape of oppression, our newspapers, which are read with inconceivable avidity throughout the island, have set before the people an example which they have gone too far not to follow to the uttermost. If we leave them to the vengeance of the Court, and the French, our faith and name will be degraded throughout the Mediterranean. If we adhere to them, and offer them a constitution, or enable them to choose one for themselves, we shall make for England an ally, grateful and bound to us by the strongest ties, we shall fix a citadel in the centre of the Mediterranean, from which the most fatal blows may be directed at the enemy the moment his power begins to shake, we shall shew by one act of manly and generous policy, the most striking contrast to the conduct of France; and prove that the people which trusts to the honour of the British character will not be deceived. *All policy is weak and empty in comparison of this.* The war is a war of character. The French, by holding out the promise of relief from acknowledged burthens, have gone forth 'conquering, and to conquer.' This, and not the arms or the wisdom of France, has made her at this day the first power of the Continent. *As character raised her, character must put her down.* The good faith and punctilious honour of England make her eminently respected throughout Europe. But there has been always an alloy of weakness and wavering in her policy. She has wanted the bold, frank, open aspect of a warlike nation. The Continent has been stricken deep; and nothing but the certainty of advantage will make it rise. It fell *through the vice of its old Governments*; and if we come forward as the allies of those Governments, we

"only come forward to make the slavery of Europe without hope. We might gain victories, and give the people a moment to breathe and buckle on their armour: but it has already encumbered and broken down their strength. Their struggle might be desperate, but it would be short; and every blow let in through the chinks of that gaping, disjointed, ponderous covering, must be mortal. If the Continent could look up to England as the reformer of its abuses, as spreading the principles of liberty, without striving for dominion, as giving the nations the mighty example of its freedom, and strengthening them for the attainment of the only thing that is worth the purchase of man's blood, we should soon see the end of French usurpation; and all the calamities with which it has harassed the world would pass away like a shade. *The experiment is open to us in Sicily*: the people are strongly attached to England, the Court has abandoned them, *they have no constitution, and they publicly demand our assistance in obtaining one.* The ground for the building is cleared; and nothing but a faint-heartedness, or a fickleness unworthy of the British character, can prevent our erecting on it a proud and glorious memorial of the blessings of alliance with England."—What would Burke have said, if he had lived to hear this in an English ministerial print? What would John Bowles have said, if he had lived to read it in that same print which he used to select as the vehicle of his lesser effusions in support of "social order." Here is the doctrine broadly laid down, that we have a right to take the part of people against their old governments. We are here told, that the continent of Europe has fallen, not by the arms of France, not by the writings of Jacobins, and Atheists, not by the seditious disposition of the people; but "through the vices of the old governments;" and, that, to come forward as the allies of those governments is to endeavour to "make the slavery of Europe without hope." Upon these grounds we are now to become "the reformer of the abuses" of the old governments of Europe, and the Promulgators of "the principles of liberty;" and we are to begin the experiment in Sicily, where "the people have no constitution and publicly demand our assistance." Hear this, all you, who, in 1793, sent up addresses in favour of "the just and necessary war," then

began against France, and one of the chief grounds of which war was, that she had passed a decree, declaring, that if any people, by their unanimous voice, asked her assistance against an *oppressive* government, she would give them that assistance. Hear this, all you who shouted for that war and who gave the name of traitor to every man who did not approve of it. Hear this, all you who have, for twenty years, been paying taxes in support of that war!—When Lord Grenville complained to Mr. Chauvelin of the Decree of which I have been speaking, the latter explained, and denied that its object or tendency was to set up any people against their government, and said that it was only intended to assist such nations as should have first conquered their liberty and should then ask assistance of France by the solemn and unequivocal expression of the general will. Lord Grenville says, in answer, that such an explanation *is not satisfactory*; for that still “there are cases; in which the “promoters of sedition may count before—“hand upon the assistance of the French “Republic.” The French Minister Le Brun afterwards wrote to our government a more full explanation; but neither was that satisfactory. The offering assistance to a *whole people* in opposition to their government was an offence, which the French nation was to answer for at the cannon’s mouth. Yet, we are now told, in an English ministerial paper, that it is our *right*, and indeed our *duty*, to give any people assistance against their government, and even the place where we are to begin is pointed out, namely, a country where we are the *allies* of that very government against which it is proposed that we should assist the people! Chauvelin, in one of his last notes to Lord Grenville, has this passage: “It is evident, that all the weight, “all the responsibility of the war, will fall “sooner or later upon those who have provoked it;” and Le Brun, in his note, after having urged every argument to dissuade England from entering into the coalition against France, concludes with these memorable words: “If her (France’s) “explanations are yet insufficient, and if “we are yet *obliged to hear a haughty language*; if hostile preparations are yet “continued in the English ports; after “having exhausted every means to preserve peace, we will prepare for war, “with a sense of the justice of our cause, “and of our efforts to avoid this extre-

“mity: We will fight the English, whom “we esteem, with regret, but without “fear.” To this Note, though coming from one of the persons then at the head of the French government, Lord Grenville did not think proper to reply.—What events have taken place since that Note was written! Children then unborn in England and Ireland have had to rue that day; and who has yet to rue it no one can tell, or even guess. But, of all the strange events, the most strange certainly is, that it is now openly inculcated in the English ministerial prints, that *we* ought to look upon it as our *right* and our *duty* to afford assistance to any people who are discontented with their government, and who apply to us for that assistance!—Time only can discover where all this is to end.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
8th Nov. 1811.

P. S. It was my intention to insert some remarks upon the TRIAL OF MR. WHITE of the Independent Whig; but, I defer them till the whole of the Proceedings are before my readers, when I can refer to them as I proceed. In the mean while, I cannot help expressing that satisfaction at the verdict, which has been so generally felt by the public.

TRIAL OF MR. WHITE.

Sittings before Lord Ellenborough and a Special Jury.

THE KING v. HENRY WHITE.

COURT OF KING’S-BENCH, NOV. 1.

The following were the names of the Gentlemen sworn as the Jury to try this case:—

Special.

Richard Noble,	St.-Mary-at-Hill.
Thomas Bowden,	Camomile-street.
John Danvers,	Bread-street-hill.
Abraham Mann,	Size-lane.
James Henokoll,	Upper-Thames-st.
Grant Allan,	Winchester-street.

Tales.

Robert-Rigalsford,	{ Bishopsgate-Ward
	{ Within.
Thomas Hamilton,	Castlebaynard-Ward.
Thomas Cole,	Same place.
James Carpenter,	Same place.
John Leafe,	Same place.
Benjamin Chip.	Same place.

Mr. *Richardson* opened the pleadings on the part of the prosecution, stating this to be an Information charging the Defendant with having printed and published a scandalous and seditious Libel on the 16th of September, 1810, and to this charge the Defendant had pleaded—Not Guilty.

The *Attorney-General*, on the same side, stated, that the Libel to which he had now to call the attention of his Lordship and of the Jury, was one of the most mischievous and malignant tendency, and was, in all its parts of such a nature, that he should have felt he neglected his duty, had he allowed it to pass without observation and to go unpunished. It would be necessary for him to state the circumstances which had given occasion to the publication in question, that the Jury might be better able to judge of the motives by which it was dictated. After the splendid achievements of our armies in Spain and Portugal, particularly in the battles of *Vimiera*, *Roleia*, *Talavera*, *Busaço*, &c. it was judged that it would be for the honour of the army, that medals should be prepared and presented to the Officers, above a certain rank, who had borne a share in those engagements, that they might wear the same, suspended by a ribbon, round the neck, in commemoration of the exertions made by the British Army on those days. It was impossible that these medals could be presented to every individual, though all were equally distinguished. All the Army, however, it must be apparent to every one who rightly viewed the subject, was equally honoured in this mark of approbation and distinction thus paid to the Commanding Officers, the medals being presented to all the General Officers, including Lieutenant-Colonels; nor was it ever dreamt, before the publication in question made its appearance, that there could a person be found capable of construing this mark of distinction into something injurious to the soldier. The object of the publication in question, however, there could not be a doubt, was to hold out to the soldiers that an odious distinction was thereby made between the officers and the soldiers; that the merit was wished to be represented all due to the Officers, and that the soldiers were disregarded, and even held out to contempt; and that a private soldier was esteemed as of no regard. The publication in question did not lose sight of a topic never omitted or lost sight of on such occasions. —It did not omit to state, and to point

out with care and anxiety, how much better the soldiers in the ranks of *Buonaparté* were rewarded than the soldiers in the British Army were. He (the *Attorney-General*) should say no more than this, that it was impossible not to see that the publication in question was intended and was calculated to produce disaffection and discontent among our soldiers; and, if such spirit were to be disseminated, it was needless for him to state, far more to enter into a detail of the dreadful consequences which might ensue. The publication was a gross misrepresentation of the feelings of the soldiery, as well as a scandalous and malignant attempt to induce them to abandon those honourable and praiseworthy feelings by which they had hitherto had been actuated, and to embrace the views of the writer of this publication. It was a gross misrepresentation of the feelings of the soldier: for, did the Jury believe that any soldier could be found who would feel a rancour in his mind at an honour conferred on his Officer?—On the contrary, did they not believe that a soldier seeing an Officer who had commanded him in any of the battles, in commemoration of which these medals had been conferred, with the medal hanging at his breast, would not say to those who accompanied him—"See how we are honoured; see how the person who led us on to victory at *Vimiera*, &c. has been honoured for him, and for us?"

The *Attorney-General* was satisfied there was scarcely a person to be found who could have given any other interpretation to the motive which actuated His Majesty's Government in the issuing of these medals. It remained for the person who printed and published the article in question to give to this act the dark representation he had chosen to affix to it. There was another part of the publication in question, which went to the conduct of His Majesty's Government, or of Ministers. Now he (the *Attorney-General*) was far from disputing the right of the subjects of this country fully, freely, and fairly, to enter into a discussion of the conduct of Ministers. This, he agreed, was a right which must, at all times, be liberally permitted; but still this would not and ought not to warrant general calumny. That the character of the present Government was infamy, that every part of their conduct was marked by corruption, was not to be tolerated as a general assertion, without assigning the ground for so harsh

and severe a conclusion. This could not be called discussion, but was gross, unprovoked, and unsubstantiated calumny, as his Lordship would inform them. Such was this publication, as far as the soldiers were concerned, and such were the general calumnies it contained, which he had no doubt the Learned Lord would inform them amounted to a libel. He should now read the libel to them, and ask them, if this was not its true character? After reciting the order in the immediately preceding Gazette, the publication goes on to make the observations of its Author, which he conceives well worthy of attention, at a moment when the military energies of a neighbouring nation have reached an unprecedented height, and when the prevention of the actual subjugation of this country by our enemies in a great measure depends on the exertions of our sailors and soldiers. That a Ministry, whose character is infamy,—that such a mass of ignorance and corruption should have put the seal to their own conduct, by issuing such an order, the Writer esteems even in them extraordinary. The Attorney-General asked, could it be permitted, that, without discussing the merits of any act of an Administration, or the merits of any Administration generally, any Newspaper Writer should take upon himself to say that the conduct of Ministers was such that their character was infamy, and such as held them out to abhorrence?—The publication proceeds, “Why, we indignantly demand, is this reward to be confined to the officers? Why is this insult to the army at large? Why is this unjust and ungenerous distinction made?” It goes on to notice the battles of Vimiera and Corunna, which it characterizes as “equivocal and barren,” and asks, “must corruption and imbecility manifest itself in every particular?”—Thus, the Attorney-General contended, it was represented to the soldiers that they were vilified and disgraced; and to the public, that the motive of this grant to the officers was corruption.—This mark of honour, which could be granted only to a few of the leading-officers, in testimony of the honourable conduct of the whole, was represented as odious and disgraceful to the soldiers, and to be corrupt on the part of Ministers. The publication then warned this country not rashly to shut their eyes against instruction, but to attend to the military system of the Ruler of France, which was deserving of imitation. “Merit

finds promotion in his army.”—“In his army, merit always finds reward.” The spirit of the order the Author of the Publication interprets into this, that the officers alone in our army are entitled to reward. At this the Author feels indignant, and complains that common policy, nay, that justice is violated, by thus treating the soldier with contempt, nay, by placing him below his level.—The Attorney-General concluded by asking of the Jury, if this could be done for any other purpose than to excite discontent in the army?—and if so, they would hear from a higher authority than his that the Publication in question was a libel.

A person from the Office of the Solicitor of the Treasury was then examined, who stated that he saw the certificate, to which was annexed the certified Copy of the Affidavit of Mr. White, as sole Proprietor and Printer of *The Independent Whig*, sworn by him at Dorchester Gaol, on the 18th May, 1810, signed by Edward Hatton, Esq. one of the Commissioners of the Stamp Office, which certificate, with the affidavit annexed, he now produced.

Mr. Lawes, jun. here addressed his Lordship, begging to be heard a few words in this stage of the business. He begged to call to his Lordship's attention the case of Mr. Redhead Yorke, who was tried at York, on which occasion it was put to the Judge, whether the Defendant might not be allowed the privilege of Counsel to examine and cross-examine witnesses, while, at the same time, the Defendant was heard in his own defence? There was a printed Report of the case, which would give his Lordship satisfaction on this point, if he required it.

Lord Ellenborough said he recollected the case, and being then Counsel for the Crown, had deferred to the opinion of the Learned Judge on that particular occasion. There was a contrary practice, however, prevailing in the Court, which he should be sorry to overturn, and that was, that no person could avail himself both of his own exertions, and of those of his Counsel. His Lordship had no objection, however, if a point of law should occur, that the Defendant should have the benefit, in arguing it, of the assistance of the Learned Counsel, or of any other Counsel he might chuse. His Lordship did not speak in relation to this trial, but objected to the irregularity which must naturally arise from such a practice.

Mr. Lawes then requested to be allowed

to take an objection as to the Copy of the Affidavit, which had been put in to prove the responsibility of the Defendant to whatever was contained in the Sunday Newspaper called *The Independent Whig*. The Act of the 38th of the King, which recognized this as sufficient proof, directed that the Affidavit of Newspaper Proprietorship should be sworn before a Commissioner of Stamps, or one whom the Commissioners should specially appoint for that purpose. The present Affidavit appeared to have been sworn only before the Distributor of Stamps for the Dorsetshire district, the Defendant being, at the time of its being made, a prisoner in Dorchester gaol; and no authority to have been given to him for that purpose.

The Attorney General answered this objection by reading from the Act a Proviso, that it should not be necessary to prove the Deputy a Commissioner or Officer.

Lord Ellenborough would assume from the Copy of the Affidavit produced, that the Affidavit itself was sworn, because he was directed to do so by the Act: but that was not enough; it must be sworn either before a Commissioner, or a Person authorized by the Commissioners. The Act did not require that the authority should be proved; but the Affidavit before the Court ran, "Sworn before me, Whitaker, Distributor." The Act did not state that a Distributor, *quoad* Distributor had any authority to take the Affidavit.

The Attorney General called Mr. Whitaker, who proved that he had received from the Stamp Office in 1803, an authority in writing to take such Affidavits; but he had mislaid it.

Mr. Lawes, rising to cross-examine this witness,

Lord Ellenborough said, he would not have what was meant for lenity quoted as a precedent. The Counsel must put his client upon examining the witness: he might suggest the questions to him.

Mr. Garrow, for the Prosecution, said, that this was not a new doctrine. It had been decided in Westminster Hall; and Mr. Clifford had left the Court in consequence of the decision.

Mr. Whitaker produced the Letter from Mr. Beresford, late Secretary to the Commissioners, which enclosed his mislaid authority. It mentioned the authority enclosed.

Mr. White then proceeded to cross-examine the Witness, which he did at considerable length.

From the incompleteness of this evidence, the fact of the Paper in question being bought at the Office of the *The Independent Whig*, No. 23, Warwick-square, was proved; and Mr. S. Hill, of the Stamp Office, produced the original Affidavit.

Mr. Lawes objected that the evidence was now more incomplete than before.

Lord Ellenborough.—They are not proceeding under the Statute now; they have proved what they are not required by the Act to do—the buying of the publication.

Mr. Lawes proceeded to state, that the Affidavit was a nullity.

Lord Ellenborough.—The certificate is now only suppletory evidence; and if the Affidavit was not sworn before the proper Officer it is void. But if the Defendant had only written a Letter, saying, I shall carry on such a Printing Business at such a Place, and a Paper had been produced bought at that Place, it would be probable evidence to go to a Jury, that the Defendant was the Publisher of the Paper.

Mr. Lawes said, that his objection was, that the Affidavit was a perfect nullity, unless authorised by the Act of Parliament. Here the Affidavit had been sworn before a Person not appointed to take it.

Lord Ellenborough.—It is against you both ways. If they go upon the Act of Parliament, the Affidavit will be left to the Jury, with such observations as the produced envelope may suggest in favour of its authority. But, at any rate, they have a Declaration under the Defendant's hand, that he is the Printer, Publisher, and sole Proprietor, of a Paper intended to be published at No. 23, Warwick-square, on the 18th of May; and on the 23d of September following, a paper is purchased there. It is competent to you to shew, that in the intermediate time he ceased to carry on the Printing Business there. Otherwise the evidence is competent to go to a Jury, as to the fact of the Defendant being the Publisher of the Paper in question.

Mr. Lawes requested that a Note might be taken of his objection.

Lord Ellenborough.—I have already anticipated your wishes.

The libel was then read by the proper Officer, Mr. Lowten. The Paper was said to be printed and published by and for the Defendant.

Mr. Lawes was afraid the court were not yet in possession of his objection. It was, that the Affidavit could not be read for another purpose than that for which it was made.

Lord Ellenborough.—I have heard your objection,—think it has no foundation,—over-rule it,—and now we will go to something else.

Mr. Whitaker underwent a long cross-examination by the Defendant.

Mr. Lawes asked the Attorney-General, if he went upon the first or third count; as he wished to know which the Libel was read as applicable to; for, having only the common faculties of man, he had compared it only with the first in the Record.

Lord Ellenborough.—As applicable to any. If it is stated differently in different counts, it was your business to discover that difference before you came here.

The Gazette was put in and proved; it being an allegation that such an order existed in it as the Libel quoted.

The Defendant said, there had been no proof where the Gazette was obtained.

Lord Ellenborough.—Your Paper admits it. The production of the Paper is evidence in all cases of bankruptcy.

DEFENCE.

*May it please Your Lordship and
Gentlemen of the Jury,*

In offering to the Court my Defence to the allegations this day produced against me,—mistrustful as I am of the effect of my own feelings in the peculiar situation in which I stand, with a desire not to waste unnecessarily the time of the Court and Jury,—I have chosen to commit what I have to say to paper, rather than to place my inexperience in competition with the practice and ingenuity of my Learned Opponent.

Sensible, also, that the nature and quality of my vindication would be likely to bear little upon the tenour of the argument which would be pressed against me, and consequently less liable to interruption, I availed myself of this circumstance to digest my thoughts, and adapt them to the double purpose of convenience and precision.—In doing which, I do but follow the example of that great literary Genius and Philanthropist, the unhappy Mr. Gilbert Wakefield;—who, it will be remembered, for a similar offence with which I am charged, so fatally endured the peril attached to the indulgence of an exuberant but virtuous fancy, by being long immured within the very walls from which I have just emerged.—To pursue the ana-

logy, and with little appearance of hyperbole,—“He did but live to taste of Liberty and die:”—while for me, it should seem, after a much longer endurance, a worse calamity than even death is reserved, from which there is no escape, but through the effect of *truth* upon the minds of an enlightened and merciful Jury.

After what has been urged by the Attorney-General, as to the nature and effect of the imputed Libel, and the dangerous tendency of its publication,—I should rise to address you in my own behalf with a much greater degree of diffidence and concern, were I not led to place my hopes upon a foundation totally distinct from the merits or demerits of the Publication in question.

Had I been charged upon the record with the mere act of publication of the matter alleged against me, it would then have been necessary to have examined its quality; but when I am charged with causing the Publication to be made,—with the view of exciting discontent and disaffection in the minds of the Liege Subjects of our Lord the King, and particularly of the Persons belonging to the Army,—I come here to justify myself from this implication of the record.—In doing which I assume it as a principle of Justice, as well as Humanity, that I shall experience the indulgence of the Court and the attention of the Jury.

Gentlemen of the Jury,—I will not question your liberality by supposing, that the remembrance of past transactions will have any influence in directing your decision upon the present occasion:—neither passion nor prejudice, I am persuaded, will interfere with or obstruct your justice.

Gentlemen,—You have heard every thing brought that could be brought, from the sources of Law and Ingenuity, to stamp the shame of wilful criminality upon my head;—and it is now your duty, as I am sure it is your inclination, to attend patiently and seriously to what I shall offer in my Defence.

I pass over, therefore, the matter alleged in the information without a comment;—but I reply to all and every the particular charges contained in the Record:—and as the Law, which sets up that official instrument against me, permits me to attempt to refute its allegations,—it is here I take my stand,—it is here I challenge conviction,—and fearlessly invoke your unbiassed and discriminating Verdict. The Record states, not only that I published the

alleged Libel, but pronounces that I did it with a Criminal Intention!—The Speech of my Learned Adversary necessarily agrees with the words and meaning of the Record,—both ascribing to me a wilful criminality, a direct mischievous and wicked intent, to the end and for the purposes set forth in the Information.—Without attempting to follow my Learned Adversary through the mazy path of legal disquisition, it is simply to the plain and positive declaration contained in that Record alone, that I propose to make my Reply, and to rest the proof of my Innocence upon the broad basis of Truth.—Gentlemen,—In a cause like the present, I apprehend your own judgment will tell you, and I should hope the Court will confirm it,—that if I show in any one instance that I am charged wrongfully,—that the Instrument by which I am arraigned is fictitious and defective,—that it is deficient in regularity as well as in substance.—I say, Gentlemen, I apprehend it will be only necessary to make this appear to procure me a ready acquittal.

I am aware, that there are certain cases wherein the law can dispense with forms, as well as render them indispensable in others. I know not, therefore, whether the error I shall detect will come under the first or last denomination; but this I know, that the error will be none the less for being disregarded; and that in criminal cases, where the life or liberty of a fellow creature is at stake, I have understood it to be the maxim of the Constitutional Law of England to let the scale of mercy preponderate, and grant the benefit of informality to the side which most requires it.

In the first place, then, allow me to direct your attention while I declare, that the Place of Publication as set forth in the Record is erroneous. I know of no Publication vended in the Parish of St. Mary-le-Bow, in the Ward of Cheap;—I have never stated myself to have had any Publication in such place. Let the Court refer to my affidavit, nay, to the Publication itself, or to any person who may be said to have purchased the same at the Office of Publication, and their evidence must refute the substance of the Record.

The Law, I know, is held to be, that personal evidence is unnecessary in a case like the present; the Court receiving and acknowledging my affidavit, together with the production of my Publication, as sufficient evidence of my printing and publish-

ing:—but then the Record must agree with both *most minutely and circumstantially. It does not do so—it does neither.* It neither agrees with my Paper, nor my affidavit—but is contradictory to both.

Should it be pretended that the forms of Court go so far as to allow that proof of the Publication *in London only* shall be held sufficient, I will ask, why attempt to name the specific place of Publication?—why should the King's Attorney invalidate his official instrument?—why impeach the Record by the introduction of a positive falsehood, if he had not known that the proof of the identity of the Place of Publication had been necessary to have sustained his information—when the simple line of truth was plain before him?—But I ask, if I had been as well prepared to have disproved the Publication being made in London, as I am prepared to disprove its being issued, where the Record states it to have been issued,—would not his Lordship have held it fatal to the information?—and I maintain the error is as palpable in the eye of reason and justice, as though the Publication had been issued at York.

In other criminal cases, the Law requires a strict adherence to fact in matters of evidence; and shall I not be entitled to equal privilege with the assassin or the highwayman?

This error is not imputed to me, and I leave it to your candour and justice to decide, whether the consequence should not rest with those who committed it.

I have shewn the Record to be false, which states "The Independent Whig" Sunday Newspaper, to be published in the Parish of St. Mary-le-Bow, in the Ward of Cheap;—that Paper being published in the Parish of Christchurch, in the Ward of Farringdon Within. Is it possible, then, that the Court shall proceed to try a cause, and a criminal cause too, by a false instrument? Or should his Lordship decree that I must answer to a false arraignment, I trust the Jury will never consent to ground their verdict upon the faith of an instrument so palpably erroneous.

Should that, however, be the decision of the Court, though I do not despair of a different sentiment being entertained by the Jury, I shall nevertheless proceed to observe, that this False Record states also, that I published the alleged Libel with the most criminal intention:—and to prove this, my Learned Prosecutor has attempted to shew,—not that I either wrote,

read, or even *saw*, the offensive article before insertion,—not that I was privy to, or participating in, the very act of its publication,—for this, Gentlemen, it was impossible that he could shew;—but only that the Law considers me responsible for all and every thing to which my name is affixed, whether with or without my consent, provided I enter my name in the proper Books at the Stamp-Office for that purpose.—Thus you observe, Gentlemen, that the Law is to be imperative upon me, to keep me to the strict letter and meaning of my Affidavit, as entered in the Government Books, while it assumes to itself the license to vary or mis-state facts at pleasure, and still justice must submit to its caprice.—If such be the usage of the Law, I cannot say much in praise of its equity. But to proceed:—Gentlemen, I humbly conceive that you sit here this day, to decide not more upon the merits and tendency of the Publication before you, than upon the positive assurance you may be brought to entertain of my intentional guilt or innocence in the fact of its publication.—His Lordship may tell you, that the matter in question is a most heinous Libel,—he may possibly convince you to that effect,—but he must fail to convince you that I entertained the Criminal Intention set forth in the Record. Gentlemen—Reason, as well as Law, must agree, that it is the *Intention* alone which constitutes the criminality of the deed. “I may shoot mine arrow o’er the house and slay my brother,”—but the Law would not condemn me, nor yet my conscience. With respect to this matter, I am as one who is told he has done some act in his sleep, of which he is altogether unconscious. But, Gentlemen, it is not (happily for me) it is not the Attorney-General’s *ouching* it to have been done with a Criminal Intention, which will weigh any thing in your minds, provided your consciences do not concur in his opinion.—Gentlemen, You sit here, deputed by the Constitution of your Country, to decide between innocence and accusation,—to elicit truth,—and such must constitute your Verdict. The Law is understood to be grounded upon Truth; and, whatever colouring art or enmity may give to a case, whatever inference or interpretation may arise from professional learning or ingenuity,—still, after all, His Lordship, I should hope, will tell you, that it is your consciences which *must* decide,—that Truth must be the umpire!—If the Rules of this

Court would permit, I would here call witnesses to prove that the article in question was the production of another person, and inserted *without either my knowledge or consent*;—but, Gentlemen, though the forms of law debar me from the privilege of thus unequivocally substantiating this fact, you will nevertheless credit the assertion; as you must necessarily conceive, situated as I was at the time, a prisoner in a distant gaol, (the gaol of Dorchester,) that, morally speaking, I could not have had the most distant idea of such an Article being about to appear in my Paper; and that consequently it was a moral impossibility that I could either participate in the intention of the writer, or prevent its publication.—I say, Gentlemen, I could produce evidence of this fact, if the Rules of Court would permit;—but, though not suffered to do this, I can at least declare, which here I most solemnly do, that the Article in question was written so close upon the hour of publication, as to preclude the possibility of any copy of it being sent to me before it was published to the world:—but that when it did reach me, I have evidence also to prove that I disclaimed any knowledge of it—let this circumstance, then, witness for me that I had no Criminal Intention in its publication.—And now, Gentlemen, let me entreat you to reflect upon the unprecedented perilous situation into which I have been driven, and from the effects of which I am thus brought to stand before you this day.—It is just and natural to trace effects to their causes, and the present will be found to have its source in the operation of that Power which now arraigns me.—I beseech your earnest attention to this point. Gentlemen, I was borne away from the scene of my avocations,—deprived of the personal superintendence of my concerns, still to be accounted amenable for every incidental error, and with this only alternative,—to embrace immediate ruin, by relinquishing my means of support.—Driven, therefore, as I have been, into this present peril by the rigorous operation of the Law,—feeling, as I am made to do, the pressure of an awful responsibility, with the combination of other evils which have resulted from it,—I cannot but feel, likewise, the just and moral right I possess to your indulgence and protection.—Gentlemen, I take my God to witness, that I neither saw nor heard of the Article in question before its insertion; I never counselled nor sanctioned its appearance;

and you must necessarily perceive, if you credit the assertion I have made, or the evidence I desire to adduce, that it was an utter impossibility, from the nature of my situation, and the time and manner of its appearance,—an utter impossibility for me to have done so.—And if I have shewn this, let me ask, where is the individual that can *conscientiously* pronounce me *morally guilty* of a malicious and wicked intention in this matter?—What alone was morally possible for me to do in such a case, *I have already offered*. The Writer and bona-fide Publisher has declared himself ready and willing to answer for its production. This offer on our part has been rejected; not rejected as to any backwardness in prosecuting the real Author, but only as to the condition of freeing me from implication.

Gentlemen, let me not be understood to infer that this conduct in my Learned Prosecutor is ascribable to any other motive than what he takes to be the line of his public duty:—I cannot question but that the practice and usage of the law constitute his rule of action:—yet, gentlemen, I may reasonably presume, that the just principle of that duty, the true essence of our law, is to invoke correction upon, such, and such only, who can be proved to have deserved it: and therefore it is upon this ground I contend, that duty should assimilate with reason and equity and not confound the technicalities of Law with the purposes of Justice.

To arrive at the true source of mischief the Law wisely admits a power to arraign the suspicious;—but, when that true source is tendered, when the real offender is neither attempted to be disguised nor withheld, where is the justice which would involve the guiltless? Here is an implied offence committed, and to get at the offender, (which surely must constitute the full intent of justice,) the Law seeks its remedy against such as lie within its cognizance;—but, if I have been placed, by the sentence of this Court, for the long interval of three years, an almost solitary prisoner in a gaol one hundred and twenty miles distant from the place of the publication of my Paper, and thereby *compelled* to submit the superintendence of that Paper to an Agent, or cease to publish it, and thus have renounced the means of subsistence for myself and family, I appeal to your consciences as just, as feeling, as honourable men, if the charge of *criminal intention* can possibly

attach to me, for the publication by my Agent, during my *compelled* absence, of an Article, which I had no human means of preventing the appearance of. To prove this fact incontestibly, and to answer all the proper and equitable ends of public justice, the writer of this alleged libel has, through the medium of his Counsel, offered to surrender himself, if the Attorney General would have consented to prosecute him instead of me, the innocent victim. Is it not, then, inconsistent with the principle of justice, of fair, strict and impartial justice, to persist in confounding the innocent with the guilty?

I do not say that the Attorney General refuses to accept the disclosure of the real offender, but he requires that I should confess to what the Record implies, that is, the Criminal Intention of doing what was done by another;—that I should so far forget what was due to the dignity of truth and my own honour, as to tamely acknowledge myself guilty of an act, in which I had not the smallest participation, and withdraw my plea of innocence, by suffering judgment to go by default.

Gentlemen, for a resistance to such a mean and dastardly expedient to court the forbearance of the Law, I trust I shall experience rather your commendation than your censure, and that my cause will thereby lose no interest in your consideration.

No, Gentlemen, that I am free,—undeniably free from the Criminal Intention imputed to me, I shall ever resolutely insist;—and neither favour nor persecution shall instigate me to a false confession!—That I am morally innocent, even my Prosecutor, (from the knowledge of the situation into which his power had thrown me, joined to the representations which have been made to him on the subject), even HE must conscientiously admit:—His Lordship himself, from the evidence which I have desired to adduce, I feel assured, must necessarily have perceived the same:—and you, Gentlemen, I trust, will fully shew you join in the sentiment by your unprejudiced Verdict this day. It may be urged, that I brave or insult the Law by proposing to compound with its authority;—that it does not become me to attempt to commute the peril I have incurred;—but, Gentlemen, let it be recollected how I have incurred this awful responsibility which is to burthen me with the faults of another! Let it be remembered, that it arose wholly from *compul-*

sion! It was the Law, as you well know, Gentlemen, which took me from my place of business,—my sphere of life;—and banished me to a distant Jail! It cannot be supposed, that, by such a sentence it was meant to be inferred, that I should be debarred the means of my existence;—it aimed not at depriving me of the lawful sources of support,—to take from me my prop of life, and the power or means of maintaining my family;—it was not intended to act as a prohibition to the farther pursuit of my profession:—yet how continget that profession, with all its local necessities, without incurring this fearful liability to accusation which now enthrals me?—Therefore, Gentlemen, you must readily perceive, that it is from the operation of that very sentence that I am placed in peril here this day:—I aver, that, from the operation of that sentence, *and that alone*, am I brought to answer this present charge:—because, had it been possible for me to have prevented it,—(without doing what the Law could not insist upon, namely, the abandonment of my necessary avocations),—I say, had it been possible for me to have prevented it, I should certainly have done so, and not have incurred the present danger. Surely, Gentlemen, nothing can be more unjust in nature, that that one man should be made to suffer for the acts of another;—for an offence which he neither prompted nor sanctioned,—which he could neither foresee nor prevent!—Ruin undeserved, the Laws of a Just Government should never permit, much less promote. The Subject, who is criminally arraigned for an imputed offence, avowedly committed by another person, surely, Gentlemen, should not be doomed to languish under the infamy of a false accusation, and to perish reproachfully by an unjust sentence.—My Learned Adversary may endeavour to set aside this my rational plea, upon the ground of its inadmissibility with the custom and practice of the Court, as well as from the danger of precedent:—that the plea of absence from the spot of Publication is no defence in cases of this nature; and, if once admitted, would set wide the gates of fraud and evasion, to the mockery of justice and the injury of society:—But, Gentlemen, will reason, justice, or common humanity, admit of no difference between a voluntary or fraudulent absence, and one caused by compul-

sion?—Or would yourselves, Gentlemen, as a Jury summoned to decide upon a case where any such fraudulent absence was apparent, not be sufficiently guarded against evasion, and decide accordingly?—Besides, Gentlemen, let me ask,—are cases such as mine at all common?—Has there ever been any thing similar before the Court? And I may add, is it ever likely to occur again, except probably in my own person, seeing the evil resulting from it?—Among the many of my profession, who have lately engaged the attention of the Law, has any one been placed in a like condition? Have *they* been forced a hundred miles from their place of business, and from the spot where the offences were committed, (however superior in criminality those offences were acknowledged to have been,)—and this at the hazard of their total ruin, or the awful risk of future liability from the conduct of agents?—You perceive, therefore, Gentlemen, that precedent is not likely to be injurious, as my case appears destined to remain solitary, and may be dealt with without apprehension of consequences. I do not say that men have not been banished to distant Gaols, but has it been attended with like circumstances?—Have they been reduced to the necessity of employing literary agents, or of relinquishing at once their means of life?—A man, it is true, may exercise his ideas, though one hundred miles from home, but not be able to correct the ideas of others:—I was not obliged to write, but, what is infinitely worse, I was rendered liable to answer for the writing of other persons;—I was debarred acting for myself, where I could only act with effect, yet held liable to account for the actions of others:—and the alternative was—the loss of my means of support!—With this argument the law may avow it has nothing to do;—but I maintain, that, in the instance before you, this argument grows out of the operation of the Law;—for, that it is to the operation of that law that the present mischief is owing;—when I say this, Gentlemen, I do not mean to vilify either the Law or the Court;—but merely to impress the plain truth upon your minds, that, by reason of the sentence which was passed upon me, (that is, the operation of the Law,) I was precluded the power of superintending my business.

(*To be continued.*)

TRIAL OF MR. WHITE,

Proprietor of the Independent Whig.

This Trial, the proceedings of which, as reported in the news-papers, have been inserted in the present and the foregoing Numbers of the Register, call for some remarks from me, and, indeed, from every man, who has any portion of the English press in his hands, and who wishes to see that press retain any portion of the liberty that it formerly enjoyed.

The publication, for which Mr. White was prosecuted, through the means of an *Information Ex Officio*, related to an order for the bestowing of *Medals* upon Officers, who had been present at the battles, called victories, in Spain and Portugal. The Order appeared in the London Gazette, sometime in the summer of 1810. Mr. White was in Dorchester Gaol at the time when the publication took place. His Son wrote the article, and it appears, that proof was produced, that the father never saw it, till after it was published. When the prosecution was commenced, Mr. White was still in Gaol; the *three years*, which, for two former publications, he had been sentenced to be imprisoned, were, as yet, unexpired, when this new *Information Ex Officio* was instituted against him. The Son, conscious that the guilt, if any, lay wholly with him, offered himself to the Attorney General as the responsible person, ready to abide the consequences. This offer was refused, it is stated by Mr. White, unless the latter, by withdrawing his plea of "*not guilty*," would lay himself at the mercy of the Attorney General. This Mr. White, conscious of his innocence, refused to do; and, accordingly, the prosecution was carried on against him.

I shall first take a view of the nature of the publication, having read it at the time, and having also read it since, with great attention. It was, for the most part, a very spirited and very sensible article, though written without that caution, which the present humbled state of the press and the fashionable clamour against bold expression rendered prudent. It complained that the Medals in question were to be given to every one of a rank above

Lieutenant Colonels inclusive; it asked, why these marks of honour were not distributed also amongst the soldiers; and it then proceeded to make a comparison between the conduct of our government and the conduct of the Emperor of France as to the distribution of marks of honour, and gave the preference to that of Napoleon, insisting that his was better calculated to inspire the soldiers with zeal for the service in which they were engaged. Besides this, the article spoke of the present ministry as weak and corrupt, and used, in this respect, those common-place expressions, which each of the political parties are in the constant practice of using towards their opponents. But, it said nothing more than those parties are in the daily habit of repeating; and, surely, if the youthful author was deceived, he might well be excused if he took the parties at their words. As to this part of the article, however, it might as well have been omitted; it was filling up space to no useful purpose; there was no man that read the article who had not, long and long before, come to a settled opinion as to the real character of the ministry, one way or the other.

As to the first part of the article, the Attorney General alledged in his speech against the unfortunate and woe-worn defendant, that the tendency was to *alienate the hearts of the soldiers from the service*; first, by telling them that they were deprived of their due share of the honors they had won; and, next, more especially by pointing out to them, that the French soldiers were, in this respect, used better than they were. The reader will perceive, that this argument makes no distinction between *truth* and *falsehood*; for, it is the *tendency* only that is brought into view; so that, according to the Attorney General, whether the statement were true or false, it would be equally criminal, if the tendency was to alienate the hearts of the soldiers from the service; and, if this doctrine be admitted, every thing is criminal that has such a tendency. Suppose, for instance, a farmer were to see a recruiting party going down a lane, and were to see the Serjeant, Corporal,

and Drummer knock a poor recruit's brains out, and then pick his pockets of his bounty money. Must the farmer not speak of this? Must he smother his knowledge of the murder, lest the relation should discourage young men from enlisting? I saw, some time ago, in the Salisbury Journal, an account of the flogging of a young man in the Militia, because he had married! Was this to be smothered, lest it should alienate the hearts of young men from the service? Thousands of cases might be supposed, and to all of them this doctrine would apply equally well as to the case before us.

It has a tendency, we are told, to make the soldiers *dislike the army*. Well, and what then? "Why, then the army would be broken up." Oh; no: that is false logic: that is not reasoning. The natural consequence, or at least, the proper consequence, would be a change as to the things complained of by the writer; and, then, so far from tending to make the soldiers *dislike* the army, the endeavours of such writer would have a tendency to make them like it better than they can now like it; and, of course, these endeavours tend to the strengthening of the military force of the country. Sir Francis Burdett, for instance, is using all his endeavours to put an end to the *flogging* of soldiers, and it is, I am pretty sure, a cause that he will never abandon till he sees it accomplished. But, is he to be told, that these efforts tend to the *breaking up of the army*? He says, on the contrary, leave off flogging and you will easily get plenty of good men for soldiers. And, is it in human nature to believe that he can, as to this matter, be wrong? Will any thing in the shape of man pretend to believe, that soldiers would like the army less on account of the abolition of flogging?

But, these publications make the soldiers *discontented* with the state of things that now is. Well; and has not every speech, at a public meeting, in favour of a petition for redress of grievances, that tendency? Is it not precisely the object of every such speech? For, as long as people are contented with what is going on, why should they petition or remonstrate? This doctrine of its being a crime to *excite discontent* strikes at the very root of political liberty. Every man who writes or speaks in *disapprobation* of what is going on comes under the charge of committing this crime; for, what he writes or speaks must necessarily tend to

excite *discontent* against people in power; every *petition*; every *address* (except it consist of praise); every thing, in short, which is, in whatever degree, expressive of disapprobation of the acts of the government, is a *crime*; is an act, for which the perpetrator may be punished *more severely than nine-tenths of the felons*! What would have been said to a doctrine like this only twenty years ago?

This doctrine goes at once to the utter extinguishment of every thing like discussion. To excite *discontent* against any act of the government that you think to be injurious to the country is not only a *laudable* mode of proceeding, but it is the *only* mode of proceeding that has any sense in it. In what other way, I should be glad to know, are you to go to work to correct what is not within your own absolute power to correct? If any of us want a road mended or turned, do we not endeavour to make our neighbours *discontented* with the old road? And, if I want to see a ministry turned out, how, in the name of common sense, am I to go to work, except it be to raise the public voice or the king's voice against them; and how am I to raise those voices against them, unless I make the public or the king *discontented* with them? Oh! blessed *Liberty of the Press*! We may "*discuss*," oh, aye, that we may! We may "*discuss*" the conduct of the government; but, woe be unto him amongst us, who dares to commit the crime of *exciting discontent* against it in the minds of those who attend to our discussions. In short, this doctrine leaves us at "*perfect liberty*" to write and speak as much as we please, so long as our writing and speaking are calculated to produce *no effect*.

But, Mr. White's publication drew a *contrast* between the treatment, in one respect, of the *English* soldiers and that of *French* soldiers, and this contrast was to the disadvantage of the former; it exhibited the French soldiers as treated, in the distribution of honours, better than the English soldiers. This was a circumstance heavily dwelt upon. This was what appeared to form the grave part of the offence. This was what seemed to give it, in the mind of the prosecutor, its deep die of offence. Whether it was *true* or not did not become a question; for, the *truth* was not, according to the mode of prosecution, a circumstance that could be stated in justification.

It is very odd to observe with what

anxious attention every word is watched which tends to this point; every word which tends to cause it to be believed, that the French soldiers are treated better than ours. *Why this anxiety?* It was never known to exist before. It is a jealousy quite of modern date; and, really, if it must exist, it does not appear to be very wise policy to be continually discovering it, and especially in such a serious manner. But, is it, then, really an offence in law; is it a matter coming under the description of a *crime*, to be punished more severely than many felonies; is it to commit an offence of this sort to compare the treatment of English with that of French soldiers and to give the preference to the latter? If this be so, why, then, what belonging to France must we say is better than a thing of the same sort belonging to us? We see no scruple made in imitating the measures of Napoleon in certain points, though, indeed, it may be said, that the imitation is very awkward. We are told, that there are corps of *Lancers* going to be established in our army; though we were once told, that those Lancers were a set of barbarous ruffians who had not sense enough to know when they had had a sufficiency of beating. We are told that his Royal Highness the Regent wears *French Pantaloon*s when reviewing the troops. And, if it be laudable, as it appears to be thought, to imitate the French as to these matters, why should it be regarded as a crime to recommend the imitation of them in the distribution of rewards amongst our soldiers? If any man had recommended, in print, the establishment of corps of Lancers, he must have done it upon the ground, that the corps of that description in the French service were better than our corps of horse; and, would it not have been a grievous libel thus to hold up the French troops as superior to our own? Would it not have been to endeavour to excite *discontents* in the army and the nation against the government and the chiefs of our army?

If this doctrine be acted upon, it is clear, that, whoever prints a paper, in which a contrast is drawn between *any thing* English and *any thing* French, disadvantageous to the former, exposes himself to the charge of *criminal libel*. French *laws* must not be preferred before English laws; nor, do I see why French *wines* should not be liable to the same sort of interdict. Sometimes, however, vastly

loyal men, without perceiving it perhaps, fall into the commission of acts of this kind, a remarkable instance of which occurred in the speech of Lord Sheffield, at the last Lewes Wool-fair. He was stating the causes of the unfortunate low price of wool, amongst which he stated, that there were large quantities raised in other countries, many of which, he said, enjoyed the great advantage over this country of *not being burthened with tythes*. Now, this not only pointed at France; it not only exhibited to the mind of every hearer a contrast between England and France, clearly advantageous to the latter; but it necessarily implied a strong commendation of that revolution and of those jacobins, against whom England has been so long at war. Here, then, was a field for innuendoes! What excursions might the mind of our active Attorney General have taken here! The author of this speech (printed in most of the news-papers), how came he to escape a charge of endeavouring to subvert the establishments in Church and State? He holds out to the *envy* of the farmers those neighbouring countries where there are *no tythes*. And is not this full as bad as to teach the soldiers to envy the French soldiers? Is not this an endeavour to excite *discontent* amongst the farmers? Is it not, in effect, to inculcate, in a manner not very indirect, the necessity of a *revolution like that which has taken place in France*? No: it is no such thing; but, it is just as much that, and more too, than Mr. White's was an endeavour to excite amongst the soldiers a spirit of mutiny. And what was to deprive Mr. White of the right of praising the establishments of Buonaparté which would not also deprive Lord Sheffield of that right? Had not the former as good a right to complain that our soldiers were not treated so well as Buonaparté's as the latter had to complain that our farmers were not treated so well as Buonaparté's farmers? The object of the war we are carrying on, is, we are told, to preserve us against the endeavours which Napoleon is making to take away our independence; to deprive us of our *freedom*; to take from us all our manifold blessings, and, amongst the rest, that supreme blessing, the *liberty of the press*! If our soldiers are persuaded, that they are treated worse than Napoleon's soldiers, they will, it is supposed, fight for us no longer; the war would, then, cease of course: and we shall lose all our blessings. But, Lord Sheffield would not, it

seems, object very strongly to be deprived of one of our blessings: namely, the blessing of *tythes*! Two, I faith! Two blessings; for his Lordship takes in *taxes* as well as *tythes*. The dulness of the wool-market "may," he says, "in great part, be attributed to *our own bad policy*, the neglect of encouraging tillage, the suffering it to labour under great expences, permitting the grain of other countries *"comparatively untaxed, and untithed, to enter our ports."* This was the most home stroke at "*social order*," that I have witnessed for a long time; it was no battling at the elbows and cheek-bones; it was what the boxers call a body-blow. It conveyed volumes into the open ears of the audience, not a man of whom (unless he was a lay improprigator) did not anxiously wish to get rid of *tythes*; not a man of whom did not know that France was meant principally by the *untithed* country; not a man of them did not know, that *tythes* were gotten rid of in France by the *overthrow of the old government*. They all well knew, indeed, that the *tythes* were done away by the republicans of France; that they were abolished by the very men against whose principles this country, in the year 1793, entered upon the dreadful war which is still going on; that they were abolished by Brissot and Paine and Guadet and Pethion and Vergniaud and Roland and the rest of that band, who have been represented as the worst enemies of order and law and especially of royalty; that, in short, the *tythes* were abolished in France by the sworn enemies of kingly government. The hearers of Lord Sheffield would not fail to bear this in mind; this they would remember perfectly well; but one thing they might possibly have been uninformed of; they might not have been informed, that Napoleon, in restoring the monarchy, had *not restored the tythes*; they might not have been informed of this; they might have supposed, that, as the kingly name and authority had returned; they might have supposed, that, as there were Bishops and Priests again in France, the *tythes* must have been restored: this they might have thought, and would, of course, have concluded, that the farmers of France had, after all, *gained nothing* by the revolution; but Lord Sheffield did not seem disposed to leave them in this error; his lordship did justice to the government of Napoleon. Whether he was well aware of what he was doing is more than I can say.

I have dwelt the longer upon this instance as it affords a case exactly in point with all those which have lately been the subject of so much discussion. To tell the people of England, and particularly to tell the cultivators of the land, when accounting to them for the dull sale of their produce, that one of the causes of the calamity is, that the government permits produce to be imported from countries (necessarily alluding to the French territories) *comparatively untaxed, and untithed*; what is this but to tell them, 1st, that the government occasions the calamity; and next, that the *cause* of those other countries being able to send grain into this cheaper than our own grain, is, that the lands in those countries are *untithed*, and that, when compared with us, the people are *untaxed*? Well, and what then? Had not Lord Sheffield a right to tell the Sussex farmers this? To be sure he had; but he had no greater right to tell it them than Mr. White had to tell the soldiers that they were not so well off as the soldiers of France. Whether either or neither spoke the *truth* is of no consequence in the argument; for, Mr. White's offence would, in the eye of our libel law, have been not the less if he had been able to prove the truth of every word that he had published. We shall suppose both Lord Sheffield and Mr. White to speak their real sentiments; and then, I think, no man will hesitate to say, that the publication of the one was full as justifiable as the speech of the other.

I have before spoken of the *ill-look* that this jealousy has; this uncommon anxiety to keep out of print all these contrasts between the situation of the French and English soldiers; and, indeed, every comparison, wherein the state of the two nations is spoken of in terms advantageous to France. This anxiety has an ugly look. It argues, that there is not a stout feeling within. It argues a fear on the part of the prosecutors, that somebody or other will *believe* what is said by the alleged libeller; that somebody or other will *really think*, that the French soldiers are better off than the English soldiers, and that the people of France, after all that has been said, are better off than the people of England.

The contrary is, indeed, constantly and loudly asserted by the prosecutors and their advocates, who say, that the army and the people have TOO MUCH SENSE to be thus misled; that they are too *thinking*

and too *loyal* to be led astray by any such efforts; and, indeed, that they most heartily *despise* the contemptible incendiaries, by whom those efforts are made. Well, now, if this were really the case, or if such were the opinion of the prosecutors, why not save themselves the trouble of prosecuting? Why prosecute men for publishing what you declare to be harmless in effect? Why take the pains to prosecute those, whom no man thinks of consequence enough to *hate*, and whom he can only find in his heart to *despise*? The object of prosecution is said to be, to prevent others from offending in the like manner. But, of what use is this, if the offence not only has done no harm, but can do no harm? If the soldiers and the people, the parties to be seduced, have been proof against the attempts at seducing them, and if they have been so, not from accident, not from any particular circumstance, but from character and mind and feeling; if this be the case, why prosecute? It is, in this case, prosecuting under colour of *preventing* what is *impossible* to take place. If a man were to publish an address to the dogs in England, telling them that they were ill-used, and that Napoleon's dogs were used much better. Would you prosecute for this? No. And why? Because, whether true or false, it could produce *no evil effect*. The dogs would not be instigated to break out against their masters by such a publication, because they would not understand what was addressed to them. Precisely so! And why prosecute, then, a man who has written that, which from the very *character* of the parties intenced to be seduced, *must* be *despised* by those parties? Why prosecute for that which you know must necessarily fall dead from the press? But, is there not, at bottom, a little affectation in these boasts about the *contempt* which the army and the people bestow upon the alledged libellers, who draw contrasts between the French and English soldiers? Is there not a little affectation at bottom? And will the reader believe, that contrasts, in which the soldiers of other countries than France should be put before those of England, would be watched with equal jealousy? Does the reader believe, for instance, that there would be any great danger in a writer's preferring the situation of an *American* soldier to that of an English soldier? Any writer might, I fancy, sing the praises of the situation of the Turkish or Russian or Prussian or Austrian or Algerine soldier long enough without attracting

any particular notice from the Ex Officio prosecutor. But, it is the *French*! Oh, the *French*! There is the gall and vinegar! There is the gravel to the teeth; there is the blast to the eyes! It is the *French*! We must say nothing good, it would seem, of the situation of France, or of any thing belonging to her. We must believe that her people are not only poor but starving, though they send us victuals in exchange for the remnant of our gold; and we must believe that her soldiers are good for little, though they have conquered the continent of Europe having us for enemies during the whole of the time.

Reader; English reader, how are things changed of late years! What wonders have been worked by this French revolution! When was it before known, heard of, or dreamt of, that offence was likely to be taken at a comparison drawn between any thing *French* and any thing *English*? Look back, and consider how strange it would have appeared for the English government to apprehend danger from any such comparison. Look at Hogarth's story of the *Gates of Calais*. Look at his *contrast* between England and France. Surely we are not the same nations that we formerly were! What! and do our rulers really fear the effect of contrasts drawn between our situation and that of the nation of *frog-eaters*? Look at the French soldiers in the above-mentioned contrast of Hogarth: ruffles without a shirt; bones sallying out through the skin; soup without meat; the sword used as a spit for frogs; the bayonet pointed at the backs of the soldiers to make them face the enemy. Such were the pictures, which we formerly drew of the soldiers of France. And, is it of contrasts between English and French soldiers that our rulers are now afraid? Is there, can there be, any ground for such fears? And, if there be no ground for such fears, where is the policy of prosecutions founded upon the supposed *danger* of such contrasts? Perhaps, in the whole of the symptoms of the times; there is not a worse than this; that the English Prosecutor should lay such mighty stress upon the evil tendency of comparisons drawn between the situation of the English soldier and that of the French soldier; that he should arraign men at the bar for drawing such comparisons; that the act should be considered as one deeply affecting the safety of the nation; an act which, formerly, would have attracted no more attention than a comparison of French against English

horses or cows. It is manifest, that there has been a great change in the relative situation of the two countries as to character, or, that these alarms are totally groundless; and, if such change has taken place, and to the advantage of France, the change must be ascribed to her revolution. To profit from whatever she has discovered of good, shunning carefully all that has proved injurious to her, would be the wisest course that our government could pursue, and would be attended with much better consequences than any endeavours to suppress the knowledge of those benefits which she has derived either from her revolution or from the laws and regulations of her present ruler.

My Article is much longer; but I am compelled to leave off here, and reserve the remainder for my next Number, because I could not divide the proceedings on the Trial again. The following very sensible letter, I could not delay inserting.

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
15th November, 1811.

ON MR. WHITE'S TRIAL.

"Mr. Cobbett; I shall leave it to your judgment, to insert in your Register or not, the following remarks on the Liberty of the Press. The result of the trial of Mr. White, is pleasing to every humane man, patriot, and sincere friend to the Liberty of the Press. In the love of truth, I beg leave to attract Lord Ellenborough's serious attention, to the subsequent concise observations, the *multum in parvo*, to use a little Latin, Mr. Cobbett, for once in a way.—Every man, my Lord, who writes at all respecting Governments, must write, either *for*, or *against* Government, and what he writes must be either *truth* or *falsehood*.

"In the first place,—*Truth written for*, or *in favor of Government*, will not be considered as libellous,—it is due to the Government, and to the People. There is no danger that the Attorney General will prosecute it.—But in the second place, what shall we say of *Truth written against Government*? it has been said, my Lord, that it is libellous—that it brings the Government into *disesteem*,—that it is of injurious tendency,—to whom, my Lord? to those, against whom it is directed, the Governors; 'ay, 'there's the rub:' but to whom is it *beneficial*? I answer, to the *People*. This

"is the very essence and vitality of the Liberty of the Press—its very meaning and explanation—its form and presence—its principal object and prerogative. And this truth ought to be written in letters of gold, on the heart of every Englishman—that the *Liberty to write Truth against the Government, is for the BENEFIT of the PEOPLE*. But, it is said, it will bring the Government into *disesteem*—so it should, my Lord—that is its great use and intention, its highest and noblest praise. Injustice, Oppression, Corruption, Bigotry, Fraud, Deceit, and Peculation, ought ever to be held in *disesteem*, in abhorrence by a *virtuous People*. To expose continually, and without ceremony, the vices and errors of Government, to stamp its measures with a *true* character, and by exposing, to tend to remove the grievances, are the grand uses and blessings of the Liberty of the Press. Now, I beg leave to turn my attention to the Attorney General.—In the first place; *falsehood written against Government*, is injustice to the Government and to the People. Mr. Attorney General will doubtless keep a keen eye upon this.—In the second place; what shall we say of *Falsehood written in favor of Government*—I assert it is an infamous libel—a libel equally upon the Government and the People—it is extremely injurious to both. It brings the Government, as well as the whole nation, into utter contempt and derision—it deceives the People, and will ultimately destroy their *confidence* in the government, as well as their integrity. It would require a volume to trace its evil effects thro' all their windings and concatenations. And should Truth be shut up in a dungeon, while Falsehood, and Impudence, and Fraud, and Oppression, stalk thro' the palace, as well as thro' our streets, and towns, and villages, with impunity? Then adieu, Dear and Noble Liberty! the paragon of this world! for whom our ancestors poured out their generous blood; and farewell, the greatness and happiness of England! Thus I think I have fully, yet concisely treated this important subject—and shown that the Liberty of the Press, is the Liberty to write Truth against the Government, for the benefit of the People. Your, &c.
G. G. FORDHAM.—Nov. 6, 1811. *Roydon, Herts.*"

TRIAL OF MR. WHITE.

Concluded from p. 608.

..... Had my imprisonment, (as is the common usage), been suffered to take place in the County or District where the offence was committed, instead of one hundred and twenty miles distant, this Article would then have been subject to my revision. Therefore it is that I say it was the *operation of the Law* which has brought me into this peril, and I hold myself justified in declaring it, because I was thereby deprived of the power of preventing its insertion. The Law is said to consider nothing but the act, and the party attached thereto:— And why?—to prevent collusion and evasion, but not to destroy the innocent.— The Law knows of no other persons than such whose names accompany the subject of Publication:—true;—but will it *refuse* to know them when tendered? And, above all, will it refuse to discriminate between the innocent and the accused? The real writer in this case offers to produce himself,—is Justice then evaded?

There is, I am certain, no person present, who has heard the circumstances of my case, but what must be convinced that in reason, and consequently in strict justice, I am not guilty of the CRIMINAL INTENTION ascribed to the meaning of the Article in question;—

It was the act of my Agent which gave it to the world, it is true, and that in my name;—whence the law implies that it becomes mine also:—But, Gentlemen, suffer me to ask,—how far this Peril of Agency,—this responsibility for the actions of others, is permitted to extend?

Are there to be no exceptions to the rule in this case?

What if my Agent, by sudden mental affliction, becomes lunatic; and inserts, without my knowledge or consent, certain expressions which should amount to High Treason?—If I am not suffered to bring that Agent forward, so cannot I avail myself of the exculpation to which he would be entitled from the nature of his affliction:—And, need I ask, Gentlemen, would you calmly send me, by your Verdict, to the scaffold for a crime so committed?

Where then does the Law fix the Line of responsibility?—Does it embrace all other subjects and circumstances, and only stop short of *madness or treason*?

Again:—does it include the peril of immoderate imprisonment, personal ruin, the destruction of the means of existence,—

and still affect to meddle not with death?

Where, I ask, is the boundary to be sought to this liability for the deeds of others?—Is it not amply sufficient for the ends of Justice, when an error has been committed, that neither Agent nor Principal desires to screen the imputed offender?—And is not the Criminal Intention charged upon either of them, by this means, proved to be misapplied?

Surely, Gentlemen you will admit, that the law was never designed to be so vague, illiberal, and unjust, as to insist upon identifying the Innocent with the Guilty.

In all criminal cases you must well know, it is the *moral intention which constitutes the crime*!—the hands perform what the heart directs, or so it is believed; and, where it is not so believed, as in the case of unintentional Killing, the Jury will never ascribe an Intention where none is proved to have existed.

Gentlemen, I have, I hope, convinced you, that neither my heart or hand consented to this act;—but, as my property was made the medium of its propagation, though perfectly unknown to me, it became my duty to produce the Author of the matter alleged against me, or become identified with him in the Accusation.— Now, as this is what I have offered to do, —as neither the matter nor the motive is justified or acknowledged by me, nor yet the Author attempted to be screened from the power of the Law;—wherein, Gentlemen, does it appear that I have provoked that Law, and why does it pursue me with unrelenting rigour?—Gentlemen, I need not remind you, that it is your province to decide upon the whole merits of the case before you, both as to *Law* and to *Fact*; and, above all, Gentlemen, according to the solemn conviction of your own consciences:—this is at once your privilege and your duty; and you will, I am confident, most scrupulously exercise them.—

The Act of Parliament, known by the Title of Mr. Fox's Act, confirmed to the Jury the right of pronouncing in cases of Libel upon the whole matter placed at issue in the Indictment or Information, and of the sense ascribed to the same;—It gives to the Jury the complete cognizance of both the *legal* and the *moral guilt of the publication*, even though such Publication be considered *legally* a Libel;—which clearly infers, that there may be a Publication, conceived to be a Libel in the *Legal* sense, and yet the publisher may be entitled to his acquittal, if the *moral* guilt

be not made manifest.—By this Act, Gentlemen, you are impowered and bound to pronounce upon *the whole matter* in issue which includes both the *legal and moral* guilt;—and you are called upon by every principle of duty and honour to acquit where the *moral* guilt be not undeniably established.—Gentlemen, I appeal to facts that this is the true construction of the Act, which was most clearly defined in the case of Mr. John Reeves, which, occurred soon after its passing, and while several of the Legislators, who were instrumental in its adoption, were on the Bench and at the bar.—In this case, the *matter* was held to be culpable, yet he was cleared of a *culpable Intention*:—the Foreman of the Jury upon that occasion pronounced these remarkable words:—"My Lord, the Jury are of opinion, that the Pamphlet, *which has been proved to have been WRITTEN* by John Reeves, Esq. is a very improper Publication:—but, being of opinion that the Defendant was not actuated by the criminal motive imputed to him in the Information, find him *NOT GUILTY*!"—And, Gentlemen, should you even be of opinion that the matter alledged in this prosecution is of the nature of Mr. Reeves's Book; yet still, unless you are equally convinced that it was given to the world with the intentions ascribed to it,—the Author of this Publication must be equally Not Guilty:—the Analogy is complete. If the Jury in Mr. Reeves's Case, though they condemned the *matter*, believed not the imputed Criminal Intention, though Reeves himself was the Author; much less can you, Gentlemen, impute a Criminal Intention to me, after all which I have offered, after all which you must have ascertained, after the conviction you must have drawn that I was totally ignorant of the Publication in question. Gentlemen, it would at once be an insult to your understanding and your justice, to suppose it possible that you can ascribe a Criminal Intention to me, with respect to a thing I never saw, nor could have seen till after its publication,—while you perceive, that a Jury, who could not make their minds satisfied that the *WRITER HIMSELF* had the Criminal Intention, imputed to him, would not suffer his conviction. I had not, could not have, the Intention imputed to me; and of this, I doubt not, you are clearly convinced.

Here, then, Gentlemen, is a direct and absolute precedent, a plain and positive example for your guide and authority,—a

Recorded Verdict for your precept and imitation!

Indeed, if the object of Mr. Fox's Act was not to bring the *moral* guilt of the Defendant, in the cases of Libel, within the purview of the Jury, the act itself was *superfluous* and nugatory.

But it not only does this, but also explains or declares, what might before have been doubtful, the *nature of a Libel*;—and if the Judge is to treat the matter in his charge to the Jury *as in other criminal cases*, WHICH THIS ACT ENJOINS HIM TO DO, the Defendant is unquestionably entitled to the same PROTECTION as afforded in other criminal Cases; and consequently that the criminal intention (whatever be the nature of the Publication) must be made manifest, or conviction cannot follow.

It has, I know, been held, and may still be held, that the Declaration of a *Criminal Intention*, as specified in the Record, is a mere matter of form,—that they are phrases of Law,—mere words of course, and out of the consideration of the Jury:—that is, that the Jury is to confine itself to judging of the *Fact*, which probably requires little judgment at all, and the Court alone is to be left to decide on the *Intention*.

We find that Lord Mansfield laid it down so to the Jury, upon the trial of Mr. Miller, for publishing Junius's Letter to the King;—He said, "that the words scandalous, seditious, &c. were inferences of law, and were not under the cognizance of the Jury!"—But the Jury thought otherwise; and, judging of the Intention as well as the Act, returned a Verdict—"Not Guilty."

Upon the Trial of Mr. Baldwin, for publishing the same Letter, Lord Mansfield again said,—“The epithets false, scandalous, and malicious, are, AT PRESENT, all words of course:—if the writing be found a Libel, they are merely inferences of Law!”—The Jury, however, who rightly considered, that a man should be charged with nothing more than was needful to his case,—that *Fact*, not *Inference*, was to constitute the Criminal Intention and direct their Verdict,—and believing no Criminal Intention to be justly ascribable to the Publisher,—unanimously pronounced him Not Guilty.

Upon the memorable trial of Mr. Owen, in 1752, for printing and publishing a Libel against Alexander Murray, Esq. Mr. Pratt, (afterwards Lord Camden,) in his argument for the Defendant, has the following words:—"If there is an in-

dictment preferred against a man for an assault to commit a rape, the *Intention* must be proved, or else the Jury cannot find him Guilty:—the same of an assault, with an intent to kill, if the *Intens* be not proved, he must be acquitted;—*if he kill*, and the *Intention* be not proved,—that is, if it be not proved, that he killed premeditatedly and of forethought, it is but manslaughter;—therefore (said Mr. Pratt,) in the case before us, if that part of the Information be not *proved* that he published maliciously, &c. YOU MUST ACQUIT !” and the Jury, notwithstanding a contrary opinion delivered by the Judge, DID ACQUIT ACCORDINGLY !!!

In the case of Mr. Almon, the Bookseller, Mr. Serjeant Glynn moved for a new Trial, and offered to produce the affidavit of Mr. Mackworth, the Foreman of the Jury, setting forth,—“ that he was by no means satisfied, with respect to Mr. Almon’s servant selling the seditious Pamphlet in question, *with the privacy, consent, and knowledge of his Master*; and, if so, Mr. Almon COULD NOT BE GUILTY of the crime laid to his charge !” One of the Judges laid down also at the time, “ that no Man was answerable for the CRIMINAL actions of his Servants !” though another of the Judges observed, that every Bookseller might by such subterfuges escape. But, Gentlemen, is there the slightest appearance of *subterfuge* in the case now before you? Can there be any imprudence or censure imputable to me in being compelled to leave the conducting of my business to my Agent; that Business which I was constrained so to leave, or to relinquish altogether? There is surely much to allow for in my situation, but nothing to condemn: necessity has combined with law against me, and I must depend on Justice and an enlightened Jury for relief. I shall adduce one more instance to prove the liability of Agents:

Barnard, K B. 336 Fitzgib. 47. The King v. Nutt. In Hilary Term, 2d. Geo. II, 1729, A woman was indicted for being the publisher of a treasonable Libel, but the evidence only proved that there the Libel was sold, but not that she knew of its being sold; in fact, she proved that she lived a mile from the shop, and had been bed-ridden for a long time; so that the presumption was that she really knew nothing of it. Kettleby trusted upon this evidence for an acquittal; for, though an action might lie against Masters or Mistresses for the actions of their Servants in a *civil suit*; it was not reasonable it should

do so in a CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. The Chief Justice said, that the Master of a Shop was answerable for every Book sold therein. The Jury, however, refused to do any thing else than find the circumstances specially, and deliver a Verdict of publishing only: and the Attorney-General, considering it a hard case, consented to withdraw a Juror.

Gentlemen,—I stand here to be judged by the Laws of God and my Country;—and sure I am, you will not suffer the technicalities or imperfections of the one to militate against the purity and justice of the other! He who reads the Heart knows me to be as free from the imputed Offence as any of the persons in the cases I have quoted; and from the facts I have adduced, Gentlemen, you must, I doubt not, be fully impressed with the same conviction.—You will not suffer the intricacies of the Law to fetter or mislead your understanding, at the peril of your own peace of mind, and to the irreparable injury of a fellow-creature. Remember, Gentlemen, your Verdict is to be the Verdict of Truth, and Truth alone. I have shewn to you that the Information is incorrect,—that the Record is false,—it will be for you to determine whether you will concur in that falsehood, and convict me upon it. Again; you must be able to look your Country in the face, and solemnly declare, upon your oath, that you believe I really had the Criminal Intention imputed to me in the Record, to which I have offered to prove that I was neither privy nor consenting: You must believe that I concurred in the full intent and meaning of the expressions therein contained,—which I have offered evidence to substantiate that I did not sanction:—You must, Gentlemen, be able conscientiously to do all this, in direct contradiction to all I have adduced, before you can possibly pronounce me Guilty. Gentlemen, On your Verdict this day depends the Liberty, and I had almost said the *Life*, of a Fellow Creature;—as too surely I feel, that the farther abridgement of the one will soon cause the extinction of the other:—and surely *that* is neither merited by the imputed Crime, taken in its utmost extent, nor sanctioned by the Law of the Land.

The greatest punishment, permitted by the jurisdiction of this Country, next to Death, is that of Imprisonment; though in some cases, even a deprivation of Life would be mercy compared to the *torture of the solitary dungeon*! Gentlemen, a condemnation of farther imprisonment upon

me will probably combine both these evils:—the fountain of life, already nearly exhausted by the effects of a rigorous and tedious confinement, will assuredly soon be wholly stopt, by a continuance of the like endurance. There has been lately a most melancholy instance of the fatal effects of a rigorous confinement acting upon a feeble Constitution; creating first despondency, next despair and delirium, and ending in premature mortality.

These considerations, though not within the cognizance of the law, will not escape the notice of humanity.—Gentlemen, as honest men,—as men of candour and discernment,—as lovers of Justice,—established on Truth and guided by Mercy,—I conjure you to reflect seriously upon the true nature of the case before you.—Recollect, Gentlemen, the case I have just adduced of Mr. John Reeves; where the Jury, because not satisfied of the criminal intention even in the Writer himself, although they condemned his production, would not convict him for it.—Now, Gentlemen, I was neither the Author nor Publisher, nor did I, as stated in the Information, cause it to be published;—on what principle, then, can a Criminal Intention attach to me that was not applicable to Mr. Reeves, the actual Author of his own Publication?—His Information, like mine, imputed to him a criminal intention, which the Jury could not discover, although they knew him to have been the Author of the obnoxious article: will you, Gentlemen, consent to impute an intention to me, which I could not possibly entertain, having no knowledge whatever of what had been done in my absence?—Reflect, Gentlemen, therefore, on the most unprecedented situation to which I have been reduced;—brought here as I am, Gentlemen, by the power of the Law, to depend solely upon the effort of reason.—Gentlemen, I do not pretend to vie in legal argument with my Learned Adversary; but I will not yield to him one point in the argument of Truth. I know little of the Law but its inflexibility, but I know that I never wantonly or wickedly offended it.—Gentlemen, you may be told that I have incurred this hazard for mere lucre sake;—so it may be said of the soldier who falls in the field, or the pleader who sits in this Court; the same inference will attach to all, who risk their persons or their property, or employ their time or talents, to improve their fortunes, or provide for their families. This cannot be a reproach, or it would attach as well

in one case as another, either to me at the Bar, or his Lordship on the Bench.—But whatever view to lucre I may have had in pursuing my Public Labours, I cannot boast of much success in that particular; as the heavy hand of the Law has contributed to crush the hopes of many years of industry and application; and left me nothing to hope for, and little more to lose.—Gentlemen, as a fellow-creature, bent down with affliction and disease, chiefly the result of my long confinement, I may truly claim your sympathy;—but, as a Man, free from all intentional crime, I claim a higher interest in your breasts.—I claim your Justice!—Gentlemen, I am *Not Guilty*,—either in word or deed,—either in act or inclination,—of the Libel imputed to me. I have offered to prove that I conceived it not,—was not consenting to it, nor even saw it till it was published to the world.—Gentlemen, You will remember that your Verdict is to be given according to the tenour of the accusation brought against me:—You have no other point to consider than the bare charge contained in that Record, which you must believe to be TRULY made in EVERY part, or no Verdict can be founded upon it.—Now, Gentlemen, I have stated to you, that the very Place of Publication, which is the preliminary to the charge, is set forth ERRONEOUSLY. I cannot answer to such a charge. I cannot consent to acknowledge that my Office of Publication was in such a place.—And I put it to your candour, Gentlemen, whether you can consent to pronounce a Verdict against the evidence of FACTS. I plead not for the forms of Law, I appeal to you for the conviction of reason.—Gentlemen, It is my undoubted privilege to have my case treated on the same principle as all other criminal cases; and, does not every day's experience prove that the least error, arising either from ignorance or informality, is fatal to a Criminal Indictment? Gentlemen, Let me ask you, were I arraigned before you for a murder or a burglary, alleged to have been committed in a wrong County or Parish, though the fact was established, would not such an error prove fatal to the charge?—Gentlemen, You may be told that the Record does not pretend to specify the identical place of Publication, that it does not even mention Warwick-square, contenting itself with the name of London.—Now, Gentlemen, had this been so, I had also been content. Had it said London ONLY, I could not gainsay it. But why spoil the Record

by a USELESS ADDITION; Why state the Publication to have been issued in a WRONG PARISH AND WARD?—Gentlemen, That such an error is fatal in a Criminal Case, the Trial of Thomas Wildey for felony, at the last Somerset Sessions, is a most convincing proof:—where the superfluous insertion of a single letter, (such as St. Michael's for St. Michael,) though it did not falsify the place, rendered the Indictment nugatory. But here, Gentlemen, is an absolute falsehood inserted:—I am persuaded you will never consent to find me guilty of publishing my paper where it never was published.—The next point Gentlemen, for your earnest attention is, that it charges me, in unqualified terms, with having published this article with a *malicious* and *seditious* motive, and you are called upon to AGREE WITH THAT CHARGE.—Let me once more ask you, Gentlemen, can *malice* attach where there has been no *forethought*?—Can a malicious motive be imputed to that man, who can prove he knew nothing of the act? You cannot possibly agree to think so. I beg you to remember, Gentlemen, THAT I KNEW NOTHING OF THIS MATTER.—Gentlemen, You are bound to decide upon the whole matter in issue.—The Act of parliament, which I have before me, expressly enjoins you to do so:—it says, "The Jury may give " a General Verdict upon the *whole matter* " put in issue; *and shall not be required by* " the Court to find the Defendant Guilty " *merely on proof of the Publication, or of* " the sense ascribed to it in the information!"—Therefore, Gentlemen, in the case before you, you must positively believe me to have had the *malice* WITHOUT THE FORETHOUGHT,—that I had the *malicious motive* ascribed to me WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATTER,—and that the Publication was issued in a Parish and Ward where it never existed. All these palpable inconsistencies and falsehoods you must *implicitly believe*,—or you will acquit me of the whole charge contained in the Record.—Gentlemen, You must upon your oaths be convinced in your consciences—not merely that I have published the matter alleged in the Information;—but that I have published it with all the criminal intentions imputed in the Record—that I have published it for the express purpose of exciting disaffection and dissatisfaction among His Majesty's subjects;—that I have published it with the view of creating discontent in the Army;—or, your Verdict must be Not Guilty. In Reeves's Case, the then Chief Justice of England

stated to the Jury—"That in order to find " the Defendant Guilty, they must be satisfied of the *evil intention* of the Defendant:—the *quo animo* was the question to be tried."—Lord Kenyon charged, that they were to find "Whether their consciences were satisfied the motive laid in the information was the motive which influenced the Defendant in the publication:—in judging of the matter alleged, they were to judge of the *motives* with which the Defendant published it. That was not to be *his* decision, " but it was for the decision of the Jury."—He added—"That it should be remembered that all Law, and especially the Criminal Law, should be administered " in mercy, for the King by his Coronation Oath was bound to administer the " Law in mercy." And now, Gentlemen, I conclude; with thanks to you and to the Court for the attention which has been afforded me; leaving my fate with confidence in your hands; persuaded, that, in the minds of an intelligent British Jury, Mercy and Truth will ever be found to prevail.

At the conclusion of his Defence, Mr. White was asked, Whether he meant to call Witnesses to speak to what he had opened.

Lord Ellenborough said, that the evidence he had stated would go only in mitigation, and not to acquittal; but his Lordship wished to know whether the Defendant would prefer having it on his Notes, or by Affidavit before the Court hereafter.

The Defendant at first chose to wait; but the Foreman of the Jury saying it would be more satisfactory to his mind to hear it, the Defendant called his Witness.

Lord Ellenborough told the Jurymen to what extent only it would affect the case. Every Printer was responsible for what was printed at his press; otherwise the moment a man gets into jail, he might open his engine for all sorts of libel with impunity.

The Defendant said, that he did not intend to call his Witness, that the Attorney General might not have the benefit of replying.

Lord Ellenborough. He has that benefit whether you do or not in this case, if he choose to exercise his right.

The Defendant then called his son, John White, who said that he visited his father in prison every day, and acted as his amanuensis. He knew of every article his father wrote for the Paper, previously to its being sent to London. The Paper in

question reached the Defendant only on the Monday after it was published. He was with his father from twelve o'clock on the Sunday of its publication, and had been so for many days previously. To the best of the witness's belief his father never knew of the Libel till after it was printed. The Defendant had not been employed in writing or reading any such Article, to the best of the Witness's belief. If his father had seen it in manuscript, the Witness must have known it.

Question by a Juror. What time does the post reach Dorchester?—*A.* It depends upon the state of the road; generally about ten o'clock, or a little after.

2. What time does the post leave Dorchester?—*A.* About twelve o'clock.

Upon his cross-examination by the Attorney General, he said, he did not know who was the Author of the Libel. When asked whether he had not heard his father say whose it was, he asked Lord Ellenborough if he was bound to answer that question.

Lord Ellenborough. Certainly.

The Defendant interposed, and Mr. Lawes objected to the question.

Lord Ellenborough refused to hear the Counsel, who, he said, had volunteered himself into a situation perfectly new; and the Court expected that the Bar would set the Public an example in preserving the order of justice.

The Defendant complained loudly of injustice; and Lord Ellenborough cautioned him not to injure himself by such unfounded complaints.

The Witness said, he might have heard his father say the Libel was written by an elder brother. This brother corresponded with his father once or twice a week. The Libel was never contradicted in the Paper, which was published till now, but which had changed its Proprietor, the witness's brother having become so since his father came to town. The brother conducted the Paper while the father was in prison.

Upon his re-examination, he knew that his brother had a discretionary latitude as to articles under the head London, as the Libel was. Such articles were written the latest in the week, and must be left to an agent's discretion.

The Attorney General, in reply, said he was ashamed to take up the time of the Jury with a refutation of that part of the argument of the Defendant which related to the parish and county in which the publication actually took place. In the

case of a murder, it might be necessary to state exactly where it was committed; but in the present case, the statement of the place of publication was a mere matter of form. The Defendant had entered into various other arguments, which, whatever effect they might have when offered at another stage of the prosecution, in mitigation of punishment, were at present totally irrelevant.—The Defendant had spoken at great length of the hardships of his situation; that he had offered to give up the real author of the libel on condition of escaping from prosecution. He would take upon him to say, that no publisher of a Newspaper had ever less reason to complain of hard treatment than the Defendant; but he could never condescend to submit to the terms which the Defendant wished to impose upon him, nor agree to the doctrine, that the proprietors of those publications in which libels have appeared, are not completely answerable for all such libels. A doctrine like this would lead to the most alarming consequences. He really could see nothing which could place the present Defendant out of the general rule of law. The Defendant did not dispute that this article charged against him was a libel, and that its intention was evidently to create dissatisfaction among His Majesty's Subjects, and to spread discontent among the soldiers; he did not dispute that it was scandalous and malicious; that it slandered His Majesty's Ministers in the most gross and unfounded manner; but he grounded his defence on this, that he was not answerable for any thing which was published during his confinement in prison; that any such improper publication was not his fault, but the fault of the law; for the law had confined him, and prevented him from exercising a superintendence over any thing which might appear in his Paper. The law had, indeed, sentenced him to imprisonment, because of his commission of an offence which called for that punishment; the Defendant had placed himself in Dorchester Gaol, by doing an act which called for the infliction of such a sentence; and nothing could be more unjust, therefore, than to charge that upon the law which was only chargeable upon himself; and when another act was committed more criminal than that for which he was sentenced, to say, that because he was prevented from superintending his publication, he was, therefore, not answerable for it. Such a proposition he knew not well how to ex-

mine ; it was neither founded on law nor justice. If a publication was carried on in London, from which all the profit was derived by the Defendant, because he happened to entrust the charge of it to others, was he to be permitted to send out fire-brands through the land, without being answerable for them ? But what evidence was there that he disapproved of the article in question ? He had asked that witness who had stated that the article was written by his elder brother, if any single article had ever yet appeared in *The Independent Whig*, from which it might be inferred that the sentiments of the libel had been disapproved of ? No such article could be pointed out ; and it appeared most evident, that this seeming disapproval was now resorted to solely for the purpose of eluding the grasp of the law. How did he not think of applying an antidote to the poison which had been disseminated by his agent ? In doing this, there could not have been the smallest danger. Although the writer of the libel was his own son, he had no occasion to disclose that circumstance ; he had nothing to do but to state that his confinement in *Dorchester Gaol* left him no opportunity to examine all the articles of the Newspaper previous to insertion, and that he had seen with concern an article make its appearance containing principles which he disclaimed. This, if what the Defendant had stated this day were sincere, would have been the course of conduct pursued by him. Had he been convinced that the article in his paper was mischievous, the road was completely open to him, and he would have endeavoured to set himself right ; he would have taken the earliest opportunity to disavow its sentiments. Instead of that, however, he allows the poison to work on the public mind, he allows it to spread among the soldiery without endeavouring to furnish them with any remedy ; and then, when all the mischief was done, and when he was called upon to answer for his offence, he thought proper to come forward with a disavowal. Let any man be as favorably disposed towards the Defendant as it was possible to be, could he, could even the Defendant's own friends and relations pretend, that if he had really repented of the libellous article, had seen the mischievous tendency of it, and wished to avert the effects which it might produce, he would not have published an immediate disavowal ? But had the Defendant done this ?—had he not quietly

allowed all the mischief to be done without taking the smallest step to endeavour to avert it, or to testify his regret ? He was aware that he was unnecessarily consuming the time of the Jury ; for the only time when such topics as had been urged by the Defendant could be brought forward with any degree of propriety was in mitigation of punishment. By law, the Proprietors of Newspapers were answerable for every thing which appeared in them ; and it was because they were answerable that the law required them to furnish their names. If the doctrine of the Defendant, however, were to be listened to, the law would become an object of ridicule, a mere stalking horse, when every man might say that he had not, forsooth, the cognizance of any particular article in his Paper. By law, it was the condition of being a proprietor of a Newspaper to be answerable for whatever was contained in it. It was not contended, the article now charged against the Defendant did not contain gross and mischievous slander ; and if it did contain such slander, as Proprietor and Editor of the Paper in which it appeared, he was every way answerable for it by law.

Lord *Ellenborough* then proceeded to charge the Jury. This was an indictment against the Defendant, Henry White, for a Libel. The first thing which was to be proved was the fact of publication ;—and if, after the notice he had given at the Stamp Office of his intention to publish such a Journal at No. 23, Warwick square, there could yet remain any doubts whether there was sufficient legal proof of the publication, those doubts must have been completely removed by the course which the Defendant had taken. It was certainly the right of every Defendant to determine whether he should conduct his defence himself, or whether he should employ Counsel ;—but they who chose to defend themselves, always incurred the danger of injuring their case, by letting out facts which the discretion of Counsel would have thought it more prudent to conceal. In this respect, the present Defendant had imprudently admitted that, which, if he had left his Defence to his Counsel, would, probably, not have been admitted. If, however, he had not been directly instrumental in the publication of this libel, the Jury must recollect, that he had taken no pains to counteract its malignity. In calling witnesses, the Defendant had made an unnecessary parade and display of evidence, the object of which appeared

merely to be, that those matters might be placed on the Judge's notes of the trial, which might otherwise more regularly be brought forward by affidavits in mitigation of punishment. It was no defence in law to say, that he was not the writer of the libel,—he was equally responsible if it were inserted by his authorised agent. He who does a thing by the hands of another, is as responsible as if he had done it himself. If that were not the law, what mischiefs might not every Proprietor of a Newspaper commit with impunity?—He might employ a machine which should be constantly at work to infect and poison the public mind with his own malignity;—his types might be always ready to disseminate libels and calumnies, and yet he himself might put his hands before his eyes, and be determined to see nothing, or know nothing of the mischiefs that he was doing. He might swear, and get others to swear, that he had never seen the libel for which he was prosecuted. This, however, would not satisfy the law. He would be still responsible for all the mischiefs done either by himself or his authorised agents. This was a doctrine upon which there could be no doubt; it was established, and recognised as law by every Judge and every lawyer whom he had ever known since his acquaintance with Courts of Justice. The Defendant had quoted several expressions of different lawyers in their arguments; but it was of very little consequence what Mr. Kettleby or any other lawyer might have said in the management of their client's causes. He knew many men of the first authority in the present day, who would be very sorry to be held to whatever opinions they might have said in arguments at the bar. He felt it his duty to lay it down as the unquestionable Law of the Land, the law which to all the subjects of this realm is the security for every blessing which they enjoy, and the protection from every mischief to which they would otherwise be exposed,—that the Proprietor of every Newspaper is responsible for the contents of his Paper, whether written by himself or any other person. This had frequently been determined to be the law, even in cases where the sickness of such Proprietor made it absolutely impossible for him to see what was inserted in his Paper. Circumstances of this nature had, however, always their proper weight, when urged at a fit time in mitigation of punishment. He had seen twenty printers on the floor of the Court of King's Bench,

who had sworn to their absolute ignorance of the insertion of the offensive article; and such affidavits were always allowed their due weight at a proper time. The Defendant had pressed strongly upon the Jury the length of his imprisonment, which should have served as a caution to him to abstain from publishing libels. If his means of subsistence were entirely derived from the conduct of a Journal, it might have been supposed, that, after so severe a warning, he would have felt more than ever the necessity of superintending the articles which were to be inserted, and keeping out what was libellous. It might have been expected that he would have been particularly cautious in the choice of his agents; and that he would have found it necessary to exercise considerable care in their superintendence and control. On the contrary, it seemed that he left the management to his son, with a discretionary power to insert whatever he might think proper. If, however, a libel had found its way into a paper which was directly contrary to its usual tenor, and an apology had been speedily made, the case would not then, in all probability, have been selected for prosecution. If the present Defendant had really disapproved of the article in question, as he now professes to disapprove of it, why did he not take some means of manifesting his disapprobation in his own Paper? The Defendant, in the course of his argument, had taken different objections to the information, which he called a foolish and false record. His first objection was to the publication being stated to have taken place in the parish of St. Mary-le-Bow. This was, however, a usual description in law, and it was not to be expected that the rules of law, established for wise purposes, were to bend to the suggestions of every unlearned Defendant. How many convictions had taken place upon indictments for robberies and other criminal offences, alleged generally in the parish of St. Mary-le-Bow, in the ward of Cheap, whereas, in fact, they were in a different parish and ward? And yet no man had ever before thought it consistent with modesty to make such an objection. The Defendant had very properly exonerated his legal advisers from any blame in taking such an objection, for it was one which he could not believe that any Barrister would make. If the offence was laid in the proper county, there was no occasion for the parish to be expressly stated; and the constant practice was, not to specify the particular parish.

In burglaries, however, (a fatal flaw in which had been quoted as a precedent by the Defendant,) the reason of the thing was different. Since that was a local offence, it was absolutely necessary to describe the situation of the house which was broken into; and, therefore, the misnomer of the place was justly fatal in the case which the Defendant had cited. The same accuracy of local description was not necessary in setting out other offences. As to his next objection, that the indictment had falsely charged him with a criminal intention, the rule which pervaded the criminal as well as the civil law was, that a man is responsible for the acts of his agents. The law collects the intention from the act itself. If any man, with his eyes open, were to strike and wound his Lordship with a deadly weapon, it would be no satisfaction to him for the man to say he did not intend it. Such a man would be as mad as the cobbler of Messina, who went about shooting every man whom he thought mischievous to the State. His plea was,—“It is true I have killed this or that man, but my intention was good,—I meant to benefit the State.”—Men must generally be presumed to intend that which they do. A man, therefore, who chooses to conduct a newspaper, and sets up somebody else, who circulates libels through its means, must be presumed to intend the circulation of such libels; and he must be considered as having done that which he has so caused to be done. He must also be presumed to have sanctioned that which he never thought proper to express any disapprobation of. As to Mr. Reeves's case, which the Defendant had cited, that stood upon very different ground; his Lordship was in the cause, and felt perfectly satisfied at the time with the verdict of the Jury, and knew that many high in authority agreed with him. The Jury thought the publication of Mr. Reeves a very improper one, but acquitted him on the ground of his not writing it with the criminal intention imputed to him. In this opinion of that publication he entirely coincided. Mr. Reeves had been charged with writing his Book with the intention of vilifying the Houses of Lords and Commons; but it appeared to him, that he had no such intention, and that what gave offence was nothing but *metaphor run mad*. Mr. Reeves had got hold of a metaphor,—the trunk of a tree;—and he called Monarchy the trunk, and the two Houses of Parliament the branches, which might be lopped off without de-

stroying the trunk. Now, as to the question which of the parts of our Government was the original stem, and which were to be considered the adjuncts, was a question more of antiquarian research than of real importance; and Mr. Reeves was a great antiquary. His Lordship was, therefore, satisfied with that verdict, because he really believed that Mr. Reeves had not the intention imputed to him; and his reason for so believing was collected from the book itself. This was the great difference between the two cases. In Mr. Reeves's case it was from the perusal of the writing charged as a libel, that the Jury formed their opinion that there was no criminal intention; but in this case he believed that no such conclusion could be drawn from the writing itself.

As to the law of Libel he did not seek, nor ever had sought, to abridge the privileges which the Constitution gave to Juries. He must say, however, that he could hardly conceive that any sensible man could entertain a doubt but that the article for which the Defendant was now prosecuted did tend to disgust our soldiers, upon whose valour and good conduct the defence of the country, and every thing dear to us, now mainly depend.—He could have no doubt but that publications tending to alienate the soldiery, and directly defaming the Government, were Libels. He should wish to know by what law it was that the very lowest Officer in the State may be protected from calumnies, but that those who fill the highest and most important offices in the Administration are to find no similar protection?—He by no means wished to abridge the privilege of discussing temperately the measures of any Administration; but such discussion ought to be conducted innocently and decently. To charge the Members of the Administration generally with corruption was clearly libellous: and to do so on an occasion where corruption could not enter, was foolish. It was most evident in the present case, that granting medals to all Officers of a certain rank, who had seen a certain service, could not answer any purpose of corruption; and that extending them to every soldier in the army would have made the distinction of no value. The Defendant, in the publication before them, spoke of “the equivocal and barren victories of Roleia, Vimiera, Corunna, and Talavera.”—Now, although circumstances had prevented results as important as we could have wished following those battles, still he conceived there was something in

them in which Englishmen naturally felt a pride; and, as to the valour of our soldiers, he believed it was as conspicuous in these battles, as in the ancient battles, which the Defendant had alluded to, of Cressy, Poitiers, &c. The Defendant had asked, "why were the soldiers who fought in those battles not also honoured with medals?"—and said, "that such distinction was an insult to the army."—Now he would ask, did not the soldier feel a pride in the honours and distinctions conferred upon his Officer?—The Defendant had also spoken of "the drooping energies and wasted resources of this country." His Lordship did not know how the energies of this country could be said to droop, and was convinced that the energies of Englishmen would always be found sufficient to defend their country. He would wish to know, for what period of time the energies of the people of this country have been supposed to be declining?—Was it during the career of Lord Nelson's victories?—was it when Captain Hoste lately conquered in the Mediterranean a hostile force of double the number?—or was it the other day, when he himself heard with his own ears, the cannon of our cruizers that repulsed Buonaparté's flotilla, under the eyes of that great Commander, and took one of his praams?—The telling the army that they were insulted by their Government appeared to him a Libel of the most dangerous tendency; and the calumnies against the Members of the Government were equally libellous. Character is of the utmost importance to every man in high trust; and those in the highest situation have a right to the protection of their characters from those coarse, brutal, and calumnious, misrepresentations which were so often poured out against them. The principal danger of those foul calumnies, which were often bestowed most undeservedly, was, that it was apt to make men callous to Public censure, and to generate a sort of indifference as to any thing which might be published with respect to their Public conduct. In this manner the licentious abuse of the press prevented that Public good which might be expected from the fair exercise of it. He would not lay it down merely from his own authority, but he would state it from the authority of Chief Justice Holt, (than whom there was no warmer friend of the liberty of the sub-

ject,) that a libel on the Government of the Country, charging them with corruption and baseness, was a sort of libel which ought to be severely punished. To tell the Army "they were insulted," appeared clearly to him to be a dangerous libel; and from this commiseration of the situation of the English soldiers, the writer (as is the custom in such articles) proceeds to compliment Buonaparté. "With him, merit is always rewarded, and the situation of the soldier attended to." He could not conceive what greater mischiefs the emissaries of Buonaparté (if there are any in this Country) could do, than disseminate such doctrines among our soldiers. As to the Government that was charged with so much imbecility and corruption, he did not himself belong to the Administration, whatever was its character, imbecile or not so: but he could not have a doubt in his mind but that the charging the Members of the Administration with imbecility and corruption in their office was a libel. He had also no manner of doubt, but the Defendant was legally responsible for the insertion of such an article in his paper. He knew that it was within the province of the Jury to determine on the whole of the case; but it was his duty also to state to them his opinion of the articles before them: and that opinion was clearly that it was a libel. If the Jury coincided in that opinion, they would of course find the Defendant Guilty.

The Trial of this Information lasted from Nine o'clock in the Morning till One in the Afternoon. The Jury, after an absence of *four hours*, returned to their box at Five o'clock, and delivered in writing the following verdict:—"The Jury find the Defendant guilty of printing and publishing the Libel, through the medium of his Agent; but on account of his peculiar situation, earnestly recommend him to mercy."

Mr. Lowten, the Clerk of the Court, objected to this verdict, unless he might consider it as Guilty. A cry of "No, No," immediately issued from the Jury; and they again retired; and, after consulting about Ten Minutes, returned with a Verdict of "NOT GUILTY!!!"

On the announcement of the Verdict, acclamations of joy proceeded from the persons who had waited in the Court for the result.

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"After the evidence on both sides is closed, the individual prosecutor, or his counsel, and the Attorney General, shall be heard in support of the accusation. The accused person, or his counsel, may answer them. The individual prosecutor, or the Attorney General, shall be permitted to reply; but, the accused person, or his counsel, shall always have the last word."—NAPOLÉON'S CODE of Criminal Procedure. Book II. Title II. Chap. IV. Clause 335.

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TRIAL OF MR. WHITE, PROPRIETOR OF THE INDEPENDENT WHIG, (continued from page 620.)

Having taken a view of the nature of the publication, for which Mr. White was prosecuted, let us next see, what were the grounds of proceeding against him in preference to his son, who was the real author of the publication, and who was, as it is stated by Mr. White, ready to stand forward and to declare himself to be such. It is stated, in the reported proceedings on the Trial, that the prosecution was carried on against Mr. White, because he was the proprietor of the paper; because he was, at bottom, the person who caused the paper to exist and go forth; and, of course, the person who ought to be made answerable for the publication, seeing that, if he had not had such a paper, the alledged libel could not have been published in it. The same was said in the case of Mr. Lovel: "if there were no publishers," it was said, "there could be no libels published;" which is very true; and it is not less true, that if there were no publishers, *nothing at all could be published*; and, further, that this reasoning leads directly to the last stage of the progress; namely, to the putting an end to all publishing, as the effectual means of preventing libelling.

But, is this doctrine *always* acted upon? The reader shall judge. When I was upon my trial, I cited an instance of the contrary. I related, that the Proprietor of the *Morning Post*, having published what was deemed a libel by Sir Arthur Pigot, the latter filed an Ex Officio Information against him, and which was the only one he did file for a libel, while he was in office. The party against whom this information was filed, had, I stated, never been prosecuted by the successor of Sir Arthur Pigot, though, as I conceived, the publication complained of had a much more direct tendency to excite a mutiny in the army, than had the publication, for which

I was prosecuted. In his reply, what did the Attorney General say? Why, he said this: that there was a great deal of difference; a very wide distinction indeed; between the *author* and the *publisher*; that the former was much the most criminal of the two; and that when *he* could be come at, the publisher might be let off. I know not that these were his very words; but, for the substance I will answer. Accordingly, he said, that the Proprietor of the *Morning Post* having given up the author, that Proprietor had not been prosecuted; but, he added, that the *author* was *abroad*, and would be prosecuted on his return home.

Nothing could be more reasonable than this. It was a very fair way of dealing; and this answer *to me* was complete; because I was not only the Proprietor of the paper, but also the *author* of the alledged libel. Was it, however an answer to my *Printer*, my *Publisher*, and one of the *Principal News-men*? Was it an answer to them? Were they more guilty than the Proprietor of the *Morning Post*; they, two of whom swore that they knew not what the article contained; and that they sold the Register in the way of their trade, as they did other publications, without being at all interested in its success any more than in that of other publications? Was this an answer to *them*, whom the Attorney General prosecuted, and who were imprisoned? And, how does the same answer apply to the case of Mr. White? He was not the *author*: he was merely the Proprietor of the paper as in the case of the *Morning Post*. The *Morning Post* Proprietor gave up his author: Mr. White's author gave himself up. The author in the first case was *abroad*; the author in the latter case was at *home*. Upon what principle, then, was it proper to pursue Mr. White, and not to pursue the Proprietor of the *Morning Post*? Nothing more need be said upon this part of the subject. The case being thus put, every

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man is able to form a just opinion upon it.

There were in the 'course' of the proceedings many things well worthy of remark; but, as the proceedings have been pretty fully given in most of the newspapers, and as they speak so plainly for themselves, much more so, indeed, than I should think it prudent to speak of them, I shall leave them to work their natural effect.

One doctrine, however, I cannot help noticing in a more particular manner. I mean, the doctrine, that the *intention* is to be gathered solely from the *act*; and that every Proprietor is *answerable* to the full extent of criminality for whatever may appear in his paper. Now, it appears to me, that this doctrine, if it be maintainable, makes the press a thing so perilous as that we ought to wish to see it extinguished at once.

When a man is charged with a *libel*, he is accused of having written, or published, such and such words with such and such *evil intention*; and, therefore, if the jury find him innocent of the *evil intention*, they must acquit him, or must be perjured men. It is, in all cases of this sort, the *intention*, and that *alone*, that makes the *crime*. The thing may be false, it may be calculated to do mischief, and it may even really do mischief; and yet the man who writes or publishes it may be perfectly innocent. How often do men injure and even kill one another, and yet commit no crime? The acts they do would be criminal if the *evil intention* existed; but, unless that be shown to exist, unless the jury be convinced of that, they ought to acquit; and, why not in cases of libel as well as in cases of homicide? As applicable to this point, Mr. White very judiciously referred to the charge given to the jury in the case of Mr. Reeves by Lord Kenyon, who said: "That, in order to find the defendant guilty, they must be *satisfied* of the *EVIL INTENTION* of the defendant: the *quo animo* was the question to be tried." He said, they were to find, "whether their consciences were satisfied, that the *motive laid in the Information* was the *motive that influenced the defendant in the publication*: in judging of the matter alledged, they were to judge of the *motives* with which the defendant published it. That was not to be HIS decision, but it was for the decision of the jury." He added: "that it should be remembered that all Law, and espe-

cially the *criminal law*, should be administered in *mercy*; for the king, by his coronation oath, was bound to administer *Law in mercy*."

Now, without stopping to compare the charge in *this case* with charges of the same judge in *other cases* of libel, I think I may anticipate the reader's concurrence with me in the opinion, that this charge was in the true spirit of English law; and that it is upon the same principles, that every jury, in cases of libel, ought to decide; and that they ought not to judge of the motive from the nature, nor from the tendency, nor even from the actual effect of the act, if it should have produced any effects. It has been said: we must judge of the *motive* from the *tendency* of the words published; but, how are we to judge of the *tendency*; what proof have we as to that prior point? It was alledged, for instance, that the pretended libel of Mr. White *tended* to alienate the hearts of the soldiers from the service, and that, *therefore*, such must have been his *intention*. He proved that he could have no intention at all about the matter, because the publication was made without his knowledge. But, suppose he had been the author. In order to satisfy the mind of the jury, that the allegation of *evil tendency* was true, it was necessary to give some proof of it. Had the hearts of the soldiers been alienated from the service? No. Where, then, was the proof of the alledged tendency? And where was the ground for a verdict of guilty as to the *motive*; which motive was, you will observe, to be gathered from *that tendency*?

With regard to the doctrine of *responsibility*, let us see whither it would lead us; let us see how enviable it would make the situation of the negro slave compared with that of the Proprietor of any periodical publication. The doctrine is, that such proprietor, be he absent or present, be he in health or at the point of death, be he the author himself or be he in a state of delirium when an article is inserted in his paper, is equally responsible for it. Now, suppose my printer, without my knowledge, were to put into my paper an article, *instigating the people to rise and kill the king*; and, suppose the article to have the effect of causing the king to be murdered. Here would be an act of high treason so clear that there could not possibly be any dispute about the matter. But, will any man say, that I should be guilty of high treason, and that I ought

to be hanged and cut up into quarters; and that the several parts of my carcass ought to be placed at the disposal of the new king? Would any jury, would any twelve men upon the face of this earth find me guilty of that crime, and expose me to such a fate, if they had it proved to them, that I had no knowledge of the insertion of the article? And, if they would not; if they would not, under such circumstances, take away my life, how could the jury have taken Mr. White's liberty?

It is very well known, that those who write and those who are proprietors of periodical works, have not the power to prevent the insertion of any article that the printer has a mind to insert. The printer has the sole management of the types and the press; and though it is quite *improbable* that a person so entrusted should insert any thing of his own head, yet it is always *possible*; and, if a verdict of *guilty* against the proprietor be to be the necessary consequence, then should the writer of a periodical paper, keep constantly upon the table before him, a *halter* and a *death's head*; for, he is every hour of his life exposed to an ignominious death. It may be said, that I have here supposed strong and improbable cases. True; but they are possible. The doctrine goes this length. This is what *may* happen to any man, who is a writer or proprietor of a periodical work, if such be the *law*.

I shall conclude what I have to say upon this subject, at present, by asking, what is, or can be, the good of these prosecutions? They have been going on, with unusual activity, for about twenty years past, and what have they done for the country, or for the government? They have for the most part been connected with the war against France and with the opinions which arose out of the French revolution. And, has the state of the nation become more secure on account of them? Is the church or state in less danger now than in the year 1793, when the horrible cry of *Jacobinism* was first set up, and when the people of England were divided into two hostile parties? Do these prosecutions tend to *unite* us? Do they tend to produce harmony in society? Do they tend to the preparing of the people for that unanimity of exertion, which will, in all human probability, ere long be necessary to the defence of our very homes?

The notion has been, that such prosecu-

tions were necessary, to prevent consequences here similar to those which have taken place in France; and this appears, with many persons, to be still the notion. "Hold tight the rein," has been the maxim. They tried this under all the old governments of Europe, and where are those governments now? Have they prevented the so-much-dreaded consequences? Has their "*timely rigour*" saved them? None of them thought of *timely concession*. That was a way which none of them tried, or attempted to try till it was too late. I have been much pleased with a passage in a small pamphlet, just published by Johnson and Co., St. Paul's Church Yard, entitled "*A Letter upon the mischievous consequences of the Spanish Inquisition, as it actually exists in the Provinces under the Spanish Government.*"—The writer is speaking of the use made of the Inquisition with regard to the *press*; and, in the passage, I allude to, he says:—"Perhaps you imagine that the Inquisition has produced or may produce, an indirect advantage, by checking the circulation of those doctrines, which, in the opinion of many, have caused the misfortunes of France, and overturned the rest of Europe. It is very far from my intention to enter into a discussion on the real causes of the French Revolution; but, even though all that influence, which some have pretended, were to be attributed to the books of philosophers, and which I am very far from admitting to the same extent, the time of explosion has now passed, and as we have witnessed what the result has been, it is ridiculous to imagine it will be repeated. Every nation of the continent has seen to what these theories amount when put into practice, and although the truths they contain can never be entirely forgotten, they are convinced that the entire systems are literally impracticable. Besides, these instruments of combustion and disorder are *infinitely more dangerous when they burn secretly, than when they waste themselves in sparks in the open air*. In a country oppressed by the religious and literary tyranny of the Inquisition, the most superficial and absurd book becomes a treasure, which passes from hand to hand: it is sufficient that it be prohibited, to be thought excellent; danger and persecution irritate the imagination of the stupid: ALL BURN WITH DESIRE OF REVENGING THEMSELVES ON

"THEIR OPPRESSORS. The party in
 "favour of a liberty as absolute as the
 "oppression under which its individuals
 "are groaning, inevitably increases, and
 "the passion for revenge, founded on a
 "basis which, amidst illusions, contains
 "not a small proportion of truth and jus-
 "tice, is unbounded when it meets an opportu-
 "nity of venting itself. The only mode of
 "avoiding revolutions, like that of France,
 "is for governments not to be blind to the
 "state of opinion of their subjects, and for
 "them to know, that it is necessary for
 "their own sakes TO YIELD IN TIME,
 "I do not say all that is just (for that
 "might perhaps be asking too much) but
 "what in the end they cannot deny. But,
 "to resist by force the propagation of OPI-
 "NIONS is a folly, is an impossibility,
 "since there is a press. If these opi-
 "nions be correct, they will penetrate
 "every where; and persecution will give
 "to them a dangerous character, without
 "succeeding in diminishing the number of
 "adepts. If they be false, and merely
 "dazzle by their false splendour, do not
 "give them consequence by a tyrannical
 "opposition; let them pass, and attack
 "them by reasoning. There is no fear of
 "falsehood ruling: one or two may per-
 "haps be deceived, but the generality of
 "people are not to be imposed upon in a
 "free discussion. If a system, examined
 "in this manner, preserves the general
 "opinion it at first obtained, or instead of
 "losing it, increases it daily in its favour,
 "neither the Inquisition of Spain, with its
 "excommunications, nor the former go-
 "vernment of France, with its banish-
 "ments and burnings by the hand of the
 "hangman, nor Buonaparté, with his sup-
 "pression of the press, will ever succeed
 "in overthrowing it."

The same reasoning applies to all coun-
 tries, all governments, and to all the vari-
 ous means made use of in resisting by force
 the propagation of opinions. It is remark-
 able, that these are almost the very words,
 so often made use of by Mr. Fox at the
 outset of the Anti-Jacobin war. He called
 that a war against opinions; and, because
 that was its basis, he said it never could
 succeed. The real grounds of that war
 were never openly avowed: it was called
 a just and necessary war; it was called
 by all sorts of indefinite names. But, the
 fact was, that it was a war for the preven-
 tion of the propagation of political princi-
 ples. It answered its purpose, for a while,
 as far as related to the effect of these prin-

ciples in some countries; but, what has it
 done in the end? It has insured the total
 destruction and annihilation of the old go-
 vernments of the continent; and it has
 created a power at the bare name of
 which uneasy sensations are excited even
 in this country, where heretofore France
 and Frenchmen were held in scorn. The
 war having failed; having so completely
 failed of its object, what reason is there
 to expect, that the propagation of opinions
 are to be resisted by any other species of
 force? Why should men believe, that
 that which immense armies have not been
 able to overcome, will be subdued by legal
 prosecutions?

Again, if it were possible to so subdue,
 so bend down, the minds of a whole peo-
 ple, as to make them afraid to interchange
 their thoughts, even in conversation,
 what would you effect thereby? Only
 render them perfectly indifferent as to the
 political fate of their country; only to
 make each man draw himself within his
 shell, and say, "let what will come, I
 cannot be less free than I am." It was
 in this state, that the French found the peo-
 ple of the continent; and was it any won-
 der, that they met with so little resistance?
 Was it not, on the contrary, wonderful,
 that they met with any resistance at all?
 I remember, that it was the fashion of
 1774, 5, 6, 7, and 8, to abuse the people of
 the continent for suffering the French to
 take quiet possession of their countries, and
 few joined more heartily in that abuse
 than I did; but I had not then duly con-
 sidered the cause, which, when it is once
 seen, leaves nothing to wonder at.

Of all objects, degrading to the country
 where they are seen, that of a slavish press is
 certainly the most degrading. With the
 press men have been understood to as-
 sociate the ideas of liberality of mind;
 thoughts free as air; words free as those
 thoughts. The press has been called the
 guardian of freedom; and, in short, it has
 been looked upon as something forming a
 sort of balance against the great powers of
 our government in particular; and, it has
 often been said, that a minister dared not
 do this or that in England, because, though
 there might be no positive law to reach
 him, there was the press.

Is not this true, reader? Is not this the
 light in which you have viewed the press?
 Is not this press, therefore, one of the
 things that we are expending ninety millions
 a year to preserve, to prevent from being put
 down by a conquering invader? If this

be so, then there ought to be some use in this press. It ought to operate as some check upon men in power; and to do that it must exercise the right of exposing these men in their *proper colours*, be they in what station they may. Instead of this what have we? A press, in whatever shape its productions may make their appearance, the most servile that ever existed in the world; a press whose continual gutter of praise of men in power, and of any one who has the means of paying its venal authors, stinks through the land; a press sending forth, whether in books, pamphlets, or papers, statements innumerable, which the authors know to be false; a press, the vehicle of the grossest fabrications, forged signatures, and forged documents, so that the history of the times as it stands recorded by this press is a mass of lies; a press, in short, the foe of truth and the foe of freedom. *Why* it is so the reader need not be told; nor will any man of common discernment fail to perceive what are the consequences, to which the exercise of such a press must finally lead.

It gives me great pleasure to be able to state, that a deputation of friends of the *liberty of the press* have waited on SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, and obtained his consent to preside at a Meeting to be held at the *Crown and Anchor*, on Monday senight, to take into consideration the claim of Mr. White to Public Support.

* * There was an error of the printer, in the last Number, where speaking of the hour of the day, when the post came in at Dorchester, it was, in page 631, said to be at *ten o'clock*, when it ought to have been at *one o'clock*.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.—In another part of this Number, will be found a Letter from a correspondent upon the subject of the Court of Inquiry, held at New York, relative to the affair between the *President* and the *Little Belt*. I will only say upon that letter, that I have inserted it, because I wish both sides to be heard; but that it, in no degree, alters my opinion as to the fact of the first shot having been fired by the *Little Belt*. Besides, if our government were not conscious of that fact, how comes it that *they* should have called no Court of Inquiry? The thing stands thus at present: either our government are

satisfied, that we were the *aggressors* in this affair, or, they think it prudent not to give *proof* of the aggression on the other side, not being prepared to resent it in a becoming manner. The former is what one would willingly suppose as least disadvantageous to the country; but, then, we ought to bear in mind, that some apology for the aggression is due to the Americans.

—Speculations now begin to occupy the public mind as to the conduct that the American government will pursue towards us when the Congress shall meet. Indeed it has met before now. It is thought by some, that the first will be an *embargo*. If this measure be adopted, it will, at this time, most seriously affect us. Corn is already very dear in this kingdom, and it appears to be rising daily in price. The quartern loaf sells at 1s. 6d. making the bread *fourpence a pound*. The supply which America could afford to this country might not be very great; but, it is by her that Lisbon and Cadiz and a considerable portion of Spain and Portugal are fed. Cut off that source of supply, and what follows? Why, our army must *come home*, or be *fed from this kingdom*, where the quartern loaf is already at the price of 1s. 6d.—That America will do whatever she can to annoy us no one will doubt; and she can now do a great deal. She can send her men; indeed they will go of themselves, to man the fleets of Napoleon, who wants nothing but sailors, and who will here find what he wants. I wish our government to think seriously of this, before they get into a war with America. We cannot materially hurt her now. She has the means of supplying herself with manufactures. She wants no more of our assistance in that way. Her lands are well stocked with the sheep, which our war has driven out of Spain. She has been sending food to our armies, and she has been, and yet is, freightening back her ships with those animals which will complete her independence of us. From the ports of Spain, and even from those of Portugal, the Americans take sheep in almost every vessel. An eye witness, who left Portugal but a week or two ago, has informed me, that, from Lisbon, scarcely an American vessel sails without having some sheep on board. This fact alone would convince any body but such a man as Lord Sheffield, that there is an end to the supplying of America with woollens from England. The former connection might have existed for some, and

even many years longer, had it not been for that series of measures on our part, which have produced the *non-importation act*. But that Act has put an end to the connection (upon its former footing) for ever.—Suppose that we, by sending out fleets, are able to do mischief to America. Will that do us any good? If we had, indeed, no other enemy, the mischief we are able to do her might be worth calculating upon. But, we have another enemy, and every shot we fire at the Americans is a shot fired for Napoleon, who, if it answered no other purpose, must gain by any expence or loss of lives that we may sustain in a war with America.—Is the reader fully aware of all the consequences of such a war? The loss of Canada and Nova Scotia would be a trifle, and their seizure might possibly not be attempted. But, the West India islands! What a force would be necessary to protect the trade with them! And, indeed, how many troops would be necessary to render them safe from the attack of a country so nearly situated, the islands always containing within themselves the seeds of revolt! The keeping up of such a maritime force in the West Indies, and on the coast of America, must weaken us in the European seas, while the force of our enemy is daily increasing. This, therefore, without any of the consequences mentioned before, seems to me to be a reason quite sufficient for coming, as speedily as possible, to an amicable arrangement with the American government, if the hour for a restoration of harmony be not already passed. That we ought to have repealed our Orders in Council, as far as related to America, I have before stated as my opinion; and, if that opinion was correct, there can be no disgrace in doing it now. It would not, besides, be the first time, that we had swallowed a bitter bolus. We promised and vowed, or, at least, our ministers did for us, that we would never make peace with France without obtaining *indemnity for the past and security for the future*. But, we made the *peace of Amiens*; and, in about twelve months afterwards, we went to war again, “because we could not be at peace.” After the peace of Amiens we may, I think, get the better of any little punctilio about the Orders in Council. We have been stiff; but, if we must give way at last, or incur the risk of fatal consequences, the sooner we unbend the better.—In short, a war with America appears to me to be full of most dangerous effects to this

country. I think it would produce a most decided preponderance on the part of Napoleon in the minds of the American people, who are smarting under the operation of our maritime regulations, particularly those relating to the impressment of sailors into our service, of the effect of which no man in this country can be a judge unless he is an attentive reader of the American news-papers, which abound with relations of this sort enough to rouse resentment in the most patient breast. From the extracts which the venal press of England copies from the American papers, the public would naturally suppose, that almost all the writers there, and the people too, are on *our side*. This is one of the many ways in which the public are abused by this press, whose object is to promulgate falsehood and to smother truth. The fact is, that there is no writer in America that attempts to *justify our conduct*: the utmost they attempt is, to show, that the conduct of Napoleon is *as bad* as ours towards their country; and, then, there is always this heavy weight of charge exclusively against us, that we *impress their seamen*; that is, that we take away, that we banish from their country, and expose to death, so many of the people of America. It is here that the American Government is strong against us; and it is here that Napoleon is free from accusation.—The danger of throwing the American sailors (full as good as ours) into the French fleet is very great. They would there meet with all sorts of rewards, they would be an invaluable acquisition to Napoleon. They would be able teachers of his boys and his conscripts. In the space of two years they would make his fleets truly formidable. This, in my opinion, is the greatest danger of all; and, if it be a danger that may be obviated without disgrace, surely it ought to be obviated.

RIOTS AT NOTTINGHAM. — For some days past the news-papers have contained accounts of riots in this town and in the county of the same name. Stocking-Weavers going in search of machines, the use of which threw them out of work, appears to have been the original character of these assemblages. Much mischief is stated to have been done; one of the rioters killed in an attack upon a house. It is stated that the price of *bread* became one of the subjects of discontent amongst the rioters; and it is also stated, that a scar-

city of work, added to the other causes, first led to the riots. The *military* having been collected together in great force, the riots appear to have been put an end to.—Now, that these riots may be traced to the American non-importation Act, and to Napoleon's continental system, is very clear; because it was the misery arising out of a *scarcity of work* that produced the riots; and, it is well known that the scarcity of work amongst the manufacturers has arisen out of the American and Napoleon system of interdict. It does not follow, that the government are to blame, however; because it was not in their power to prevent the interdict of Napoleon at any rate. What I point out the fact for is, to shew, that his system has produced such effects, that it may produce others of the same kind, especially in a season of scarcity of corn, and that measures ought to be adopted, not so much for the putting an end to riots, as to prevent the misery out of which they arise. It is in vain to hope for the return of such a state of things as would restore the manufacturers to their former state. That state of things will never return, or, at least, in the life time of any man now twenty years of age. Something else must therefore be thought of. There must be something done to give employment to persons formerly employed in the manufactures. I do not mean, the *work should be made* for them, as we make work for the people in the Highlands of Scotland. But, I mean the adoption of such measures as would give all possible facility to the employment of additional hands in *agriculture*, amongst which measures certainly is that of relieving all enclosure bills from the heavy expence that now attends them, and which operate as a very great discouragement. A wise government would find out many means to adopt in such a case; and though I am sensible, that no government can do much in this way in haste; yet *something* might be done.—The most pressing object, however, is the *high price of bread*. If that price should continue to rise, great and general misery must be the consequence, especially if we obtain no supply of corn from the dominions of Napoleon. This will depend, perhaps, upon the nature of the crops there; for he is not fool enough to prevent the *exportation* of corn, while it brings him back our *hoarded gold*. He has acted very wisely in this respect. The exportation enriches

his own farmers; improves the soil of France and her dependencies; makes ample provision for years of scarcity; and makes us, in some measure, dependent upon him. It must make us even not wish to see France destroyed; it must give us an interest in the prosperity of our enemy. He is aware of all this; and he knows very well how to prefer such effects to the gratification of his passion of hatred against our government. He knows very well what impression the supplying of England with part of her bread is calculated to produce in his favour. The man whose hunger is fed by another will feel his anger abate towards him. It is not all that the venal writers can say in a year, that will be able to wear away the impression produced by the simple fact of the quartern loaf having fallen a farthing in consequence of corn sent from France. The reasonings of the belly are always more powerful than those of the brains.—Nothing could happen more injurious to us than an embargo in America at this time. In all ways it would be mischievous. Besides the evil arising from the want of the supply, it would throw us more into the power of Napoleon. His conditions would be harder, or, if they were not, he would have the merit, in the eyes of most people, of acting from motives of humanity towards us, while others were moved by no such considerations.—The *contrast*, too, would be such as it would not be very easy to bear patiently. The fact would become as notorious as the sun at noon-day, that France was sending bread to England. There would be no disguising this fact, the inference from which would be so obvious, that no one could fail to draw it. Who, then, would the venal prints or the author of the *Imposter Pamphlet* be able to persuade that the people of France were in a state of misery? Who would believe any such assertions? They might be repeated in every line of every column, and no soul would believe them. Misery and a superabundance of bread, all the nation would say, were never yet companions.—These are views of this matter, which, perhaps the government will laugh at; but they and their partizans have been accustomed to laugh at so many things, which have, in the end, become subjects of deep regret, that I do not attach much importance to what they may think of my opinions.

SPANISH REVOLUTION. — In another part of this Number the reader will find an article, translated from a Spanish newspaper, upon this subject, which article I beg him to read with attention. If he does this, he will clearly perceive, that those who have any weight in the government of Spain, are decidedly for a *complete revolution*; that they are for the *constitution*, the plan of which I have before published, and which is *more democratical* than the first constitution of France. Indeed, the Cortes have declared for this constitution; and though it may be *too late*; though it may have been done after the country has been lost in fact, still it will live as a memorial of the wishes of the parties, and, as I believe, of the wishes of the people of Spain.

—But, the interesting question, is, *what shall we do?* We are fairly in for it here. We are fighting for the Cortes. Well, then, we are also fighting for the constitution that the Cortes are making and will act under. Shall we continue to fight for the Cortes when they have adopted their new constitution? We must, or we must withdraw, and leave the Spaniards to themselves; for, as to pretending to espouse the cause of any faction against the Cortes, that, of course, would send the Cortes and the people over to the French. And yet, to fight (O, heavens!) for a constitution even more democratical than that which was drawn up by Condorcet and applauded by Paine! To this dilemma, however, we shall be reduced: either we must fight for this constitution, or leave the Spaniards to fight for it themselves. —Then, again, either the Spaniards will succeed in their struggle, or they will not. If they do not, then is Napoleon master of Spain, and all our expence of life and money is wasted: if they do, then they succeed without *our* aid, and not only their triumph, but the triumph of the sovereignty of the people, are proclaimed to the world. While Spain was under its old government, it was unable to resist France; but, having formed a constitution upon the basis of the sovereignty of the people, it has been able to resist that power, before which all the old governments of Europe have fallen. Will not this be the observation of every man? —How much better would it have been if we had been at the head of this revolution, and had encouraged the promulgation of such a constitution before the French had had time to abolish the Inquisition! This, as my readers will recollect, was what I was for from the outset. I said, “assist

“them not, unless they make a new and “a free government.” I have many times since said: “the country will be *free*, or “it will be Napoleon’s.” It was as clear as day-light, that, without a total abandonment of the old system, there was no means of defence against the French. It was clear, that nothing short of a revolution could rouse the people of Spain. I said, that I hoped, that their struggle would be a *long* one; because a long struggle was necessary to shake the old system to atoms, and so disperse those atoms as to make it impossible to reunite them. The Spaniards appear to be divided between yielding to the French and becoming free; but, they are, at any rate, resolved *not to have their old government*; and, if we mean to stand by them against the French, we must make up our minds to fight for the new constitution; that is to say, for the “*rights of man*” and the *sovereignty of the people*”; and, it only remains for us to see, whether we shall take this course or not.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
22nd November, 1811.*

I understand, from a gentleman, who was present last evening at a meeting of the Royal Society at Somerset-house, that a paper by Mr. GLENIE was read, in which he demonstrated, that the circumference of the circle is not only incommensurable to the diameter, but infinitely so, and that its quadrature is therefore impossible. This much celebrated problem, then, for the solution of which high rewards have been offered in different countries, and on which the solutions of many other important ones hinge, is now put to rest by that gentleman, though it has heretofore baffled the attempts of mankind.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.

*From the Semanario Patriotico of Cadiz —
Oct. 24, 1811.—Conspiracy against
Liberty.*

We are told, that M. Turgot, one of the Ministers of the unfortunate Louis XVI. observed to him early in his reign, —“Your Majesty should anticipate the Revolution which is approaching, and conduct it yourself: if not, one of two things will happen:—your majesty will either see yourself compelled to shoot your people, like Charles IX of France; or the

French people will drag you to a scaffold, like Charles I of England." Louis, though naturally well inclined, did not follow this advice: the Revolution advanced in spite of him, and that indecisive prince verified the prediction in its two extremes; at first making war upon his people through the medium of his Courtiers, and then being dragged by that people to a scaffold.—The same advice might have been useful to the classes, corps, and ambitious Authorities, who, on the approach of the terrible crisis of our country, were desirous above all to preserve the influence and power of which they were possessed. Place yourselves, might they have been told, in the van of the Revolution which is approaching,—be the foremost and most active in gaining liberty and independence to the state, shew yourselves the most devoted and most ardent defenders of the rights of the people. If you do not act thus, you are lost: your ambition and your pride, ill according with novelties, will leave you not a moment's repose: and you will perform the part of odious oppressors, if you conquer; and of vile conspirators, if you are conquered.—That, since the commencement of the Revolution, there has existed a very numerous party, hostile to every innovation the object of which was to reform our administration and political Institutions, is a fact quite obvious to the most cursory observer. It could hardly be otherwise; for there were among us too many people whose importance, and even existence depended upon old abuses, not to be interested in their preservation. Hence have we seen them oppose with rage, or reject with contempt, every plan of reform, however useful and necessary, that has been adopted by government or proposed by individuals. And, as the measures for delivering us from the French must go hand in hand with those which have the establishment of liberty for their object, (since you cannot expect great efforts from the people, without great privileges in return), it unfortunately happened, that the enemies of good principles were depressed when fortune was favourable to our arms; and, on the contrary, assumed importance when events were unfavourable: not because they rejoiced in the successes of the enemy, but because such successes discredited and weakened the authority of men and maxims whose destruction they sought. Deplorable situation, certainly, to which pride and ambi-

tion naturally lead, when they are listened to rather than reason and patriotism! We have seen them form a hostile confederacy against all whom the Revolution has summoned into employment,—pride themselves on their old stations,—and boast of having been official men under Charles IV. Idiots! as if they could suppose that the nation had forgotten that Charles IV. his ministers, his agents, and his whole system of government, were that which had ruined it!—The installation of the Cortes, which they were unable to prevent, and its first decrees, confounded these men. But they soon began to rally; and determined to avail themselves of the first favourable conjuncture for dissolving the Congress, and putting a period to liberty.—This crisis was approaching. The campaign of Estremadura, brilliant in its commencement, but trifling in its results,—the almost desperate situation of Catalonia, after the occupation of Tarragona and Figueras by the French,—Valencia already threatened,—all seemed to prepare the mind for discontent, and smoothed the way for destroying that order of things, which apparently neither promised felicity, nor inspired confidence. Hence intrigues of every kind were set at work. Rumours destined to prepare the public mind for insubordination and change, flew from Valencia to Cadiz, and from Cadiz to Valencia. In the former place, it was asserted, that the French had taken the Isla by surprise,—that various Deputies were prisoners,—Cadiz in fermentation, the Cortes dissolved,—the Government changed. Here, at first with a mysterious air, and then with more confidence, Valencia was represented as tumultuous, and as risen against the Regent General: that the latter had died miserably in the tumult: some said that he had escaped the sedition, and fled to Tangiers; others, that he was concealed in Cadiz. Such were the reports whose object was to discredit that respectable Functionary, who, since the Revolution began, has not ceased to perform eminent services to the public cause, as a soldier and as a citizen. The Cortes, notwithstanding their continued application to the discussion of the constitution, which is the same thing as marching straight forward to the termination of their functions, were represented as an assemblage of intriguers aspiring to perpetuate their power, to arrogate all authority, and to divide all offices among themselves. A resolution of the Council of Castile was talked of, which

would shew the Congress its illegitimacy, the falsehood of its principles, and the injustice and political mischiefs, of its measures; in short, every thing presented a black and gloomy aspect to the friends of liberty, who were in a momentary dread of an explosion.—At this very time was published in Alicant, a manifesto of the Ex-Regent Don Miguel de Lardizabal, which, when denounced and publicly read in the Cortes, excited the indignation of all who heard it, and shewed Congress the danger in which it was placed. That a few contemptible authors, as ignorant as obscure, might accumulate attacks upon the eternal bases of social order, adopted and sanctioned by the Cortes, and pour forth reproaches and calumnies against their defenders, was not a thing to be wondered at; and their miserable efforts might justly be consigned to contempt and oblivion. But that a Statesman, an Ex-Regent, after having sworn to these laws, as the fundamental laws of the monarchy, —after declaring his adherence to the established order of things, should publish a libel for its subversion, —should deny the sovereignty of the nation, the legitimacy of the Cortes, the authority of their decrees, —should profess his intention to restrain and destroy them, if he could depend upon the opinion of the people and the army, —should involve his former colleagues as accomplices in this base design,* and should represent the deputies as a club of Jacobin levellers, was an absurdity so enormous, an attempt so scandalous, that it appears rather the frenzied act of a madman, than the crime of a responsible being. But it is not possible, however much one would wish it, to account for the thing in this way: the coincidence of other circumstances shews that the manifesto was only part of a complete plan, which, from want of co-operation in the other parts produced an effect contrary to that which its author anticipated.—The Cortes, justly indignant at this scandalous conduct, and bound to defend public liberty thus attacked in its origin, ordered that the author should be arrested, his papers seized, and himself brought to

* Senor Escano, the only one of the Ex-Regents now resident in Cadiz, took an immediate opportunity of warmly repelling the imputation, in a representation which he addressed to the Cortes, and which they ordered to be printed and circulated among the people.

Cadiz. A tribunal has since been formed for deciding upon the cause of the Ex-Regent, that of some of the Members of the Council of Castile, and all the ramifications connected therewith; and, if there has been a conspiracy against the liberty of the country, their decision will inform us who are its accomplices, and what punishment they deserve.—What object had they in view, who, under such calamitous circumstances, calumniated our new institutions, and that national representation from which they flowed? Surely it was a terrible moment in which to raise the standard of division among us! Suchet was advancing against Valencia; —Suchet, still more formidable as an intriguer than as a General. One would almost say, that these perfidious agitators acted by his directions, were not the imputation too horrible to be ascribed to Spaniards. We rather believe, that their conduct proceeds from an inflexible pride, from a boundless lust of power, from aversion to a constitutional government, from rage at losing an influence and preponderance founded on vicious institutions, and inveterate abuses. There were, doubtless, few who were personally attached to Godoy, whose insolence and vices disgusted even those on whom he conferred favours; but there were numbers partial to his arbitrary power, to his despotism, and to his disorderly and fatal system of abuses. These men have always believed, and still affect to believe, that the revolution had no other object, but to preserve to them their influence, their honours, their employments: they have always retarded the tendency of our affairs towards a salutary and general reform. Enemies, perhaps, of the tyrant, but not of tyranny, they are more easily capable of coming to terms with Napoleon, than with the friends of liberty.—It will not cost them much. Of the principal instigators of these treasons, some swore obedience at Bayonne to the usurper King; others did the same at Madrid; and a third set received commissions from the intruder to calm the effervescence of the people; the least culpable among them let themselves be carried down the stream without openly joining either the French or the Spanish party. It is painful to descend to these odious accusations; but they have compelled us to that step who let no means of reproach and calumny pass that may tend to discredit the friends of the people; and who, in order to prejudice the weak, have always upon their

lips the appellations of *impious disorganizers*, and *even of rebels*. Let them thank our moderation, that, in recording their treachery, we do not also address them by their names; and let those who pretend to be so zealous in defending the rights of Ferdinand VII. that they *would not leave a single right to the nation*,—let these hypocritical pretenders to fidelity tell us, what they did with those rights at Bayonne and at Madrid, when they sold them with so much facility to the tyrant who usurped them!—There is no middle course: *our political revolution is not a game of puppets*; it is the work of men and of Spaniards. The nation contemplates with anxiety those constitutional laws, which are to become its hope and its consolation: Europe views them with respectful admiration,—the French with terror. Who, then, are the rash men who would dare to retard the progress and conclusion of these majestic labours? If they are individuals, let punishment repress them; if public bodies, let them be dissolved. Are we to seek for supporters of liberty and guardians of the nation, among its representatives, or among those, who, for twenty successive years, abandoned it to the deplorable and shameful voracity of *Maria Louisa, and of Godoy*?—There is no medium: we repeat it. The Cortes must either resolve to preserve the national liberty and dignity, together with their own institution, or resign themselves to an untimely dissolution, by intrigue or by violence; thus bringing on themselves the execration of Spaniards, and the scorn of the whole world. In fine, if the sovereignty of the people is a fundamental maxim, from the recognition of which flows both civil and political liberty,—if the balance of powers,—if the equality of the laws,—if the benefits of a Constitution, are not the ravings of heated brains,—then fit it is, that the senseless men who conspire against its establishment should suffer the punishment due to their audacity, and learn, that the Spanish nation does not drain its veins in the sanguinary contest with Buonaparté, in order to remain subject to the caprice of four insolent Viziers.

AMERICAN STATES.

Court of Inquiry, relative to the Rencontre between the President and Little Belt.

Sir,—I have just read in your last week's Register (the general sentiments and language of which I highly approve)

an account of the Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry, held at New York, relative to the affair between the Little Belt and the American Frigate President; I confess, however, that, by the same evidence, I am led to very opposite conclusions, and I have so high an opinion of your perfect uprightness of intention, and liberality of sentiment, that I doubt not your readily giving this a place in your invaluable Paper, and moreover that, should my exposition make that impression on yours, which your statement has on my mind, you will with equal readiness admit it.—In the first place then, Sir, I am an old Soldier, and have seen and heard many shots fired, both by sea and land; and though I am willing to admit the bare possibility, that men below, and employed, (though I must even then confine my meaning to men without experience) might be so situated as, on the hearing of a gun, not immediately to know whether it proceeded from their own ship, or from one 70 or 80 or 90 yards distant, still I have no hesitation in declaring my full conviction of the utter impossibility of any man's being on the quarter-deck, fore-castle, or gangways, or in any other part of a ship, above-board, and of his not, of an absolute certainty, knowing from whence the first fire (particularly a single shot) proceeded, more particularly under the circumstances of that extreme silence and attention which invariably accompanies the hailing of one ship by another; and more particularly still, when accompanied by the nervous anticipation of an action. Sir, I lament that my own experience has convinced me, and your numerous statements and expositions have confirmed the fact, that there are men (aye, and I fear in bulk too) who will rob and plunder, and prosecute, and persecute, under false pretences, the innocent, the poor, and the needy; and commit every breach of every law, human and divine, without fear, and without remorse; why, then, should they not lie and swear? And why not Americans, as well as those who now disgrace the once honourable name of Englishmen? It is a lamentable fact, Sir, that where hopes of reward, and no fears of punishment exist, we must now look among men for circumstances, and not for oaths, in confirmation of their statements. Sir, it must be evident to every man of common understanding, that it will be pleasing to the American government to substantiate the fact of the

first shot having been fired by the Little Belt; they thereby remove the *onus* (in the eyes of the world) from their own shoulders to ours; and make their hostile measures (which I verily believe it to be their real interest to pursue), still more and more palatable to the American people at large; for the American government, Sir, hath not (like some other governments) ceased to regard the opinions of that very people, who have established their power, and on whose shoulders they are borne. And when I consider the numerous indignities and oppressions which have been exercised towards that people at large, and towards the American seamen in particular, how can I wonder that the first shot should have been fired by them; even supposing it not to have been accidental? or how can I expect them to swear against their strongest and bitterest animosities, and equally against their self-evident personal interests? There exists however in some of the instances an evident and almost insurmountable dislike to the thing itself, however palatable, however gilded; which as far as it goes, does honour to the individuals, and to the American nation. In the first place then, Sir, it appears on the face of the proceedings, that they embrace only every deck officer, as well as captains of guns, 'now' on board the President who were present at the action. Sir, it cannot be doubted, but that every man's sentiments were known long before the examination took place; in all examinations of that sort, it is invariably so; and here, either all were prosecutors or all defendants, an absurdity in all law; here were no cross examinations; but an evident anxious desire, that there should not be the smallest variation in evidence; and the above quotation evidently implies that, some of the deck officers or captains of guns had been removed from the President subsequently to the action; and were not among those examined. In the face of the world, let me then ask, Sir, why is this? Is not a rupture between the two nations, which may involve the dearest interests of both, worthy of every testimony, of every elucidation which can be given to it? and will it not subject the American government to a suspicion at least, of having removed some conscientious men out of the way, thereby endeavouring to smother the truth? and expressing as well as though they had used words, the sort of evidence they desired, demanded, and would reward. But even in this,

Sir, they have not succeeded, for as is commonly the case, falsehood sooner or later takes care to detect itself; so in this instance we find several of the evidences contradicting each other on their oaths; and others though in situations where ignorance is manifestly impossible, swearing that they are ignorant, thereby evidently endeavouring (weak men) to salve over their consciences, and trying hard to reconcile their interests and their feelings with something at least like the truth. Sir, all that can be said for them is, that to a lesser degree of wickedness, they add a much greater degree of weakness; but to the proofs.—In the first place, Charles Ludlow, master commandant, and acting captain of the President (of course an experienced seaman) swears, that he does not *know* whether the first shot was fired from his own ship, or from one 70, or 80, or 90 yards off!! This at least will prove, that there is not at all times a sensible jar felt at all parts of a ship, from the firing of a single gun; and you will observe, Sir, that the chaplain who was on the quarter-deck, only *imagined* the first shot to have proceeded from the Little Belt, because he felt no jar in his own ship! Well done, oh thou prince of quibbles! well done, oh thou worthy brother of the gown! what, thou on the quarter-deck couldst find no other cause of suspicion, but that thou didst feel no jar on board thine own ship; what wast not thou directing thine eyes, and thine ears, and all thine attention towards the ship thine officer was hailing? Thou couldst bear the reply to the hail of thy commodore, but thou couldst not see whence the flash, the sound (that dreadful sound, the cannons' roar) and the smoke proceeded! no, though several seconds intervened between the first solitary shot, and the second!—oh, thou worthy brother of a quibbling brotherhood!!—John Orde Creighton, the first lieutenant, stationed on the upper-deck, who had received instructions to keep at half cock, &c. &c. and who must of necessity have been watchful and attentive, and have participated in that silent feeling of anxiety, which must have pervaded the whole crew; he also swears that he only *believes* the first shot to have been fired from the Little Belt! Had he given a reason he probably would have said, because he had since been told so; and which would have been as good a reason at least as the reverend Churchman's!—The question asked by the Commodore of Captain

Caldwell of the marines, is also a strong presumptive evidence, that he also did not know, or indeed believe, that the *Little Belt* had fired; "what is that"!! an exclamation evidently of ignorance, as well as surprise; an explosion on board his own ship! What a shot fired without my orders? well indeed might he exclaim "what is that?!" and Captain Caldwell also, may have answered with truth, she has fired at us; for I doubt not it was returned, as quickly as the trigger could be pulled. Had the shot been fired from the *Little Belt*, a ship the Commodore was hailing, and which at that moment engaged all his attention, he must have been an ass indeed, to have enquired of his Captain of marines "what is that?!" And this, if possible, receives additional confirmation from the evidence of Lieutenant John Orde Creighton, on that point, who swears that the orders to fire were not given till they had received the *Little Belt's* broadside! What then, did they fire without orders? no doubt they did, and the whole mystery is solved; for it appears by Ludlow's swearing that the second shot was from the President, then three and musquetry from the *Belt*, &c.; L. B. Maddison, Lieutenant of marines, swears to the same purport. Captain Caldwell ditto ditto. Jacob Mull, sailing master, ditto. Joseph Smith, midshipman, ditto. How then, I hear it said, is this important point to be settled? I answer, not by the contradictory evidence of interested and impassioned men, but by the unerring law of facts and circumstances; the evidence is contradictory, and consequently militates against themselves; and that only which appears to have been extracted inadvertently and which is contrary to their own avowed interests and wishes, can be received as truth. Now for once, let us admit as a fact, that the first shot was fired from the President, and without orders; for what he dared to do, he (the Commodore) would have dared to justify; in short, he would not have so acted, without orders; but let us picture to ourselves a ship full of men, nine tenths of whom had never seen a shot fired; guns loaded, and though ordered on half cock, some of them probably on full cock; for on board our own ships of war, I have seen locks that would not stand at half cock, or indeed at full either; and, is it likely, let me ask, that an American frigate should be better found (furnished) than ours? Let

us further picture to ourselves (what is assuredly the fact) that the ship was full of men, whom by our own acts we have driven to detest us, and who must have felt much of that nervous irritation and trepidation, which accompanies every parley preceding an action; let us fancy all this, and which is undoubtedly true, and we may easily come to the conclusion, that the first shot was very likely to have proceeded from the President, either by accident or individual design, without orders. That the second and third shots, and the whole broadside followed immediately from the *Little Belt*, is a natural and necessary consequence, and during those moments it is natural also, to conclude, that the first impulse of the Commodore was directed towards a prevention of a repetition of the shot fired by the President; and that not until the fire was so warmly returned, was the order given to fire; here, Sir, is an easy solution of the whole affair, and perfectly accords with such of the evidence as in the present case is admissible; here I should close my observations, considering them unanswerable, did I not think it advisable by proving further falsehoods, still further to invalidate the testimony before us. With reference to the hailing preceding the fire, Raymond H. Y. Perry, jun. lieutenant, and signal officer swears, that he was on the quarter deck, near the Commodore's elbow, who hailed and got no reply; that he hailed again, and got none. Andrew L. B. Maddison, lieutenant of marines, swears to the same effect. Joseph Smith, midshipman and master-mate, ditto, ditto. Now again, Jacob Mull, sailing master, swears that he also was on the quarter deck, heard the Commodore hail, and that he got no answer but halloo! after sufficient time hailed again, but got no reply but a shot. Henry Denison, acting chaplain, swears, that he also was on the quarter-deck, heard the hail, and the reply, though he does not say what reply, (though others swore he got none) then a hail again, then a gun; but whether it came from Heaven or Hell, he cannot tell. Richard Carson, midshipman, swears he was on the fore-castle and gangways, generally a much more noisy situation than the quarter deck, heard the hail, and was answered by repeating his own words. Thomas Gamble, second lieutenant, swears, that he commanded the first division of guns, that Commodore

Rogers hailed "Ship a hoy," was answered "halloo," asked "what ship is that?" received his own words repeated in reply; hailed again "what ship is that," then a gun from the Belt! Here we have a circumstantial account of question and answer, though several of the evidences have sworn that no reply whatever was made, and although they were in the most eligible situations possible to hear; and men who will swear to one falsehood will swear to one thousand; and are only to be believed, as I have before observed, when their evidence is against themselves; and in these instances it is evident, that these persons, for the greater part, have been governed in their replies by no other considerations than the general tendency and importance of the questions, as they bore on the points they desired to establish. But as many men have many minds, so also have some of these gentlemen deemed certain points of sufficient importance to deny, which others have truly considered as of little or no importance to the question, and have therefore permitted themselves to admit; and thus have they on their oaths contradicted each other; proving to the world, that their oaths are not worth three inches of an old tobacco-pipe; and thus, Sir, may perjury and falsehood almost always (and always when a sufficient number of persons are concerned) be detected. The last recorded hail is most likely the truth, because the words said to have been used, are those commonly used, on similar occasions; I have purposely omitted drawing any conclusion from the sizes of the respective vessels, neither our sailors or soldiers are much in the habit of calculating or reasoning on any odds of that sort; any inferences drawn therefrom would consequently be fallacious. I trust, however, that our government still holds the fair character of this nation, of too much importance to be thus trifled with in the eyes of the world or to suffer an official document of this sort to go abroad without a full and complete refutation; the only mode to be pursued is obvious, and let us hope our attempts thereto will be at least as strong, and more consistent, than that before us.—I am, Sir, a friend to America, a friend to the constitution of America; but a still greater friend to truth, and your obedient servant and wall-wisher,
 No. 11, 1811. AN OLD SOLDIER.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—THE WAR.—*French Official News from the Armies in Spain.*

Ciudad Rodrigo, Sept. 30, 1811.

Report of the Marshal Duke of Ragusa, Commander in Chief of the Army of Portugal, to his Highness the Prince of Wagram and Neufchatel, Major General.
 (Concluded from p. 576.)

..... I cannot, moreover, too much praise the Generals, Officers, and soldiers of the army. We should have followed the enemy to the lines of Lisbon, where we should have been able to form a junction with the Army of the South, which, completely entire, has in its front only the division of General Hill, had the moment been come which is fixed for the catastrophe of the English.

(Signed) MARSHAL DUKE OF RAGUSA.

Ciudad Rodrigo, Sept. 30, 1811.

Report of Count Dorsenne, Commander in Chief of the Army of the North of Spain, to the Prince of Wagram, &c.

MONSIEUR—As soon as I was informed that the English army had recrossed the Tagus, and was approaching the Coa, I resolved on marching against the insurgent army of Galicia, with the design of retaking Astorga, and driving back into the mountains these ill-organised corps. I had acquainted the Marshal Duke of Ragusa with my intended movement, that, should the English army march to the assistance of that of Galicia, he might take measures for following it; but the English army gave itself no trouble to support that of Galicia, which was beaten and dispersed. I retook Astorga, which was repaired and provisioned. I repaired to Salamanca; I collected, thanks to the activity and the talents of the Commissary Voland, whom I cannot too strongly recommend to the favour of his Majesty, about 1,500 carriages laden with provisions for Ciudad Rodrigo. The Duke of Ragusa having communicated to me, that he was coming with a part of his army to co-operate in the revictualling of Ciudad Rodrigo, I did not think it necessary to avail myself of the latitude which your Highness gave me, to summon to my aid the army of reserve; I contented myself with sending for the division of Souham, and leaving in the cantonments marked out by your Highness the three other divisions of that army-corps.—I joined the

Duke of Ragusa at Tamames on the 22d. We entered Ciudad Rodrigo on the 24th. I immediately changed the garrison, emptied the hospitals, and provisioned the place for a year.—The first object of my movement was thus happily accomplished; the second, which was that of carrying the entrenched camp of Fuente Guinaldo, has also been as speedily attained.—While General Watier marched with the cavalry of the Army of the North upon Espeja, Gen. Montbrun took to the left; he came up with the enemy on the ridge of Bodon, where he had a brilliant affair, in which the enemy was overthrown. We soon arrived at Fuente Guinaldo, where we learned with astonishment that the English army had not yet collected its corps. Had we been able to foresee that the English General would have been capable of committing such a blunder, we might have taken a part of the English army in partial combats; but our infantry was not to come up till the night, and the ensuing day, which was the 26th. I made my arrangements for attack on the 27th; they could not, however, be so secret, as to pass unobserved by the enemy: by ten in the evening the English General was in full retreat upon Alfayates. On the 27th Gen. Watier came up with, at Aldea del Puente, the rear-guard of the enemy, consisting of 15,000 infantry, and 3,000 horse, with 14 pieces of cannon. He charged the English cavalry with audacity, broke and put them to flight; while General Thiebaut advanced rapidly on the road of Alfayates, pouring upon the enemy in disorder a terrible fire of artillery.—Several cavalry-charges made us masters of the whole plain. At half-past four General Souham joined Gen. Thiebaut with his grenadiers and voltigeurs; he made an attack on the village with that vigour which characterises him; the enemy made an obstinate resistance for half an hour; but at last the village was carried with the bayonet, and the enemy precipitated into a ravine; soon after, this part of the English army was driven beyond the Coa. My army-corps lost in this affair 40 killed and 120 wounded. The loss of the English was considerable; the English General Cole was severely wounded.—I was extremely satisfied with the zeal, activity, and intelligence of General Reynaud, Commandant at Ciudad Rodrigo; he had organised that place in such a way as to make the most brilliant defence, had it been necessary.—I transmit to your

Highness an account of the officers who distinguished themselves. I beg you to lay before his Majesty, the zeal and ardour which animate all my troops. When he shall pronounce the moment arrived for commencing the grand operations for definitively driving the English from the Peninsula, his Majesty will find in no army more zeal and devotedness.

(Signed) THE COUNT DORSENNÉ.

ARMY OF ARRAGON.

Head-quarters at Alcala de Chiver,
Sept. 16, 1811.

MONSIEUR,—I have entered the province of Valencia: on the 14th, my head quarters were at Beni Carlo; to-day they are at Alcala de Chiver, with the view of advancing on Murviedro, which the enemy has fortified. The army is animated with the greatest ardour.

MARSHAL COUNT SUCHET.

Head-quarters at Murviedro,
Sept. 30, 1811.

MONSIEUR,—I have already acquainted your Highness that I had entered the province of Valencia, and was marching upon Murviedro. I arrived on the 27th, and took possession of the town. On the 28th, six companies of the division Habert, and six others of the Italian division advanced in front of the ramparts of the fortress, and carried all the outworks. The enemy has in the forts 3,000 men and 18 cannon; on the 29th the trenches were opened. I have also invested Fort Oropesa.—An assemblage of from 1,000 to 1,100 peasants had collected on my right, at Val de Uxo; Colonel Milet, of the 121st, advanced against them with 300 men of his regiment and 50 cuirassiers; he routed them completely, killed 400 of them, and took the greater part of their arms.

MARSHAL COUNT SUCHET.

Camp at Murviedro, Oct. 1, 1811.

MONSIEUR,—Informed that General Blake had advanced a part of his forces upon Liria and Segorbe, I ordered Gen. Palombini to march against the division of Obispo, established at Seneja. Four hundred horse defended the high-road, while three thousand infantry occupied the heights to the right and left. General Palombini ordered a battalion of the 114th to charge the enemy on the left, while General Robert directed the attack on the right with the rest of his brigade. Col. Schiazetti, at the head of the dragoons Napoleon, charged the enemy's cavalry,

and pursued them to the bridge of Masana, the whole division of Obispo was assembled at this point. The dragoons took post on the bridge, and preserved it in spite of the fire of the enemy. Obispo was making every effort to surround them, when the arrival of the select companies of the 114th and the 1st of the Vistula arrested his movement; a general charge decided his route, and his flight upon Liria. The dragoons Napoleon entered Segorbe pell-mell with the enemy, sabreing all that opposed them; they pursued the enemy to within two leagues of the city. General Balathier, who commanded the reserve, caused them to pursue the enemy in good time on the road to Liria. Obispo is in a state of complete route, and has lost 300 men, one colour, 90 horses, and a great many prisoners.

MARSHAL COUNT SUCHET.

ARRAGON.

The band of Pessoduro, a famous brigand, the Lieut. of Mina, had infested for a long time the Cincovillas and the banks of the Ebro; the Adjutant Commandant Priloque pursued them for several days without relaxation. On the 20th Pessoduro escaped him in the Bardana; but on the same evening that brigand halted in the village of Biota, with his 60 horsemen. Lieut. Foison, of the 14th squadron of cavalry, got knowledge of it; he took with him two detachments of the 9th and 14th squadrons, arrived at the village by by-roads, surrounded it on all sides, took them unawares, killed them all, and mortally wounded the ferocious Pessoduro himself; three gensd'armes only were wounded; twelve French prisoners were set at liberty.

PORTUGAL. THE WAR.—*Gazette Extraordinary, published 18 Nov. 1811.*

A Dispatch, of which the following is an extract, has been received this morning by the Marquis Wellesley from Charles Stuart, Esq. his Majesty's Minister at Lisbon, dated Nov. 2, 1811.

The movement of General Gerard on Caceres induced General Hill to break up from Portalegre on the 22d ult. He reached Albuquerque on the 24th, and on the 26th his head-quarters were at Malpartida. General Gerard having fallen back from Caceres on this day to Torremacha,

was endeavouring to gain Merida, when Gen. Hill came up with, and surprised him at Arroyo dos Molinos, on the morning of the 28th. One column of the French had proceeded on the road to Merida before the commencement of the action, and although pursued, will probably be enabled to cross the Guadiana, before the arrival of our troops.—General Gerard was badly wounded, and escaped to the mountains with about three hundred men, followed by the Spanish corps under General Murillo. Two hundred French were killed, and one thousand taken, including Generals Bron and the Prince d'Aremberg, two Colonels, and forty Officers, with all their artillery and baggage.

Downing-street, Nov. 18. Dispatches, of which the following are extracts, have been this day received at Lord Liverpool's Office, addressed to his Lordship by Gen. Viscount Wellington, dated Frencda, 23 and 30th of Oct. 1811: Frencda, Oct. 23.

The enterprize of Don Julian Sanchez, to carry off the cattle from Ciudad Rodrigo, adverted to in my last dispatch, was very well conducted and very successful. During the night of the 14th he posted his troops near the places at which he had been informed that the cattle from the garrison were usually brought to graze in the morning, and he expected that they would come to the ground on the left bank of the Agueda, between the hills on the El Bodon road and the fort; and he placed two detachments of cavalry behind these hills. The Governor, General Regnaud, had come out of the fort and across the Agueda, attended by some Staff Officers, and escorted by a party of about twenty cavalry: he was surrounded by Don Julian's detachments as soon as he entered the hills, and was taken with two of his escort under the fire of the guns of the place. The remainder of the escort escaped; one of the officers attending the Governor was wounded.—Shortly afterwards, Don Julian's detachments on the right of the Agueda, drove off the greatest number of the cattle which had been sent to graze under the guns of the fort, on that side of the river.—The enemy's troops in front of this army have made no movements of importance since I addressed your Lordship last.

(To be continued.)

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

IRISH CATHOLICS.—Let those who do not reflect spend their joy upon the "*victories*" gained abroad, my readers will, I hope, reserve some part of theirs' for the victory lately gained in *Ireland* in the acquittal of Dr. Sheridan. We are expending enormous sums of money in the war against France; we are undergoing hardships of every sort for the support of that war, the purse and the veins of the nation are drained by it: and, what is all this for? For what purpose do we make all these hitherto-unheard-of sacrifices? What is the object held out to us by those who call upon us for the means of supporting this war? Why, to prevent our country from being subdued by Napoleon; and for *what reason* should we wish to prevent that? Why, because it is presumed, that if he were to subdue our country, he would take from us some part, at least, of that liberty (be it what it may) that we now possess. Well, then, to *preserve this liberty* is the object of the war; and, what a beast must he be, therefore, who tosses up his cap at every cry of victory from Portugal, and yet feels uninterested at what has now taken place in Dublin, in the acquittal of Dr. Sheridan? —The cause which led to the trial, as well as the proceedings on the trial itself, are stated in another part of this Number, and to that statement I beg leave to refer the reader.—It has been said, that the Irish *people* had no feeling in common with the Catholic leaders. This does not appear from the effect which this trial and acquittal appear to have produced in Dublin. "The words NOT GUILTY," says the Freeman's Journal, "were scarcely pronounced when a peal of huzzaing" and shouts rung through the Court and galleries, and shook the very Judicial Bench. It was caught by the anxious auditors in the hall. The Judges attempted to speak, the Officers attempted to act; the enthusiasm deafened and destroyed every attempt. The Judges waited for some minutes, and the Chief Justice attempted to address the Court,

"but he could not be heard; nothing could be heard but the loud, the overwhelming torrent of popular enthusiasm. As the Jurors passed through the Hall they were greeted with waving of hats and clapping of hands."—This shews that the *people* did feel upon the occasion; and, perhaps, they have seldom felt more upon *any* occasion.—JAMES II upon hearing a distant shout that seemed to rend the air, asked what it was; and, being told, it was *nothing* but the army then encamped on Hounslow-heath shouting for joy at the *acquittal* of the seven Bishops. "And do you," said he, "call that *nothing*?" It was ominous of what was to follow; and though we have no such sequel to apprehend in the present day, yet these clear and distinct expressions of public opinion must be supposed to be of some consequence; it must, by every rational man, be supposed, that they are not to be *despised*.—But, what do the ministers think of these matters? I do not know; but, I know what the venal prints say, and shall here quote a passage from the Courier of the 26th instant, which the reader will find worthy of his attention. It is very curious, and will be a thing to recur to hereafter:—"The Judges who, as our readers have seen in our private letter, delivered their opinions *seriatim*, were each strongly with the prosecution in point of law. The Jury, however, considered that the *evidence* was insufficient, and brought in a verdict of acquittal. Great, in consequence, have been the rejoicings of the populace, and with reason. For, after having been told that the *Constitution* afforded their rights inadequate protection; that the *laws* were not strong enough to prevent oppression; that the subject had insufficient guards and guarantees against the Crown; that *Juries* would be packed to bring verdicts against the liberties of the subject; in short, that the whole system was a system of tyranny and injustice; they now find that they have been daringly imposed upon; that the *Constitution* has been wickedly calumniated; and that the laws favouring no one class of society

"more than another, and dealing out the same measure of justice to the Peer and the peasant, *afford equal protection to all.*" This conviction we did not want: but we are glad that the veil of delusion with which the *Reformers* wished to blind the eyes of the people, has been *thus removed*, and that they now see they need not apply to Conventions nor to self-created Parliaments, unless their object be to destroy, instead of *preserving those Laws and that Trial by Jury*, which are now the subjects of their triumph and their exultation."—This is a poor miserable piece of sophistry and falshood. In the first place, it is false that the *Catholics* or the *Reformers* ever complained, that the constitution did not afford adequate protection. They have, on the contrary, always said, that it did afford them ample protection; but, they have said, that the constitution had not fair play; they have said, *that they were deprived of its benefits.*—And, as to the *packing of juries*, what was predicted about this, might, for aught I know, have no foundation. It might have been, for any thing that *I know* to the contrary, what is here called a calumny. But, this acquittal does by no means *prove* that it was wholly without foundation. The jury were good men; but, that is no *proof* that it was not intended to have them a packed set. There is, indeed, no proof neither that it *was* intended to pack them; but, there is no proof that it was not so intended. Indeed there is no positive proof one way or the other; and the fact must, as in all similar cases, be left to be gathered from the chain of circumstances, which the proceedings present to the reader, and upon which circumstances I do not think proper to offer any opinion.—The idea here is, that, because an acquittal of a man, accused by the Attorney General, has taken place, there can have been no ground whatever to complain of any prosecutions of this sort, either before or now. In answer to which, I have first to observe, that the innocence of Dr. Sheridan having been proved by his acquittal, surely he may complain of the heavy expence to which he has been exposed and which he has incurred in consequence of a *groundless charge* pushed on against him *at the public expence*; and, surely, here is also some ground of complaint for the public. —But, if we were to adopt the reasoning of this venal writer, and to conclude, that, because one acquittal has taken place, there can have been no ground to

complain of any former decisions, let us see whither it would lead us. The Seven Bishops were *acquitted*, their acquittal was the cause of great rejoicing; but, did it draw from the nation an acknowledgment that all former decisions were just? Did it make men acquiesce in the sentences upon Russell and Sidney? Because a jury acquitted the Seven Bishops, did the nation say, or did any one ever say, that the juries who sent Russell and Sidney to the block were not packed and perjured? And, again, did the acquittal of the Seven Bishops shut men's mouths either as to the past or the future? Did it prevent the people's alarm for their liberties? Did it prevent the "*Glorious Revolution*," which followed soon after, and which seated the present family upon the throne to the exclusion of the lineal heirs?—As to Ireland, I am not able to speak of the past. All the whippings and transportings and hangings and shootings that have taken place in that unhappy country, during the last twenty years, may, for aught I know, have been conformable to law; but, the acquittal of Dr. Sheridan does not *prove* this. It proves nothing at all relating to the matter.—It is perfectly notorious, that the juries of Russell and Sidney and a great many other innocent men were packed; it is as notorious that the Sheriff who packed them was chosen by the court for the express purpose of selecting juries to answer the purposes of that corrupt and tyrannical court; it is also notorious, that their decisions and the sentences grounded upon them have since been declared infamous, and that reparation has been done to the descendants of the sufferers. But, according to this venal man's mode of reasoning, those decisions and sentences ought to have been considered as just the moment a subsequent jury was forced to bring in a just verdict, and thus the joy which the people expressed at the acquittal of the Seven Bishops was to be construed into a mark of public approbation of all the numerous legal murders before committed. If this writer will look back into history, he will find, that the acquittal of the Seven Bishops had no such effect. On the contrary, it made the people more watchful over their remaining liberties, and gave them courage to endeavour to regain those that the tyrannical bigot had wrenched from them, in which endeavour they at last succeeded. —The acquittal of Dr. Sheridan must, therefore, rest upon its own bottom, and

so must the general conduct of the courts and the government in Ireland. This acquittal has nothing to do with the past, and it may possibly have no effect as to the future.—I do not know whether it be too much to expect, but one must wish at any rate, that this acquittal and the demonstrations of public feeling that it has drawn forth may tend to produce those measures of *conciliation*, that I have so long been anxious to see adopted with regard to Ireland; for, when I am speaking of the *Irish Catholics*, I cannot get rid of the idea, that I am speaking of the *Irish Nation*. What joy it must be to Napoleon to see Ireland thus disturbed! Of all things in the world it is that which must please him the most. If the Catholics were to be silenced by these prosecutions, or by any other means, that silence would, in the mind of no rational man, be a mark of contentment and harmony; and it is harmony, it is *unanimity*, that this kingdom now stands in need of.

GENERAL HILL.—The affair, in which this General has been engaged, and of which an account was given in my last Number, appears to have been a very brilliant one. Here we have a *proof of real victory*. Here are a *thousand prisoners* actually taken, including many officers, and some of high rank. This is unequivocal success. What might be the circumstances I know not; what might be the advantages General Hill had and what the disadvantages of the enemy I cannot tell; but, upon the face of the thing as it now lies before us, this gentleman has shown a great deal of the character of an able general.—Yet, very little has been said in his praise by the venal prints. They seem to think very little of a thousand prisoners taken from the French upon this occasion. When were there, however, a thousand taken by us before? And this was achieved, too, with so little loss. We have had a long war in the Peninsula and have won a great many *victories*; but, does the reader recollect any other victory which was attended with the capture of a thousand of the enemy?—The Morning Post and the Courier have taken a great deal of pains to instill into the minds of their readers, that this movement of General Hill was *planned* by Lord Wellington, and thus the former is, by them, represented as little more than the mere executer of the thing; the mere agent, as the musket is in the hands of the soldier.—

This mode of representing the matter is not fair; for, though General Hill certainly acted under the orders generally of his Commander in Chief, a good deal, as to this particular case, must have depended upon himself; and, if he had *failed*, would there have been no *blame* imputed to him? Would the whole of the blame have been imputed to the Commander in Chief? Has this been the case upon former occasions?—As to a campaign upon the whole it is certain, that whatever success attends it the Commander in Chief is to be praised for; but, if he is to have the praise due to successes like that of General Hill, his eulogists will be so good as to bear in mind, that they expose him, on the other side; and yet, they would not, I imagine, be very ready to blame him for the escape of Brennier from Almeida. Justice, however, clearly demands this, if they insist upon ascribing to him, in so exclusive a manner, the merit of this affair of General Hill.

SPAIN.—BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM.—The French official account of this battle will be inserted in next week's Register. Here we have the detail of another real victory, and such a one as our allies will find it difficult, I believe, to repair the loss of. The *result* of a battle is what we are to judge by; and here we see 7,211 prisoners taken and sent off to France, and we also see a celebrated fortress fall immediately afterwards. This is *victory*.—The account of the siege of the fortress is very interesting. It shows, in a striking manner, what French engineers, with French troops under them, are capable of performing; and, it has awakened in my mind a thought, which had not before presented itself; namely, the possibility of a siege of *Gibraltar* succeeding in the same hands. That it will be *attempted* I have no doubt; and, though I cannot know how difficult the undertaking might be, having never seen the place, I know that there are very few difficulties that such besiegers would not, in the pursuit of such an object, overcome. For this, therefore, the nation ought to be prepared. Not that I look upon Gibraltar as of much real value to England; but, it has a great imaginary value. It is a possession of honour; but, this circumstance would be only a motive the more for the French to endeavour to put us out of it. If Napoleon should subdue the rest of Spain, it is not to be supposed, that he will ever make a peace.

leaving this proud fortress in our hands. We must, therefore, make up our minds to *continue* the war for it, as we *began* it for Malta; or we must, I think, make up our minds to give it up in the arrangements of a peace; that is to say, if Napoleon should finally subdue the rest of Spain.—I throw out this to the public here, in order that it may be *thought of* and *talked of* and that I may hear the opinions of others upon the subject. It is, as appears to me, an exceedingly great folly for us to cling to old prejudices. Europe has all been changed; there is a new distribution of dominions and power, and a new distribution of commerce is fast taking place. We cannot expect to remain unaffected by this change; and, we ought, in our views as to peace, to dismiss all old prejudices, and to consider merely what is likely to redound most to our own safety and our own happiness.—To return to MARSHAL SUCHET, the venal prints, by way of commentary upon the battle of Saguntum, tell us, that the man who won it was formerly a *barber*. These are very malignant and base men, but still *folly* is their great characteristic. For, what is the tendency of statements of this sort? Why, to exalt the character of that nation, whom it is their wish to decry. They publish the account of the battle; they cannot contradict that account; they are compelled to become the vehicles of the facts, that the fruit of this battle have been the fall of Saguntum and the taking of 7,211 prisoners of war. And, then comes the observation which *they* suggest to the reader, that this achievement has been performed by a *French Barber*! If, then, the reader might say, French Barbers can do things like this, what a nation must the French be! And, again, if the Spaniards, with their best generals and best army, and strongest fortress, and with most gallant fighting, were beaten by a French Barber, what chance have they of final success?—This puts one in mind of Mallet du Pan and the “Printer’s Boy” of Limosin,” who was opposed to the Duke of York in Holland. Does the sensible reader not perceive how all attempts of this sort have a contrary effect to that of degrading the French nation and their officers? Why, there are, after all, more Barbers and Printers Boys than there are noblemen (though these latter are become pretty abundant of late years in this country); and, who can fail to see, that the impression produced by these attempts at degradation is an impression, in the minds

of men in general, in favour of the enemy? —Then, again, what a conclusion do these attempts point to with regard to the French Revolution; and, of course, to revolutions in general? *Before* that event, we heard of no *Barbers* becoming great Generals. The Marshals of France, whom we used to see *beaten*, and whom we used sometimes to *beat*, were all of the *high nobility*. Of all the animals, two-legged or four-legged, exhibited upon our stage, a *French Barber* was the most contemptible. He was always the most ridiculous, puny, cowardly, and despicable thing that the author could imagine and that the manager could dress up. This was the idea we *formerly* had of Frenchmen in general, but especially of French barbers. What a wonder-working thing then, must this Revolution have been! What a change it has produced in the character of that nation! France has suffered much; but, was it not *worth some suffering* to effect a change like this!—These are the reflections, which the silly attempts above-mentioned are calculated to give rise to. It is obvious enough that such *must* be the effect of them; but the writers, of whom I am speaking, do not take time to look at ultimate effects. They are actuated by a desire to degrade the character of the men of whom they are writing; and do not perceive, that they do, in fact, pronounce not only the eulogium of these *men*, but also of their *nation* and of their *revolution*. This revolution it is to which a wise statesman will constantly look. He will examine well into the causes and the effects of it; and, he will find amongst the latter the triumph of talent and courage over birth. He will cast his eye over Europe; he will see that dominion and power have changed masters; he will see a total subversion of almost every establishment that before existed; he will see new sovereigns, new codes of laws, new connections of commerce. And, he will see, that all this has been accomplished by men emerging from the lowest walks in life, some of whom were at the plough and some upon the shop-board, when the sound of liberty was first heard in France. And, with these facts before his eyes, he will not be inclined to affect to feel contempt towards a great general because he was once a barber; but, on the contrary, he will endeavour to draw forth from obscurity the talents and virtues of the *barbers* in his own country; that is to say, he

will avail himself of talent and virtue, find it where he may, either in high life or in low, and he will take care not to encourage publications like those upon which I have here been observing; for he will perceive, that they preach up revolution in the most persuasive language. When a barber is told that, before the revolution, Count SUCHET was a barber; when a labourer is told, that, before the revolution, the PRINCE OF ESSLING was a labourer; when the farmer is told, that, before the revolution, the DUKE OF TREVISO was a farmer; when the drummer is told, that, before the revolution, the DUKE OF BELLUNO was a drummer; when the printer's boy is told, that, before the revolution, MARSHAL BRUNE (I forget his title) was a printer's boy; when the post-boy is told, that, before the revolution, GENERAL DROUET was a post-boy; when the people in general are told, that, before the revolution, the now KING OF NAPLES was living in an ale-house kept by his father, and that the EMPEROR himself is the son of "a Little Attorney." When these things are told to the people, what must naturally be the effect upon their minds; and what but the grossest folly could induce those, who wish to preserve the present establishments, to tell the people these things? Will the barbers and the labourers and the farmers and the drummers and the printer's boys and the post-boys and publican's and attorney's sons think the worse of the French revolution for being told this? And will they be the more likely to set their faces against any thing tending to a revolution in England?—I leave these questions to be answered by the wise men whose publications have called them forth.

NOTTINGHAM RIOTS.—These riots appear to be still going on. The rioters continue to enter houses and to demolish the *machines*, which they look upon as the cause of their want of employment. They have, however, committed, it seems, several other acts, such as setting fire to ricks and houses. It is a sad sight to behold, and the more so on account of the season of the year and the high price of bread, especially if we consider the several circumstances that seem to concur for the keeping up of that price.—These riots in Nottinghamshire, if they are very mischievous, as they are, in many respects, might still be useful in one way, if our writers would but make this use of them: I mean, if they would, for a moment, sup-

pose such riots to exist in Normandy, or any other province of France, or in any part of Holland; and tell us, what they would augur therefrom as to the disposition of the subjects of Napoleon in general. Would they not publish "*second éditions*," in order not to lose a moment in conveying the glad tidings to this most thinking people? Would they not predict a counter-revolution, the fall of Buonaparté, and the restoration of the Bourbons? Yet, there would be no more truth in that than there would be in the French now predicting the fall of this government from the riots at Nottingham. This ought to teach these writers some degree of caution: it ought to operate as some little check to those sanguine conclusions which they are so ready to draw from every little brawl they hear of upon the continent.—The riots have undoubtedly arisen from the diminution in the demand for the articles upon which the people at Nottingham worked; and, as this diminution has arisen from the interdicts of Napoleon, he may very fairly be accused of being the instigator, the prime mover and cause of the riots. That he ought to be punished for this there can be no doubt; but, alas! *he is beyond the reach of a prosecution!* We must, therefore, do as well as we can, not being able to do what we would. He prevents the nations of Europe from wearing our stockings and cutting their meat with our knives; but our government prevents us from drinking his wine and eating his oil. We dare not say, that our government does wrong; and, really, we may full as well hold our tongues about Napoleon. He has his commercial system and we have ours. We do him all the mischief that we can, and he is by no means backward in the way of retaliation.—One measure that may be adopted, as connected with the cause of these riots, is the putting of a stop to the use of grain in the *Distilleries*, and this is, I suppose, to be done; but, if the Americans should lay an embargo, and thereby prevent the exportation of food to *Spain and Portugal*, the stoppage of the *Distilleries* will not answer much purpose; or, at least, it will not keep down the price of corn. This Embargo, if continued for any length of time, would be a measure of the most fatal tendency in this crisis of our affairs. It would compel us to send food out of England and Ireland to Cadiz, and Lisbon, and to many parts of the pen-

insula. Our armies must be fed from home, instead of being fed from America as they now are; and the West India islands also must be fed from home.—What would I do, then, to prevent this embargo? The means are always at hand. Come to an arrangement with America; repeal those Orders in Council of which she complains, and which were to be repealed upon the revocation of the Berlin and Milan Decrees. I see no obstacle to this. We have been trying this war of the custom-house for some years, and we find, not only that it is productive of great present distress, but that it is likely to transfer permanently a considerable part of our manufactures and commerce to other countries. Since, then, it has not succeeded, why not abandon it? We see Buonaparté abandon many of the modes of warfare that he tries. It is the part of wisdom to change a path that is wrong for a path that is right. Who that finds himself in a wrong path does not act thus? And, as to the *shame*, what shame can there be in doing that which is for our own good and for the injury of nobody?—Another reason for coming to a speedy arrangement with America, is, that the longer we delay it, the harder will be her terms. She becomes every day more and more independent of us, and she every day has a stronger ally in the growing fleets of Napoleon, and, indeed, in his armies. Every victory that France gains in the Peninsula tends to raise the demands of America upon us. In short, while we are in this state with her, every thing that injures us is for her good; and, as the distress of our armies for want of food would be greatly injurious to us, she will, in all probability, do whatever she can to produce that distress.—It is useless for us to rail at the President and the Congress, and excuse them of partiality for France: they have just as good a right to accuse us of partiality for Ferdinand. We cannot prevent their laying an embargo. They will do what they please in their own country, at any rate. We have the power to do at sea what we please, and we do not please to let them trade with the dominions of France. And, if they do not please to let their corn and meat go to Spain and Portugal, why, then, each party does his pleasure; and there is no more to be said about the matter.

HORSE-WHIPPING.—And what can horse-whipping have to do with *Politics*? the

reader may ask. Very little, and especially the horse-whipping below recorded; but, the article which I have here to insert from the Star Newspaper of the 21st instant contains matter well worthy of public attention. After inserting it I will offer some remarks on it, which will, I think, show, that the subject is one of a really public and important nature.—

“REMARKABLE CASE.—Relating to an assault, tried at the Assizes at Winchester in 1810, Mr. Paddon, an Attorney at Fareham, Plaintiff, and Mr. Denmark, Surgeon of his Majesty’s ship *San Josef*, Defendant.—A poor woman, wife to a marine on board the *San Josef*, lying at Spithead in July 1809, having travelled from Devonshire with two young children to see her husband, had the misfortune to have one of them taken ill with the small pox, shortly after going on board. She was, of course, in order to prevent the communication of infection among the ship’s company, ordered on shore, among strangers, without money, without friends, and carrying contagion in her arms. A small subscription was instantly made at the ward-room table for her; and it occurred to Mr. Denmark, that he might be able to gain her admittance into a house entirely adapted for the reception of small pox patients, in the parish of Titchfield (to which he belonged, and which was situated about seven miles distance), through the medium of a MRS. BREIT, of that place, of whose humanity he had a high opinion. To effect this humane purpose, he wrote her the following letter, viz.:—“*His Majesty’s ship San Josef*, July 22, 1809.—My Dear Madam “—In the first place, give me leave to enquire particularly after your valuable health, and, in the next place, to recommend to your benevolent attention a poor woman, whose child has been taken ill of the small pox, on board this ship. We cannot, without endangering the ship’s company, keep her on board, and her being a perfect stranger, with no friends at Portsmouth, will obviate her being received at lodgings. I have, therefore, my dear Madam, most earnestly to entreat you will use your beneficent influence to get her into the Pest-house. In this you will particularly oblige one who must ever hold you in the highest estimation. Believe me, “My dear Madam, ever truly,—Your

“ “obedient humble servant, — ALEX-
 “ “ANDER DENMARK.—P. S. The object
 “ “of your attention is a marine’s
 “ “wife, who has travelled from Ply-
 “ “mouth.”—This lady advised with the
 “ “parish clerk, Roger Gough, who in
 “ “his turn recommended the *opinion of an*
 “ “attorney to be taken on the poor woman’s
 “ “case! Accordingly Joseph Paddon, an
 “ “attorney at Fareham, upon the sole au-
 “ “thority of this parish clerk, wrote Mr.
 “ “Denmark the following letter, viz.:—
 “ “*Fareham, July 25, 1809.*—Sir,—The
 “ “church wardens and overseers of Titch-
 “ “field have directed me, on behalf of
 “ “themselves and the rest of the inhabi-
 “ “tants, to sue you in an action-at-law,
 “ “or prosecute you by indictment, as coun-
 “ “sel shall advise, for the most unwar-
 “ “ratable, illegal, and INDECENT act
 “ “they have ever had occasion to seek a
 “ “remedy at law for. You have sent
 “ “into the parish a family afflicted with
 “ “the small pox, not having the least
 “ “claim to relief there; and that too,
 “ “in a manner which gives the *highest*
 “ “offence to the lady, upon whose know-
 “ “ledge of you in your profession, you
 “ “presume to ask assistance of in this
 “ “ABOMINABLE TRANSACTION.
 “ “Your letter to her is before me. You
 “ “state that it would endanger the ship’s
 “ “company to keep the family on board.
 “ “Pray are not the lives of the inhabitants
 “ “of Titchfield as valuable as those of the
 “ “ship’s company? And is not the life
 “ “of Mr. Anderson, who has never yet
 “ “had the small pox, but who was ne-
 “ “cessarily the person to receive this
 “ “pestilential consignment from you, of
 “ “equal value with that of any indivi-
 “ “dual on board the *San Josef*? You
 “ “have caused the *greatest distress in the*
 “ “parish of Titchfield, and must answer
 “ “for the consequences. At present I can
 “ “only demand of you a recompence for
 “ “the injury which the parish as a body
 “ “sustains. And I am directed to call
 “ “upon you for your undertaking in
 “ “writing to defray all the expences
 “ “which the parish may incur in conse-
 “ “quence of your “benevolent attention to
 “ “a poor woman, who must ever hold you in
 “ “the highest estimation.” Your imme-
 “ “diate determination will determine the
 “ “parish, in whose behalf I am, Sir,—
 “ “Your very obedient humble servant,
 “ “J. PADDON.”—Mr. Denmark, on the
 “ “receipt of the above letter, waited on
 “ “the parish officers, who assured him

“ “that, instead of having authorized the
 “ “above, Joseph Paddon to write to him
 “ “such a letter about the afflicted family,
 “ “which he had sent into the parish, they
 “ “did not so much as know of the circum-
 “ “stance of the family being in the parish,
 “ “except a Mr. Fry, one of the overseers,
 “ “and even he had not authorized the writ-
 “ “ing of such a letter as was sent by Pad-
 “ “don. Upon receiving this information,
 “ “Mr. Denmark repaired to Fareham, the
 “ “place of the residence of Paddon, and
 “ “finding the latter not in a humour to
 “ “retract any of the expressions he had
 “ “used, he, in the language of the law,
 “ “committed an assault upon his body;
 “ “or, in plain English, HORSEWHIPPED
 “ “HIM. The consequence was, a prose-
 “ “cution on the part of Paddon; and, as
 “ “might be expected, a conviction at the
 “ “assizes at Winchester in 1810. On the
 “ “14th instant, Mr. Denmark was brought
 “ “up to the Court of King’s Bench to re-
 “ “ceive judgment, when he gave in affida-
 “ “vits, stating that he had been called on
 “ “to pay, and had paid the parish officers,
 “ “for the expences of the poor woman and
 “ “her children while in the pest-house of
 “ “Titchfield! that he had been put to
 “ “very heavy expences in preparing for a
 “ “trial at the Quarter Sessions at Win-
 “ “chester in 1809; that he had incurred
 “ “more than seventy pounds in law ex-
 “ “pences previous to June 1810 (not know-
 “ “ing how much he had incurred since,) and
 “ “that he had now been compelled to
 “ “leave his ship, and to travel expressly
 “ “from Plymouth to London, and to re-
 “ “main here many days, while his family
 “ “were in the greatest anxiety on his ac-
 “ “count. His Counsel presented several
 “ “other affidavits, particularly one from
 “ “Sir Charles Cotton, Commander in Chief
 “ “of the Channel Fleet, strongly expres-
 “ “sive of the humanity, benevolence and
 “ “gentlemanlike behaviour of Mr. Den-
 “ “mark, both in his professional and pri-
 “ “vate situations; and expressing his opi-
 “ “nion, that nothing short of great provo-
 “ “cation could have urged him to a viola-
 “ “tion of the laws.—Also, an affidavit of
 “ “Mr. Fry, one of the parish officers, de-
 “ “claring that Paddon was not authorized
 “ “to write to Mr. Denmark, in the unqua-
 “ “lified terms he made use of in his letter
 “ “to that gentleman.—The Court sentenc-
 “ “ed him to pay a fine of 30*l.* to the King,
 “ “and to find bail to keep the peace for
 “ “two years.—In the course of the plead-
 “ “ing in this cause, Lord Ellenborough

"observed, that "the Court felt that all "the conduct of the defendant was meritorious up to the unfortunate moment "in which he exceeded the bounds of "law." He also observed, that Mr. "Serjeant Pell "need not enforce the "subject matter of Paddon's letter; for "the Court will perceive it was a "coarse letter, and that he was not "warranted to the extent he went."—The public are, indeed, little interested in the question, whether the horse-whip was used, in this case, too freely or too sparingly; but, they are, or ought to be, much interested in the circumstances connected with this horse-whipping, and which the horse-whipping has, at any rate, brought before the public.—We here see a poor woman, a soldier's wife, at 150 miles distance from her home, with two small children, and one suddenly taken ill of the small pox, recommended to the attention of a lady, in order that they may be received into a parish pest-house; and we see the gentleman, who had the humanity to give the recommendation, compelled to pay, out of his own pocket, the expences attending the keeping of these poor creatures, while in the pest-house. And, can this be according to law? Is it, then, a *crime*, punishable by pecuniary penalties, to recommend a poor helpless wretch to the charitable attention of any one? Is it here, in this country, where we are raising money to comfort the *Portuguese*, and where we almost blubber out loud at hearing recounted the sorrows of *Cuffee and Quashee* and their sable offspring; is it here, in this country, where we seem to be beating up round the globe for objects of compassion; is it here, that it is a sort of crime to recommend a soldier's wife and children to the humanity of a parish? It may be said, perhaps, that the same thing would not have happened in any other parish in the kingdom; that, search England, Ireland, and Scotland through, you will not find a parish to do, in a similar case, what was done in the parish of Titchfield. May be so: I would fain hope so: but, *the law*? Is it possible, that Mr. Denmark was liable to an *action* or an *indictment*, for what he did? Is this possible? If it be, let us cease to talk about English humanity.—What was his crime? Why this: a soldier's wife, anxious to see her husband before he sailed to the Mediterranean, and he as anxious, doubtless, to see her and his children; this poor woman, with one child by her side

and another in her arms, tramps up to Portsmouth from the neighbourhood of Plymouth, a distance of about 150 miles. She goes on board, and she is hardly there when her youngest child is taken ill with a disease which too often proves mortal. She cannot remain in the ship, for there the contagion may reach a considerable part of the crew. She and her husband are compelled to part. And, under what circumstances! Reader, if you be a *father*, need I attempt to describe to you the feelings of this soldier at that moment? Talk to me not of "*our brave fellows*," our "*gallant tars*." This, unless you can feel for this man, is all empty sound. He is compelled to quit his wife and child; he sees them sail to the shore; and under circumstances the most painful that can possibly be conceived. They are 150 miles from home, they are friendless, penny-less, and his youngest child seized with a dangerous disease. But, he has some little hope, he receives some comfort, when informed that the Surgeon of the ship has had the goodness to recommend them to the protection of a lady and of officers of a parish near at hand. What must the man's thoughts have been when he heard the result of this recommendation? I do not mean the horse-whipping result; but the result as far as related to the people at Titchfield? Must not their conduct have made him ask himself, for whom he was daily venturing his life?—The parish officers of Titchfield appear to have had nothing to do with the offensive letter, which produced the horse-whipping; but they made Mr. Denmark pay, out of his own pocket, for the feeding and taking care of the poor woman and her children. They took care to do this; they inflicted this species of punishment upon him for his humanity: as an example, I suppose, to others likely to offend in the same way.—But, again I ask, is it possible, that Mr. Denmark did in this case, by recommending the poor woman to the lady and the parish officers, commit a *crime* in the eye of the law? If it be so, then what is to become of people in the situation of this poor woman and her child? If it be a crime to send a person into a parish, that person having the small pox, it must be a crime for a person so afflicted to go into a parish; and, as every spot of land in the country is in some parish or other, what, I should be glad to know, is to become of any one who is put on shore with the small pox? There seems to be a sentence of death

passed before hand upon all persons in that situation, who may happen to be on board of ship.—It is, I think, impossible that such can be the law; or, if it be, there ought not a moment to be lost in altering it.—This is an object of much greater consequence than is that of *educating* the poor; and, there ought, in my opinion, to be some special regulations relative to the wives and children of Soldiers and Sailors, who are made of flesh and blood as well as other people, and who cannot live upon empty bombastical praises.—Of the conduct of the several *individuals*, in the transaction here recorded, I need say nothing. The facts speak for themselves, and no man of a right mind will fail to draw a proper conclusion from them. That the parish officers should have made Mr. Denmark pay the expences is what does very much surprize me; and, I should be glad to know, whether even that was legal.—One thing remains to be noticed, and I deem it worthy of the reader's particular attention, if he be not already well acquainted with Parish law.—We here see, that it was the *Parish Clerk*, upon whose instructions the Attorney acted in the case before us; and, the Parish Clerk appears to have had nothing more than the *bare consent* of a parish officer; but, that officer was but *one* out of *six*, all the rest of whom have, upon their oaths, disavowed having had any knowledge of the matter. So that here is all this turmoil conjured up by the Parish Clerk acting upon the *bare assent* of one of the Parish officers. But does the reader imagine, that parishes are to be plunged into law in this way? Does he suppose that any Parish Clerk, or even Parish officer, has the power to make the people pay taxes in order to put money into the pockets of Attorneys, or to gratify any whim or passion of his own, under the garb of *going to law for the parish*? If the reader thinks this, he is mistaken; for no Parish officer, no, nor all the officers of a parish put together, can legally employ any Attorney or Advocate, on the Parish account, *without the consent and approbation of the Parish, given in Vestry*. If the law were otherwise, what parish would be safe from ruin? Any litigious man, in the character of overseer or churchwarden, might give the parish as many law suits as days in the year. I do not know a cheaper way for a vindictive man to gratify his hatred of his neighbours. The law does not permit this: it

does not hold out this temptation to any litigious man to indulge his mischievous taste at the expence of others. It requires that, before an Attorney be employed in behalf of a Parish, the whole Parish shall be consulted and give their assent. How necessary this is, appears from the case before us. It appears that five out of six of the Parish officers were wholly ignorant of the Attorney having been applied to; and, that the one, who was acquainted with it, had merely given his assent; and that, too, with reluctance. So, in fact, here we see the Parish Clerk, who is no parish officer, setting an Attorney to work in the name of a whole Parish, the Parish being almost wholly ignorant of the matter. This would have been prevented, together with all the consequences, if the Parish had been called together and consulted before the Attorney had been employed; and I hope that this case will be a warning to Parishes how they act in this respect.

* * In the last Number, in the remarks upon MR. WHITE'S TRIAL, at page 648, there was an error of the press. Instead of "1774, 5, 6, &c." it should have been "1794, 5, 6, &c."—I find, too, that there was an error in my assuming, as a fact, that the *author* of the alledged libel was *Mr. White's son*. I see, upon looking over the defence again, that this is not particularly stated, and that Mr. White speaks of an *agent*, without any thing further.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
29th November, 1811.

IRISH CATHOLICS.

In the present volume of the Register, at pages 193 and 215 and the following ones, an account will be found of the *cause* of the prosecution of Dr. Sheridan and the several other Catholic Gentlemen, whose trials are now going on in Dublin. It would, therefore, be useless to repeat here the circumstances whence the prosecutions arose. The *trial* of one of the gentlemen, Dr. Sheridan, has taken place, and an *acquittal* has been the result. I shall here, therefore, give an account, taken from the Dublin Papers, of the Proceedings on that trial, which are of very great importance. I beg the reader to attend in particular to what is stated as to the *formation of the jury* and as to certain other points, which were

discussed before the Judges and decided on by them, before and during the Trial.

COURT OF KING'S BENCH, DUBLIN, Wednesday, 20 Nov. 1811.—Dr. Sheridan was called upon his trial, and the following Jurymen answered to their names, and appeared in the box.

1. *Benjamin Geale, Esq.*—Mr. Geale was asked by the Traverser's Council, if he had formed or declared any opinion upon the subject? But the question was over-ruled, and he was sworn.

2. *Peter Digges Latouche, Esq. sworn.*

3. *John Roche, Esq.* objected to by the Crown.

4. *John Lindsay, Esq. ditto.*

5. *Bartholomew Maziere, Esq. do.*

6. *Leland Crosthwaite, Esq. sworn.*

7. *John Orr, Esq. sworn.*

8. *Richard Darling, Esq.* objected to by the Crown.

9. *John Duncan, Esq. sworn.*

10. *William Hutton, Esq.* objected to by the Crown.

11. *Thomas T. Frank, Esq. ditto.*

12. *Francis Beggs, Esq. do.*

13. *Alexander Jaffray, Esq. do.*

14. *John Pepper, Esq. sworn.*

15. *Patrick Marsh, Esq.* objected to by the Crown.

16. *Richard Geoghegan, Esq. do.*

17. *William Sparrow, Esq.*—Upon the book being handed to Mr. Sparrow, Mr. Burrowes objected to Mr. Sparrow, as being an Orangeman; the Chief Justice declared that was no legal objection. Mr. Burrowes then proceeded to make his challenge against Mr. Sparrow, that as an Orangeman, he had malice against all Roman Catholics, and, of course, against the Traverser.—The two first of the Jurors who had been sworn, Benjamin Geale, Esq. and P. D. Latouche, Esq. were appointed to try the challenge; and Mr. Sparrow was sworn to give evidence.

The *Chief Justice* observed upon the novelty of a man being sworn to give evidence against himself; but if both sides assented to it, the Court will not interfere.

Mr. Burrowes stated, that he had made a fair appeal to the Counsel for the Crown to have Mr. Sparrow sworn, in order to shew that he belonged to a society hostile to the religion of the Traverser.

Judge Day.—If the man has taken an unlawful oath he is hardly bound to acknowledge it, as he subjects himself to a serious indictment. If he has taken the Orangeman's Oath I don't know that he could have taken an oath more unlawful.

The *Chief Justice.*—He cannot be examined to make himself infamous in society. I will not object, however, to any proper question.

Mr. Johnson—A number of questions may be asked him to make the objection intelligible to the Jury, without asking an improper one.

Mr. Burrowes.—We have no witness to prove the fact but himself, and we appeal to his conscience.—The objection was over-ruled by the Court, as no sufficient proof was adduced. Mr. Sparrow was accordingly sworn.

Mr. Burrowes.—If there are nine other Orangemen on the pannel—we shall make no further observations.

Robert Orr, Esq. objected to by the Crown.

Thomas Meade, Esq. do.

R. Williamson, Esq. do.

Thomas Jameson, Esq. do.

Thomas Prentice, Esq. do.

N. Wade, Esq. do.

John Hutton, Esq. sworn.

W. Humphreys, Esq. objected to by the Crown.

James Chambers, Esq. do.

Wm. Wood, Esq. do.

James Jackson, Esq. do.

Robert Armstrong, Esq. sworn.

Edward Clibborn, Esq. sworn.

Charles McKernon, Esq. was objected to by the Crown.

Thomas Richardson, Esq. do.

Charles Pentland, Esq. sworn.

John Hamilton, Esq. sworn.

Of the above, our readers will perceive, twenty-two were put by, by the Crown, and none by the Traverser.—The Clerk of the Crown stated—"Doctor Sheridan has been indicted for an offence, of which he has traversed—you are to try whether he is guilty or not."

Mr. Kemmis, the junior Counsel for the Crown, opened the pleadings.

The *Attorney General* then addressed the Jury to the following effect:—I congratulate you, Gentlemen of the Jury, that the long expected day of Justice has at last arrived, and I am sanguine that the result of this day's proceedings will frustrate the designs of treason, and give a check to the disguise of faction, and folly. The case itself lies in a narrow compass, both with respect to the law and the fact: it is, however, connected with such a variety of matter, that I must trespass upon your patience much longer than I could wish. I hope the issue of it will be to restore our

peace, allay the discontents, and abate the ferment which prevails in this country. Treason and disaffection, Gentlemen of the Jury, have been but too successfully exerted in influencing the minds of the Roman Catholics of Ireland, and the project of a Convention was detailed in Resolutions of a certain Aggregate Meeting, assembled in this city, the 9th of July last. The Aggregate Meeting sprang from a Resolution of a Committee, which, for 18 months, had acted a distinguished part, under the name of the General Committee of the Catholics of Ireland. When I talk of treasonable views—bottomed in treason and rebellion—let me not be misunderstood.—A great proportion of Roman Catholics are loyal and amenable to the laws, and look with alarm and dismay at the unwarrantable and false proceedings which have taken place in the name of the Roman Catholics of Ireland. I do declare that a great proportion of them are loyal, and take no part in their projects. Some of them are misled, and are dupes, and made the instruments of designs which they would abominate if they were to know them. Young men, in particular, of ardent minds, have engaged in those political pursuits, with no criminal object; they merely desire to raise themselves to notice, and to make speeches. Some of those speeches are most dangerous and unwarrantable, the work of United Irishmen, labouring for a separation of this country from England. Others are made merely for the gratification of vanity, the authors not seeing that they are acting adverse to the public peace, and contrary to the success of that very Catholic Emancipation they pretend to be the advocates of. I will now call your attention to the Resolutions of the Aggregate Meeting of the 9th of July. Here the Attorney-General read the Resolutions, as follows:—*First*—That being impressed with the unalterable conviction of the undoubted right of every man to worship his Creator according to the dictates of his own conscience, we deem it our duty thus publicly and solemnly to declare our decision, that no government can inflict any pain, penalty, or privation, for obeying that form of Christian Faith, which, in his conscience, he believes to be right.—*Second*—That we again Petition the Legislature for a repeal of the laws affecting the Catholics of Ireland.—*Third*—That, in exercising our undoubted right to Petition, we will adhere to the ancient forms of the Constitution, &c.—*Fourth*—

That a Committee be appointed to inquire into the Penal Laws, and make a report of the same, within one month—all which were carried unanimously. That the Committee to be appointed to prepare Petitions to Parliament, do consist,—*First*—Of Catholic Peers, and eldest sons of Peers and Catholic Baronets.—*Second*—Catholic Prelates.—*Third*—Ten persons chosen from the Counties, and the survivors of the Delegates of 1792 to form an integral part of these ten.—*Fourth*—Four persons from each of the Counties in Ireland; which resolution was likewise carried unanimously.—These resolutions were merely to throw dust into the eyes of loyal Catholics. Fully aware of the law they were about to offend, they professed obedience to it while they were actually disobeying it. Observe, they appoint managers to conduct Catholic affairs until a new Committee is elected, an interim government was appointed not confined to a Petition to Parliament, but to manage Catholic affairs generally. By the Constitution the management of the public affairs is entrusted to the lawful Government of the country. But this is a disclaim of all Government, and such proceedings are hostile to Government. It is said, that an assembly so constituted, would not act contrary to the peace and tranquillity of the country; but a few respectable loyal men in such an assembly, could be no guarantee for its conduct; the intemperate men, in all such meetings, govern the rest. This Committee took its rise from the last; look at what their proceedings had been. Their language had been so seditious, treasonable and indecent, that their Press, wicked and daring as it had been, was alarmed, and would not venture to insert some parts of their speeches—but left chasms and blanks in their paper, for that which they dare not tell. Every Catholic of respectability felt himself scandalized, by such wicked and dangerous proceedings. Every loyal man was calling out against such barefaced sedition. Government was blamed for not interfering. In February, however, they were about to terminate their sittings; a circular letter from the Committee was issued to call a renovation of itself; then, and not before, Government interposed, not by a measure against law, it merely signified to the Magistrates throughout Ireland, that the intended elections were against Statute Law, and should be prevented. This had the desired effect; for a time it was abandoned. Several re-

spectable members of the Committee who had left it, however, went back to it, believing, perhaps, the existence of it was useful to the cause, their presence was a restraint upon the rest, and a Committee was from that circumstance not interfered with until the close of their sittings. The meeting of the 9th of July was composed of some of the members who had been guilty of the greatest excesses. It is impossible not to conceive, however, that there was a portion of well meaning men amongst them. It was then held out to the loyal Catholics of Ireland, that their attention was merely called to the Petition, and for that purpose it was necessary to elect a Catholic Convention—but see what the substance of the Petition is, which was thus made a pretence of assembling this Convention. In order to shew what little deliberation is necessary to frame a petition, I will state to you, what the state of the Catholics was in the year 1778, and what it is now.

[Here the Attorney General went into a statement of what the penal laws were at that period, and their gradual repeal, and what the restrictions were which still continue. In running over the list of penal laws he mentioned one which encouraged the son to rise up in rebellion against the father, one which dispossessed a Catholic of his horse if it was worth more than 5*l.* &c. &c. &c.; and when he ended a narrative of this description, a smile of contempt at the bigotry of those disgraceful times, spread through the court, and created a temporary interruption. The Attorney General, when this subsided, proceeded].—Let it not be understood that I mean to speak lightly of these matters; I acknowledge the repeal of them are laudable objects for men of rank and talents to pursue.—But what is the object of the Petition? Those restrictions can be expressed in a narrow and confined compass. Persons capable of reading and writing could form a Petition at once, and without difficulty; and therefore to talk of collecting a National Convention for the purpose, is an imposition upon common sense. Their Petition has been again and again presented to Parliament; it has been discussed by Parliament, and has never been rejected for want of form. Why has it therefore been now thought necessary to summon a Convention to deliberate upon it: to call a Convention of 500 persons, to act in the capital, day after day, and month after

month? Because there is a Rebel party and a party of United Irishmen at work, and who now endeavour to effect by artifice what they could not do by force in 1798, and in 1803—they may have an object in calling a National Convention, because such desperate, wicked and factious persons always sway such assemblies. How was this Convention to act but by the example of that Committee, out of which it was to spring?—What rules or orders were to govern them? Our Parliament cannot meet but by order of the King, and cannot sit a moment longer than he pleases. But this Convention, self-created, has no law but its own discretion—such an assembly can never be tolerated under any form of government. This is no contest between the Government and the Catholics.—I deny it.—It is a contest between the law and the violation of the public peace. Government would be unable to stand, if it was obliged to submit to such things. The Press says the right to Petition is attacked—it is no such thing. Because Government stops a National Convention, can it be said they stop Petitioning? Because the Catholics cannot have a Parliament of their own, do they complain of not having the Right to Petition? The Attorney General then adverted to the origin and necessity of the Convention Act, which was adopted in consequence of intended meetings proposed by the North of Ireland. He then proceeded with great ingenuity and ability, to comment on the Convention Act, and its applicability to the case of the Traverser, but we must defer the remainder to allow ourselves time to detail the evidence.

John Shepherd was the first witness called, was examined by the Solicitor General. He said he was a police officer. He attended at Liffey Street Chapel on the 31st of July last according to directions. He knew Dr. Sheridan. The Meeting was large, but he could not take upon himself to say how large. Dr. Sheridan was in the chair. Heard Mr. Kirwan address the Chair, and make a motion for a petition to the Prince Regent and both houses of Parliament for a Repeal of the remaining disabilities which affect the Catholic body. The question was put upon this motion by Dr. Sheridan, and it was carried unanimously. He recommended another motion for appointing a Committee of five, to represent that parish in the General Committee—he omitted

those particulars, appointing a Committee to prepare and present a petition, and transact the business of the Meeting in the General Committee. It was not in his recollection that this motion was put in consequence of any former Meeting. The motion of appointing five Delegates was put by Dr. Sheridan. There was some difference as to the mode of electing the five: it was proposed at length that seven persons should be appointed to select five out of a list which was furnished. The proposal was carried, of the seven persons who retired two alone, as he could perceive, for he was in a situation to command a general view, returned.

One of the persons returned, handed a slip of paper to Dr. Sheridan. He believed Dr. Sheridan handed the slip of paper to another, and from it were read the following names; Dr. Sheridan, Thomas Kirwan, Henry Edmund Taaffe, Francis Sweetman and Richard Shiel. Dr. Sheridan was removed from the Chair, and Dr. Burke took it and put the question of Dr. Sheridan's election, which was carried unanimously. Dr. Sheridan then resumed the Chair, and all the new nominations were carried unanimously with the exception of one. Mr. Kirwan, and Mr. Taaffe returned thanks for the honour of their election. Mr. Sweetman was not present, but some person spoke for him. Mr. Shiel was in London, and this was the reason of an opposition being made to his nomination. Dr. Sheridan left the Chair and Mr. Taaffe took it, when the thanks of the meeting were voted to Dr. Sheridan. The motion was carried unanimously, and Dr. Sheridan merely thanked the meeting. Liffey-street Chapel is in the parish of St. Mary. No other business done but what he related—could not swear that he was at Fishamble street on the 9th of July.

Cross-examined by Mr. Burrowes.—He was of the Established Church. Did not go to Liffey-street Chapel as a member of the meeting. It was open to every one. No concealment. There was no abuse of any individual or government. He could discover no sedition at the Meeting, from the respectability of the persons who attended he would be surprised to find any thing of a seditious tendency. *He believes the Meeting met to Petition Parliament and to Petition Parliament alone.* He believes the resolutions were read from a written paper. [Here he was shewn a brief containing a resolution; he believed

it was the first. He read another which he said was *like* the second; but it was not at all so full.] He swore positively to the word *represent*—oh! he begged pardon, he meant *prepare* or *present*. When he said *prepare* or *present* he did not mean to say *represent*. He did not doubt but a written document would give a better account of the proceedings than he did. He again said he thought the only object of the meeting was petitioning. 'Did you not,' said Mr. Burrowes, 'talk of transacting other business.' [In answering this the witness seemed to have a confusion of ideas.] Five delegates were appointed, but he believed that petitioning was the object of the meeting. There was no business but about petitioning. Did not recollect where they said would 'transact' business. He believed Liffey-street included the parishes of St. Mary's, St. Thomas's and St. George's. He took a memorandum of the proceedings of the meeting, but has it not now. He had it *ten days* ago; knew then he was to appear in this case as a witness. He was not desired by any one to leave the memorandum at home. He does not know but it is in his desk. If he had it he would bring it. He looked in his desk and could not find it; *yet it may be in his desk.* He was sent to this meeting as to others; and he told those he had a right to tell what took place. He believes he gave his report to the Magistrates. He does not know to whom he gave it. Alderman Pemberton, Counsellor Hare, and Major Sirr, were present when he gave it. He thought that Major Sirr and Counsellor Hare were together when he gave it in. He said he had *General Orders* to attend the Meetings. "Those *General Orders* did not come from Heaven," said Mr. Burrowes, "and from whom did they come?" Sometimes from the Magistrates, and sometimes from the Chief Constables. He acknowledged he swore informations against Dr. Breen on *hearing* of his name. All he swore was hearing of his name. He swore the information before the Chief Justice. He did not see Dr. Breen. The Second Clerk of the Police Office swore against some others; it was not on his information Dr. Breen was arrested. This meeting did not last half an hour.

James M'Donough, examined by Serjeant Ball.—He is a clerk in the head police office. Was on the 9th of July at Liffey-street Chapel with Shepherd.—He heard Mr. Kirwan move five persons to present a petition and to represent that

parish in the General Committee. [He answered the matter of course questions without differing from the other witness.]

Cross-examined by Mr. Burne—*Shepherd* and he went together by order of the Magistrates, either Hare or Sirr. Is a clerk. Took notes of the proceedings according to order. He does not know what became of his notes. He saw them [like the other] ten days ago. He did not give his notes to any Magistrate; nor was he asked for them only once by Mr. Hare. He did not give them then, but the informations were grounded upon them. He did not see them since he looked at them last. He does not know on what occasion he looked at the notes. He believes they are in his desk or *elsewhere*. (He was asked to repeat the Resolutions; and he seemed to be as *undecided* as the other witness on strictness of expression. He believed the word "*We present*" or *something like it*, was in the Resolutions.) He believed the Resolutions were on paper; and that the Chairman spoke from a *written* report. He did not see Dr. Breen though he swore an information on which he was arrested. He heard the name of Dr. Breen mentioned.

FRANCIS HUDDLESTON, commonly called *Captain Huddleston*, was next examined and cross-examined. He is now, it appears, a news-paper reporter, has been a Captain in the army, has been in the Barrack Department. He gave an account of what passed at the Meetings of the Catholics in Dublin; he stated the purport of the resolutions that they entered into; and gave an account of the part which the defendant took therein.—Here ended the proceedings on the 20th of November.

On the 22nd the Trial was resumed, when the Chief Justice called on Mac Donough, a Clerk in Major Sirr's Office, to explain certain parts of his evidence which, in his Lordship's mind, were contradictory and inconclusive. The witness was examined by the Court, and appeared very much dashed and confounded. He was asked, whether among these persons sworn to in the information he had mentioned Doctor Breen as present.—He could not actually say that Doctor Breen was in the Chapel at Liffey street—heard his name to the best of his recollection mentioned—did not see him in the Chapel—knew his person, and heard that he was one of those concerned in the delegation.

Mr. Justice Osborne.—But in the infor-

mation before us, you do not speak as to your belief—you swear positively that Doctor Breen was one of the persons chosen.

Chief Justice.—Then you swore positively to a man whom you did not see.

Witness ordered to retire.

Mr. Burrowes then addressed the Jury. The Learned Council began by arraigning the conduct of the Crown in the formation of the Jury. He lamented to have witnessed that more decency, or the appearance at least, if it was no more, of justice on the part of the Crown. He did not lay any blame to his Majesty's Attorney General. It was notorious that on the Jury, there was not a single Catholic, in a cause, in which the Catholic Interest was so deeply concerned. He reflected upon the circumstance with pain, not unmixed with a considerable portion of dismay, that in a City, nine-tenths of whose inhabitants consisted of Catholics, not one was to be found on a Jury in which the Catholics were to be tried. It was, he feared ominous for the Country, when Government had recourse to such paltry artifices. Nay, the only Catholic on the pannel was instantly objected to—but that was not enough for the Crown—it was not content with objecting to the solitary Catholic—but in the spirit of liberality which so very honourably distinguished the Administration of the Country, it objected against *twenty-two Protestants* upon no grounds whatever. These Protestants, it should seem, were under the suspicion of being suspected as friends to the great Catholic Cause. But the very circumstance of these shameful challenges put the present Jury in a most delicate and awful situation. The eyes of the Country were on them. From the partiality evinced by the Crown to their selection from among so many of their excellent and liberal fellow citizens, it would naturally be concluded that they were prejudiced, and illiberal. He did not insinuate that they were, he believed in his heart that they were not—but see the situation in which they were placed by the Crown—a situation he would contend not only indelicate but almost unconstitutional.—They would, however, he felt convinced, risk themselves from the peculiarity in which they were so unhandsomely placed, as contradistinguished from the remainder of their fellow-citizens.—Mr. Burrowes then, at great length, went into the subject matter of the trial

before the Court. As we have already said, it would be impossible for us, to enter into any thing like a detail of this admirable forensic display. He first addressed himself to the facts, then to the Law—next to the History of the Catholics of Ireland, and finally to the Policy of the Irish Administration. In all these divisions, Mr. Burrowes was supereminently, supremely happy. But we are compelled to reserve until our next a satisfactory report of this admirable speech. After he had sat down, there was a murmur of applause, and he was congratulated on all sides by his friends. Indeed the union of honesty and talent was eminently conspicuous in this address, and we never saw more powerfully exemplified what great virtue, aided by great ability, is able to perform. In the course of his speech Mr. Burrowes pronounced a panegyric on the free press of Ireland, and stigmatized in his powerful and impassioned language the incendiaries and slaves hired by the Castle to influence the popular mind, and to inflame the people to madness.—When Mr. Burrowes had concluded, the Council for the traverser, relying upon the evidence of the Crown and the Law and Justice of their case, declined calling witnesses, or occupying the attention of the Court and Jury on a case which they considered already proved for their client.

The *Solicitor General* rose to reply.

Mr. Goold objected on the ground of usage, that the Crown Lawyers, except in cases when evidence was tendered on the part of the Traversers, had no right to reply.

The *Attorney General* insisted on the right.

Justice Osborne wished for precedents to establish the right.

Mr. O'Connell said that Mr. Justice Day ruled in the case of Williams (we think) on the last Munster Circuit, against the right claimed by the Crown in those cases.

Mr. Justice Day assented.

Mr. Bellew said, that Mr. Justice Osborne ruled a similar case at the Assizes of Waterford.

Mr. Justice Osborne assented.

Mr. Byrne cited a case from reports made in the time of Lord Kenyon, in which that able Judge had strongly reprobated the practice which Crown Lawyers assumed of speaking when no evidence had been produced by the Traverser.

Mr. O'Connell immediately read the passage, and in corroboration, cited the

case of Walter Cox, in which Lord Norbury and Baron George decided against Serjeant Moore, who essayed a reply.

Mr. Perrin stated the particulars of the case, in which the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, said that the right of the Attorney General was a personal right and could not be transferred to his brother.

Mr. Justice Osborne was rather against the practice.

Mr. Justice Day thought that it was established by analogy.

Mr. Justice Day was rather inclined with his brothers.

Mr. Bellew argued acutely against the right claimed.

The Chief Justice did not think the case in Lord Kenyon went to the present instance.

Mr. Burton said that perhaps the Crown would waive the right and allow the case to go to the Jury.

Mr. Ball insisted on the right of the Crown.

Mr. Solicitor General would not give up that right.

The *Attorney General* coincided with the Solicitor, and insisted on the right.

The Chief Justice at length determined in favour of the Crown.

Mr. Burton then asked whether since two Crown Lawyers were allowed to speak where no evidence was adduced on the part of the Traverser, another Counsel would not be allowed to his clients.

To this the Court after some hesitation assented.

Mr. Goold then touched upon all the leading topics of this great cause.

The *Solicitor General* replied.

The Chief Justice, after recapitulating the evidence, proceeded to define the Law. After about an hour and half's charge, the Jury retired.

Mr. Byrne rose and enquired whether the indictment on which the traversers were tried, was handed up to the Jury.

The Chief Justice said that it was not usual nor necessary.

Mr. Justice Osborne thought that the indictment might have been read to them, if they wished it.

Mr. O'Connell contended that the Jury should have a copy of the Indictment on which they were to decide.

While the point was mooted,

Mr. Geale, the Foreman, and Mr. Pepper, returned into the Box and requested a Copy of the Indictment. He took occasion at the same time to inquire whether

the Court could bring in separate verdicts for the two counts laid in the Indictment.—He was answered in the affirmative, and the Clerk of the Crown having enlarged the issue, the Jury again retired. In about an hour and a half, the Jury returned with a verdict of NOT GUILTY.

The names of the Jurors are these :

1. Benjamin Geale, Esq.
2. Peter D. Latouche, Esq.
3. Leland Crosthwaite, Esq.
4. John Orr, Esq.
5. John Duncan, Esq.
6. John Pepper, Esq.
7. William Sparrow, Esq.
8. John Hutton, Esq.
9. Robert Armstrong, Esq.
10. Edward Clibborn, Esq.
11. Charles Pentland, Esq.
12. John Hamilton, Esq.

The following is the substance of the Indictments found against Messrs. Kirwan and Taaffe.

County of the City of } The Jurors of
Dublin, to wit. } our Lord the King
upon their oath
present, that, on the 9th day of July, in the year of our Lord, 1811, at Fishamble-street, in the County of the City of Dublin, divers persons, to the said Jurors unknown, assembled themselves together, and being so assembled, and then and there contriving, and intending to cause and procure the appointment of Persons professing the Roman Catholic Religion, to exercise an authority to represent the inhabitants of Ireland professing the Roman Catholic Religion, under pretence of causing Petitions to both Houses of Parliament to be framed, for the repeal of all laws remaining in force in Ireland, by means whereof any person professing the Roman Catholic Religion is subject to any disability by reason, or in consequence of his religious tenets; and also, under pretence of procuring an alteration of the matters so established by law, did then and there, amongst other things, enter into certain Resolutions of and concerning such Committee, and of and concerning said laws so remaining in force in Ireland, and of and concerning certain districts in the City of Dublin, called Parishes, and used as such for the purpose of public worship, according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Religion, of the purport and effect here following: that is to say, that a Committee of Persons

professing the Roman Catholic Religion, meaning such Committee as aforesaid, should be appointed, and requested to cause proper Petitions to both Houses of Parliament to be forthwith framed, for the repeal of the Penal Laws, meaning the said laws so remaining in force in Ireland, and to procure signatures thereto in all parts of Ireland, and to take measures for bringing such Petition under the serious consideration of the Legislature, within the first month of the ensuing Sessions of Parliament; and that said Committee should consist of the Catholic Peers, and their eldest Sons, the Catholic Baronets, the Prelates of the Catholic Church in Ireland, and also ten persons to be appointed by the Catholics in each County in Ireland, the survivors of the Delegates of 1793, to constitute an integral part of that number, and also of five persons to be appointed by the Catholic inhabitants of each parish in Dublin, meaning each district so called a parish, as aforesaid, and that *Edward Sheridan*, late of Dominick street, in the County of the City of Dublin, Doctor of Physic, being a person professing the Roman Catholic Religion, and divers other persons professing the Roman Catholic Religion, to the said Jurors unknown, well knowing the premises, but being ill disposed persons, and unlawfully contriving and intending to aid and assist in and towards the constituting and forming of such Committee as aforesaid, on the 31st day of July, in the year 1811, at Liffey-street, in the County of the City of Dublin, in order to comply with such resolutions, and to aid and assist in and towards the constituting and forming such Committee, did meet and assemble themselves together for the purpose of appointing five persons to act as Representatives of the Inhabitants professing the Roman Catholic Religion, of and in one of the districts in the city of Dublin aforesaid, commonly called the Parish of St. Mary, in the said Committee so proposed to be formed, and that at and in the said Meeting so then and there held for the said purpose, one Thomas Kirwan, then and there being a person professing the Roman Catholic Religion, was then and there unlawfully appointed by the said persons so then and there assembled to act as one of the Representatives of the said Inhabitants of the said district in the said
(To be continued.)

Th' appearance is against me, I confess,
Who seemingly have put you in distress :
You, if your goodness does not plead my cause,
May think I broke all hospitable laws,
To bear you from your palace-yard by night,
And put your noble person in a fright :
This, since you take it ill, I must repent,
Though, heav'n can witness ! with no bad intent.
DAVIDEN. Cock and the Fox.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

IRISH CATHOLICS.—The acquittal of Dr. SHERIDAN, in spite of all the means made use of to obtain his conviction, has produced, as might have been expected, a suspension of the prosecutions against the other Catholic Gentlemen, whom it was intended to try for the same alledged crime, and against whom Bills of Indictment were found. Yet, as the reader will bear in mind, when that acquittal, which does so much honour to the Jury and to Ireland, which has given so much satisfaction in this part of the kingdom, and which will be received with applause in every part of the world where there remains one spark of the love of freedom; when that acquittal was first announced to the English public, the venal prints, and especially the COURIER, who seems to be a hack always in requisition, said, that Dr. Sheridan was acquitted for want of sufficient evidence; but, that the rest would be proceeded against upon amended indictments.—For want of sufficient evidence! To be sure; and who, pray, was ever acquitted upon any other ground? Who, (except in cases of mere *flaw*) was ever acquitted upon any ground other than that of a want of evidence to support the charge? Dr. Sheridan was charged with *having become a delegate in violation of an act of parliament*; and the Jury say, *not guilty*, upon the whole of the charge. They bring in no qualified verdict; they do not say, that there is not sufficient evidence to prove that he had become a delegate; they do not say, that to have become a delegate would have been a crime. They say, *not guilty*, upon the whole of the charge.—Now let us hear what the venal prints have resorted to, in order to account for the suspension of proceedings against the other accused persons.—At first, it was said, as I have

observed above, that they were to be brought to the bar under amended Bills of Indictment. But a suspension has taken place; and, from the following article in the COURIER, it would seem, that there was, at one time, an intention of dropping the proceedings altogether, provided the Catholic Gentlemen would give up their scheme of assembling as delegates. I quote from the Courier of the 30th of November, and the passage is one that merits a good deal of attention. It pretends to give the words of the Irish Attorney General, when he expressed his intention not to pursue the prosecutions any further; and it contains doctrines such, I believe, as never were broached before, and which, if they be permitted to pass as sound, there can, in the mind of no rational man, exist the smallest doubt that our liberties are a mere dream. "The intention of Government to prove by the highest legal authorities, that Delegation for the purpose of petitioning for the alteration of law is contrary to the Convention Act, having been fully fulfilled, the Irish Attorney General signified in open Court last Tuesday, that it was not his wish to press for the trial of the Delegates at present. He said, "that though there has been a verdict of acquittal in the case of Dr. Sheridan, "the law of the case has been clearly, unequivocally, and unanimously declared by the Court; and therefore I consider it now as settled law that the Committee or Convention proposed to be convened by the resolutions of the gentlemen on the 9th of July last, would be, if it should meet, an unlawful assembly. That being so, I cannot suffer myself to believe that the Roman Catholics of Ireland will persevere in the measure, because I cannot suffer myself to believe that it ever

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“ *was, or is, their meaning to violate the law of the land.* Under this impression I feel that it would be hardly consistent with the object of these prosecutions, which never was to persecute or to punish the individual, but to prevent a public mischief, to press for the trial of any other of the Traversers at present; and I will go farther, and say that it is my confident expectation, as it is my sincere wish, that it may not be rendered necessary for me at any time hereafter to call for the trial of the other Traversers.”—We trust, therefore, that the Catholics, who enjoy the right of petitioning in as full and free a manner as any other of his Majesty’s subjects, will not persist in convening the Committee or Convention, which their resolutions in July last had proposed to do. If they do, if mistaking forbearance for fear, and erroneously supposing that the acquittal of Dr. Sheridan was an acquittal upon the law as well as the fact, they do determine to call such a Convention, then, of course, the trials of the other delegates will be pressed.—Now, I do not, observe, say, that the words here put into the mouth of the Irish Attorney General were ever uttered by him. I see them published in a newspaper; and containing, as I think they do, some most offensive matter, I shall make freely my comments upon them. If they were not uttered by the Attorney General, it is for him, or his friends, to set the public right as to the fact. To me, it is of no consequence whether they proceeded from his lips or not. They form a publication, and, as such, I comment upon them.—Let us take the article in the order that it lies before us. The Attorney General, the official prosecutor on the part of the government, having seen one of the prosecuted parties escape, through the verdict of a jury, is here made to come into court, into that very court where the acquittal had taken place, and there to say, that, though there had been an acquittal of one of the accused persons, “the law of the case had been clearly, unequivocally, and unanimously declared by the court, and that he therefore now considered it as settled law,” &c. So then, according to this notion, the court is all and the jury nothing as to settling the point whether a man has, or has not, been guilty of a breach of the law! Dr. Sheridan was charged with having violated the Convention Act. The jury declared him

not guilty; but, according to this doctrine ascribed to the Attorney General of Ireland, that verdict is to have no weight, and the declaration of the Judges is to be taken for the true decision. Why, we were told, in this same *Courier*, that all the Judges had given their opinions on the side of guilt; but, are we, therefore, to consider the acquitted man as guilty? Lord Ellenborough, the other day, was by no means equivocal in his charge in the case of Mr. White, whose publication he expressly and repeatedly declared to be a libel, and whom he expressly and repeatedly declared to be answerable for all that appeared in his paper. Yet, the jury said, that he was not guilty. Their decision was in opposition to the opinion of the judge; and are we, for that reason, to conclude, that Mr. White was guilty, and that the jury were ignorant or perjured men? If this were to be the case, what, I would beg leave to ask, is the use of a jury? If their decision is to pass for nothing; if a man, though acquitted by them, is still to be looked upon as guilty in fact, and as having escaped by mere chance; if this were to be the case, what a despicable, and even what a mischievous institution that of the jury would be!—Here was a man indicted for the breach of a positive law; the written law was before the jury; they had to compare the act done with the acts prohibited by that law; and, they declare the man not to be guilty. But, because the Judges all declared, that the act done was amongst the acts prohibited by the law, it is here said to have been assumed, that the acquittal was to pass for nothing as a declaration of the meaning of the law; as if the opinions of twelve men were not as good as the opinions of four men, and that, too, in a case so plain that it strikes me with wonder how two opinions should ever have been entertained upon the subject.—Am I told, that the Judges must understand the law better than the Jury? If this be to be taken in its full extent, abolish the juries at once, for they are mere automata. Let them stay at home for God’s sake, and mind their farms and their shops; for, to stick them up in courts of justice is a mere mockery. If the Judge is, upon all occasions, to be looked upon as understanding better the application of the law to the act alledged than the Jury, away with the latter at once. But this is not so; and, until of late years, it never was pretended. The Judge is in the court to

regulate the proceedings; to see that all the evidence is *fairly laid before the Jury*; to state to them the words of the law as applicable to the act alledged; and to give them, if necessary, his opinion, as to the meaning of doubtful parts of the law. But, it is for the Jury to *try*, as Mr. Tooke so well urged it in his celebrated action with Mr. Fox; it is for the Jury to *try* the person accused, or rather, the question at issue. They are sworn "*well and truly to try*;" and, if they are to be no judges of the law by which they are to decide, what is the use of them? They do not, in that case, *try* the question at all; and, they had better be sworn well and truly to say whatever the Judge might bid them say. The Jury, and the Jury alone, tries the question brought before it. The institution of the Jury is founded upon the presumption that twelve men, impartially taken, are not only as likely, but *more* likely to form a correct opinion and make a just decision than one or more judges are; and, indeed, what *other* reason can there be, or could there ever have been, for the institution of Juries? If the Jury be to act as the Judges bid them, and if, in cases where the verdict goes in the teeth of the charge, the Judges are to be regarded as right and the Jury wrong, and if the *charge* and not the *verdict* be to be looked upon as decisive of the law; what, again I ask, is the use of the Jury; what sense is there in such an institution; and how can the Jury be said to *try* any thing?—But, would I make the Judges *nothing at all*, then? No: my objection is to the attempt, which has often been made, and with but too much success, to make them *every thing except responsible persons*. They have powers enough without being *triers* of causes and criminals. To them belongs the vast powers of directing and governing the whole of the proceedings in every trial; of giving their interpretation of the law; of determining what is or is not admissible evidence and admissible argument; of receiving the verdict or causing it to be revised; and, finally, of passing sentence, of saving life or inflicting death. Is not this enough for them? Are these powers too limited? See, then, what power they possess in the granting or refusing of motions, rules, attachments, &c. &c. And, when we consider, that they are all appointed by the king, or his ministers, and may, at any time, by the vote of a majority in parliament, have their salaries raised, can we say, that these powers are

not sufficient? I do not say that the powers are too great; but, I do say, that they are quite great enough; and I further say; that, without the Jury in criminal cases, these powers would be monstrous, and such as would leave the people not the shadow of liberty. The jury was instituted; and was always considered, and is, I hope, still to be considered, as the *guardian of the people's rights*; as a *security for the administration of Justice in mercy*; and not a mere shew, not the mere echo of the Judge, but a body of men *more* likely to come to a just decision, all the circumstances considered, than the Judge would be. If it be not so, of what earthly use, I again ask, is this thing called a Jury? Why, the only use, and the only possible use, which it could then be of, would be *to screen the Judge from all responsibility* as to the decision; and thus removing that check, which would exist if there were no jury at all, and making our mode of administering justice the very worst that ever was heard of in the world.—The Jury must be *efficient*; they must be, according to their oath, the *real* triers of the issue; or, they are infinitely worse than useless; and, if they are not the real triers, they betray their trust and falsify their oaths.—To return to the doctrine ascribed to the Irish Attorney General: I would ask, if the declaration of the Judges were sufficient for his purpose, and that, too, in opposition to a subsequent verdict of a Jury, why was a *trial* necessary? Why was not the declaration of the Judges taken without any indictment or trial at all? Why were the delegates not told, that the Judges said that the law was against the meeting by delegates? There was something to be answered by the trial surely? But, now, it seems, that these indictments and trials were to answer no other purpose than merely that of giving the Judges an opportunity of declaring, *upon the bench*, what was the meaning of the law; and their opinions are now set up, by this writer, in the form of a speech of the Attorney General, as tantamount to a *declaratory act of parliament*, and that, too, though they did not produce conviction in the minds of twelve men assembled and sworn to try the very question, which it is held forth that these opinions have *decided*.—I now come to the second part of this publication pretending to be a speech of the Irish Attorney General; and it is certainly very well calculated to excite some little surprise. He is made

to say: "I cannot suffer myself to believe, "that it EVER WAS, or is, *their*" (the accused persons) "*meaning to violate the law of the land.*" Here, reader, is this Attorney General, this Official Prosecutor, made to say, in open court, that he does not believe; nay, that he cannot *suffer* himself to believe, that the accused persons *ever meant* to violate the law of the land. Now, what had this same person said only a few days before in the *indictment* against Messrs. Kirwan and Taaffe? Why, just the reverse; for he there, as you will see by a reference to the copy of the indictment, in the last column of my last Number, says, that they were "*ill-disposed persons and were unlawfully contriving and intending*" to do what he had accused them of! Was it possible, then, for him to have uttered the words ascribed to him by the *Courier*? Was it possible for a man to come into court, and, before those very judges, to whom he had accused these gentlemen, declare in so solemn a manner, that *he did not believe* them to have been guilty of the crime that he had laid to their charge in a manner still more solemn, and which charge was founded upon informations upon oath? Was it possible for a man to come into court and declare, that he did not believe persons to have ever been guilty of the crime, for which he himself had prosecuted them, he himself having necessarily been the adviser of the prosecution? And, yet, if there be no truth in the statement, at what a degree of impudence must this editor of the *Courier* have arrived?—I cannot bring myself to believe, that the declaration was made; because it would, it seems to me, call for the most serious inquiry into the conduct of the Attorney General. He has powers enough, God knows! Powers sufficient to make him truly formidable without any abuse of them; but, if he were to arrive at such a pitch as to avow, that he prosecuted men for crimes, of which *he could not suffer himself to believe that they were guilty*; if he were come to this pass, what a country would Ireland be to live in?—Yet this is what the *Courier* attributes to him; I have quoted the very words said to have been uttered by him; I have, I believe, seen the same words, under the same form, in other public prints; and, thus seeing them, were I to let them pass without comment, I might be thought to acquiesce in the *right* of an Attorney General to prosecute any man that he chose for a crime of which he

could not suffer himself to believe that he was guilty; I might be thought to allow, that, in addition to all his other powers, of which I have so often had to speak, he possessed this of prosecuting men, of harassing their minds and ruining their fortunes, and that, too, under pretence that they had committed a crime, which he could not suffer himself to believe that they had committed.—Let there be no attempt at *shuffle* here. Let it not be pretended, that the gentlemen might *commit* the crime and not *mean* to do it; for, observe, all crime consists in the *evil-intention*, or *meaning*; and observe further, that this Attorney General, in his indictment, did actually charge the Catholic Gentlemen with being "*ill-disposed persons*" and with "*unlawfully contriving and intending*" to do that which he accused them of, and for which he brought one of them to be tried as a criminal.—Our English Attorney General, when his conduct was under discussion, in the House of Commons, last year, said, that he was not to be looked upon as free from *errors of judgment* any more than other men. Very true; but, we here see the *Courier* exhibiting the Irish Attorney General as having prosecuted men for crimes that he himself acknowledged that he did not believe them guilty of.—The third part of this speech given to the Irish Attorney General relates to his views in the prosecutions; and he is made to say, that "*the object of these prosecutions never was to persecute or to punish the individual.*"—No? What was the object, then? This passage of the *Courier's* fabricated speech (for fabricated it must be) forced into my recollection the professions of the Fox, in Dryden's beautiful Fable, where the poor Cock has just escaped from his jaws to the branches of a friendly maple. And so, Dr. Sheridan, according to this "*false Loon*," the *Courier*, no *harm* was intended you, though you were informed against, indicted, and put upon your trial, and though so strong an appeal was made to the Jury against you! No harm, according to this venal writer; no harm at all; only to put you a little in a fright perhaps! No harm at all, though you were described, in the indictment, as an *evil-disposed* person, not having the fear of God before your eyes, but being moved and instigated by the Devil, and well knowing the premises, contriving and intending to do the act laid to your charge! No, not the least harm; no persecution, no

punishment, intended: all in good part; all perfectly friendly, according to this English hack, surpassing, be you well assured, all the hacks of Ireland, except, perchance, you have imported some of the true British breed, the fame of which has now extended over the whole earth. You know the answer of Chanticleer:

"Nay, quoth the Cock, but I beshrew us both,
If I believe a Saint upon his oath."

—If any thing more were wanted to prove, that this speech put into the mouth of the Irish Attorney General was a mere fabrication of the *COURIER*, we have it at the close, where the former is made to say, that he hopes not to be under the necessity of pursuing the prosecutions; but that, if the Catholics persist in what they were doing, he shall pursue them. No man could have said this: no man would, I hope, have been permitted to throw out a threat like this in open court. What! first prosecute men for an alledged crime, which proves to be no crime, and then tell them, that if they persist in doing that which is no crime, they shall be harassed with prosecutions! What would this be but to tell them, in substance, that though Juries acquitted them, though they were guilty of no crime in the eye of the law, they should, at any rate, suffer all the trouble and expence of a state prosecution, wherein the prosecutor pays no costs, and wherein the public and the prosecuted person are obliged to bear all the expences, amongst which are the fees of the Attorney General himself? If this could be said in open court; if this could be permitted; if a threat like this could be suffered to be thrown out in the presence of the Judges, then, indeed, we should be in a pretty state. But, as I said before, it must be a fabrication of the *COURIER*, like the French Dispatch said to have been promulgated by Mr. Adams, and like the many intercepted Letters between Napoleon and his brother Joseph. —The *COURIER* then adds something as from himself. He seems to think, that it is not enough to make the Attorney General threaten, and therefore, takes upon him to put forth an additional threat of his own, and says, that, if the Catholics mistake forbearance for fear, they will be prosecuted with renewed vigour. *Forbearance!* The Catholic Gentlemen have experienced forbearance, have they? It is hard to say what this man's ideas of forbearance may be; but this we know, that these gentlemen have been informed against before

the Judges; that warrants to apprehend them have thereupon been issued; that they have (I believe) been held to bail; that they have been indicted as ill-disposed persons, unlawfully contriving and intending to do certain wicked acts; and all this for what? Why, because they were delegates, or took a part in choosing delegates, for the purpose of agreeing upon, and causing to be presented, a petition to Parliament, the object of which was to obtain for themselves and the rest of the Catholics an equality in rights with their Protestant fellow-subjects. Call you this forbearance! The Attorney General has *forborne* to prosecute some of those who were indicted. But, when did he forbear to do that? Not till one of them had been acquitted, and till Dublin and the whole kingdom had expressed their joy at that acquittal and their approbation of the conduct of *the Jury*. Not till then; and, therefore, it is by no means difficult to form a just estimate of this forbearance.

—If the object of the prosecution had been merely to put the question at rest by a legal decision, why were so many persons involved in it? One would have been enough for this purpose. —I can, therefore, discover nothing like forbearance in any part of the proceedings; and a man must have the impudence of an English venal writer to give that term to the suspension of the trials at Dublin, which, be it observed, appears to have been contrary to the express desire of the parties prosecuted, who, of course, were anxious to get rid of an indictment hanging over their heads. —At the tail of the article, on which I have been remarking, there are some observations upon the conduct of "*the Reformers*", as this writer calls them, which are also worthy of notice. —He says: "We apprehend, from what we have read in some Irish Papers, that we must not flatter ourselves with the expectation that the Reformers will suffer the people to be undeceived; they will keep the declaration of law by the Judges as much out of sight as they do the fact, that the acquittal of Doctor Sheridan was an acquittal solely on account of insufficiency of evidence. Their wish is to keep the public mind in a ferment, to inflame and agitate the people, and to take eager advantage of any season of calamity or distress. Public calamities are their element. Then is the time to create alarm, to exalt their own merits, to establish the fame of their political sagacity in the

"fulfilment of *their predictions*, and their true jacobin ferocity, by demanding that Ministers "*shall be brought to the block.*" "It is not their country that they love, but their party; it is not *the enemies of their country* that they hate, but their political opponents; the men whose talents and characters keep them down."—

Now, if the Reformers really did wish to keep the public mind in a ferment; if they did really wish to inflame and agitate the people, what must have been their satisfaction at seeing the above-mentioned prosecutions commenced? It is by those prosecutions that the public mind has been excited into a ferment, and that the people have been inflamed and agitated, and not by any thing that the Reformers have said or done; for, unfortunately, what they say has but little effect upon the people, who have enough to do to meet the misery of the moment.—And as to *seasons of calamity and distress*, whose fault is it, if there are such seasons? The Reformers have had no hand in producing calamity and distress; for they have had no power. Their advice has been scorned; they have wished for and recommended a set of measures the opposite of those which have been adopted; if their advice had been followed, there would have been no stoppage of those channels of intercourse, which were before open, and through which so many persons were fed; if their advice had been followed there would have been no armies to support in Sicily, Spain, and Portugal. You will say, that their advice was foolish; very well; but, as you did not follow it, acknowledge, at least, that they have had no hand in producing the calamities and distress, of which you talk; and, acknowledge further, that they have a fair right to lay these calamities at the door of those who rejected their advice.

—But, they are charged with *exulting* in the fulfilment of their predictions. It is very natural and very proper for men to point out to those, who have rejected their advice, the consequences of such rejection; but, it by no means follows, that they rejoice at these consequences. The farmer comes into the field to his harvest men, and tells them it will rain by such an hour, and that the corn will be wet, unless it be got in before that hour. The rain comes; the corn is not got in; he then reminds his men (who have been dilatory) of his prediction; but, is he, therefore, to be said to *exult* in the fulfilment of it?—

We have said what would be the conse-

quence of pursuing such and such measures; and if those measures are pursued, and the consequence arrives, are we not to point out the fulfilment of our predictions, without exposing ourselves to the charge of rejoicing at the mischief that has happened?—The Reformers are here accused of, "demanding that Ministers shall be brought to the block." I have never seen any such demand in print, I have never heard it verbally made, I have never heard any man destine them to such a fate, nor do I believe that any Reformer in the kingdom would *care* one single straw what became of the Ministers, provided he could see a House of Commons chosen as freely as Sir Francis Burdett was chosen for Westminster and as his Brother will be chosen for Southwark. This talking about the *block* is a trick to scare people. A mere invention; but an invention that will answer very little purpose; for, the writer may be assured, that the days of *terror* are past; all the terrors that he or his abettors could conjure up would not extract a sixpence from the pocket of the most timid creature in the kingdom. The day is gone by when the people were made to believe, *that it was necessary to give their money to placemen and pensioners in order to prevent the French from making them Atheists*. That day is past never to return; and so is the day for exciting a dread of revolutionary horrors. The *alarming*, the *terrifying*, system is worn out; and to attempt to revive the use of it is only to expose the party to ridicule. If Paine were to write twenty such books as he wrote before, there would be nobody found to burn him in effigy.—But, the Reformers do not, it seems, hate the *enemies of the country* so much as their *political opponents*. In the Scripture a very pithy question is put: "who is my neighbour?" And, it is equally proper for us to ask, "who are the enemies of the country?" The French, to be sure. Oh, yes! but the country may have other enemies. A man is not our neighbour merely because he lives at next door; nor are people our enemies merely because they are foreigners. No; but, the French are at war with us. True, and they are, in that sense, our enemies; and, let the cause of the war be what it may, it is our duty to defend our country against these enemies. But, it does not follow, that the country may not have other and even greater enemies, or, at least, more wicked and worse-designing enemies, than the open foreign enemies

are; and, if so, they are just objects of as great, and even greater, hatred. Why do we call the French our enemy? Because they endeavour to do us *harm*; and, are we not to consider others as enemies if they endeavour to do us harm? We are called upon to fight against the French, lest they should conquer our country, and take from us what we have of liberty; and, if we were to see any body else endeavouring to effect the same object against us, should we not be called upon to oppose them too?

—This accusation, therefore, against the Reformers, has no sense in it, even supposing it to be founded on a fact. No fact is produced as to their feelings about the enemies of the country. It is mere assertion; but, were it not so, it would be necessary, in order to fix blame upon the Reformers, to show that they were unjust in their estimate of the degrees of enmity towards the country. —These same writers have not been backward in charging the Reformers with enmity towards the country; indeed, it is done in this very sentence; let them not, therefore, be surprised, if the Reformers should think that they also perceive some enemies of the country besides the French.

AMERICAN STATES.—The President's Speech, at the opening of the Congress, will be found in another part of this Number. It does not announce the intention of recommending an Embargo, for which our armies in Spain and Portugal may thank him; but, it breathes a spirit of *hostility* against England, and plainly indicates, that measures growing out of such a spirit will be adopted. One passage of the Speech I beg leave to point out to the reader. It is that, in which the President informs the Congress, that the Marquis Wellesley has signified the design of this country not to revoke the Orders in Council, as far as they relate to America, until American ships are permitted to take our goods to the ports of the Continent, as they were formerly. That is to say, then, our government will not suffer the Americans to carry their own goods from their own country to France, unless Napoleon will permit them to carry our goods to France and her dependencies, all the continent being her dependencies. This is, as the reader will bear in mind, precisely what I anticipated. Napoleon suffers America to bring her goods to us; but we will not suffer America to carry her goods to France. In short, Napoleon leaves the trade between Ame-

rica and England, in American ships, perfectly free; but, we will not suffer any trade, in any ships, between America and France.—Now, on what law, or custom, of nations, do we prevent America, a neutral nation, from carrying tobacco, for instance, to France, and taking home wine in exchange? There is no law, no custom, amongst nations to authorize this. We did it, at first, upon the ground of *retaliation*; because, we said, that Napoleon, by his Berlin and Milan Decrees, was doing the same with regard to us. But, he has repealed those decrees, and why do we continue in our course? Why, as the President tells us, because Napoleon will not suffer *American* vessels to carry our goods to the ports of the Continent, in his dominions, or under his controul! This is, surely, the most curious reason that ever was alledged. For, what have the Americans to do with the regulations that Napoleon chooses to establish as to the trade in his ports? If he were to prohibit the introduction of *American* goods, the Americans would have no ground of quarrel with him. Every nation has a right to admit, or not, any goods into its own ports. The preventing of two other independent nations from trading with each other is the ground of quarrel; and well it may be, for it is just the same as if one man were to say to any two of his neighbours, you shall not deal with each other, because one of you is my enemy. But, every sovereign has a clear right to prohibit the entry of what he pleases in his own ports, and this is what *Bonaparté* does. It pleases him to prohibit the entry of English goods and Colonial Produce; and, we call upon the Americans to make him admit our goods into his ports, or else we will not permit them to carry their goods into his ports. In short, we want, it seems to me, to have the benefits of *peace* and of *war* at one and the same time; a desire, as to the modesty of which there cannot, at any rate, be two opinions, whatever men may be disposed to think of it in other respects.—And is this; is *this* the way, by which our government expects to remove, or to modify, the *Continental System*? Men certainly see with different eyes; for, to me, this appears just as likely to produce such an effect as the frost that is now benumbing my fingers is likely to make other men sweat. The Continental System is a thing not to be changed on any account; it is one of Napoleon's modes of warfare; he is

fighting us with it: and we may with as much reason expect to see him give up his army to us as give up the Continental System. He is resolved, that England shall no longer trade with the Continent. He well knows, that her influence there has always arisen out of that trade. His object is to prevent her from having any influence there; and, as the means of accomplishing this object, he will, if he can, and it appears that he can, prevent her from enjoying any longer that trade. This is a fixed and settled thing. He had not the power of cutting off our trade with America; that was beyond his reach; he could not march his troops into the American sea-ports in order to shut out English goods. No: that was a thing too much for him; and, that we have, by our measures against the Americans, kindly caused to be done for him. America was open to us though the Continent was shut; and we have induced the Americans to shut it themselves; and thus to aid, in the most effectual manner, that system which our great enemy has adopted as one of his modes of warfare.—I have, for my part, no notion, that the Americans will go to war. It would be very inconvenient to them, and could do them no good. They will, probably, pass some laws that shall more effectually annoy us in the way of trade and commerce; but, if they continue to do what they are now doing, it will, perhaps, better answer their end. They will carry on less external commerce than formerly, and they will every day want it less and less.—It is said, it has been urged by some writers in the way of complaint against the Americans, that they permit the French to capture our vessels and carry them to American ports, while they will not permit our ships of war to go into their ports at all. The state of the case is this: the ports of a neutral state are open to the ships of war of all belligerents; and, if no dispute had ever existed between us and America and Napoleon and America, the ships of war of both would have been, at all times, permitted to enter her ports, and to carry in their prizes. But, when we passed our Orders in Council and Napoleon his Decrees, America, by way of show her resentment, prohibited the ships of war of both nations from entering her ports; declaring, at the same time, that the prohibition would be taken off as soon as those violations of her neutrality should cease. The decrees of Napoleon have been re-

pealed; and, therefore, to his vessels returns the right of entering the American ports with or without prizes; but, we have not repealed our Orders in Council, and, for *that reason* our right of sending ships of war into the American ports has not returned. There is no *partiality* here. The measure is the same towards both belligerents. We find an advantage, doubtless, in refusing to repeal our Orders in Council; and, if so, we cannot expect to enjoy, at the same time, the advantages that would attend the assenting to such repeal.

MR. WHITE'S SUBSCRIPTION.—Nothing is calculated to give greater encouragement to the friends of freedom than the meetings, which have taken place in behalf of Mr. FINNERTY and Mr. WHITE, both of whom distinguished themselves by a gallant defence of the rights of the press.—The latter, which took place on Monday last, consisted of about 200 persons, and was, in all respects, worthy of the CHAIRMAN, Sir Francis Burdett, whom we always find at his post, when the liberties of Englishmen, which he seems born to defend, call for the exertion of his abilities. He availed himself of this occasion to repeat those opinions, which he stated with so much force and effect, during the debate, last winter, upon Ex-Officio Informations and the conduct of the Attorney General, and which opinions are, thank God, daily gaining ground. Indeed, what, compared to this subject, are all the discussions about wars and commerce? Nay, what are wars and commerce themselves? What would complete success in both be, if we were not at liberty *freely* to scrutinize the conduct of public men?—Mr. ALDERMAN WOOD, another true friend to the liberties of his country, was appointed by the meeting to be *Treasurer* of the Subscription. Other gentlemen were appointed to receive, but I am not in possession of their names. I see great subscriptions for the *Portuguese*, who, in my opinion, have, all the whole nation put together, not so good a claim upon us as either Mr. Finnerty or Mr. White. Others may think differently; and let them follow their taste. As, however, there are not likely to be, for Mr. White, very many collections in the Churches, under the direction of the Clergy, it becomes the friends of the freedom of the press not to neglect any means that they have in their power to further the object of the late Meeting. It must

generally be of *small sums* that considerable subscriptions consist. There is scarcely a large town where there are not *Clubs* of some sort or other; reading societies, or periodical meetings of some kind. If in each of these a trifle was subscribed by each member, the aggregate sum would be very considerable; and, when the losses and sufferings of Mr. White are considered, I cannot help hoping, that there will be found, in many, if not in all the large towns, some persons ready voluntarily to become collectors of sums too small to be forwarded singly. At Chichester, at Nottingham, at Coventry, at Northampton, at Norwich, at Chester, at Sheffield, at Frome, at Bath, at Bristol, and at many other places, I *know* there are such men; and I will not believe, that it is necessary to say any more to induce them to use their best exertions in such a cause.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
6th December, 1811.

PRISONERS OF WAR.

SIR ;—The different matters introduced into your very excellent Paper, are treated in such a perspicuous manner, that I have wished long ago, that such an independent and good writer as you would give his opinion upon a subject, which has yet, I think, never been presented in its true light, and still lies in the dark, though a very interesting one to the public at large, and to many families in particular. The subject I allude to, is the exchange of Prisoners of War, which particularly calls upon our humanity.—What the bulk of us know about it, is, that a negotiation has taken place at Morlaix, and that the result was, (as it has been said) that if there was no exchange, it was intirely to be attributed to the French government.—If, in impartially investigating this subject it should appear, that an exchange of Prisoners is incompatible with the honour and welfare of the British nation, it would give our unfortunate countrymen in France the great consolation, that, if they suffer, it is for their country; and, in this case, there is not one among them who would not be proud of his sufferings. But if, on the contrary, the exchange is practicable, and not disadvantageous, then the long injustice committed against our brave soldiers would appear palpable, our eyes would be opened, and there would be liberal minded persons, who in

Parliament would plead in favour of our unfortunate exiles, some of whom have been nearly nine years far from their home, their families and business.—We have seen by the documents in our newspapers, published at Mr. M'Kenzie's return, that our Government had consented, —1st, To exchange according to their ranks, the English travellers detained in France since 1803.—2dly, To send without exchange, 3,000 French prisoners for the Hanoverians who capitulated in 1803, and entered afterwards into the British service.—3dly, To send without exchange, 1,905 Frenchmen composing the garrison of Cape François, who capitulated to us in 1803, (and who have been sent to France a few months ago).—4thly, To exchange the Spaniards and Portuguese against French prisoners in this country. These terms were mutually agreed upon by both governments; and when they had settled the delicate points which had been in contest for so many years, it could hardly have been expected that they should not have understood each other upon the mode of evacuation of the Prisoners.—The plan of evacuation proposed by the English government, was to exchange the English first, by sending one thousand Frenchmen at once, for an equal number of Englishmen, and so on till the exchange of Englishmen was effected. Afterwards, the French were to take a thousand Spaniards to Cadiz, and receive an acknowledgment of their reception; they were then to come to England, and carry home a thousand Frenchmen.—The French government objected to our plan from this motive; because, when all the English prisoners should have been returned to their homes, they could have no security for the continuation of the exchange, with respect to those French prisoners who should then have remained in England; and, besides, in sending the Spaniards to Cadiz by a thousand only at a time, the exchange of the French prisoners now in England could not have been terminated in less than eight or nine years; a term, before the expiration of which, there is a great probability that our British army would have quitted Spain and Portugal, in which case the Spaniards and Portuguese would be the subjects of the Emperor of the French.—The plan of the French was to exchange the English proportionably with the Allies, and to exchange them by three thousand at once; one thousand

English and two thousand Spaniards or Portuguese, by which means neither government could have any interest in breaking off the exchange.—Let us see now, then, what has broke the treaty. In adopting our own proposals, one month at least would have been necessary to bring home all our countrymen; while, in adopting the plan of the French government, three months, only at the most, would have been necessary for the whole exchange of 50,000 prisoners on each side.—Hence then the only disadvantage in this case on our side, would have been, that those of our countrymen who had remained longest in France, would only have remained two months longer than those who had been exchanged first.—Now, Sir, were these terms so hard and dishonourable, that it is preferable to let our countrymen remain in an eternal captivity, rather than comply with them? Are the enormous expences this country is at, in maintaining and keeping 50,000 French prisoners, a matter of no moment? An expence amounting to considerably more than one million sterling a year; and, would it not be a material advantage under our present circumstances, to have an army of 50,000 English and Spaniards to dispose of in the most essential manner?—I know, Sir, if you would undertake this subject it would undergo a proper investigation, and every circumstance would be made clear as the day. For my part, I cannot possibly see any motive, grounded on public good, for preventing the exchange from taking place. If you are of my opinion, I hope, Sir, that it will not be said hereafter, that twenty thousand Englishmen, who have shed their blood for their country have perished in captivity, without Mr. Cobbett having said a word upon the subject.—I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant, CANDIDUS.—*November 30th, 1811.*

LIBEL LAW.

SIR;—I am one of the many persons who approve of the verdict of Not Guilty, given by a late Jury on the prosecution of Mr. White for a Libel, or, rather, to speak more correctly, for a Seditious Libel: for the word Libel alone (as Sir Francis Burdett has, in a late very excellent speech, observed,) means nothing more than a book, or writing; and, in the proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Courts, it means the declaration, or plaint, of the

plaintiff in the cause. I say, I approve of this Verdict, even upon the supposition that the writing, for which Mr. White was prosecuted, was really a Seditious and Mischievous Paper, for which the wilful publisher might legally be prosecuted and punished; and I approve it for the very reason that seems to have induced the Jury to give the verdict of Not Guilty, or because Mr. White was not the evil-minded, or intentional publisher of it, as he is charged to be in the information. He therefore, not being guilty of the crime of commission with which he was charged in the information, ought not to be found guilty of it by the Jury. But it is possible that he may have been liable to a prosecution for a much smaller offence, which would have been a crime of omission, in neglecting to superintend and examine the several papers published in his Journal, before they were sent to the press, in order to prevent the publication of any thing of a dangerous and seditious tendency, as it was his duty to do, and he must be supposed to have undertaken to do, when he entered his name in a public office as a publisher of a newspaper according to a late act of parliament. There ought therefore, as I conceive, to be in every information against a bookseller, or other person that publishes a seditious paper, two or more separate charges or counts; the one charging him with knowing the contents of the paper, and publishing it with a malicious intent to produce certain mischievous effects; the other charging him with neglecting to examine it and satisfy himself that it can have no mischievous effects, before he publishes or sells it, as a bookseller or publisher ought to do: whereby the charges would describe distinctly the different degrees of guilt which may possibly have been incurred by the publisher; and the Jury would find the publisher to be guilty of that particular offence which was charged in the count to which the evidence produced against him applied. It seems to me, that it is only by this careful way of stating the charges in the informations, that the degree of guilt incurred by the publisher can be ascertained, and the ends of justice fully attained. For the guilt of publishing a seditious paper admits of a great number of different degrees, and, in some cases, is no guilt at all; as, for example, in a bookseller's porter, who carries a bundle containing a dozen, or more, copies of a sedi-

tious paper from one bookseller to another, or to a private customer of the former, which the porter neither has read nor can read, nor in any degree knows the contents of them. In this case the porter would certainly be a publisher of this paper; but yet, I presume, would be allowed by all the world to be guilty of no offence whatever by so doing. I shall be glad to hear your opinion upon this subject.—A CONSTANT READER.—3rd Dec.

AMERICAN STATES.

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TO THE CONGRESS.—Fellow Citizens of the Senate and of the House of Representatives,—In calling you together sooner than a separation from your homes would otherwise have been required, I yielded to considerations drawn from the posture of our foreign affairs; and in fixing the present for the time of your meeting, regard was had to the probability of farther developments of the policy of the belligerent powers towards this country, which might the more unite the national councils in the measures to be pursued.—At the close of the last session of Congress, it was hoped that the successive confirmations of the extinction of the French decrees, so far as they violated our neutral commerce, would have induced the government of Great Britain to repeal its orders in council; and thereby authorise a removal of the existing obstructions to her commerce with the United States.—Instead of this reasonable step towards satisfaction and friendship between the two nations, the orders were, at a moment when least to have been expected, *put into more vigorous execution*; and it was communicated through the British Envoy just arrived, that whilst the revocation of the Edicts of France, as officially made known to the British Government, was denied to have taken place, it was an indispensable condition of the repeal of the British Orders, *that commerce should be restored to a footing, that would admit the productions and manufactures of Great Britain, when owned by neutrals, into markets shut against them by her enemy*; the United States being given to understand, that, in the mean time, a continuance of their Non-importation Act would lead to measures of retaliation.—At a later date, it has indeed, appeared, that a communication to the British Government, of fresh evidence of the repeal of the French decrees against our neutral trade, was followed by an in-

timation, that it had been transmitted to the British plenipotentiary here, in order that it might receive full consideration in the depending discussions. This communication appears not to have been received; but the transmission of it hitherto instead of founding on it an actual repeal of the orders, or assurances that the repeal would ensue, will not permit us to rely on any effective change in the British Cabinet. To be ready to meet with cordiality satisfactory proofs of such a change, and to proceed, in the mean time in adapting our measures to the views which have been disclosed through that minister, will best consult our whole duty.—In the unfriendly spirit of those disclosures, indemnity and redress for other wrongs have continued to be withheld; and our coasts and the mouths of our harbours have again witnessed scenes, not less derogatory to the dearest of our national rights than vexatious to the regular course of our trade.—Among the occurrences produced by the conduct of British ships of war hovering on our coasts, was an encounter between one them and the American frigate commanded by Captain Rodgers, rendered unavoidable on the part of the latter, by a fire commenced without cause by the former; whose Commander is, therefore, alone chargeable with the blood unfortunately shed in maintaining the honour of the American flag. The proceedings of a Court of Enquiry, requested by Captain Rodgers, are communicated; together with the correspondence relating to the occurrence, between the Secretary of State and his Britannic Majesty's Envoy. To these are added, the several correspondencies which have passed on the subject of the British Orders in Council; and to both, the correspondence relating to the Floridas, in which Congress will be made acquainted with the interposition which the Government of Great Britain has thought proper to make against the proceedings of the United States.—The justice and fairness which have been evinced on the part of the United States towards France, both before and since the revocation of her decrees, authorised an expectation that her Government would have followed up that measure by all such others as were due to our reasonable claims, as well as dictated by its amicable professions. No proof, however, is yet given of an intention to repair the other wrongs done to the United States, and, particularly to restore the great amount of American

property seized and condemned under edicts, which, though not affecting our neutral relations, and therefore, not entering into questions between the United States and other belligerents, were nevertheless founded in such unjust principles, that the reparation ought to have been prompt and ample.—In addition to this and other demands of strict right on that nation, the United States have much reason to be dissatisfied with the rigorous and unexpected restrictions to which their trade with the French dominions has been subjected; and which, if not discontinued will require at least corresponding restrictions on importations from France into the United States.—On all those subjects our Minister Plenipotentiary, lately sent to Paris, has carried with him the necessary instructions; the result of which will be communicated to you; and by ascertaining the ulterior policy of the French Government towards the United States, will enable you to adapt to it that of the United States towards France.—Our other foreign relations remain without unfavourable changes. With Russia, they are on the best footing of friendship. The ports of Sweden have afforded proofs of friendly dispositions towards our commerce in the councils of that nation also. And the information from our Special Minister to Denmark, shews, that the mission had been attended with valuable effects, to our citizens, whose property had been so extensively violated and endangered by cruisers under the Danish flag.—Under the ominous indications which commanded attention, it became a duty to exert the means committed to the Executive department, in providing for the general security. The works of defence on our maritime frontier have accordingly been prosecuted with an activity leaving little to be added for the completion of the most important ones; and, as particularly suited for co-operation in emergencies, a portion of the gun-boats have, in particular harbours, been ordered into use. The ships of war before in commission, with the addition of a frigate, have been chiefly employed, as a cruising guard to the rights of our coast; and such a disposition has been made of our land forces, as was thought to promise the services most appropriate and important. In this disposition is included a force, consisting of regulars and militia, embodied in the Indiana territory, and marched towards our North Western frontier. This mea-

sure was made requisite by several murders and depredations committed by Indians; but more especially by the menacing preparations and aspect of a combination of them on the Wabash, under the influence and direction of a fanatic of the Shawanese tribe. With these exceptions, the Indian tribes retain their peaceable dispositions towards us, and their usual pursuits.—I must now add, that the period is arrived, which claims from the legislative guardians of the national rights a system of more ample provisions for maintaining them. Notwithstanding the scrupulous justice, the protracted moderation, and the multiplied efforts on the part of the United States, to substitute, for the accumulating dangers to the peace of the two countries, all the mutual advantages of re-established friendship and confidence; we have seen that the British Cabinet perseveres, not only in withholding a remedy for other wrongs, so long and so loudly calling for it, but in the execution, brought home to the threshold of our territory, of measures which, under existing circumstances, have the character as well as the effect of war on our lawful commerce.—With this evidence of hostile inflexibility, in trampling on rights which no independent nation can relinquish, Congress will feel the duty of putting the United States into an armour and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations.—I recommend, accordingly, that adequate provision be made for filling the ranks and prolonging the enlistments of the regular troops; for an auxiliary force, to be engaged for a more limited term; for the acceptance of volunteer corps, whose patriotic ardour may court a participation in urgent services; for detachments, as they may be wanted, of other portions of the militia; and for such a preparation of the great body, as will proportion its usefulness to its intrinsic capacities. Nor can the occasion fail to remind you of the importance of those military seminaries, which, in every event, will form a valuable and frugal part of our military establishment.—The manufacture of cannon and small arms has proceeded with due success, and the stock and resources of all the necessary munitions are adequate to emergencies. It will not be inexpedient, however, for Congress to authorise an enlargement of them.—Your attention will of course be drawn to such provisions, on the subject

of our naval force, as may be required for the services to which it may be best adapted. I submit to Congress the seasonableness, also, of an authority to augment the stock of such materials as are imperishable in their nature, or may not at once be attainable.—In contemplating the scenes which distinguish this momentous epoch, and estimating their claims to our attention, it is impossible to overlook those developing themselves among the great communities which occupy the southern portion of our own hemisphere, and extend into our neighbourhood. An enlarged philanthropy, and an enlightened forecast, concur in imposing on the National Councils an obligation to take a deep interest in their destinies; to cherish reciprocal sentiments of good will; to regard the progress of events; and not to be unprepared for whatever order of things may be ultimately established.—Under another aspect of our situation, the early attention of Congress will be due to the expediency of farther guards against evasions and infractions of our commercial laws. The practice of smuggling, which is odious every where, and particularly criminal in free governments, where, the laws being made by all for the good of all, a fraud is committed on every individual as well as on the State, attains its utmost guilt, when it blends, with a pursuit of ignominious gain, a treacherous subserviency, in the transgressors, to a foreign policy adverse to that of their own country. It is then that the virtuous indignation of the public should be enabled to manifest itself, through the regular animadversions of the most competent laws.—To secure greater respect to our mercantile flag, and to the honest interests which it covers, it is expedient, also, that it be made punishable in our citizens to accept licences from foreign Governments, for a trade unlawfully interdicted by them to other American citizens; or to trade under false colours or papers of any sort.—A prohibition is equally called for against the acceptance, by our citizens, of special licences, to be used in a trade with the United States; and against the admission into particular ports of the United States, of vessels from foreign countries, authorised to trade with particular ports only.—Although other subjects will press more immediately on your deliberations, a portion of them cannot but be well bestowed on the just and sound policy of securing to our manufactures the success they have

attained, and are still attaining, in some degree, under the impulse of causes not permanent; and to our navigation, the fair extent of which it is at present abridged, by the unequal regulations of foreign governments.—Besides the reasonableness of saving our manufacturers from sacrifices which a change of circumstances might bring on them, the national interest requires, that, with respect to such articles, at least, as belong to our defence and our primary wants, we should not be left in unnecessary dependence on external supplies. And whilst foreign governments adhere to the existing discriminations in their ports against our navigation, and an equality or lesser discrimination is enjoyed by their navigation in our ports, the effect cannot be mistaken, because it has been seriously felt by our shipping interests; and in proportion as this takes place, the advantages of an independent conveyance of our products to foreign markets, and of a growing body of mariners, trained by their occupations for the service of their country in times of danger, must be diminished. The receipts into the Treasury, during the year ending on the 30th of September last, have exceeded thirteen millions and an half of dollars: and have enabled us to defray the current expences, including the interest on the public debt, and to reimburse more than five millions of dollars of the principal, without recurring to the loan authorised by the act of the last session. The temporary loan obtained in the latter end of the year 1810 has also been reimbursed, and is not included in that amount.—The decrease of revenue, arising from the situation of our commerce and the extraordinary expences which have and may become necessary, must be taken into view, in making commensurate provisions for the ensuing year. And I recommend to your consideration the propriety of ensuring a sufficiency of annual revenue, at least to defray the ordinary expences of government, and to pay the interest on the public debt, including that on new loans which may be authorised. I cannot close this communication without expressing my deep sense of the crisis in which you are assembled, my confidence in a wise and honourable result to your deliberations, and assurances of the faithful zeal with which my co-operating duties will be discharged; invoking, at the same time, the blessing of Heaven on our beloved country, and on all the means that may be employed in

vindicating its rights and advancing its welfare. (Signed) JAMES MADISON.
Washington, Nov. 5, 1811.

IRISH CATHOLICS.

(*Concluded from p. 704.*)

Committee so proposed to be formed; and that the said Edward Sheridan then there, with force and arms, knowingly, wilfully, and unlawfully, was one of the persons so assembled, and then and there acted as Chairman of the said Meeting, and then and there, as such Chairman, proposed as a question to the said Meeting whether the said Thomas Kirwan should be so appointed or not, and on the said question being so put, the said Thomas Kirwan was then and there so appointed by the said persons as aforesaid; and so the said Jurors say that the said Edward Sheridan in manner aforesaid then and there acted at and in the said appointment to the great encouragement of riot, tumult, and disorder, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, against the peace of our said Lord the King, his Crown and Dignity, and against the form of the Statute in that case made and provided.—And the said Jurors of our said Lord the King further present and say, that Edward Sheridan aforesaid, so being a person professing the Roman Catholic Religion, together with divers other ill disposed persons professing the Roman Catholic Religion, on the 31st day of July, in the year of our Lord 1811, at Liffey-street, in the county of the city of Dublin, met, and assembled themselves together for the purpose of appointing five persons to act as Representatives of all the inhabitants professing the Roman Catholic Religion of and in a certain district there situate, commonly called the Parish of Saint Mary, in a Committee of Persons professing the Roman Catholic Religion, to be thereafter held, and to exercise a right and authority to represent the Inhabitants of Ireland professing the Roman Catholic Religion, under pretence of preparing Petitions to both Houses of Parliament, for the Repeal of all Laws remaining in force in Ireland, by means whereof any person professing the Roman Catholic Religion is subject to any disability by reason of his religious tenets, and of thereby procuring an alteration of the said matters so established by Law; and that at and in the said Meeting, so then and there held, one Thomas Kirwan, then and there,

being a person professing the Roman Catholic Religion, was then and there unlawfully appointed, by the said persons so then and there assembled, to act as one of the Representatives of the said Inhabitants of the said District in the said Committee, to be so thereafter held as last aforesaid; and that the said Edward Sheridan, then and there, with force and arms, knowingly, wilfully, and unlawfully, was one of the persons so then and there unlawfully assembled, and then and there acted as Chairman of said Meeting, and then and there, as such Chairman, proposed as a question to the said Meeting, whether the said Thomas Kirwan should be so appointed or not, and, on the said question being so put, the said Thomas Kirwan was then and there so appointed by the said persons as last aforesaid, and so the said Jurors say that the said Edward Sheridan, in manner last aforesaid, then and there acted at and in the said appointment last mentioned, to the great encouragement of riot, tumult and disorder, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, against the peace of our said Lord the King, his Crown and Dignity, and against the form of the Statute in that case made and provided.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—*French Dispatches.*—*Marshal Count Suchet's Account of the Battle and Capture of Saguntum, 26 Oct. 1811.*

MONSIEUR—Your Serene Highness has been informed, by my preceding reports, of the difficulties encountered in forming our approaches before Saguntum, in consequence of the nature of the ground. We succeeded, however, after twenty days labour and fatigue, in making a practicable breach; but during this period General Blake had time to summon to his aid Mahi, General in Chief of the Army of Murcia, with the whole of the force which the insurgents had disposable, amounting to 6,000 men.—The division called that of Albuera, under the orders of Lardizabal and Zayas, joined to the divisions of Villa Campo and Obispo, commanded by O'Donnel and Miranda, forming the army of Valencia, united with the guerillas, composed a corps of 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. On the 24th of October this corps advanced, and took post on the heights of Puch, supporting its right on the sea, flanked by the English fleet, and its left resting upon Livia. Blake perceiving that Saguntum

was on the point of falling, and that the battery of eight 24-pounders which I had constructed, would soon decide its fate, marched up to me to give battle and oblige me to raise the siege. I directed Generals Balathier and Bronikowski, with six battalions to continue the blockade and the works of the siege of Saguntum; General Compere, with fifteen hundred men, observed the road of Segorbe, and served as a reserve to the troops of General Chlopiski and Robert, destined by the defile which leads from Giletto Betera, and to occupy my right.—The next day, on the 25th, at seven in the morning, I reconnoitred the enemy. The heights of Puch, and those which covered the road to Betera, were defended by artillery and infantry. At eight o'clock my sharpshooters were briskly driven back, and from that moment I was convinced that I had to contend with far different troops from those of Valencia. Some strong columns outflanked me on my left, under the protection of some English vessels, the enemy's troops filled the village of Puzol, which I had quitted; 6,000 men attacked my right, which were full a league from me. Finding myself thus outflanked on both sides, I formed a determination to penetrate the centre of the enemy. Scarcely had I quitted a height, which I considered convenient to favour my attack, when 1,000 cavalry, and 6,000 infantry, came to occupy it in my place. The hussars of the 4th charged with valour, and though three times repulsed, returned again to the charge. The fire of nine 24-pounders, which were battering in breach at Saguntum, could not repress the enthusiasm of the garrison of Saguntum, which observing a movement in their view in which they believed they might soon take a part, went so far as to throw their caps into the air, and cry, "Come on to victory!" This first effect was checked by our infantry, which arrived in columns on the line of battle. I ordered Gen. Harispe to attack the enemy. He advanced with Gen. Paris at the head of the 7th of the line; the 116th, and 3d of the Vistula, coming after with their arms on the rest, deployed under a heavy fire of grape and musketry, like troops accustomed to conquer. The brave 7th carried the breast work with the bayonet, repulsed the enemy and pursued them. Our artillery occupied the breast-work, but the enemy returned to the charge. Our artillerymen were surrounded and

sabred. Gen. Bousart St. George, chief of a squadron, at the head of the 13th cuirassiers, vigorously charged 1,500 cavalry, which General Caro, brother of Romana, brought up with great resolution. The conflict was long, but the valour of the hussars and cuirassiers triumphed. The Field-Marschals Caro, Governor of Valencia, and Almoyer, who came from Cadiz, were wounded and made prisoners by Quarter-Masters Bazin and Vachelot, of the hussars. Six pieces of cannon were taken.—During this time the enemy was making some progress on the left; some pickets of our cavalry were obliged to fall back by the Spanish cavalry. General Palombini, at the head of four battalions, received them with the greatest coolness; the 2nd light, and the 4th of the line, Italians, by a well served fire, repulsed the charge, and covered the field of battle with dead bodies. In directing the division of General Harispe to the centre, I ordered General Habert to move with his corps upon the great road, and to take possession of Puzol. He had in front the division of Albuerca; he caused it to be charged first by two battalions of the 5th light infantry; a very brisk cannonade was kept up on both sides; General Montmarie, with the 16th of the line, supported the 5th; the action was maintained with great slaughter; the enemy defended themselves in the houses of Puzol, through the windows, and from the roofs; a body of Spanish cavalry shewed an inclination to turn our troops, and to advance by the great road of Valencia. The General of Cavalry, Debort, received orders to overthrow the enemy with the 24th dragoons; he executed this operation with the greatest valour, and drove back the enemy beyond the Albalate, without suffering himself to be impeded by the fire of some battalions which were placed in ambush; he took on the road one howitzer, one 4-pounder, and 30 artillery men. Nevertheless, the enemy, though far outflanked, defended themselves still in Puzol, and had not abandoned the heights of Puch; the 16th of the line vigorously charged them from street to street sword in hand; the 5th light infantry succeeded in surrounding 700 of the Walloon Guards, and made them lay down their arms.—General Chlopiski, to whom I had entrusted the command on my right, very seasonably perceived that it was of consequence not to suffer himself to be outflanked. He ordered General Robert to attack and follow up the

troops of Obispo and Miranda.—This General executed with success several charges of infantry: the 114th and the 1st of the Vistula fought well, and lost no time in repulsing the enemy. After this General Chlopiski, with the 44th, and the Dragoons Napoleon, came to take a glorious share in the success of the centre. The Colonel of Dragoons, Schiarette, at the head of his brave regiment, broke through three battalions of the enemy, and made 800 prisoners.—From this moment the hussars, the cuirassiers and the Dragoons Napoleon, found themselves on the same field of battle. They overthrew all the corps of cavalry that presented themselves, broke all the squares which the enemy endeavoured to form; and for the space of two leagues covered the ground with arms and dead bodies, and made 2,000 prisoners, amongst whom are 150 officers. Generals Harispe, Bousart, and Chlopiski, pressed hard upon the enemy, by my orders, without intermission. Nevertheless the enemy contrived to form again behind Betera, by the favor of a deep ravine. We were impeded some time, the infantry not having been able to keep up with the rapid movements of the cavalry. As soon as the infantry arrived, the enemy no longer looked for safety but in flight.—I had allowed some rest to the troops of Generals Habert and Palombini; I now ordered the latter to pass in the plain the village and the heights of Puch with his Italians, and the 3rd of the Vistula, whilst General Hubert was to attack the heights of Puch, which was defended by Blake himself, with his reserve, and five pieces of cannon. The Chief of Battalion, Passelar, with a battalion of the 117th, arrived first on the ridge which the enemy occupied, whilst Gen. Montmarie forced it on the left: the enemy fled in disorder, the five pieces of cannon were taken, and it was under the protection of the English ships that these troops sought shelter. At this period the English fleet, which, since morning, had approached to take part in the battle, executed, at the same moment, with its allies, its retreat towards Grao de Valencia.—The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners exceeds 6,500 men: on our side we have 128 killed and 596 wounded,

according to the accompanying returns. Amongst the latter are General Paris, who had his leg pierced by a ball; the Chief of Squadron, Barbe, of the 4th hussars, who was wounded in the arm, the Aides-de-camp, Peridon, of General Harispe; Brard, of General Habert. The young Debilly, Aid-de-Camp of General Montmarie, had his arm shot off: he is a brave officer, for whom I shall solicit the favour of his Majesty the Emperor; M. Troquereau, Aide-de-camp of General Paris, was severely wounded. I was myself in like manner struck by a ball in the shoulder. General Montmarie received many contusions, and had several bullets through his clothes. General Harispe had two horses shot under him. Colonels Christophe and Meselop had also their horses shot under them. The brave Colonel Gudin, of the 16th of the line, although very severely wounded, wished not to quit the head of the regiment. All the troops of the army, Monseigneur, rivalled each other in the endeavour which should best serve his Majesty on this day; they fought for seven hours, and followed up their victory to the close of night. I have been particularly satisfied with the incessant zeal with which my Aides-de-Camp and my Staff have served.—I shall not go at any length into particular panegyrics upon the conduct of the troops. I believe I have said enough on this head to your Serene Highness, when I detailed what they had done on the field of battle. The result is, the victory of Saguntum places in the power of the Emperor 4,639 prisoners, of whom 230 are Officers, 40 Colonels or Lieutenant Colonels, two Field Marshals, 16 pieces of artillery, eight caissons, 4,200 English muskets, and four stand of colours.—I have the honour to transmit to your Highness a list, by name, of the officers prisoners, and an aggregate statement, by regiments, of subaltern officers and privates.—I beseech your Highness to call the attention and goodness of his Majesty to the Officers in whose favour I solicit rewards. I am assured, Monseigneur, that they have rendered themselves worthy of them.—I am, with respect, &c.—Count SUCHET, Marshal of the Empire.—*Camp at Murviedro, Oct. 26.*
(To be continued.)

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.—The Speech, or rather Message of the American President, Mr. James Madison, has been the object of much attention here, and the subject of much observation. That it should have excited more than ordinary interest is not at all to be wondered at; and, whatever else may be the consequence of the present dispute with that country, one consequence is already apparent, namely, that our government and our public writers no longer seem to think America an object of contempt. I was always of opinion, that we ought to be particularly attentive to observe all the forms of respectful demeanour towards her government; and I a hundred times dwelt on the propriety of sending out as ministers to America men equal in point of diplomatic rank and public character to any whom we sent to the first courts in Europe, seeing that her government always sent hither men selected from amongst her most distinguished citizens. Our conduct has been just the reverse. We have invariably sent men of inferior note; and the whole of our demeanour towards her government seems to have been marked with studied *slight*, not to say *contempt*.—The time is now come, however, when we, by the whole of our language, show, that, at bottom, we do not *despise* America; we discover, in all we say, that, however great our dislike may be, there is no longer much contempt remaining. Of this I am very glad, and I hope that our conduct will correspond with these feelings; and that we are not doomed to see every country upon earth, where freedom exists, armed against England. I am for making no degrading concessions to America; I am for giving up to her not one particle of the rights of England; but I deprecate any measure tending to goad her into a war against us, and, in which war her government would have all the people heartily on its side. —After this preface I shall proceed to offer some observations upon certain commentaries that have been made upon the

President's Message, in our public prints. —First, as to the *style and composition*, upon which I should have said nothing at all, had I not cast my eye upon the following *criticism* in the Times news-paper. —“We cannot help, before we conclude, bestowing a word or two upon the *style and composition* of this document. It is barbarous beyond all conception. Such jargon was never before put together, instead of language, in any official paper whatever; except, perhaps, it were in those of the Wabash and Shawanese savages spoken of by the President. There was a dispute some time ago between Mr. Smith and a man of the name of Calvin, respecting the right of authorship to the former State-Papers of America. *Neither* of them, we apprehend, will claim the present as *their* production. We do not mean, however, to give this subject more weight than it deserves. We know that the most illiterate man may be a sagacious politician and a firm patriot; *but yet*, in the present enlightened state of the world, it is hardly conceivable that the chief officer of a large nation, could *neither* by himself or a substitute convey his thoughts in proper and correct terms. Our copy is extracted from the American official paper.”—To remark on such flippant trash as this may seem quite unnecessary; but, it becomes those writers who disapprove of it to show, that *all* the people in England are not of this writer's taste. When the Americans see, if they ever should see, this criticism on their President's Speech, what must be their contempt for the critic and for a public that would seem to tolerate him! In this short paragraph of criticism on style and composition, there is, as the reader will see, no less than *three grammatical errors*, and one instance of the most gross and stupid *tautology*. To be sure, these are not rare, in this print and some others; but, when a man was finding fault of the style and composition of another, we may well suppose, that he himself would have taken care to be grammatically correct at least, if his ignorance had

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not been an over-match for his care. But, if this criticism does not discover much judgment and literary correctness, it does what it is full as useful for the Americans to see: it discovers pitiful spite, impotent malignity. They will readily conclude, that they have little to apprehend from those, who are driven to assaults of this nature.—Let us now come to the *matter* of the Message. It has been objected to it generally, that it is not *decisive*; that the President does not, in short, declare, at once, for *one* or the *other* of the two belligerent powers; and that he makes America a mere machine dependent upon the conduct of those belligerents.—Perhaps the best answer to this would be, that this is the policy which America has pursued for the last twenty years, and by the means of which her people have been free and happy; that they have had no fleets and armies to maintain, that they have had no increase of paupers, no depreciated paper money, no suspensions of the Habeas Corpus, or Personal Safety Act. This would, I think, be a pretty good answer; but, what is meant by making America a *machine*? She is a machine, it is said, because her measures are to depend upon the conduct of the belligerents. Upon what else, however, ought her measures to depend? If they act justly towards her, she will not go to war; if they do not, she will go to war.—But, it is said, that the President follows the “*narrow selfish policy of all his predecessors, whose patriotism is base and sordid, and consequently, a self-destroying principle.*” Now, really, I have never seen any thing to justify these observations. If, indeed, Mr. Madison had, while he was out of office, called for a reform of abuses, and, the moment he got in, had taken care to fix himself and all his relations upon the people’s purse for life or for two or three generations, under the title of sinecure placemen and pensioners; if it had been the custom in America for each succeeding President and his party to fasten themselves, their relations and dependents, down to their very footmen, upon the people; then, indeed, I should be ready to agree with this writer, that their patriotism is *base* and “*sordid,*” and that if it be not “*self-destroying,*” it, at least, *ought* to be so; but never having seen any proof of the facts, I cannot allow that the charge is just.—It is possible, however, that this writer might not mean to allude to *individual* patriotism. He might mean

the patriotism of the nation; and then his meaning is only *nonsense*; for, what nation does not love itself better than any other nation?—The assailant of Mr. Madison speaks a little plainer, however, as he advances; for he says, that “it has long been a settled maxim of *our wisest* and “*best* writers, that we are scarcely less “interested in the *social order* and happiness of the world at large, than in that “of our own community.” And hence he infers, that the Americans ought to take a part with one of the belligerents; and, of course, with England.—But, does not this writer allow, that the American President has some reason to doubt of the maxims of these “*wisest* and *best* “writers?” Mr. Madison has some little experience to guide him in this particular. He has seen England, urged, goaded on, by these “*wisest* and *best* writers,” to a twenty year’s war for “*social order,*” and, perhaps, he does not feel very much encouraged by her success; and he may moreover, think that what we mean by *best* writers, is, *best paid* writers, of whose speculations and predictions he has long witnessed the folly and the falsehood. With this experience before him, Mr. Madison might, surely, be permitted to doubt of the soundness of the maxims of these “*our wisest* and *best* writers;” or, at least, he might be excused for hesitating to plunge his country into war upon the strength of such authority.—Having, as he appears to suppose, thus cleared the ground, this writer (who, I dare say, numbers himself amongst our *wisest* and *best*) comes, at once, to his great point; namely to show, that the Americans must take one side or the other, and that *ours* is the side, which the President ought to have unequivocally espoused. Let us first take the passage at full length, and then examine its contents.—“Mr. Madison “ought to have fairly stated to his fellow-citizens the nature and extent of the present contest. He ought to have told “them, that it must eventually involve “themselves. He ought to have instructed them, that duty, and honour, and “even prudence urged their taking a side “at once, rather than remaining to be the “sport of the victor. In making their “choice, he should have placed before “them the two pictures, so very unlike in “feature. On the one side, a self-created “Emperor,—the sworn foe of all political liberty,—openly aiming to be the “despot of the whole earth,—supported

"by a military system entirely incompatible with the existence of civil rights, invading, annexing, subverting, annihilating free and independent Governments, the friends and allies of America, without pretext, or the formality of excuse,—fraudulent, equivocating, rapacious towards allies; to enemies, barbarous and perfidious beyond example. On the other side, he should have faithfully portrayed that country from which America has drawn, as from a mother's breast, every thing of value that she possesses,—the spirit of civil liberty and religious toleration,—the precious writings in the English language, the salutary laws, the proud examples, the very blood itself of our common ancestors. That country, he should have said (whatever be her errors), is now heroically contending in a more glorious cause than the page of history records; she has staked her existence upon its event; and if she fall, liberty and national independence cannot for a moment survive. Upon such grounds as these it is, that the United States should have been called to make their election. If the democratical republicans were still attracted by the gaudy form of an insolent despotism, they should at least have acted with their eyes open; their leader should not have abused his authority to mislead or to deceive them. The narrow policy which I have described as common to the generality of American Statesmen, does not indeed exactly tally with Mr. Madison's professions. He lays claim to "an enlarged philanthropy," and "an enlightened forecast." It has unfortunately happened of late years, that the most sacred terms have been so wretchedly perverted, as to become suspicious in their very sound. Enlarged philanthropy! Does this express the feelings with which Mr. Madison contemplates the accursed devastation of Spain and Portugal? Is it meant to imply that new species of honour, which he has gained by the magnanimous annexation of the Spanish territory (the "forts excepted) of Florida? Does it serve to explain his passive acquiescence in the subversion of the free commercial states of Tuscany, Genoa, Holland, Hamburg, Lubeck? Is it the Napoleon code,—the conscription laws,—the liberty of the press in France,—or, lastly, is it the continental system,

"with its burnings, its confiscations, its capital punishments for the horrible crime of smuggling? Is any one, or are all these together, I say, the true objects of Mr. Madison's enlarged philanthropy? If so, God defend my country in all ages from the government of a philanthropist! As to his enlightened forecast, it is a quality, according to his own description of its effects, which I apprehend no other Statesman will very greatly envy; for it appears, that all which Mr. Madison is enabled to do by this rare and peculiar faculty, is "to regard the progress of events," and to be not wholly unprepared for "whatever order of things may be ultimately established."—Now, as to the first point, upon what does this writer ground his assertion, that the President should have told his fellow-citizens, that the contest must eventually involve themselves; and that they must either take a side at once, or finally become the sport of the victor? Upon what does this wisest writer ground this assertion? The President has seen the progress of the contest; he has had twenty years experience of it; he has seen it suspended by a treaty of peace and amity; and he has not seen, that America was, at any time, likely to become the sport of the victor. Besides, does this writer pretend, that there would be any danger to America if *England should be the victor*? Ah! That is a pinching question; for, if he says, that there would, in that case, be danger to America, he proclaims beforehand, that England only wants the power to do America mischief, and, of course, suggests a most potent argument against America's adding to that power; and, if he says, that there is no such danger, and that America has only to dread the victory of France, he does, in fact, tell her that she is in no danger unless England be subdued; and, as he will not allow any one to believe in the possibility of this, there can be no danger at all to America from the result of the contest. The President, however, in judging of what would be the treatment of America by France or England in the case of one or the other becoming the decided victor, must be ruled by what she has *hitherto experienced* at the hands of each power; and, if he be of opinion, that the treatment at the hands of England be worse than that at the hands of France, he will, of course, have as much dread of the preponderance of the former as of that of the latter; he will, I am afraid, take

“the evidence of facts” in preference to the assertions of “our wisest and best writers.” If England, he will naturally say, does all the things which we complain of so bitterly; if she *now* does those things, having so mighty an enemy to cope with; what will she do, if she should once completely become the victor over that enemy? What will she do, when all her fleets and her armies shall return home triumphant from the seas and countries of Europe?—But, this writer tells us what the President should have told his fellow citizens as to the nature of the cause, in which we are engaged, and as to the difference in the character and conduct of us and our enemy; and, of course, the President was to draw us in the shape of angels while he drew our enemy in the shape of a devil.—One reason for the President not doing this might be his having seen, that our cause has been abandoned by all those who were our allies at the out-set. He has seen on our side the king of Prussia, the emperor of Russia, the emperor of Austria, and many others, who have not only left us to ourselves, but who have actually joined the French against us. He saw, indeed, one Royal House, in possession of a part of its dominions, remain our allies at the price of a subsidy of 400,000*l.* a year; I mean the court of Sicily; but, of this court he has now seen *our writers* openly and with impunity recommend the expulsion, upon the ground that *they* too were secretly attached to our enemy; a recommendation which he does not know but he may see acted upon. Surely, after having seen all this, the President might well hesitate before he pronounced any very decisive opinion as to the nature of our cause; for, of that cause who were so likely to understand all the merits and the bearings as those who had actually taken part in it? He has, at different times, heard “our wisest and best writers” extol the several sovereigns who have been leagued with us, and he has seen the people of England drained in order to subsidize them. He has heard their praises sounded in the speeches of ministers and even in those of the king; where they have been applauded for their justice, wisdom, magnanimity, and, in short, for all the princely virtues. When, therefore, he sees that all these sovereigns have turned their backs upon us, what is he to think? Is he to set his single judgment up against all theirs combined? When he sees the Emperor

of Austria, who was so long our “august ally,” not only leaving us, but actually giving his daughter in marriage to our enemy, what is Mr. Madison to think? When he sees the Emperor of Russia, late our “magnanimous ally,” join with our enemy in calling upon us to give up our pretensions and restore peace to Europe, what is Mr. Madison to think? Surely, under such circumstances, he might be expected for not pronouncing any distinct sentiment in favour of our cause. I am aware, indeed, of the maxim, that no evidence whatever, whether presumptive or positive, that makes against us, is to be looked upon as worth a straw; that every thing said in our favour is to be set down as true, and every thing against us as false; but, I humbly presume, that this maxim, in its operative effect, does not extend so far as the American States, and, therefore, the President could not be reasonably expected to act upon it.—Besides the above-mentioned circumstances, had the President seen nothing in our own conduct to make him hesitate in pronouncing an eulogium upon our cause? In short, could he well know, *what that cause was*? If he had asked, could any of “our wisest and best writers” have told him *what it was*? If these wise and good hirelings had been shipped off to America to remonstrate with him upon the subject in the strain of this writer, and to prevail upon him to eulogize our cause to his fellow citizens, he might have been reasonably expected to address them thus: ‘Before I consent to your wishes, be so good, Sirs, as to tell me what this cause of yours really is; for, as I have to address myself to a people who are not to be easily cajoled, I cannot think of grounding any opinion of mine upon loose and unproved assertion. Now, Sirs, if my memory be not very treacherous, you began this war with the French, or, at least, you began to quarrel with them and to inveigh against and punish those amongst you who propagated their principles of government, at the time when they had, as they thought, established a *Limited Monarchy*, calling them, at that time, by the way of reproach, republicans and levellers, which by the bye, was a combination of terms that could not be very pleasing to the people of these States. Soon afterwards the French nation formed a *Republican Government*; and open war followed on your part, having been preceded, for nearly a year, by acts of

more than an unfriendly nature. You now became the soul of a coalition of kings against this new republic, the professed objects of which coalition were, the preservation of regular government, social order and the holy religion, though, amongst the coalesced parties, the religions were many. Upon various occasions some persons in your legislature recommended overtures for peace; but still you refused upon the ground of the anarchy which existed in France, and of the danger to be apprehended from a communication with her licentious people. The next form of Government in France was that of a *Directory*; but, though, after many and sore defeats, you condescended to treat with this government, you still kept on the war, and that too upon the ground, that there was not in France a regular government, and an order of things to afford security from the democratical principles in vogue in that country. A *Consular Government* having arisen upon the ruins of the *Directory*, the chief of that government implored you in the most earnest manner to put an end to the misery of war and the effusion of human blood, assuring you at the same time, of the pacific wishes of France; to which you replied, that assurances were not sufficient, that you waited for "the evidence of facts," and that until you had it, you would not treat with him, who, on his part, eager, apparently, to prevent you from waiting long, gave you the evidence afforded by the battle of *Marengo* and a long list of other such facts. Having imbibed, though very slowly, the conviction which facts so notorious and so striking were calculated to produce, you, at last, amidst the pressure of scarcity at home, condescended to treat with the person who had obligingly afforded you those facts, though the government of France had undergone no change since your last refusal to treat, and though the political principles professed by the French still remained the same, liberty and equality being still the rallying words of the nation. The peace at that time concluded, lasted not long, but soon terminated in a new war against the Chief Consul, now become, as it were to please you, *Consul for Life*. The hated name of republic has since been dropped, that of Empire assumed, and the man, whose offers of peace you once rejected because he was not at

the head of a regular government, having during this war, become Emperor of France and King of Italy, has established what he calls an *Imperial Government*, and what you call a *Military Despotism*; and still I find you at war with France. What, then, Sirs, again I ask, is this cause for which you are fighting? Social order? Do you tell me that you are fighting for the order and happiness of mankind? Social order? Why, Sirs, could you, in none of these forms of government see a chance for the existence of social order? In the Limited Monarchy, in the Republic, in the *Directory*, in the Consular Triumvirate, in the Consulship for life, in the Imperial Government or Military Despotism: could you in none of them see a chance for the security of surrounding nations? Have you found, that the principles of them all are so dangerous that you cannot live in safety within their vortex? Really, Sirs, if this be the case, I am constrained to believe you to be very difficult to please; and, I must say, that it is wholly beyond my mental powers to guess at what your cause, considering it a cause in which the rest of the world are interested, can possibly be. I will, however, out of complaisance to you, now notice the particular parts of your remonstrance. You tell me, that on one side, I see "a self-created Emperor," and at another time, you call him an "usurper." It is not for me to judge of the ways, in which foreign rulers become possessed of their power; but, I do well remember, that there was an election of the Emperor of France, and being aware, that you may say that this election was a mere sham, a mere cheat upon a degraded people, the mere dirty result of the vilest jobbing, of the basest bribery and corruption carried on between the most infamous miscreants upon the whole earth; being aware, that you may say all this, and, while being ignorant of the facts, not at all disposed to question the propriety of your epithets, if the acts were such as you state them to have been, I shall content myself with just putting this question to you: will you assert, that these reasons are sufficient to justify a resistance of his authority? If you say no; then what is the source of his authority to me? And, if you say yes, I must still take the acquiescence of the people for an expression of their consent. Besides, have I not seen him recognized by you as the

• legitimate ruler of France? Have I not
 • seen you conclude and ratify a treaty of
 • "peace and friendship" with him? Have
 • I not seen you receive territory in the
 • way of cession at his hands? Have
 • you not, by acts the most solemn, in the
 • face of the whole world, acknowledged
 • him to be the lawful ruler of France?
 • And, how can you, after this, urge his
 • usurpation, as you now call it, as a rea-
 • son why I should not use my best en-
 • deavours to live at peace with him and
 • his people? Besides, if need were of
 • further argument, have I not seen one of
 • the French emigrants in your country,
 • one of those who (from whatever motive)
 • remained attached to the Bourbons, pro-
 • secuted by your Attorney General by
 • Ex Officio information, tried in your
 • Court of King's Bench, and convicted of
 • a libel on this same person, whom you
 • now call an usurper, and that, too, upon
 • the express ground, as stated by the judge,
 • of his being the Chief Magistrate of
 • France? And, yet do you reproach me,
 • because I will not suffer what you
 • call his usurpation to be an obstacle
 • to my endeavours to preserve peace
 • between the people of America and
 • those of France?—You tell me, Sirs,
 • that Napoleon is "the sworn foe of all
 • political liberty, and you cite for instance
 • his conscription laws, and his laws against
 • the liberty of the press in France." As
 • to the former, it is a thing which, dis-
 • guised under whatever name, my country
 • knows nothing of, and, therefore, I shall
 • say nothing particular with regard to it;
 • and, as to "the liberty of the press in
 • France," though I am sorry to see it put
 • an end to, I must say, that I am better
 • pleased at seeing the press under a li-
 • censer openly avowed, than I should be
 • to see it really enslaved under the pre-
 • text of being left free, and thus made a
 • partial mirror, the slave of power, the
 • cheat and the disgrace of the French
 • nation, and, withal, the cause of much
 • individual suffering and ruin, oppression
 • never being so severe and the cause of
 • the oppressed never being so desperate
 • as when tyranny is exercised under the
 • names and forms of liberty and law.—
 • You say, Sirs, that this enemy of yours is
 • the sworn foe of all political liberty. I
 • do not know how elections are conduct-
 • ed in France; whether the people be
 • really represented in the legislature or
 • not; whether the strong have the law
 • mildly administered to them, while the

• weak have not; whether the taxes be
 • levied impartially; whether there be a
 • system of espionage established; whe-
 • ther powerful plunderers of the public
 • be protected; whether the officers of the
 • Emperor be screened from all real re-
 • sponsibility; whether the people of
 • France can be sent to prison without
 • any previous legal inquiry into their
 • conduct; whether, in short, the Napo-
 • leon Code, which you number amongst
 • his wicked acts, be a mere sham, a fraud,
 • a mockery, and that all the proceedings
 • under it be intended as the safest means
 • of exercising that tyranny, which, if
 • openly avowed, the people would not
 • bear: I do not know how these things
 • are; and, until I do, you will excuse me
 • for hesitating before I pronounce him
 • the foe of all political liberty, or of civil
 • liberty; but, if I am to believe, that the
 • Napoleon Code is intended by him to be
 • sincerely acted upon, I must say, that
 • with your Edinburgh Reviewers, I look
 • upon him as being a friend to the latter
 • at least. Besides, are you aware of what
 • you are doing here? Are you aware,
 • that by calling upon me to make com-
 • mon cause with you against him, on ac-
 • count of his mode of governing France,
 • you acknowledge my right to join him
 • against you, on account of the mode of
 • governing your country? You must be
 • aware of this, but doubtless, you will tell
 • me, that the English mode of governing
 • is very different from that in use in France.
 • True, but it may not suit my taste; so,
 • the best way will be for us not to meddle
 • with that point any further, than for me
 • just to observe, that, as long as the peo-
 • ple of either country yield obedience
 • to their government, the Americans;
 • whatever may be their wishes, will not
 • attempt to interfere.—In your next
 • charge against Napoleon I feel much
 • more interest. You tell me, that he
 • openly aims "to be the despot of the
 • whole earth." And here, Sirs, permit
 • me to express my surprise, that you say
 • nothing of the sea. You go on: "sup-
 • ported by a military system entirely in-
 • compatible with civil rights." Nothing
 • again about a naval system. You pro-
 • ceed: "invading, annexing, subverting,
 • annihilating free and independent go-
 • vernments, the friends and allies of
 • America, without pretext or the forma-
 • lity of excuse; fraudulent, equivocating,
 • rapacious towards allies: to enemies
 • barbarous and perfidious beyond exam-

“ple.”—You lay it on pretty thick here, Sirs, especially for “the wisest and best writers.” But Sirs, as you have drawn a contrast, or professed to draw a contrast, your picture is defective in as much as you have not said a word of the conduct of your own government towards other countries and governments. You should have brought into view the history of your own conquests, of which you have made not a few, as well in islands as on continents. Till, however, you choose to do this, I shall, as impartiality demands, pass no judgment between you upon this head. It is, in fact, nothing to America which of you has been the greatest invader, which has annexed most territory, which has subverted most independent governments, which has deposed the greatest number of sovereigns with the least provocation, which has been the most rapacious and has caused the most misery in the world: but, I cannot help reminding you, that every sovereign who has been driven from his throne and dominions by the Emperor Napoleon, did, at one time, belong to the league against republican France; and did at one time, participate in the endeavour to subdue that country to the will of the members of the league, who were the first invaders; and, I cannot help further observing, that, though I pretend not to criticise the conduct of the English government in their conquests, I know, that the governments annihilated by them never made any attempt to invade, or to dictate to England.—You were pleased, Sirs, to say, that Napoleon had annihilated allies of America. The answer to this is, that America has no allies. You talk, Sirs, of my acquiescence in the subversion of the commercial states of Tuscany, Genoa, Holland, Hamburgh, and Lubeck; but, from what authority do you state this? In what document do you find the proof of my acquiescence? Does the proof consist in my not having recommended war against Napoleon on account of this subversion: As well might you say, that my predecessor acquiesced in the conduct of your government towards the commercial state of Denmark, because he did not recommend, upon that occasion, war against you; than which, however, none could be a more erroneous conclusion.—As somewhat connected with this con-

plaint respecting the subversion of commercial states, you ask me, Sirs, if it be the Continental System of Napoleon, with its burnings, its confiscations, its capital punishments for the horrible crime of smuggling, that is the object of my enlarged philanthropy; if so, you say God defend your country from the government of such a philanthropist! Take the Amen! so well merited by such a pious ejaculation. But, really, Sirs, did you, then, never hear of punishments for smuggling, and of capital ones too? Surely you do not come from England! Surely you have never been in the Court of Exchequer at Westminster: have never seen the list of Informations filed by the English Attorney General; have never visited the jails and the poor-houses of your own country! If you contrive to keep the people of England in a state of darkness as to these matters, you cannot blind the rest of the world. As for me, though my head is covered with my own sleek hair, and my body with these plain, farmer-like garments; though I wear neither big wig nor long robe; though I assume not the name of “learned gentleman,” I know something of the law of my own country and of yours too; and, I know, that your laws against smuggling form a code of forfeitures, fines, confiscations, imprisonments, banishment, and death..... Nay, Sirs, attempt not to stop my mouth. If I say what is painful for you to hear, bear in mind, that it is you who have provoked it; it is you who have forced it from me..... That the description which I have given of this code is just you cannot deny. Your laws, your permanent laws, make it death for any person being one of three and being armed, who shall assist in the work of smuggling. Transportation is the punishment of numerous smaller offences; and, one part of your law provides, that any suspected person lurking near the coasts, not giving a good account of himself, may be sent by a single justice of the peace to the house of correction for a month: Such is your standing code of laws relating to smuggling; and, as to the laws you have passed relating to an intercourse with France and her dependencies, I find in your Statute Book, an act, which in the year 1793, made it high treason for any person in England who should send, or cause to be sent, or have any hand, either directly or indirectly, in sending or causing to be sent, to any part of France or any

'country under her controul, any *wheat*, or
'*grain*, or *flour*, or *flesh*, or *potatoes*. Yes,
'Sirs, if any Englishman, or any man re-
'siding in England, had been detected in
'any act of this sort; if he had been detect-
'ed in the crime of smuggling food of any
'kind to the people of France, at a time
'when they were thought to be in the
'midst of famine, the punishment which
'your law allotted him was, first to be
'hanged by the neck till he was dead;
'next to be cut in quarters, those quarters
'being placed at the King's disposal;
'and, lastly, to have his estate and goods
'confiscated, and his family consigned to
'beggary. Look, Sirs, at the 27th Act of
'the 33rd year of the reign of George the
'Third, and say, if I have misinterpreted
'your laws. Very imprudent was it in
'you, therefore, to impute to me a want
'of sincere philanthropy, merely because
'I did not express my disapprobation of
'Napoleon's laws against smuggling; for,
'with what justice could I have so done,
'without, at the same time, saying what I
'have said of your code? I did not wish
'to say any thing of either; for, though
'I feel for those who may be subjected to
'them, it was not my business to inter-
'fere in the domestic management of fo-
'reign countries, especially in cases, where
'I really possess no power to make any
'alteration—I have before observed,
'Sir, that your contrast as to the conduct
'of France and England was incomplete,
'because after having, on the *one side*, told
'me what France had done towards other
'countries, you did not tell me what
'England had done towards other coun-
'tries. You do, however, say something
'about the benefits which *America* has
'derived from England; and as you ap-
'pear to erect here a charge of *ingratitude*
'against her, it is my duty as well as my
'inclination to be somewhat particular in
'my answer to this charge. You tell me,
'that I should have told my fellow-citi-
'zens, that, on the *other side* (in contrast
'with the French) they might behold "a
'"country, from which *America* has
'"drawn, as from a mother's breast,
'"every thing of value that she possesses."
'My fellow citizens are a plain, common
'sense sort of people, Sirs. They do not
'much relish bombast. They are apt to
'analyse, and to dive into the literal mean-
'ing of words. They would, therefore,
'have laughed at me; or, which would
'have given me greater pain, they would
'have charged me with telling them false-

'hoods. They would have said, that what
'*America* possessed as to soil and climate,
'she received from the hand of nature;
'and that, if the religious, the civil and po-
'litical possessions, and the possessions of
'agriculture and the arts, of *America* were
'the things of value meant, they owed them
'to their own wisdom, courage and indus-
'try.—To come to particulars, however,
'you tell me, that we owe to England the
'*spirit of civil liberty and religious toleration*.
'That we derive the forms of our legal
'proceedings from England, that our com-
'mon law was thence derived, and that they
'are, for the most part, excellent, we are
'proud to say; but, we cannot forget, and
'we are sorry that you force us to say,
'that, if we still possess these in their an-
'cient purity, no thanks is due to England,
'seeing that we were compelled to wage a
'long war against her in order to save
'ourselves from being *taxed* and being
'*bound in all cases whatsoever* by a legisla-
'ture, in the choosing of the members, of
'which we were to have nothing to say.
'Nor can we, Sirs, thank you for the li-
'berty we enjoy in carrying on all sorts
'of trades, when we remember, that the
'maxim with England was, that we *ought*
'*not to be suffered to make ahob-nail for*
'*ourselves*. I wish you had said nothing
'about *religious toleration*. Indeed I do;
'for it compels me to remind you, that
'the far greater part of these states were
'settled by those of our forefathers, who
'fled from religious persecution. It is
'true, that the great State of Pennsylvania,
'which has always been so interesting a
'member of the Union, was settled, that
'all its wise and benevolent institutions
'were founded, that all the exemplary
'virtues of the greater part of its inhabi-
'tants were implanted, by an Englishman,
'whose name will be held in veneration as
'long as gratitude remains a feeling of
'the human breast; but, Sirs, we recol-
'lect, that this Englishman was persecuted
'for his religion in England; that, at one
'time, he was, for uttering his religious
'opinions, prosecuted as a seditious libel-
'ler; that he was saved from a jail, and,
'perhaps, from a lingering death, by a
'Jury, who had the virtue to withstand the
'menaces of a ruffian Judge; and, in short,
'that it is to religious persecution in Eng-
'land that *America* owes the wise regula-
'tions and the bright example of William
'Penn. I would not add, but you force
'me to do it, that of the present popula-
'tion of *America* no small part are *Anti*

Catholics. I will say no more, but refer you to them, who will be able to tell you, whether the religious toleration they now enjoy is, or is not, of English origin.

—You next tell me, Sirs, of “the *precious writings* in the English language,” that we derive from you. Why, Sirs, what favour is this? Do you hold yourselves indebted to the Saxons and the Normans, from whom you derive your language in common with us? Or, if you allude to mere *books*, what favour do you confer on us any more than on any other nation, who may choose to purchase your books, and who, in fact, thereby, in a commercial sense, confer a favour on you. The French write more books than you; they do not prevent us from having them, and we have the capacity to put them into our own language; but ought we for this to look upon ourselves as *politically* obliged to France? As to myself, I do not wish to suffer my personal feelings to enter into this discussion, but, I will just observe, that I have seen, in some of your “*precious writings*,” great abuse of me, and most false and foul misrepresentations of my character and motives; and, at any rate, you cannot expect me to feel towards you any gratitude for those; if I feel no resentment, it is as much as you can expect. Besides, amongst the writings from England I have seen histories full of falsehoods; and, indeed, as to all matters wherein your government is concerned, and those are the matters most interesting, we in this country never expect to hear from an English writer a single word of plain truth; our reasons for which I would state to you, were I not disinclined unnecessarily to offend your ear, those reasons being to you, who are “the wisest and best writers,” in England, very well known.—You next tell me, Sirs, that we owe to England “the salutary laws, the proud examples, of our common ancestors.” You do not, of course, allude to the *smuggling* laws that I have mentioned above; and, as to the other laws which we derive from England, I have spoken of them before. The “proud examples of our common ancestors,” we owe to those ancestors; we are indebted and so are you to them. With your domestic affairs we pretend not to meddle; but, as to ourselves, we have endeavoured to follow those examples by guarding ourselves against public robbery and all those oppressions and that degradation

and infamy which would justly be our lot, if we were ever to forget those examples, to show our gratitude for which the best way is to *follow* them and not brag about them.—You tell me, in rather a pathetic strain, that I should have told my fellow citizens, “that England, whatever be her errors, is now heroically contending in a *more glorious cause* than the page of history records.” Indeed! This would have been going very far. What! was I to prefer her cause to that in which America herself contended? Was I to prefer it to the cause of our common ancestors when contending against the Star Chamber and arbitrary taxation and arrests? And, was I to say nothing about those *errors*, of which you condescendingly seem to admit the existence? But, Sirs, as I have said before, I cannot for my life discover *what your cause really is*? In Portugal I see you contending for the old government; in Spain I see you contending for the ancient Spanish monarchy, the inquisition being still in being; I see you contending for the son of the Old King, while the father is alive, and while the Cortes are framing just such a constitution as I saw you reprobate in France. In Sicily I see your writers recommending the taking part with the people against the King. In Asia I see you continually extending your dominion, and by what means I need not describe. I pretend not to say, that all this may not be very just and very wise; but, really, you must excuse me, if I do not clearly see what your cause is; and, while I am in this state of uncertainty, you will have the candour to allow, that it would have been unpardonable in me to pronounce your cause to be more glorious than any that the page of history records.—But, you tell me, that your country “has *staked her existence* upon the event; and that, if she “fall, *liberty and independence* cannot, for “a moment, survive.” You wish me, Sirs, to have told my fellow citizens this; but, as I said before, they are a plain, common sense sort of people, given to inquire, examine, and analyse; and, I do assure you, that I should have found it very difficult to make them believe these facts. They would have asked me how it was *possible* for a country to *stake its existence*; how it was possible for a country to *lose* its existence; and, then, perhaps, if I had made this matter out to

their satisfaction, they might have asked me, *who* it was that had been the organ of the country's will in putting its existence at stake. You, who are the "wisest and best writers" in England, might, may be, have been able to answer them; but I freely confess to you, that I should not. And, Sirs, upon *what* is it, that your country has staked her existence? You say, upon the *event*; but *what* event? The event of the contest in which she is engaged; but, then again, what is the contest *for*? And, thus, we go round the circle, and all that we arrive at is, that England is contending for her existence; for, after all, that is the only object clearly pointed out.—Your corollary, is, indeed, worthy of great attention, supposing the premises to be true; for, if "*liberty and independence* cannot, for a "*moment, survive*" in the world after the fall of England, and if she really has put her existence at stake, it is high time for us to look about us. But, Sirs, while I trust that England is not doomed to fall; while I hope that the spirit of our ancestors is not wholly extinct; while I entertain the most anxious desire to see the country of my forefathers enjoying not only independence as a nation but all the blessings of freedom; while I am confident that there wants nothing to preserve England but the hearts and arms of free Englishmen; still I must be permitted to say, that, if the contrary were unhappily the fact, and if England were actually to fall beneath the power of France, I do not see, why it should follow, that liberty and independence are to exist nowhere else in the world; and, of this I am certain, that, unless her own safety called upon her to interfere, America is in no way bound to prevent that fall, never having, either in the way of advice or example, stimulated England to that war, which was begun against the republicans of France, in 1793, and which has produced all the dangers, with which she is at this time surrounded from without and pressed from within. The war was her *own* war; she was afraid of the principles of republicanism: she is now, you say, afraid of those of despotism. Nobody has controuled her; she has had her own way; and, if she has chosen, at last, to stake her existence, surely, she has too much pride to call upon others to link their fate to hers; and especially to make this appeal to *America*, of whom she has never 'till now made any ac-

count, and through *me*, too, whom your "*wisest and best writers*" have treated with every species of obloquy and contempt.—Such, Sirs, is my answer: I wait your reply. But, understand me: I protest before hand against a reply consisting of hard names and foul insinuations. You may call me Jacobin and Leveller; you may call me an emissary of Buonaparté's; you may call me what you please; you may sneer at my philanthropy, and, in bad grammar, speak contemptuously of my style and composition, comparing it to those of the Wabash and Shawanese Savages; but, unless you can by fact and fair argument overset what I have said, you will do well to leave the discussion where it is.—Now, reader, let us see what reply, if any, will be given. If Mr. I. S. the writer in the Times newspaper, whose article I have quoted, will send me his reply, in the same compass, the answer and reply shall, I pledge myself for it, travel together all over the Continent of North America; and, if he will not, why let his admirers sit down contented with the consequences.—These remarks relate to the general principles of American politics; upon particular points I shall, perhaps, remark hereafter; though, these general principles are of the most importance, because from a full discussion of them, we get at a fair view of the grounds upon which the American government acts, and we hence know what we may reasonably expect at its hands.

FLOGGING SOLDIERS.—It has before been seen, that this subject, the discussion of which has been attended with such serious consequences to several public writers, has been, without any evil consequences, discussed by other persons, especially by Sir Robert Wilson and Sir John Stuart. We have now to add the Honourable Henry Augustus Dillon to the list of those who have condemned this species of punishment in our army. Mr. Dillon, in a work on the Military Establishments and Defence of the British Empire, which work he has addressed to the Regent, treats of this matter. He expresses his disapprobation of it; and, what are the reasons which he urges against it? He says, in page 60, that he will proceed to discuss the question, "*whether corporal punishment be necessary or not; and whether it be not a great drawback upon the speedy recruiting of the army.*" Now, *how* does he

proceed to this *discussion*? What are the *arguments* that he uses for and against this degrading punishment? None at all for it; and, against it he uses but this one: namely, that the FRENCH conduct their armies without it; that the Emperor Napoleon does not find it necessary to flog his soldiers. He goes on to state, that our soldiers are of as good, and of a better, natural disposition than the French soldiers; and concludes by expressly asserting, that corporal punishment is not necessary in the British army.—Before I apply this to the purposes that I have in view, let me correct this denomination of Mr. Dillon, who follows the example of others in using the phrase *corporal punishment* instead of the word *flogging*, the use of which, by the partizans of the practice, is shunned with as much solicitude as if it were the most obscene word in the language; no weak presumption, by the bye, that they are, in fact, ashamed of what they, for motives best known to themselves, become the advocates.—It is not *corporal punishment* to which Sir Francis Burdett has ever objected. *Shooting* is, surely, corporal, or bodily, punishment; and so is *imprisonment*. What is objected to is the *flogging*. Mr. Dillon, doubtless, means this sort of punishment; but he should have been more definite. *Delicacy*, I suppose, prevented him from calling the thing by its name. What, then, must we think of the infliction of the punishment?—However, here we have the *contrast*. Here we have the contrast for which I and Mr. Drakard are suffering corporal punishment and pecuniary punishment too, and that Mr. White was lately brought to trial for, but was saved by the verdict of a Jury. Here we have the same *contrast*. Here it is stated that the *French soldiers* are, in this respect, *used better than ours*; and, as the public will not fail to bear in mind, this it was that was most strongly urged in all the cases of libel before alluded to. We were all called *sedition libellers* because we said what Mr. Dillon says in a work addressed, *by permission*, to the Regent. This forbearance of the Attorney General towards Mr. Dillon is but a poor compliment to that gentleman's powers as a writer; and, at any rate, whatever merit this part of his work may have (and it has a good deal) must be considered as vastly beneath that of us, who led the way, and of whose mode of reasoning he is an imitator.—And, surely, this is the best possible mode of reasoning. It is an ar-

gument drawn from experience, and such ample and home-felt experience too, that nothing can resist it. If, indeed, we and Mr. Dillon had said: "Look at the Prussians and Hanoverians and Austrians: *they* do not flog; why, then, *should you?*" If we had said this (supposing it to be true instead of being false), the answer would have been. "Yes, *they* do not flog; and they have all been *subdued by their enemy*." But, the *French*, the conquerors of those countries; these were the people for us to look to for an argument of experience; and to this argument, and this *alone*, Mr. Dillon has thought it necessary to resort.—On Mr. White's trial, the Attorney General is reported to have dwelt particularly on the passage, where he said, the writer "warned the country to attend to the military *system of the ruler of France*;" meaning, I suppose, the *Emperor Napoleon*, for those are his title and name. The Judge is reported to have said: "From his commiseration of the English Soldiers, the writer, *as is the custom in such articles*, proceeds to compliment Buonaparté. "With him" (the writer says) "merit is always rewarded, and the situation of the soldier attended to." He could "not conceive what greater mischiefs the *emissaries of Buonaparté* (if there are any in this country) could do than disseminate such doctrines amongst our soldiers."—Such doctrine, nevertheless, is Mr. Dillon disseminating; for, he expresses his disapprobation of the punishment inflicted upon our soldiers, and, in order to shew, that this punishment is not necessary, he says, that it is not used by the *French*; he says that the French soldiers are not punished in the way he complains of; and, what have any of us said *more* than this? To what other standard were we to refer? Where else should we look for an argument of experience, as to the good or evil of any mode of treating soldiers? From whom were we to take an example, if not from him who has won more and greater battles than all the Commanders that have existed during the last five hundred years, and who has gained such an ascendancy in Europe, by dint of his skill and prowess, as to make it a question with public bodies in this country, whether England herself will be able to resist his attempts to subjugate her? From whom, if not from him, were we to take an example as to the treatment of our soldiers?—So much

for Mr. Dillon's observations as to the flogging of soldiers; and here I should put a stop to my remarks upon his work, were there not another part of it very intimately connected with this subject: I mean the part which relates to REWARDS; and this will be found to apply to the point, which Mr. White's writer discussed, and for which discussion he was prosecuted.—In all services whatever; nay, in every situation of life, men ought to have two motives to do well and avoid doing ill: the hope of reward in some shape or other, and the fear of punishment in some shape or other. This is not always the case; for, it often happens, that the exercise of power is such as to punish the innocent and to screen the guilty; that it is such as to make a man afraid to speak the truth, while the propagator of lies is sure to meet reward. But, that the good *ought* to be rewarded and the bad punished is what no one will, as yet, I believe, have the boldness openly to deny.—When I saw that Mr. Dillon disapproved of the degrading punishment before mentioned, and especially when I saw him justify that disapprobation by citing the example of the French military service, I turned over the pages of his book in great haste to see what he had said upon the subject of rewards. And, I am sorry to have it to say, that I was here most grievously disappointed. But of this I shall say more in my next.

MR. WALSH, M. P.—I have very seldom noticed any of the proceedings at Bow Street, or the other police-offices; but, really, when I see a Member of the Honourable House brought there, the matter must not be suffered to escape being put upon record. The affair appears to have nothing very extraordinary in it, in itself considered. It becomes dignified only through the parties; the person, whose money seems to have been in jeopardy, being the Solicitor General, and the person who seems to have put it in jeopardy, being a Member of the Honourable House, as, indeed, is the Solicitor General himself.—What a crowd of ideas come into the mind upon reading these proceedings, to which, as published in the papers, I give a place immediately after this Summary; what a crowd of ideas! Mr. Walsh was no Jacobin; Mr. Walsh was a reader, you see, of the *Morning Post*. I have heard of this Honourable Member for Wootton

Bassett long ago. His name is by no means new to me.—But, how will it be with his constituents, I wonder? The worthy electors of that "ancient borough" will lose their representative, perhaps, for a while.—But, more of this when I have more time.

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
13th December, 1811.

MR. WALSH, M. P.

At half-past eight o'clock yesterday evening, Mr. Benjamin Walsh, Member for Wotton Bassett, was brought up to the Police-office, Bow-street, in custody of the officers, and was seated at the bar.

Sir Thomas Plomer, His Majesty's Solicitor-General, was sworn.—He stated, that having made a considerable purchase, he consulted with the prisoner about three months ago respecting the selling-out of some stock in the three per cents., at which time the prisoner advised him to the contrary, alleging that the funds would certainly get up, and that by keeping the stock in them, he (Sir T. Plomer) would be benefited. On the 29th of November last, however, the prisoner called on him in Lincoln's-inn, and advised him to sell out, as he, the prisoner, was of opinion, that the funds would fall; and Sir Thomas, after consulting a mercantile gentleman, determined to do so, and the prisoner was instructed to find a purchaser. On the 1st of December the prisoner called, and told Sir Thomas, that he had sold the stock, and only waited for him to suit his convenience to make the transfer. Sir Thomas made the transfer, and the money was paid into his banker's. It so happened, that not being able to get the title-deed to the estate which he had purchased completed, he found the money he had in his banker's hands for that purpose would not be wanted; and he consulted the prisoner about laying it out in Exchequer bills; on which business, he, the prisoner, called on Sir Thomas, in Lincoln's-inn, on the 4th of December, and received a cheque on Messrs. Gosling and Sharpe, for 22,000*l*., which cheque was accordingly cashed by the bankers. On the evening of Thursday, the 5th of December, the prisoner called on Sir Thomas, at his Chambers, and informed him, that he had only been able to purchase Exchequer-bills to the amount of 6,645*l*. 18*s*. 6*d*. and that he had paid them

into his (Sir Thomas's) banker's; also, the sum of 15,500*l.* in cash. The prisoner gave to Sir Thomas a receipt for the Exchequer-bills; but did not give him any receipt for the cash alleged to be paid in. The prisoner farther informed Sir Thomas, that he had contracted for 15,000 pounds worth more of Exchequer-bills, with the agent of Messrs. Coutts: he believed the prisoner said his name was Trotter. He told Sir Thomas, that Mr. Trotter had agreed to put him in possession of the Exchequer Bills, at half past 3, on Saturday, December the 7th; that he had paid 5*s.* premium for them, and that they bore interest at 3½*d.* per day. He promised to call on Sir Thomas, on Saturday, at 2 o'clock, for a cheque for the 15,000*l.* which he stated he had paid in, to complete the purchase of those bills which had been agreed upon with the Agent of Messrs. Coutts. Sir Thomas, on the prisoner's leaving him, went to his banker's, and there found that the Exchequer Bills had been paid in, but not any part of the cash; he soon after learnt that the prisoner had left town, no one could tell where, and that his family supposed him to have gone into the country on business. Sir Thomas immediately applied to the Admiralty, to transmit the necessary information to the out-ports by telegraph; and an application was made to the Post-office, to detain any letters that might come into its charge in the prisoner's hand writing. The Magistrates and Officers of the Public Office, Bow-street, afforded all the assistance required of them. The first letter that was received had no date, but bore the Exeter post-mark. It was sworn by Sir Thomas to be the prisoner's hand writing, and was addressed to himself (the prisoner) in London, but intended for his clerk Mr. ——. It stated, that as he had the fullest confidence in his clerk, he could confide in him the secret, that he had misapplied the 15,500*l.* entrusted to him by Sir Thomas Plomer; that he was either to do this or to suffer his poor wife and seven dear children to starve, and wrong other people who could not half so well afford it as Sir Thomas, one of whom was the Clerk's father. He spoke in reprobation of his own conduct, for such an unjust act to a man who throughout life had been his and his father's best friend; but the act was done, and he had no idea of the transaction being as yet discovered. In this letter to his clerk he inclosed one for Sir

Thomas, which was read; and the substance of which was, that as Mr. Coutts's agent would not be in town on the Saturday, the receiving of the Exchequer-bills from him could not take place until Monday, at half-past three o'clock; and, that he, (the prisoner,) would call on Sir Thomas, on that day at two o'clock, for a cheque for 15,500*l.* The next letter received from the prisoner was addressed to his brother, in which he acknowledges his guilt in having robbed Sir Thomas of 15,500*l.*, and says, he had disposed of part of it to pay small debts, the loss of which to the parties would be inevitable ruin, but that the bulk of it he had turned into Foreign Property and Bullion. He spoke most feelingly of his "dear, dear wife," and of his "seven children; the admiration of every one that beheld them." He requested, in the most impressive terms, his brother's attention to his wife; who, he said, must be within a week of her confinement; and most fervently prayed for her and his children's happiness. He had some hopes that Sir Thomas Plomer would not make the matter public; but, if he did, he hoped it would not get into the Morning Post, as his dear Mary would then see it; and such a shock, in her present situation, he was confident she could never survive.

The next letter received at the Post-office was produced, which was also intended for his brother. It chiefly spoke of his affection for his wife and family, and concluded by saying, that ere this, he had no doubt but that that *arch fiend*, Bish, had made a pretty story of it in the news-papers; and that but for that man, he and his family might at that hour have been in affluence and happiness. This letter also stated, that he intended to have taken the money from another, whose miserable and unprincipled conduct deserved nothing better; but that the temptation had fallen in his way by Sir Thomas's money being in his hands; that rather than see his wife and family starve, he had, by this most unjust conduct, added ingratitude to real injury, as Sir Thomas Plomer was a sincere friend. His last letter was to Sir Thomas Plomer himself, confessing the robbery, imploring his forgiveness, acknowledging the magnitude of his guilt, and stating the wretchedness of his circumstances, and the impossibility of their ever mending or recovering in this world; but that if any change of circumstances should take

place, and he once more become possessed of money, Sir Thomas might depend on every farthing being returned; but that he could not help supposing, that Sir Thomas would at present only think such a declaration from him as adding insult to injury. He farther stated to Sir Thomas, that he had repeatedly applied to Mr. Perceval for a situation under Government; that he had offered to leave his home, his dear wife, and children; and to meet the dangers and difficulties of the worst of foreign climates; but, that, latterly, Mr. Perceval had returned no answers to his letters. After the last letter, and one or two others of less importance, had been read, Sir Thomas Plomer signed his deposition, and retired.

The next witness examined was Sir Thomas's Solicitor, who stated, that he accompanied the Police Officer to Falmouth, and found the prisoner at an Inn there at breakfast, and on seeing the prisoner, he said to him, "I suppose you know my business with you:" to which he answered in the affirmative. He (the Solicitor) then asked him to retire into a back parlour with him and the Officer, which he did. The deponent desired him to give up all he had; his answer was, that he had very little; but on being informed by the deponent, whose name we do not recollect, that he knew every circumstance of the transaction, he stated, that he had only some foreign money, and some bullion. This, he said, was in his trunks; which the deponent sent for, and now produced the contents of them. The foreign money consisted of 10,000 and odd pounds worth sterling, purchased into the American funds, and with it were blank transferable warrants. The bullion was in a bag, which the deponent, on securing, put his seal on. The packet was now, by order of the Magistrates, opened. It consisted of doubloons, 71 in number, one half-doubloon, and other Spanish and Portuguese money, amounting in all to about 300*l*. A small dressing-case was next produced by the deponent, which contained nothing but the usual articles, and a few ends of cheques which had been used.

The Magistrates enquired if his person had been searched, as there were still upwards of 5,000*l*. unaccounted for. Being informed by Sir Thomas's Solicitor that it had not, the prisoner was ordered from the bar for that purpose. On his return he wept bitterly.—There were found in his possession forty-seven pounds in bank

of England notes, and some silver; which, with the American stock, the bullion, and other loose articles, were given to Sir Thomas's Solicitor, and the further examination was postponed at half-past eleven, until this day.

Mr. READ enquired of the prisoner if he had any question to ask, or any thing to say; but, without taking his hands from his face, where he had placed them during the whole time, he answered "No, Sir." He bowed respectfully to the Magistrates when he retired from the bar.

Mr. READ suggested, that as the prisoner had been searched, and all his money had been taken away, that a small sum should be given him for present purposes. The prisoner was immediately supplied with four pounds by Sir Thomas's solicitor.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—*French Dispatches. — Marshal Count Suchet's Account of the Battle and Capture of Saguntum, 26 Oct. 1811.*
(Continued from page 736.)

To his Highness the Prince of Wagram and Neufchatel, Vice-Constable.

Monseigneur; After the battle of Saguntum I left the army a league from Valencia, and returned at night to my camp at Murviedro.—During the day the breach had been merely formed, a fire of some hours would have sufficed to render it practicable; but it was of consequence to profit by the victory which had been gained under the eyes of a whole garrison, for your Highness is aware that the isolated heights on which Saguntum is built command the entire plain. I wrote the enclosed letter to the Governor, by means of which reminding him of what he had witnessed during the day. I offered him permission to send two officers in order to inform himself of the successes which the French army had obtained. My dispatch was received at seven o'clock on the morning of the 26th, and a Lieutenant-Colonel of artillery was ordered to carry an answer. He obtained egress with difficulty, all the outlets of the fortress being walled up. I had him conducted to the Generals Caro and Almoya, through the midst of the officers and all the prisoners.—He could no longer doubt of the loss of the battle. He returned at five o'clock in the evening, he came with the Colonel of the regiment of Don Carlos, bringing in information,

that the Governor had come to a resolution to accept the terms I had offered. I consented to the terms of capitulation subjoined, and at nine o'clock the Brigadier Adriani, eight officers of high rank, and 2,572 soldiers, filed off through the breach, laid down their arms, and six stand of colours, and were conducted as prisoners of war to Murviedro.—We found in the place 17 guns, 800,000 cartridges, 2,000 pounds of English powder, 6,000 balls, and 2,500 English muskets, &c. &c. I have the honour to transmit to your Highness the detailed account thereof, as well as well as that of the provisions.—Difficulties vanquished by the science of fortification; the hollowing a passage in the rock for the artillery, and making approaches upon the single accessible point of the forts of Saguntum; the labours of the artillery, in the erection of their batteries, all raised upon points of rocks brought to a level by means of earth brought from a distance; all this effected under a heavy fire, do honour to the Colonel of the Engineers, Henry, who displayed a great constancy and activity, as well as the Chiefs of the Battalion Capelle and Charu, who particularly distinguished themselves by their exertions.—I have the honour to transmit you the views and plans of the forts, and a detailed report of the extraordinary labours by which a passage to them was effected. The task was very severe, and would have been much more so if the enemy had had time to place 24 pounders in the forts.—Thus uniting the prisoners taken at the battle of the 25th, and the garrison of Saguntum, I am about to send to France, in three columns, 7,211 prisoners, of whom more than 369 are officers.—I am with respect, &c. SUCRET, Marshal of the Empire.—*Camp of Murviedro, Oct. 27.*

P. S. I have the honour of transmitting likewise to your Highness, the report of the Generals of Artillery and Engineers, Vallie and Regnat.

Copy of the Letter of his Excellency Marshal Count Suchet to Brigadier Adriani, Governor of the Forts of Saguntum.—Camp before Murviedro, Oct. 25.

You have witnessed the battle of to-day. Three stand of colours, twenty pieces of cannon, 4,500 prisoners, among whom are Generals Mahi and Caro, have fallen into the hands of the French army. I offer you permission to obtain what information you may want, by sending some Officer to

the French camp. After that I shall grant you terms of capitulation, which in giving you the honours of war, will secure to you the right of filing off through the breach, and of laying down your arms outside the fortress; and further, I shall consent that the Officers should retain their arms and baggage. I require an answer in the course of an hour.—SUCRET, Commander in Chief of the Army of Aragon, and Marshal of the Empire.

The substance of the capitulation is, that the garrison shall march out, through the breach, prisoners; but with the honours of war, shall file off with their arms and baggage, and lay down their arms outside the fort.—The Officers shall retain their arms, equipage and horses, and the soldiers their havresacks. Persons not bearing arms shall be free, and may immediately return to their homes.

Report with Respect to the Works erected by the Engineers during the Siege of Saguntum.

The army arrived on the 23d of September before the fortress of Saguntum. The same day the town of Murviedro was taken possession of, and all the enemy's posts were driven in, and the fortress completely invested. For some nights following communications were formed in Murviedro, where we were screened from the enemy's fire. The streets were barricaded, and embrasures were opened in the houses on the side next the fortress. These works, which were executed under a heavy fire, cost the lives of several miners, and that of Raffard, Lieutenant of Engineers, a brave and zealous young officer.—The rock of Saguntum is situated on the right bank of the Murviedro; it is insulated from all the heights, and rises in a peak on the half of its periphery. The other half falls in very abrupt declivities, and is accessible but on a very few points, on account of the jetting of the rock. The ancient theatre of Saguntum is about half way up, partly cut out of the rock, and, at the foot of the rock is the town of Murviedro, the walls of which are washed by the river of the same name. On the long and narrow ridges of the rock are the remains of ancient works, attributed to the Moors; the Spaniards have repaired them—have added new ones, erecting flanking works, and have formed tenures for the batteries and parapets. The entire mass of these works forms a very irregular fort of 400 toises in length; and in breadth from 30

to 60 toises. It is divided into four parts or places, so that a part of the fortress being taken the remainder may be still defended. The redoubt of St. Fernando is on the highest point, and commands all the rest. The great roads from Valencia to Barcelona meet and pass under the guns of the place.—We were obliged to have the artillery for the siege brought from Tortosa; but the little fort of Oropesa, which the enemy occupied in our rear, interrupted the way in a defile. A battery of three 24-pounders, and a mortar, was raised against this fort, which surrendered on the 11th of October, after a cannonade of eight hours.—All that was necessary for the siege of Saguntum was then free to pass, and the tools and sacks of earth wanted by the engineers were forthwith conveyed thither. All the counter-forts of the rock were too low to permit of our erecting in them works to batter in breach, except a ridge of rocks which stretches for 200 toises in front of St. Fernando, so that the attack was necessarily made on that side.

On the 5th of October, the officers of engineers commenced the approaches, formed covered ways through the rock, and lodged picquets of infantry within 70 toises of St. Fernando; profiting by the occasional protection which they derive from the irregular form of the rock. The artillery began to batter in breach on the extremity of the platform at the distance of 160 toises. Colonel Henry and Major Chulliot had a road formed with great diligence, in order to bring up 24-pounders to the battery. They were constantly obliged to level the rock by mining.—On the 12th, they claimed the first point, behind which they had stationed themselves, in order to reach the covert of the rock, which runs out from that on which St. Fernando is situated; they got through the rocks on the right, taking advantage of such veins of earth as were in their way, and making use of sacks of earth and gabions. On the night of the 15th they reached a place within 35 toises of the fortress, covered by a bend of the rock, which afforded a place of rendezvous for the troops who were to be engaged in the assault. Major Chulliot, who had directed a part of these works with great bravery, was severely wounded.—On the 17th the artillery began to bombard with three 24-pounders, two ho-

witzers, and five mortars. They attempted the tower of the outwork of St. Fernando. It was constructed of hard and thick mason work, and the battery was at too great a distance, so that the breach was but slowly effected, which induced a determination to batter the angle formed by the tower and the flank, which proved a matter of greater facility.—On the 18th the fire was kept up, and at four o'clock in the evening the breach was practicable for five or six men abreast; but it was still of rather difficult access. It was formed only of the rubbish of the walls, without any admixture of earth. It was 30 feet high, and its base being on an inclined rock, it was, of necessity, very steep. The enemy appeared above with much resolution, and neither our artillery or musketry could repel them, nor prevent them from constantly repairing the parapet with sacks of earth, as they were levelled by the guns. Orders were given for the assault at five o'clock in the evening.—The column of attack assembled in the place, which had been formed within 55 toises of the work, pushed on to the breach, and some gallant fellows actually reached the top; but they were driven down by a shower of grenades and hobits, and their failure determined the retreat of the columns.—In this unfortunate affair we lost 120 men. Lameran, Captain of Engineers, was killed in the breach, together with some miners.—The assault had failed because the breach was in a recess covered by the fire of the enemy, because it was too narrow—because the troops debouched from too great a distance, and finally, because the battering train of three pieces of cannon was insufficient to level the parapets and drive the enemy from the breach. A resolution was adopted to erect a new battery nearer, to increase the number of guns, and to push the covert ways to the foot of the breach.—On the 19th, Colonel Henry caused the troops to advance in an indented form. Steps were cut in the rock behind which they were stationed, to facilitate the ascent, and when they had reached the summit of this rock, they approached the breach by the aid of an indented covert formed of sacks of earth; on the night of the 24th they were within three toises of the fort of the breach, when they formed a small parallel.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONQUEST OF THE EMPIRE OF JAVA.—

On Monday, the 16th instant, intelligence was received by our Government, that the ships and troops, sent against the Empire of Java, under Rear Adm. Sir Robert Stopford and Sir Samuel Auchmuty, had succeeded in taking the city of Batavia and also the greater part of the Dutch and French European forces in the Empire of Java. The troops landed, it seems, on the 4th of August, Batavia surrendered at discretion on the 8th, and, on the 26th, the intrenched and fortified works of Cornelis were forced. The enemy are stated to have lost two thousand in killed and fivethousand in prisoners, including amongst the latter two generals. Our loss is stated to have been considerable. The Governor of the island, whose name was JANSENS, was a Dutchman, and his troops, about 10,000 in number, were Dutch. The amount of our force, which went from our East India possessions, is not stated in gross; but, from the detail of the several corps engaged, it would seem to have amounted to between 15 and 20 thousand land troops, exclusive of the sailors and marines belonging to the squadron employed on the expedition, which, to have conveyed such an army, must have been considerable, though its force is not particularly stated, an omission so common to all our dispatches of this nature, that it cannot fairly be attributed to accident. The contest seems to have been very sanguinary; for Sir Samuel Auchmuty states, in his dispatch, that "in the action of the 26th, the numbers killed were immense, but it has been impossible to form any accurate statement of the amount. About one thousand have been buried in the works, multitudes were cut down in the retreat, the rivers are choaked up with dead, and the huts and woods were filled with the wounded, who have since expired. We have taken near 5,000 prisoners, among whom are 2 General Officers, 34 Field Officers, 70 Captains, and 150 Subaltern Officers;

"General Jansens made his escape with difficulty, during the action, and reached Buitenzorg, a distance of 30 miles, with a few cavalry, the sole remains of an army of 10,000 men. This place he has since evacuated, and fled to the Eastward."—Lord Minto himself, the Governor General of India, repaired to Batavia, the capital of the Empire, and thence he writes his dispatches, dated on the 1st of September. Directly after his arrival there he took formal possession of the sovereignty of the country and of sovereign sway over all its inhabitants, by the following proclamation:—"PROCLAMATION. In the name of his Majesty George the Third, King of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland.—In consequence of the glorious and decisive victory obtained by the British Army under the Command of his Excellency Lieutenant General Sir Samuel Auchmuty, Commander in Chief, on the 26th of August, by which the French troops were driven out of the strong position at Meester Cornelis, upon which their Generals placed their sole reliance, and by which their whole army, with hardly any exception, either fell in the field, or were made prisoners of war; Lieut. Gen. Jansens fled in great disorder to Buitenzorg; but, knowing that the victorious troops would soon pursue him, he has precipitately quitted that post also, and has directed his flight, in despair, to some other quarter, after having refused a second time the invitation of the English, to enter into arrangements for the benefit of the country, which he left without defence at their disposal.—Lieutenant General Jansens, who represented the French Sovereign in Java, having thus abandoned his charge, and avowed by his actions his incapacity to afford any further protection to the country; the French Government is hereby declared to be dissolved, and the British authority to be fully and finally established in the island of Java, and all the possessions of the French in the Eastern Seas. This Proclamation is issued for the information

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" of the good people of Java, in order
 " that they may strictly conform to the
 " duties of *allegiance and fidelity to their*
 " *Sovereign George the Third*, and they are
 " hereby enjoined and commanded, *under*
 " *the most severe penalties*, to abstain from
 " holding correspondence with, or afford-
 " ing any aid or assistance to the Mem-
 " bers of the late French Government or
 " its adherents; but on the contrary, sup-
 " port with zeal and obey with fidelity,
 " the authority with which they are now
 " happily united. *A provisional form of*
 " *Administration* will be immediately es-
 " tablished, and as soon as that is per-
 " formed the *beneficent and paternal dispo-*
 " *sition of the British Government* towards
 " the people of Java will be manifested
 " by the publication of such regulations
 " as may be successively adopted. Done
 " at Weltevrede, the 29th day of August,
 " 1811, by his Excellency the Governor
 " General of British India. (Signed)
 " MINTO."—Thus the conquest was
 completed in due form, and assumed all
 the characters of permanent sway over
 the whole nation, without any exception
 as to the rights of any of the native sove-
 reigns of the country; and, in one of his
 dispatches, Lord Minto observes, that this
 conquest being completed, the British na-
 tion has neither an enemy nor a rival left
 from the Cape of Good Hope to Cape
 Horn; that is to say, in nearly one half of
 the globe. His Lordship speaks of this
 achievement as being full of glory and
 advantage, and appears to anticipate from
 it the most beneficial results.—The first
 Lord of the Admiralty, in communicating
 this intelligence to the Lord Mayor of
 London, calls it "*satisfactory intelligence*;"
 the ministerial writers exultingly observe,
 that this puts the finishing hand to the
 work of conquest out of Europe, there
 being now three out of the four quarters of
 the world, wherein neither a French nor
 Dutch flag is flying; and, it is to be re-
 marked, that, on the day when the intelli-
 gence arrived, those old proclaimers of
victory and joy, the Park and Tower guns,
 were fired.—Yet am I, for my part, of
 opinion, that this conquest, great as is its
 magnitude, will be of *no advantage* to this
 country; nay, that it cannot fail to be an
 injury to her; for which opinion I will
 now proceed to give my reasons.—Were
 I to confine my view to that description
 of persons in the kingdom, who are the
 dispensers, or the objects, of *patronage*, I
 should be far from saying, that there

was no advantage in this conquest; for, to
 them, it will, for a while, at least, prove a
 most abundant harvest; as it already has
 proved, I dare say, to those immediately
 concerned in it, the worth of the *prices*
 being immense. I look at the conquest
 as it will affect the whole nation; as it will
 affect those who have to pay the taxes,
 and to expose their persons in defence of
 this our own country; and then, I am to
 inquire, how it will aid the pecuniary re-
 sources, or add to the security of the
 country from foreign attack.—But, first
 of all, let us see what this conquest con-
 sists of.—A country, in geographical
 extent equal to England; and, in popula-
 tion, exceeding it by two thirds. The
 Island, or Empire, of Java, contains, it is
 computed, 30 millions of souls. The
 Dutch were the absolute masters of the
 island, though there are in it, one *Em-*
peror, several *Kings*, and many Princes of
 inferior note, who are suffered to retain
 their titles, but are the mere puppets of
 their European Masters, who take upon
 themselves the trouble of governing, espe-
 cially in those two important particulars,
 the *administration of justice* and the *collec-*
tion and disposal of the revenues; that is to
 say, the absolute power over men's *lives*
 and *purses*. We have now stepped into
 the shoes of the Dutch, or, rather, those of
 their sovereign, the Emperor Napoleon;
 and, indeed, the Proclamation of Lord
 Minto, above quoted, clearly shows, that
 we mean to hold the Country by the same
 tenure. That Proclamation takes the ab-
 solute sovereignty from the hands of Na-
 poleon and puts it into those of George the
 Third, who has certainly been the greatest
 conqueror, as well as the greatest warrior
 that ever sat upon the English throne. He
 has lost some territory, indeed, and some
 subjects, in his time; but, what were the
 three millions, which the American States
 contained, at the time of their separation,
 compared to the scores of millions, which
 he has conquered and who are become his
 liege subjects in Asia and Africa?—The
 Empire of Java produces great abundance
 of articles of commerce, especially Spices,
 Indigo, Cotton, Coffee and Sugar; and,
 we are told, in the ministerial prints, that
 we have, by this conquest, supplanted the
 Dutch-French in the most valuable part
 of their commercial possessions and pur-
 suits.—These are fine pictures to draw;
 fine exhibitions to make to a people who
 are called upon so often by the tax-ga-
 therer for the means of supporting the

war; fine matter for a paragraph or a speech; but, let us not be dazzled by them; let us examine the thing with closer eyes.—In the first place, as to our relationships with Europe and North America: does the reader suppose, that the having made this conquest will tend to convince the nations of Europe, that Napoleon alone has the rage of conquest and ambition in his breast; that it will tend to convince them, that they ought to hate him and make other efforts against him, because he is not content with a sway over the original territories of France; that it will tend to convince them, that we are not actuated by any motives of ambition, and that we are at war purely for our own defence, and for the restoration of the liberties and independence of the nations of Europe; will this conquest, in short, tend to make the nations of Europe regard us solely in the light of *deliverers*? We have here added 30 millions of people to our conquered subjects, a number far surpassing all those whom Napoleon has added to the empire of France; and, if our conquests in India, in Africa and in the Islands of America, since the commencement of the French revolution, be taken into the account, all that he has done in the way of conquest is, as to the number of subjects, a mere trifle; and, as the vulgar saying is, he, as a conqueror, is a fool to us.—And, as to the Dutch nation, what impression must this conquest produce upon their minds? Will they like us the better for it? And will they like him the worse? Will it not rather make them zealous in his cause, and reconcile them to his sway, as the only means of protection against our power? They have often been reproached by our writers for submitting quietly to that sway; but, those writers have never pointed out the means by which the Dutch were in any other way to preserve themselves from submission to us and to Prussia. The States of Holland were compelled to seek protection from the old Government of France, upon whom they actually depended for their safety; and, that which has taken place now is very little, if any, more humiliating than their then situation.—As to the part that Napoleon is acting towards Holland, it is that of a conqueror, to be sure. The country, whose government was then at war against France, was conquered by France in the year 1795, just after the retreat of our army, under the Duke of York, out of

Flanders. From that time, Holland has been at the disposal of France; it has been under the sway of France; and now it has become a part of the French empire, as much as Ireland is become a part of the United Kingdom, sending, in the same manner, deputies, or members, to the Legislative Assembly at Paris.—The right of conquest is a right that has never been disputed until of late. It is the way, and the only way, that the sway over countries is acquired; but, the folly of our complaints against Napoleon, on this score, is, that every word we say, is a word said against ourselves; for, by what other right than that of conquest, do we hold so great a part of India, and by what other right have we divested so many sovereigns of their authority? Talk of putting down sovereigns, indeed! Why, here, in this single conquest, of which we boast, do we not assume absolute sway over an Emperor and several Kings, as well as over the 30 millions of people of whom they formerly claimed allegiance?—How will this new conquest operate in the mind of the American government? Does the reader think, that it will tend to remove any apprehensions there felt, with regard to the power and the views of England? Will it tend to give the President a more favourable opinion of those views? I should think not. I should think, that it would make him doubly fearful of doing any thing tending to throw weight into our scale. He must naturally wish to see neither France nor England have the power to domineer over the world; and, of course, when he sees, that “France has not a flag flying in any part of three quarters out of the four,” he will feel less apprehensions at her strides than at those of England. Therefore, every conquest that we make tends to give America a stronger and stronger bias towards France. And is it not perfectly ridiculous to hear our writers reproaching the American President for not making our cause his own; for not declaring himself on our side; at the very moment, when these same writers are boasting of our having swept three quarters of the world clean of the French? They say, that England has *staked her existence* upon the event of this contest, and they tell America, that if we fall, she must fall too. They are, here, downright alarmists; but, what must she think of their alarms, when the next packet brings her an account of England having, at one single dash, con-

quered more subjects than Napoleon has conquered all together; and when she hears us not only express no doubts as to the propriety of such conquests, but hears us boast of it as a glorious achievement?

—The President, in his late Speech, takes a glance at the revolution now going on in South America, and seems to signify his approbation of the change which is likely to be the result. Strong condemnation has been expressed of that part of his speech here. But, does he not perceive, that that country will, unless independent, fall into the hands of either England or France; and ought he not to wish to see that prevented? This new conquest of ours will not, I presume, tend to alter his opinions upon that subject; for, why should we stop at Java? Why should Peru and Mexico not be as necessary to us as kingdoms in Asia? And why should the President of America think more about the conquest of Spain and Portugal than about that of Java? If he takes a view of the *whole* of the conquests of France, he will find them to fall far short of this *one* conquest of England. Let us see a little how the fact stands, when exhibited in figures. France has conquered, or claimed sovereign sway over the following countries, inhabited by the following numbers of people.

Genoa and Tuscany	1,250,000
Modena and the other Sovereign Dukedoms of Italy	2,000,200
States of the Pope	2,000,000
The Two Sicilies	6,005,396
The United Provinces	2,758,632
Switzerland	1,900,000
Hanover, Brunswick, Ham- burgh, &c.	1,145,000
Spain	11,000,000
Portugal	1,838,879

29,898,107

England has conquered and proclaimed full and sovereign authority over the Empire of Java, containing of inhabitants

30,000,000

Deduct conquered by France 29,898,107

Balance in favour of Eng- land	101,893
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Now, observe, reader, this is giving the Island of *Sicily* to France, while it is very well known, that our writers recommend the vigorous measure of taking possession

of it for ourselves, and it is also giving her Spain and Portugal, of the latter of which countries it is equally well known that we have actual possession and almost absolute command, and of the former of which we say that the French will never obtain the sovereignty. I have here placed the object in the best possible point of view for the enemy; and yet, we beat him by 101,893 conquered souls. I beg, therefore, to ask any man in his senses, what should induce the President of America to be alarmed at the progress of French ambition, and to feel no alarm at all at the progress of English ambition?—I shall be told, perhaps, that there is a great deal of *difference* in the two cases. O, aye! a great deal indeed. I am well aware of that: namely, that the one is *French* and the other is *English*; but that is all the difference that I can see. There is indeed another difference to us; that is, that our conquests are in another hemisphere, whereas those of Napoleon are close at home; are of territories and people bordering upon France, and speaking, in great part, the French language. But, while this, though an important distinction with us, will not, I should suppose, weigh much with the American President, who can scarcely be more alarmed at that power which confines its conquests to Europe and to its own borders than at those of a power, which sends its conquering fleets and armies to the utmost extent of the globe. Am I told, that Napoleon would gladly extend his conquests to distant countries if he could; my answer is, that his inability to do it must render him less an object of fear with America. So that, in whatever way I view the matter, I cannot help thinking, that, as far as this new conquest of ours have any effect at all upon the minds of the American government and people, the effect will be that of giving them a stronger disinclination than before existed of throwing any part of their weight into our scale in the present contest, which, in spite of all our boasting, we yet feel to be *for our existence as a nation independent of France*.—And here we come to the second question: what advantage will this country, what advantage will the *people of England, Scotland and Ireland*, derive from this conquest? That it will benefit those who possess *patronage* and those who crave for its largesses I know very well; that it opens a vast field for those who wish to get fortunes without labour or study; that

it will be an out-let for hundreds and thousands of persons who for divers reasons require a voyage to the antipodes; that it will disburden many and many an individual who is loaded with that species of poor-rates which the parish knows nothing of; that it will tend to make elbow-room upon the sinecure and pension lists: that it will do all this I readily allow; for Java with its 30,000,000 of people and all its Emperors and kings cannot be taken proper care of without a great number of persons from this country any more than they were by their Dutch or French rulers. We are told that these latter "took care" of the *administration of Justice*, and of "the *public revenue*;" and, it is not to be doubted, that we shall take as good care, at least, of these matters as they did. Here will be an abundance of *lawyers* and of *tax-gatherers* wanted, and, will any man say, that we are, as to numbers, at least, deficient in either; and, with regard to the latter, can any man have the face to say, that he supposes, that we fall short, in point of experience and ability, of any nation to be found on the globe, whether we speak of taxes to be raised on land or on water?—To impart to "the good" *people of Java*," as Lord Minto calls them, a portion of what we enjoy in the above-named descriptions of persons the nation might, and, doubtless, would, be very willing; but, still I ask, what *advantage* the conquest will produce to the people of this kingdom; to the people who perform the labour and pay the taxes of the country?—Will it cause less labour; or, which is more to the point, will it cause *less taxes to be paid* by the present payers of taxes; for all centers there at last? That it will *not* I am, for my part, fully convinced; and, indeed, I am pretty confident, that I shall be able to *show* to my readers, when the proper time comes, that it will have caused an *augmentation* of the taxes. I never yet saw one of our conquests which did not produce such an effect, in which respect our conquests are of a nature precisely the opposite of that of the conquests of our enemy, who always makes a shift *tirer parti*, as he calls it, or, as we call it, *to turn to good account*, the conquests that he makes. In short, he always makes the people, whom he conquers, assist in carrying on the war against us, while we, as far as my observation has gone, always incur a new burthen with every new conquest. I shall be told, that this conquest clears the Eastern seas of

every French sail, and that we shall require less men of war, and, of course, less expence to protect our commerce in those seas. May be so; but, that is not to my point; which is simply this: will the conquest *diminish our taxes*? If it does not, it is worth nothing to us.—Yes, it might possibly be, if it rendered us at home *more secure* against those deadly blows which the enemy aims at us; and here we come to the last and the main point of our discussion; for, though the conquest were not to lessen our taxes; nay, if it were to augment them if that can well be; still if it lessened our danger, if it added to our security, I should freely say, it was a good thing; a thing for which we ought to toss our hats into the air, to hollow, and to make bonfires, the age for which latter seems, by-the-bye, to be passed. I do not, however, see how this can possibly be. For, in the first place, Java will require *European troops*; and have we these to spare? All the good things in Java, with 30 millions of people; all the justice, all the Revenue, will require *troops*. But, granted that we can find troops to send thither, still there is nothing *added* to that force which is to protect us against the fleets that are building for the avowed purpose of our subjugation, and to augment which force so many schemes have been resorted to. The reader cannot carry in his mind one half of the devices that have been put in practice to get men into the army. Measure after measure have been adopted, law after law; there have been regulars and militia, and fencibles and supplementary militia and army of reserve and local militia and volunteers and volunteering out of the militia into the regulars. In short, what has not been resorted to in order to augment and keep up the military force in this kingdom? Now, it will, I suppose, be admitted, that these measures have all been *necessary to the safety of the country*; I mean to the defence of the country *against the French*; for, as to any *other* danger; as to any *other* purpose for keeping up this force, it never has, at any rate, been openly avowed. Well, then, if all these means of raising men, means so distressing to the people, so burdensome to the parishes and so ruinous to many individuals, have been necessary to the defence of the country against the French, who are just on the other side of the Channel, must not that defence be rendered less secure, must not our danger be augmented,

by sending 15 or 20 thousand troops, and keeping them up, in the newly conquered Empire? Shall I be told, that the troops necessary for the defence of the empire of Java will go from our Indian Empire? My answer is, that they cannot be spared thence; or that, if they can, we have been making great waste of money and of lives in keeping up so large a force, in our Indian Empire, and that, too, at a time, when the superfluous force might have been employed in Spain and Portugal, or at Walcheren. No: it is clear, that we must send out an additional number of troops to those Empires; and then, I say, that we shall, by so much as this number amounts to, weaken our defence at home. If, indeed, we could hire foreign troops, at so much per head, as was done in the American war, there would then be nothing but the money wanting; but these, I believe, are not, now-a-days, to be got to serve out of Europe. So that we must, it seems to me, make an absolute deduction from our native force, for the purpose of securing the possession of this newly conquered Empire. Thus do our conquests work in a way precisely opposite to that of the conquest of Napoleon, who from all the countries that he conquers, draws legions to fight against us, and whose armies now in the peninsula, are well known to consist in great part of Germans, Italians, Hollanders, Swiss, and even Polanders. If we, indeed, could bring a hundred or two of thousands of our newly conquered subjects into the field against the French; if we could bring a good stout army of those brave people, 30,000,000 of whom suffer themselves to be held in subjection by 15 or 20 millions: if we could bring these into the field against the French, we might see fine works; but, as matters are, the conquering of them will give us not the smallest security against France, and must, as I think I have shewn, weaken the defence we already have.—At the time when the peace of Amiens was made, the ministers and Mr. PITT (for whom, in fact, the peace was made by Mr. Addington), told the nation, in their Speeches in parliament, that *extension of dominion was no proof of an increase of real power*. Their motive for doing this was plain enough. They, who had all been in office during the Anti-Jacobin war, had to justify themselves for having suffered France to retain such an extension of territory as she did retain at the peace. They, therefore, to

hide their disgrace, held forth that France would rather be weakened than strengthened by her new acquisitions. They were told of *Antwerp* and of the fleets that would grow up there; but, still they insisted that an extension of territory would tend to weaken the power of France; and, Lord Hawkesbury, who had once talked of marching to Paris, said, that all the territorial conquests of France were more than over-balanced by our acquisitions in the way of "*capital, credit, and confidence*;" whereupon Lord Castlereagh produced a string of statements and calculations about imports and exports, proving the truth of Lord Hawkesbury's assertion. These worthy people forgot, or seemed to have forgotten, wholly, that they had, a thousand times over, insisted upon the necessity of continuing the war in order to drive the French within their old boundaries: and that one of the great alledged grounds of the war, in the first instance, was the necessity of preventing the French from opening the navigation of the Scheldt. All this they had forgotten, or supposed that the people had forgotten it; but, at any rate, they now all said, that there was no danger to England from the extension of the dominion of France; for, that extension of dominion was no proof of an increase of power.—Now, passing over the inconsistency, the change of tone, of these people, and passing over also the fact, that we are every day of our lives inveighing against Napoleon for extending his dominions, and that we are now, as we say, "*fighting the battles of England*" in endeavouring to keep him from conquering Spain and Portugal; passing all this over, let us see how this position of Lord Hawkesbury applies to our present case. As a *general* position it certainly is not true; for, if it were, what state need ever be afraid of the aggrandisement of its neighbour; what state would ever complain of its neighbour's conquests? If it were true as a general position, little states would be more powerful than great ones, which it would be burlesque to attempt to maintain. Conquests, extension of territory, by adding the means of warfare, generally add power to that which a country already possesses, as was shown in the rise of Prussia, where a kingdom, and one of the most powerful in Europe, grew out of additions of territory and of subjects, from time to time made to a petty Electorate. But, then the conquered parts, the acquired territory, must be contiguous;

nature must assist policy. The territory must be advantageously placed, and the people must be able and willing to defend their new government; they must bring no burthen upon the conqueror, but must bring him assistance. Where this is the case, extension of territory is a proof, and the most certain of all proofs, of an increase of power. This is the case with the conquests of Napoleon. The countries of which he has assumed the sovereignty lie contiguous to France; they are parted from her only by imaginary bounds, such as those which separate Middlesex from Hertfordshire; the people inhabiting those countries had an intimate intercourse with France before. When you get to Hamburg or Rome, indeed, the connection was more remote, but, still there was a connection by the means of intermediate countries, and when these had been annexed to France, the annexation of the former partook less of the odious nature of a conquest. But, how is it with our conquests? What connexion is there between us and the people conquered? They knew us not as neighbours but merely as conquerors; and, of course, we have no power over them other than that of the sword; no principle to govern by but that of fear. From such conquests no military aid is to be expected; but, on the contrary, they demand a part of our own military means to secure us the possession of them. Nothing is to be drawn from them in the way of taxes; for all the proceeds of those are swallowed up by the persons deputed to rule over the conquered; and, if we wanted any proof of this fact, it is found in the experience of all our colonies, not one of which ever yet sent a shilling into the Exchequer. Far different, therefore, are those conquests which the conqueror annexes to his own dominions from those which he holds at a distance. And this is the difference between the conquests of France and those of England. The former gives strength to the conqueror and the latter weakness. The former are like fresh battalions brought up to join the main army; the latter like towns captured in a country where the battle is not to be fought. If there were two armies engaged in a desperate conflict upon Salisbury Plain, one fighting for Wiltshire and the other for Dorsetshire, what should we say to the General who should, in the midst of the battle, on the result of which his existence and that of his country depended, send off a detachment of his army to take

possession of the highlands of Scotland? What should we say to such a general? And yet, this does seem to me to be not very dissimilar to our conduct in pursuing distant conquests, while, according to our own acknowledgments, we are carrying on in Europe a contest, upon which we have staked our existence.—Some persons think, that these distant conquests will, at any rate, be worth something to us, as objects of exchange in the negotiating of a peace. Did colonies tell in this way at the last peace? Did they purchase back one single yard square of European territory? Did they take one jot of power out of the hands of France? No man will say that they did; and why should they do it at another peace? If, indeed, the taking of the Empire of Java would afford us even a chance of diminishing the power of Napoleon at a peace; if it would make him, for one week, cease his ship-building at Antwerp, I should say there was some national advantage in it; but, it will not do that; and will, on the contrary, sharpen his desire totally to destroy the power of England. During the Anti-Jacobin war, when that profound pair of statesmen, Pitt and Dundas, were conquering Sugar and Coffee Islands, the orators in the French tribune promised their country, that they would reconquer those Islands on the continent of Europe. "Let the English capture and guard and cultivate and improve our colonies," said they, "we have something else to attend to; and, at the peace we will make them deliver them up with all their improvements." And were they not as good as their word?—The conquest, of which we are speaking, cannot, however fail to give an additional degree of desire to Napoleon to destroy the power of England. He sees, as well as we, that there is not a French flag flying in any quarter of the world except Europe; and he cannot see this without feeling a strong desire to put an end to the cause, and to force into action all his resources for that purpose. We do not go about to nip the ramifications of spreading weeds; we do not even give ourselves the trouble to trace to their points the numerous shoots; we look for nothing but the root, and having found that and cut it off, we leave the rest of the work to the ordinary operations of nature and time. The root of all these colonial conquests is here in England. Our enemy will never attempt to reconquer colonies from us; he will leave the ramifications to

themselves; but, as he sees them increase, he will see the necessity increase of getting at the root. In this view of the matter, therefore, I am inclined to think, that, if the conquest of the Empire of Java answers no other purpose, it will not be likely to fail in answering that of rendering the great conflict here more desperate, more expensive, more bloody, and of longer duration. I do not know that it is possible for N  oleon to make our commercial exclusion from the continent of Europe more complete than it is; but if it be possible, I am sure that this new conquest will be a reason for attempting it: and, indeed, it is folly not to believe, that no exertion will be spared to effect against us all possible mischief, in which Napoleon's measures will, doubtless, be cordially approved of by the Dutch.—Such is my view of the nature and probable consequences of the conquest of the Empire of Java. I am aware that I differ from many persons respecting it, and especially from the editor of the Morning Chronicle, who observes, that our success here points out the sort of warfare that we ought to pursue; but, if he were asked, whether he believes, that the possession of the Empire of Java is equal in real value to the possession of any one of the forts at the mouth of the Scheldt, or into that of a single farm in Switzerland or in the late Austrian Flanders, I hardly think that he would venture to answer in the affirmative.

SPAIN. THE WAR.—French dispatches give us an account of the operations of their armies in Spain, from the fall of Saguntum (mentioned in a former Number) to the 18th of November. Marshal Count Suchet writes, under date of the 6th of November, that he was beginning to prepare for the siege of the city of Valencia: that he had defeated some bands of Spaniards after the fall of Saguntum, and that he was clearing the country of these bands. He speaks very confidently of the success of the siege; and mentions that the English Consul, Tupper, is circulating money in profusion, and the most false and ridiculous news with a view of keeping up the spirits of the Valencians. The Consul has, we see, from our newspapers, published an address to the soldiers in the French army, inviting them to *desert*, and promising them protection and reward.—The Marshal Duke of Dalmatia, under dates of the 21st and 20th of October and 2nd of November, gives an account of the

death of General Gaudinot, who killed himself with a musket, and who, as the Duke says, was afflicted with melancholy. Our writers attribute this act to chagrin at not having been able to beat the Spanish General Ballasteros; but there does not appear much ground for this. The Duke is quite severe on General Girard, who was surprised by General Hill; and he threatens the former with punishment, accusing him of almost wilful neglect. He states the French made prisoners upon that occasion at 400; we stated them at 1,000; probably the truth lies between the two accounts.—COUNT DORSENE gives, under dates of 21st October and 9th November, accounts of several engagements of inferior note, in all of which, as he says, the French were victorious, killing many hundreds and making more prisoners.—From these accounts, making due allowance for exaggeration and suppression, I think that, as to Valencia, which is a very important object, it is likely not to make a very long resistance; for, in the first place, it has Suchet before it, and it has the dreadful example of Tarragona. Mr. Tupper's invitation to the foreigners in the French army will be of little avail, as long as these foreigners have a fair prospect of plunder before them, and have provisions in their camp: nobody ever knew such men desert under such circumstances. Suchet appears to be a man of great ability and of equal courage: a man of great resource, as the French call it. A French officer, on parole at Alresford, has written to me to assure me, that Suchet was never a *barber*, but was the son of a *Manufacturer* of eminence in his line of life, and received a good education. This was of no consequence at all. It will neither add to nor diminish any part of his merit or demerit. He will not be known in history, nor in the present times, by his former state of life, no, nor by his rank, but by his *acts* in Spain or in any other part where he may be employed; nor will the circumstance be of any consequence to them against whom he may serve. The inhabitants of Tarragona might as well have been killed by a barber as by a manufacturer. They did wrong to suffer so long a resistance to be made, and I do not know that it was in his power to prevent the bloody consequences. All that we know of him for certain is, that he has shown great talents as a general, and this we know only from his great success; for amidst all the lies (for where there are

such flat contradictions there must be lies) we hear, it is impossible to build upon any thing except such great and notorious acts as cannot be denied. I have observed that, since I have been in Newgate, this commander has sent about 25 thousand men prisoners to France, including about 12 hundred officers. This is a fact that has been found to be undeniable, and this fact is enough for his reputation as a general.

—Upon a view of the whole of this intelligence, it is fairly to be presumed, that the French experience great harrassing from the Spaniards, especially those who fight in small irregular bodies, who appear to be a species of bands, and of whom the inhabitants are, probably, as much afraid as they are of the French, if not more. Their mode of warfare is something like that which was practised by the Royalists in La Vendée; and if they could take safe possession of any one particular district, they might probably obtain for themselves some considerable boon at the hands of the French; but, there does not seem any good reason to suppose, that they will be able to retard, for any length of time, worth speaking of, the subjugation of their country, unless assisted by a greater force than it appears we are able to send into the peninsula. —It is much to the honour of the Spaniards (supposing them to be actuated by a hatred of being conquered, and not by a senseless prejudice or a still more senseless fanaticism) that they have withstood the French, in any portion of the country, so long as they have. It is often observed in our public prints, that they are a very different enemy from the Austrians, the Prussians, and the Dutch, to which may be added the Hanoverians and the Brunswickers; but, without stopping to make any remark upon these omissions, let me ask these writers, these wise men, whether they are aware of the tendency of this contrast? The Spaniards were deserted by their King and all the royal family; and, when they first rose with arms in their hands, they rose to oppose him to whom both their kings had consigned their authority; they rose, as they expressly stated, against their "*old infamous government*." Now, the nations, who have been subdued by France, had all of them their Kings and old governments at their head. To reason from analogy here would, therefore, lead to conclusions, which, I imagine, these writers would be very much afraid to draw. They should, then, be very careful to abstain from so frequently dun-

ning the premises in the ears of their readers. But, this is their way, they are bunglers, and if they were not bunglers, they would not be venal writers.

CITY ADDRESS.—The general principles of American policy, as relative to France and England, were discussed in my last. I will not now hazard, because it would be useless, any conjectures as to what measure the Congress will adopt with regard to England; nor would I again revive the question relative to the *Orders in Council*, that having been already discussed more fully than was necessary to the conviction of impartial men; but, an article in the *Courier*, of the 19th instant, upon the *City Address** (which I in-

* On Wednesday, 18th December, 1811, the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor, the Aldermen, Sheriffs, and Common Council of the City of London, waited upon his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, at York-house, with the following Address, which was read by the Recorder:—

To his Royal Highness the PRINCE OF WALES, Regent of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,

The dutiful and loyal Address of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled.

May it please your Royal Highness, We, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled, humbly approach your Royal Highness on behalf of ourselves, and the community at large, with an earnest request that your Royal Highness will be graciously pleased to adopt such measures, as with the advice of the Most Honourable the Privy Council shall seem meet, for causing a suspension of the use of Grain in the Distilleries of the United Kingdom, such suspension appearing to us to be one of the most effectual means of preventing those serious evils which a farther rise in the price of grain is at this time so obviously calculated to produce; and we farther humbly beg leave to express our confident hope, that, well aware, as your Royal Highness must be, of the causes of the present scanty supply of grain from foreign parts, and of the great distress that may arise therefrom, your Royal Highness, to whose justice and humanity we shall not, we trust, appeal in vain, will be graciously pleased to em-

sert below), demands some attention. The reader will perceive, that the City is here found fault with for having presented such an Address. That alone would deserve some notice; but, here is a defence, or, at least, an attempt at a defence, of the conduct of the Ministers in refusing to revoke the Orders in Council, and this must not pass unnoticed. — “Undoubtedly his Royal Highness is aware of the causes of scanty supplies from foreign parts; he is aware that his Ministers have no controul over them; that the measures they have adopted were measures *strictly of defence*, the necessity for which was *imposed upon them by the offensive decrees of the enemy*, in which decrees, America, the only neutral nation, either tacitly acquiesced or feebly and slowly opposed. The City desire, though they do not say so directly, that the Orders in Council should be repealed, and the usual channels of foreign intercourse reopened. No persons would be more willing to do so than the Ministers: but there must be two parties to the contract, and the City of London have not informed us how we are to compel one of them to execute it.

ploy all the means in your power, by adopting measures corresponding with your own Royal character and disposition, to re-open to us, if it be practicable, those channels of intercourse with foreign, and especially neutral nations, which have heretofore been found so generally advantageous to his Majesty's subjects, and so good a security against those dreadful calamities which are but too often the consequence of a scarcity of the necessities of life.

To which Address his Royal Highness was pleased to return the following most gracious Answer:

I must always see with great concern the pressure arising from a deficiency in the harvest. I have directed such steps to be taken as may tend to give the earliest effect to any measures which may be adopted by Parliament, for the purpose of relieving the inconveniences or evils likely to result from such deficiency; and whenever circumstances shall make it practicable, nothing shall be wanting on my part to contribute towards the restoration of commercial intercourse between this country and other nations to the footing on which it has been usually conducted even in the midst of war.

“They do not assert (and we are glad that they have not repeated the language of the Americans and their advocates in this country) that Buonaparté has really repealed one of his Decrees against us, or that *the Berlin and Milan Edicts are not in as much force as they were when they were first issued*. To repeal our Orders in Council, therefore, *would not bring us a bit nearer the desired re-establishment of commercial intercourse with foreign nations*; and of this his Royal Highness seems perfectly convinced. He assures the City of London, “that nothing shall be wanting on his part to contribute towards the restoration of commercial intercourse, whenever circumstances shall make it practicable,” or, in other words, *whenever Buonaparté, by really repealing his Decrees, shall prove to us, that he is himself desirous of such restoration*. But he must set the example of relaxation, because he set the example of severity. The initiative must proceed from him, and those who argue otherwise, attempting to persuade the people that our Orders in Council are the causes of commercial distress, and that their repeal would remove it, *practise a scandalous delusion upon the Country*.” — No: it is you, and your like, who practise a scandalous delusion upon the country, in making attempts to cause them to believe the contrary; and to prove this be it now my task. — It is said here, that the Ministers have *no controul over the causes which do, or may, prevent the supply of corn from foreign parts*; and further, that, if the Orders in Council were repealed, *that measure would not bring us a bit nearer the desired re-establishment of commercial intercourse with foreign nations*. — With regard to the first of these assertions, it may possibly be true, because we do not yet know, that the Americans have prevented, or will prevent, corn to be shipped for England. But, as to the second assertion, it is as destitute of truth as any thing that ever appeared even in this same Courier; for, what is it that prevents the free intercourse with America now? What is it that has caused the prohibition of the entrance of English goods into the American States? Does not every one know that it is the existence of our Orders in Council? Is not the fact notorious? Is it not well known, that the President, by a Proclamation issued in November 1810, declared, that, if those Orders were not repealed by the 2nd day of February, 1811, the importa-

tion of English goods should cease; and, is it not notorious, that such importation did cease accordingly? And does not the President now declare, that this is the cause of the non-importation?—What assurance, then, must a man have to say, in a public print, that, if the Orders were repealed it would not bring us a bit nearer the desired re-establishment of commercial intercourse with foreign nations; unless, indeed, grown bold by the conquest of the Empire of Java, he does not regard America as a *foreign* nation, but as still being an appendage to the Mother Country?—Here is America, at any rate; here is this great out-let for our goods; here is an out-let that took off one third part of the whole of our exports; here is this market cut off by the Orders in Council, and solely by them; and, as it would be in the power of the Ministers to repeal those Orders, to them the nation has to look for responsibility on the subject.—But, I shall be told, perhaps, that the Orders *ought not to be repealed*. That may be; but that is *another question*; and that question we will now discuss.—I will first say, for myself, that of these Orders in Council I always disapproved; not, however, on account of the power that they caused to be exercised; but, on account of that power being exercised under pretext of retaliation against Napoleon, instead of meeting the hostility of the world in the shape of a, *right* boldly declared to exercise a mastership on the sea; and I foresaw, and foretold, that, if ever Napoleon repealed his decrees, our ministers would find themselves compelled to break with America at a time less advantageous than at the time when the Orders were first issued. I was further of opinion, that such a power as the Orders gave would so distress the continent of Europe as to compel Napoleon to repeal his decrees and to suffer commerce to take its usual channel. In this I was deceived. Experience has proved, that the continent is too safely in his hands, and that the privation of colonial and English goods can be borne with. But, experience, which makes fools wise, has, of course, had no effect upon men like our ministers.—The ministers went, not upon our *right*, *generally*, to exercise such a power upon the sea; but, upon the particular right of *retaliation*. They said to America: France has issued certain decrees detrimental to *your* commerce with us; and, therefore, we have issued Orders detrimental to *your* commerce with her.

The logic by which this was attempted to be justified was perfectly original, as was the act itself. The pretext did, however, clearly imply, that, the Orders were to remain in force no longer than the Decrees. Indeed they could not, if they were to be considered as measures of *retaliation*. Whenever America complained of these Orders, which, in effect, cause war to be carried on against the American ships trading with France, as far as merchant ships can taste of war; whenever she complained of these Orders, we told her, that they should be revoked as soon as she could prevail upon Napoleon to repeal his decrees. She was told, that we were very anxious for that event; and that, in order to get rid of all difficulties as to which party should begin to repeal first, we were to proceed *step by step* with France in the good work. Well, France did, at last, not only begin, but ended this work. Napoleon revoked his decrees, and then America called upon our ministers to do the same, agreeably to their repeated professions and promises. They did not repeal their Orders; and the consequence was, the execution of the non-importation act in America, which has assisted so materially to produce the present distress in the manufacturing towns in England. What, then, is the ground of justification, which this partizan of the ministers takes. Why, he says, that Napoleon *has not revoked his Decrees*, and that, therefore, our ministers are right in not repealing the Orders in Council. Thus the question is reduced to a mere point of fact; and where are we to look for satisfactory evidence of this fact, except in the declarations of the American ministers and government? The evidence that we have is as follows: Mr. Pinkney, then American minister in London, officially informed our government in August 1810, that he had received official information from the American minister at Paris, that the French decrees were revoked, and that the revocation was to be acted upon on the 2nd of November, 1810. Mr. Madison, upon receiving the same information, issued a Proclamation declaring the fact, and, at the same time declaring, as the law required him, that, if England did not revoke her Orders before the 2nd of February 1811, the non-importation Act would be put in execution as to English goods. Here, then, the fact was asserted first by an accredited minister in England; next in a proclamation by the President in America; next by an Act of

Congress, put in force after the operation of the revocation; and now in the speech of the President, after a year's observation and experience; for, he says, in this Speech: "it was hoped, that the *successive confirmations of the extinction of the French decrees*, so far as they violated "our neutral commerce, would have induced Great Britain to repeal its Orders "in Council." And, after all this, the fact is denied, and that denial is made the ground of a refusal to repeal the Orders in Council! Yes, we are still coolly told, that it is for Buonaparté to *begin* repealing; and that *then* we will follow his example!—This really is too impudent. We know better than the President and the Congress whether their commerce be still subjected to the French decrees! We are the only judges of the fact whether they be still injured in this respect by the French? They are to see with *our* eyes and hear with *our* ears! This is acting the *Mother* country to some tune.—We will believe nothing and nobody. We ourselves are the sole judges of what is true and what false in the whole world. We not only claim the right of judging for ourselves, but that of judging for America also. She is to believe or disbelieve as we dictate: and, though a fact comes vouched by a declaration of the President and by a law of the Congress, we, without the smallest ceremony, treat it as a *notorious falsehood*. This is what our venal prints, and the one above-quoted, has done; and, indeed, this is what our government does, if it refuses to admit that the French decrees, as far as they related to America, are really revoked.—Does the reader think, that this is calculated to conciliate America? Does he think, that this is the way to re-open the channels of commercial intercourse with neutral nations? Does he think that the Americans will brook such an affront, than which it is impossible to offer a greater? it is telling the whole world, that the Chief Magistrate and the Legislature of the United States are both *liars* and *hypocrites*, and the basest of hypocrites, too; because the object of the lie must be to disguise facts, which, if acknowledged, would call upon them for measures of resistance.—What would our government say, if their solemn declarations were thus treated by America? Nay, what would they say to *one of us*, if we were so to treat their declarations? One of the charges in the Ex Officio Information which sent

Mr. Gilbert Wakefield to Dorchester Jail for two years, was, that he accused "the "great Statesman now no more" of *insincerity* in his overtures to treat for peace with the French Republic. And, are we to suppose, that other governments are to be accused of lies and hypocrisy without inoving their gall? Is no government but our own to be supposed to have any feeling?—At this rate, there can never be any peace between us and America; for, it is perfect nonsense to treat with a government, upon whose declarations you place no reliance. There can be no accommodation while this pretension to be the sole judge of the veracity of the American government is asserted. It has, indeed, been distinctly asserted only in our venal news-papers, as yet; but it must be distinctly abandoned, in acts, at least, before any accommodation can possibly take place.—So much for the revocation of the French Decrees; but this writer is quite wide of the mark. He seems to suppose that the only ground, upon which our ministers refuse to repeal the Orders in Council. This, however, is not the case; for, it appears from the President's Speech, that, if our ministers were to acknowledge the revocation of the French Decrees, they are by no means prepared to repeal the orders. They have taken entirely *new ground*, and say, that they will not repeal till *our goods* are permitted to be *carried by neutrals, into the ports now shut against them*. The President says, that it was, with the English government, "an indispensable condition of the repeal of the Orders in "Council, that commerce should be restored to a footing, that would admit the "productions and manufactures of Great "Britain, when owned by neutrals, into "markets shut against them by the "enemy." That is to say, that, though France does repeal her Decrees, we will not repeal our Orders, unless Napoleon permits neutral ships to carry our goods into the countries out of which he now shuts them; though France does cease to prohibit America from trading with England, the latter will not permit America to trade with France, unless Buonaparté will receive English goods, though the means of neutrals. So that we here punish America because France has established such internal regulations as are as injurious to our produce and manufactures, though, as to those regulations, America has neither the power nor the right to interfere.—And, does

the reader believe, that we shall get our end? Does he believe, that America will be able, or, indeed, that she will endeavour, to prevail upon Napoleon to abandon the Continental System? Yet this is manifestly what the answer of the Prince Regent alludes to, when he talks of a change of circumstances. He says, that he shall be ready to contribute "towards the restoration of commercial intercourse between this country and other nations to a footing on which it has been usually conducted even in the midst of war." Yes, but where is the power, or where the right, to make the French abandon their custom house regulations? What should we say, if any nation were to demand of us to give up any part of our prohibitions or seizures or confiscations? What should we say to any nation who should dare to interfere with us in the execution of our smuggling laws? What should we say to an American envoy who should make to us any proposition having that object in view? "The footing on which it has usually been conducted." Aye, but there is no principle in the law of nations that forbids the exclusion of English produce and manufactures from other countries. Every sovereign has a right to admit, or not admit, whatever goods he pleases into his states, unless he be under some particular engagement with regard to such admission or non-admission. We punish America because she does not force France to suffer English goods to enter the continent of Europe; but, what should we say of Napoleon, if he were to punish America for not forcing England to admit French goods into this kingdom?—But, the thing is too plain to admit of further illustration. It is a mere question of power; we are able to seize American vessels trading with the French Empire, and we seize them. If any one thinks that this is good policy, let him say so; but, let no one attempt to justify the measure by the miserable means that the above writer has resorted to. Time will shew what the effect of the measure will be; but, I am of opinion, that there are few men of any information to be found, who expect it to produce a restoration of trade to the continent of Europe or that of North America.

CARACCAS.—The adherents of the old government in this country appear to be making desperate efforts to prevent the establishment of freedom. My readers

have before seen the new constitution formed in the Caraccas, and, I trust, they have seen it with great satisfaction. It was not, however, to be expected, that such a change would be accomplished without troubles and bloodshed. There always are so many persons so deeply interested in preventing the putting down of an old system of sway, and especially such an one as existed in the Caraccas; there are so many persons, who, when stripped of what they got from the public resources, may as well cease to exist at once, that it is never to be expected, that they will yield without a desperate struggle; and, as they will seldom fail to have a considerable number of dependents and partizans, who, more or less, partake in their fall, the struggle will seldom fail to produce some bloodshed.—It was stated, sometime ago, that Miranda, the Commander in Chief, had taken possession of New Valencia, and it now appears, that there has been a formidable conspiracy, the object of which was to wrest it out of the hands of the Republicans. The governor of the place, under the date of Sept. 6th, writes thus to General Miranda.—
 "It gives me extreme pain to inform you, that last night a conspiracy broke out in this city, the object of which was to overturn the Authorities lately established, and again to place Valencia in the hands of the enemies of the cause of independence.—The number of infatuated persons engaged in this detestable plot has not been ascertained; but at present more than 200 are in confinement, many of them persons of the highest trust and distinction. It should seem, that by means of bribery many of the troops that had sworn allegiance to the General Congress, notwithstanding the benefits they had derived under its Government, were induced to disregard their oath, and abandon their duty, and even the guards of the palace were parties to the conspiracy. The 13th, 22d, and 23d regiments of infantry, and the 27th of cavalry, however, remained faithful to their officers.—At midnight the palace was attacked, when these gallant troops flew to their arms, and with unexampled intrepidity put to death a few conspirators who had scaled the walls, and with fixed bayonets effectually resisted the entrance of several thousands who had forced the gates. This dreadful contest continued for the space of an hour, when the triumph of

"the cause of liberty was again conspi-
 "cuous. The enemies of the confederated
 "provinces were every where defeated,
 "and the approach of day-light displayed
 "to view the leaders of about 700 victims.
 "—Such are the particulars I now have
 "it in my power to detail; and since the
 "defeat of this horrible project, I have
 "taken the necessary measures to secure
 "and bring to trial the prisoners, but not
 "until some of the conspirators, taking
 "advantage of the confusion, effected
 "their escape through the gates of the
 "city. I am happy to add that all is
 "now tranquil, and the prisoners in my
 "hands will be brought to trial, and exe-
 "cuted, as soon as is consistent with the
 "course of the law."—Another article
 of intelligence is of still more importance.
 It appears, that, on the 21st of September,
 a person of the name of Paz had been ap-
 pointed on a mission from the Govern-
 ment of Venezuela to that of the *United*
States; and that he was to inform the
 latter that his Confederation is ready and
 willing to *enter into a commercial treaty*
with the North American Government.—
 This, though naturally to be expected,
 is intelligence of a high order. That
 such a treaty will be formed there
 is little room to doubt. Indeed, the
 Speech of the American President pre-
 pared us for this, and more. "In con-
 "templating the scenes," says he, "which
 "distinguish this momentous epoch, and
 "estimating their claims to our attention,
 "it is impossible to overlook those deve-
 "loping themselves among the great com-
 "munities, which occupy the Southern
 "portion of our own hemisphere, and ex-
 "tend into our neighbourhood. An en-
 "larged philanthropy and an enlight-
 "ened forecast concur in imposing on the
 "National Councils an obligation to take a
 "deep interest in their destinies; to cherish
 "reciprocal sentiments of good will; to regard
 "the progress of events; and not to be un-
 "prepared for whatever order of things may
 "be ultimately established."—Let any one
 look at the map of America, and he will
 be at once convinced, that there must
 exist a close connection between the
 United States and the new Republics
 which are rising up in the South. The
 latter have the Gold and Silver and nu-
 merous other commodities wanted in the
 United States, while these latter have all
 the things wanted by their Southern
 neighbours, ships and arms and ammuni-
 tion not excepted. It may be too much

to hope; but it is by no means impossible,
 that two or three years may see freedom
 established in all those countries, whither
 the Spaniards carried slavery, persecution,
 and the most horrible cruelties.—Now,
now is the time for the achievement. The
 old government of Spain can give its re-
 presentatives no assistance; it has neither
 ships nor troops. England can spare none
 of the latter. Every man that she can
 spare out of these islands is called for in
 Portugal, Spain and Sicily. She cannot
 send troops against the Republicans of
 South America; and, as to Napoleon, his
 ships, if he had the troops to spare, dare
 not venture out to sea. Thus is all Europe
 benumbed with regard to South America
 and its revolutions. The great powers
 here, who could alone interfere with ef-
 fect, are safely bound to Europe by their
 mutual animosities. This is lucky, at least,
 for South America, which will now
 become an object of extraordinary in-
 terest with those, who wish to see free-
 dom and happiness the lot of all men, in-
 habit whatever country they may.—A
 free commerce with South America, or
 even with the Caraccas alone, will produce
 wonderful effects in the United States. It
 is precisely that sort of commerce which is
 most advantageous to them: it opens a
 market for their produce, and what they
 have never before had, for *their manufactures*.
 The terms of such commerce can-
 not fail to be liberal: there will be a fel-
 low feeling between the parties; there
 will be every motive for friendship and
 reciprocally advantageous intercourse.
 —And, what are we doing with regard
 to the Caraccas? We are sending out
Commissioners to the people there. And to
 do what? To *mediate* between them and
 the government of Old Spain, which go-
 vernment they no longer acknowledge!
 They have not only declared for indepen-
 dence; but, they have fought for it; have
 won it; have formed a constitution of go-
 vernment for themselves; and have ap-
 pointed one envoy at least to treat with a
 foreign power. And do we expect, that,
 after this, they will enter into any negotia-
 tion, or conference, *as subjects of Old Spain*,
 that being the only capacity in which our
 Commissioners will be authorised to con-
 sider them? If we do, we expect a great
 deal more than is authorised either by the
 nature of the case or the character of the par-
 ties principally concerned.—Yet, while
 we are allied with the Old Government of
 Spain, we cannot enter into any compact

with the Republicans in South America: we cannot consider them as independent; but must, as far as we are able, take the opposite side; and, if, at last, Napoleon should subdue Old Spain, we shall have friends in neither country.—Besides, what an *example*! would the Anti-Jacobins exclaim. What an *example*, in taking part with, or giving countenance to Republicanism; and that, too, after having fought so many years against its principles in France! Yet, there is some reason to expect, that we must condescend, at last, to treat with these people as an independent nation; or, we must expect to have them for enemies in a neighbourhood where enterprising enemies may be very dangerous.—But let us watch *events*: for they are the only instructors that we now listen to.

NOTTINGHAM RIOTS.—These riots do not seem to be put an end to. The rioters have burnt some corn stacks, it seems, and committed various other enormities, not only in the county where their operations began, but also in Derbyshire and Leicestershire. Great numbers of troops, horse and foot, are stated to have been marched against them; but, hitherto, without much success. The cause of these riots is unquestionably a scarcity of work in the manufactures co-operating with the high price of bread. The former might in some measure be removed, the latter cannot by any power that man possesses. Whether it would be *right* to remove the former, by such steps as would re-open the ports of America to our goods, is a question upon which we differ; but, no one can doubt, that Napoleon has his eye upon these riots, and upon this marching of troops against them; and as little is it to be doubted, that he will not be thereby discouraged from adhering to his measures for shutting out English goods from the continent of Europe. Satisfied as I am, that such exclusion will, in the end, be a benefit to the people of England, I am by no means disposed to repine at his smuggling laws. W^m. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
20th December, 1811.*

PRISONERS OF WAR.

SIR; I have read, in your Weekly Register of the 7th December 1811, a letter upon the subject of Prisoners of War, which has interested the friends of huma-

nity, and particularly those who have some relations prisoners in France. I must confess, that I was induced, like many other people, to think that we had offered very advantageous proposals to the French concerning the exchange, and that on the contrary, their's were neither founded upon reason nor justice; and I pitied the long captivity of our unfortunate countrymen without the prospect of an exchange. But Candidus's letter has awoke my attention, and in making use of the small portion of understanding that nature has given me, I see plainly, by an impartial examination, that the proposals of the French are not so much to be despised, nor so much to the disadvantage of this country, as they have been represented; and it gave me some hope that the long sufferings of our prisoners may soon come to an end. According to Candidus's statement, I found that the principal, or rather the only, objection made against the plan of evacuation proposed by the French, consisted in this; that some of our countrymen, according to their plan, would remain two months longer in France than according to our own. It is now easy to prove that the portion of time for this purpose would be the same in both cases. To elucidate this matter, we must remember, that when Mr. M'Kenzie was at Morlaix, the English prisoners in France, were estimated as one to three, with respect to the number of French prisoners in England, and it was for that very reason that the French proposed to exchange the prisoners by 3,000 at a time (*viz.* one thousand English and two thousand Spaniards or Portuguese), in order that the English in France, and the French in England, might constantly remain, during the exchange, in the same proportion. Now, if we suppose the sea ports agreed upon by each government for the evacuation of the Prisoners to be at Plymouth and Morlaix;—In order to carry home our own 16,000 Prisoners, by one thousand at once, it would require the ships fitted out for that purpose to make 16 voyages from Morlaix to Plymouth. If therefore the ships, instead of bringing over only one thousand at once, were to bring over three thousand each turn, the whole 16 thousand English and 32 thousand allies would be all brought over in the time assigned for bringing over the 16 thousand English only. This statement is accurate, and presents itself to our conviction at once. Some people, I know,

have objected to the Spanish and Portuguese Prisoners coming to this country (according to the plan of the French;) but I consider their coming hither of a much greater advantage, in a military point of view, than if they were sent to Cadiz (by one thousand at a time) where they would be of very little use, and of no influence in the operation of the War; whereas, if we had them here all together, we could carry them to whatever point of the Peninsula we might choose, either to strike some great blow, or to make a very powerful diversion. As to the expence which has been mentioned for clothing, and arming them, I dare say that two months pay of the French Prisoners in England would be more than sufficient for that purpose. Besides, if those Prisoners were sent from France to Spain as we propose, would there not then be the same attendant expence! Do not our Papers often inform us of clothes and arms being sent for our Spanish allies? and would there be any difference of expenditure, whether we should send these articles packed up, or on the back of the Soldiers? But even if we were to equip them, to the Peninsula, in the most expensive manner, it would only be, to spend a pound to save much more than ten thousand: would to Heaven, then, that we were never to make a worse speculation than this!—I can remember but one thing more, which has been advanced against the plan of evacuation as proposed by the French, which, so far from being an objection, is, as I should think, a high recommendation to it; and that is, that our allies would be exchanged at the same time with our own Prisoners. For my part, I cannot conceive that our Prisoners would object to this plan, nor can I see in what manner it would be an injury or an injustice towards our soldiers to exchange them with those who have fought by their side, and been taken along with them. Were it not for such erroneous ideas, our countrymen would now have been returned to their homes a year ago. How many years they are still to remain captives, and what good reason may be given for their captivity, we must ask of those who lay all the blame upon the French government.—As to our plan of evacuation, Candidus has given us very clear reasons, why the French government must object to it. The French have as

great right to mistrust us, as we to mistrust them; and can any one blame them? nay, have not the transactions for these last ten years proved that we are by no means so pure a people as to refuse to adopt a measure very advantageous, only because it is unjust: Might not the French have just ground to expect that after the evacuation of Spain and Portugal by the British army, we should say to them; now that the Spaniards and Portuguese are become French subjects, we cannot reasonably exchange them against Frenchmen: When, therefore, and against whom (the French would say) would have been exchanged the 30,000 French Prisoners remaining in this country?—We see then, Sir, that by consenting to the French plan of evacuation, our countrymen would be exchanged in the same length of time, as by our own; that we should save more than one million sterling a year (necessary for the maintenance of the French Prisoners in this country) and moreover should have 50,000 English and Spaniards to dispose of. These are advantages resulting from an exchange of Prisoners to the country at large; and what a blessing would it be,—for our brave and unfortunate countrymen, who without it may perhaps never see their country again;—for their friends in England, who long to see them;—for the wives and children who have been deprived of their husbands and fathers for so many years? (I mean the wives and children of the English travellers detained in France ever since the year 1803). It belongs only, Sir, to a pen like yours, to treat such an interesting subject as it ought to be. When the good of the country is in contemplation, it is enough to give a hint to a man like Mr. Cobbett: we see him always in search of subjects which tend to the good and happiness of his countrymen; he will certainly undertake to plead so just a cause as this (upon which our venal writers will keep silent because they have nothing to say against it), and I hope, that, through him, the truths contained in this letter, will find their way to the Public, and perhaps reach our gracious and benevolent Prince (the only hope of England) who will not think, I am sure, this subject unworthy of his high consideration.—I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant, MILES.

December 13, 1811.

"We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer, to any man, either Justice or Right."—
MAGNA CHARTA.

[801] _____ [802]

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

EX OFFICIO INFORMATION IN IRELAND.
—In the Times news-paper of the 26th instant, there is an article, which I shall notice, before I touch upon the subject here proposed for discussion. The *Ex Officio Informations* in Ireland, and especially the case that I am going particularly to notice, call loudly for remark; but, I believe, that I should perhaps have delayed the task for another week, if I had not met with the article in the Times, which I have mentioned above, and which I will now insert.
—"Our paper of this day contains two documents of somewhat antiquated date; but yet of so much importance, as elucidating the manner in which the Continent is oppressed, insulted, and plundered by Buonaparté and his agents, that we cannot omit inserting them. They issue from the official bureaux of the Westphalian and French Ministers at Cassel. The former of them commands the people of Westphalia to testify their joy on the birth-day of Jerome Buonaparté, by public festivals and meetings. The latter directs the receivers of the Forest rents to secure Buonaparté his stipulated share of the plunder of the Hanoverian revenues; and cautions them against the application of any part thereof to the necessities of the State. Poor, suffering Westphalians! But to what people of the Continent may not the same epithet be applied? Your lot is the common one of all others over whom the ferocious Tyrant has extended his dominion. Poor, oppressed, and suffering Dutchmen! Poor, oppressed; and suffering Swiss! and so may we run through the list of European nations. And perhaps, when the time shall come that the universal Oppressor shall have followed his predecessors in guilt, and his internal administration of France herself shall be exposed to view, her sufferings and oppressions, though now hid in darkness and silence, may be found to have been only so much the more severe, as she has been nearer his per-

son. Then will this sanguinary theatre of his domestic cruelties, like the den of "Cacus, be laid open to public view, his conscriptions, and bastilles, and solitary murders."—First of all let me observe, that, after having read the two documents, here referred to, I am fully convinced, that they are fabrications. They are communicated by a correspondent, who calls himself "GERMANICUS;" and, the object of them is, to keep alive, in the minds of the people here, a great horror of the oppressions inflicted by Napoleon on all the people who are under his sway. Germanicus compliments our friend I. S. and is, doubtless, I. S. himself, who, be it observed, has not thought proper to accept of my challenge upon the subject of Mr. Madison's speech; but has preferred letting my article run all through the North American Continent without any reply to accompany it. But, supposing the above-mentioned documents not to be fabrications; supposing the first to be intended to bully the people of Westphalia into demonstrations of joy on the anniversary of king Jerome's birth; supposing it to be true, that Napoleon insists upon his stipulated share of the public property in Hanover. What then? Have we never on the continent heard of such things before? Have we never before heard of a nation being bullied into rejoicings? Have we never before heard of a sovereign's insisting upon his full share of the plunder arising from captures?—The reader may ask, however, what this article in the Times has to do with *Irish Informations Ex Officio*. A very natural question; and one which, at first sight, may appear to be not very easy to answer.—The truth is, that the two subjects have no other connection than this: that, this writer appeared to me to be wasting his compassion upon foreigners, while it was called for by the situation of one of his own countrymen; the publisher of a news-paper in Ireland, to whose case I beg leave to solicit the attention of the reader.—I had been looking at this case; I had been reading the proceedings on it; I had been thinking about it; I was just about to

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take up my pen to write upon it, when the above article in the Times caught my eye. Bless me! said I, how enlarged is the philanthropy of this writer! With what pathos he speaks of the poor, suffering Westphalians, Dutchmen, and Swiss! But, has he no feeling for the poor, suffering *Mr. Cox*, his countryman and his brother public writer? My philanthropy is not, I must confess, of so enlarged, or rather, over-stretching, a kind. I am for thinking of my own country before I think of any other; and, I cannot think and feel for my country, without feeling for those who live in it. There are numerous writers who are very loud in defence of "*the country*" (as they call it); but who never seem to have any feeling for any one who inhabits it. This is a sort of patriotism, which I do not understand.—Now to my case; and, I will venture to assert, that one equal to it the reader has never yet seen or heard of.—But, first of all, though I have done it once before, I must explain the nature of the power of the Attorney General as to Informations *Ex-Officio*.—In the ordinary course of our law, when a man is accused of a crime, there is a bill of indictment drawn up and presented against him. If the Grand Jury, to whom the bill is presented, find that there is ground for the charge, the accused person is put upon his trial; if not, he is set at large. So that, as the reader will see, here are two points secured; first, that there is a jury to judge of the grounds of trial before the accused can be tried, which is a pretty good protection against groundless charges; second, that the accused must either be discharged at once, or put upon his trial, which prevents him from being harassed by delays and tormented with suspense.—Now, mark the difference. The Information *Ex-Officio* is a thing which excludes the interposition of the Grand Jury. It is drawn up by the Attorney General, and it is placed upon the file, or list, of things to be tried, without any previous investigation by any body but himself; and, the man whom he chooses thus to accuse, is ordered to come and take his trial, whenever the Attorney General pleases. He may file *Ex-Officio* informations against whomsoever he pleases, and as often as he pleases against the same person. He may cause such person to come and be tried whenever he pleases: he may bring him to trial the next term; or, if he chooses, he may

keep the information suspended over him for many years, nay, to the day of his death. He may cause him to come into court to be tried every term; and he may put off the trial time after time, as long as he pleases; and he may have as many of these informations as he pleases going on, at the same time, against the same person. He may, if he pleases, drop for ever any or all of such informations; he may put a man upon his trial on one information, and leave the rest hanging over his head. He may put him upon his trial on a subsequent information and keep former ones in reserve; or he may keep the latest in reserve and put him upon his trial on the former ones. There is no limit to his authority in any of these respects. The Attorney General is responsible to nobody either for the grounds of his accusations or for any other part of his conduct relating to these informations. He may, indeed, be put out of his place by the King, whenever the ministers choose to advise it; and, how this check is calculated to operate; in what way this check is calculated to guide his conduct, the reader will not be at any great loss to guess.—All this, however, we know before; but a case has arisen in Ireland, which has brought out something, which, I dare say, will be quite new to the greater part of my readers.—The case, to which I allude, is that of *Mr. Walter Cox*, who is now a prisoner in Newgate in Ireland, under a sentence of *libel*, flowing from an *Ex-Officio* Information. Being there, and being, apparently, wholly ruined, the Attorney General (*Mr. Saurin*) files another *Ex-Officio* information against him. Having been served with an order to plead to it, he applied for a copy of the information that he might know what it was that he was accused of. But, he was told, that he could not have this copy until he paid the fees of the office and the Stamp Duty on the Copy. These amounted, he was told, to twenty pounds, and the poor man had not twenty pounds. But, not having taken out the copy and paid the fees and stamp duty, he was not allowed to plead; and, as he had not pleaded, he was set down as guilty of the crime laid to his charge; and, was about to receive a new sentence, without any more ado, when his counsel came into court, on the 28th of November last, and stated his case, demanding, at the same time, that he should be furnished with a copy of the charge against him, and be suffered to take a fair trial.—*Mr. Perrin* was one of his coun-

sel, who opened his case, according to the published report, in these words:—"Mr. Perrin moved the Court to set aside the judgment had by default against the defendant, and that he should be furnished with a copy of the information gratis, or that the same should be read to him, and he be permitted to plead thereto, *without paying fees and Stamp Duty on a Copy.*" He stated from the affidavit of the defendant, that the present information was filed against him by the Attorney-General, while he was a close prisoner in Newgate; *that he never had been apprized of the charge against him, of which he was still ignorant*; that on being served in prison with a rule to plead to it, he directed his agent to apply for a copy of the charge to which he was called on to plead; *that he was answered that he could not have a copy, or be made acquainted therewith, for less than £20, the amount of the fees and Stamps*; and that his plea would not be received till he took out a copy; that he was not able to pay such a sum, and that thereupon judgment had been marked against him for an offence of which he was still ignorant."

Reader, English reader! Have you no feeling for this man; this ruined man, who is your fellow subject; and, are your feelings so alive towards foreigners, of whose sufferings you have only heard vague and unauthenticated reports? But, Mr. Perrin shall speak to you upon this point; for he has done it more forcibly than I can.—"He recollected," he said, that when the defendant was last before the Court, one of their Lordships pronouncing the sentence of the Court, dwelt in language as just as it was eloquent, upon the peculiar advantages which even culprits enjoy under our constitution, and forcibly and emphatically contrasted the treatment of the defendant with that of the unfortunate *Palm*, who had been sacrificed by the *tyrant of the Continent* to his hostility to a Free Press, who had been *executed without a trial*; but what was a *trial* without the opportunity of a *defence*? If Mr. Cox be not permitted to defend himself, nay to *hear* the charge against him, is it not a mockery to call his condemnation trial? *what is the difference between this case and Palm's*? None; and the just feelings and sentiments which reprobated the conduct of his persecutors must befriended the present application; what was *tyranny and cruelty, in Germany, can-*

not be Law and Justice in Ireland. If the Court determined that the defendant should not be permitted to plead, or see his accusation until he paid the sum of 20*l.*, he must be condemned to lingering and hopeless imprisonment without a trial, for he has deposed that he is not worth 20*l.*; he has been already sentenced to two years imprisonment; before one third of that period has elapsed the Attorney-General filed an information spread over sixteen skins of parchment; and calls on him to take out a copy at an expence of 20*l.*, or submit and suffer as if guilty of whatever imputation it may cast upon him; *for recollect that is still unknown to the defendant.* If the Attorney-General have the power not only to subject this defendant, manacled as he is, to the necessary and heavy expences of a Crown prosecution, upon any charge which his discretion or his suspicion may imagine, by an ex-officio information, but in the first instance and before a plea shall be received, to the grievous and monstrous costs of a copy of the information, under the name of Stamps and Fees to strip him not only of the constitutional shield which a Grand Jury holds, between every man and imputation, but for the very weapons of defence, and inflict a fine for liberty to answer, nay to *hear* the charge; what hope can this unfortunate man entertain of any period to his confinement? What hope, that when he has dragged through half the term, that shall be added to his present sentence, a new and equally unknown, equally expensive, and, therefore, equally undiscoverable information may not be filed against him? When he may be equally unable to purchase a trial; and may again be called to judgment for a crime of which his poverty alone has convicted him; *what security has any man against such informations, if he must pay a fine at the pleasure of his accuser for liberty to plead?*"—Ah! what security indeed! And, are we to be told that such a man enjoys the *liberty* of the Press! Again, I ask the reader, if he has no feeling; if his feeling be quite dead towards a fellow citizen in this situation, while his feelings are all alive towards the Westphalians, the Dutch and the Swiss?—The Attorney and Solicitor General both contended most strenuously against this motion; and insisted that Mr. Cox ought to be brought up to receive sentence without seeing a copy of the information;

and even without an opportunity of *hearing* it read.—But, let us hear what it was that the Attorney General said in answer to the above passage in Mr. Perrin's speech. I beg the reader to mark it well.

—“He said, that a great deal had been said about the hardship of paying fees and Stamps; that the rule of the Court required the fees to be paid on the copies before a plea could be received, and that on recurrence to the Statute the question of Stamp Duty would be ascertained; that the Court had no discretion on the subject; he **WOULD NOT ANSWER** what had been thrown out upon the subject of **ABUSE OF HIS AUTHORITY** and office, that he would not **HUMILIATE** himself to put his character in issue on the necessity of the present information or its length, that the public had **SUFFICIENT PLEDGES** of the good conduct of the Attorney General in the **SITUATION AND RANK** of the office, and in the **CONSCIENCE** and **OATH** for office of the persons who should fill it; that he would not rely on the circumstances of this case for the justification of his character; that *he was satisfied none would charge him with oppression or severity, or abuse of the high and important power entrusted to him*; that what had been already observed on these matters and on the danger of the subject, and the enormous power of the Attorney General in inflicting fines, as it had been phrased, *he was sure was not expected to weigh with the Court on this motion*; but was intended for the public ear, and to impress a notion of feeling that the defendant was oppressed and persecuted by the Government of the Country; which he trusted that no one would seriously entertain a belief of.”—So, he would not *humiliate* himself so much as to attempt to shew that he had not abused his authority! This was not amiss; but, what he says afterwards is of more consequence. He says, that the public have quite a *sufficient security* against his abusing his power. And, where have they this security? Why, in the *situation and rank* of his office; and in his *conscience and oath*! So, then, away go all the famous *checks and balances*, which have been so much applauded in our constitution. We are told, that there are two Houses of Parliament to be a check upon each other; that both are a check upon the Crown; that juries are a check upon judges; and that by these means our pre-

cious liberties are secured. But, here we have high *situation and rank* and *conscience and oath* for the only checks upon a power of accusing, of bringing to trial or suspending or dropping proceedings, and all this in one and the same person, and that person, too, *removable at the pleasure of the Crown*! These, we are here told, are quite *sufficient pledges* for the conduct of the Attorney General! Why, the judges and the members of both Houses and the King all take *oaths*, and why should we not rely upon their *consciences* and their *high rank*? But, if the doctrine be good so far, why *stop here*? If these be quite sufficient securities for his having the absolute power of accusing, arraigning, suspending or suppressing prosecutions; if his high rank and oath be a sufficient pledge for his good conduct as to all these matters, why should they not be a sufficient pledge for his passing *sentence* without any trial? Why should Judges and Juries be troubled with any part of the business? Why should not the Attorney General of himself have the power of putting into gaols and pillories any body that he pleases?—The Judges in Ireland did, at last, allow the unfortunate Mr. Cox to *hear the information Ex-officio* read, and to take his trial upon it. But, I beg the reader to consider well what a state we are all placed in by this power of the Attorney General. Mr. Cox was excused from paying for a copy of the Information because he was reduced to that state, in which he was able to *swear* that he was not worth *twenty pounds*. If he had not been able to swear that, he must have paid the money, or he would have been sentenced as being guilty without any trial. What, then, is our state? What man is safe from ruin? Who is there that may not be made to rot in a gaol, if the Attorney General pleases? And are we not all at his mercy? Have we any other security than what is to be found in his *humanity and conscience*?—He may, if he pleases, file an Information Ex-Officio against me every day of my life; nay, fifty or a hundred in a day, if he pleases; and, according to the doctrine now laid down in Ireland, I must pay whatever sum he has a mind to make me pay for a copy of each of them, or I must be found *guilty* upon each, without any trial at all, without either Judge or Jury to protect me; because I am not allowed to plead; I am not allowed to *defend* myself; I am not allowed to answer the charge against me.

'till I have purchased a copy of the charge at the Crown Office, and have also paid a *tax* upon it in proportion to its length. So that, I am wholly at his mercy; and every other man in the kingdom is at his mercy, until we can swear that we are not worth so much in the whole world as will pay the fees and the tax upon any information *Ex Officio* that he may choose to file against us. Few writers and printers can swear, the first time, that they are unable to pay the fees and the tax; but, the Attorney-General may keep on till he puts them in a condition to swear it; and, if they miss paying the fees and the tax, they are marked down as *guilty* without any trial. Well, then, are we not all at his mercy? Has he not absolute power over the property and liberty of us all?—I shall be told, perhaps, that I am supposing improbabilities; that such a monstrous abuse of power is not to be supposed. The supposition goes, indeed, very far; but, it is within the compass of *possibility*, and that ought to be quite enough to put a limit to the power, especially as the person exercising it is at all times removeable from one of the most lucrative offices, at the pleasure of the minister of the day, and is always brought in and put out with the political party to which he is attached. —But, why do we talk of *probabilities*? It ought to be quite sufficient to know that the thing is *possible*; it ought to be quite sufficient for us to know, that there is an officer in the kingdom *who has the absolute power of ruining whomsoever he pleases*; this ought to be quite sufficient; it ought to be quite sufficient for us to know that in this kingdom, there is an officer of the crown, who, at his arbitrary will, *may reduce any man, be he who he may, to a state of pauperism*; or, *to make him pass his life in a prison*. Any man, no matter who; for there is *no limit* to his authority in these respects. He may file *as many* informations *Ex-Officio* as he pleases against any man; he may make each of them cost the man *any sum* that he pleases; and, when he has so done, he may, if he pleases, bring him to trial upon none of them, but rest satisfied with having reduced the man to beggary. He may, too, if he chooses, hold the man to bail upon each of them; and thus prevent him from leaving the kingdom for his whole life; for the trial may be deferred as long as the Attorney General pleases; and if the bail do not answer for any length of time, new informations may be filed.—The answer

to all this is, I know, very short. IT IS LAW. Very well; then, let it be KNOWN TO THE WORLD; that is my reply. Let it be known to the world, that it is the law of England. Let every body know, that we have such laws. Let them not be kept in hugger-mugger. We are everlastingly boasting of our laws; and, therefore, it is right that the world should know what these laws really are; or, at the least, it is right that we ourselves should know what they are.—Let us now take a look at this power of the Attorney General as a SOURCE OF REVENUE. The money, which a man is compelled to pay for *liberty to plead*; that is, for liberty to answer the charges preferred against him by the Attorney General, consists of two parts: *fees* and *stamp duty*. The fees go into the pockets of the people at the Crown office, I suppose; but, the stamp duty goes into the Treasury. So that, before a man, accused by the Attorney General, can have *liberty to answer the charge*; before he can have the *liberty of defending himself*; before he can have the *liberty of saying that he is not guilty*; before he can enjoy this LIBERTY, he must pay A TAX!—When you have placed this fact firmly in your memory, reader, then add to it, that the *amount* of this tax has no other measure than the will, the sole will, of the Attorney General, who may spread his Information over sixteen skins, or sixteen thousand skins, of parchment. And, observe, that, whether the Information be *true or false*, it is all the same as to the *tax*; the *tax* must be paid; and, if the person accused be found *not guilty*, he is not entitled to any return of the *tax*; he has no means of recovering that; that is so much money gone for ever. And, besides, the Attorney General is not obliged to put the accused person upon his trial after he has paid the *tax*. He may then hang the accusation up over the man's head and keep it suspended over him as long as he pleases; or, as I said before, he may quash it at once, at his own will and pleasure. —Well, but THIS IS THE LAW. A quite sufficient answer; but, let all the people *know* it, then; let us not hide our light under a bushel. Let those who are grown up know what they are liable to; and let our children know what they are born to inherit.—I am aware, that some readers will say: *aye*, but this law is only for *writers and printers*. Suppose it were not? What then? Are they so few in

number, and are their occupations such as ought to make it a matter of indifference what laws they are subject to? But the fact is not so. The whole community, every man and woman is liable to the operation of this law; and it is well known, that Ex-officio Informations are constantly resorted to in cases of alleged offences against the *revenue laws*. I should like to know how many of these Informations have been filed in the last four years. The reader will, perhaps, remember the poor woman, who was, a little while ago, sent to Horse-monger Lane Jail, where she now is, for having interrupted or molested an excise officer in the execution of his duty. She is, I have been told, the wife of a very poor man and the mother of a large family of children. They had not the means of paying the expences of a copy of the accusation against her. She, of course, was marked down as *guilty*, without having had any trial. She had to come from a great distance in the country up to London to receive her sentence; her husband came with her to protect her; all their goods were sold off to supply the means of performing the journey; their children were sent to the workhouse; and the mother is now in jail.—“But, **THIS IS THE LAW.**” This woman and her husband and family are experiencing no more than the effects of THE LAW. All was perfectly LEGAL and perfectly regular; all IN DUE COURSE OF LAW. Agreed, with all my heart. I do not accuse any body of doing ILLEGAL acts; I am only anxious that all the world should know *what this same law is*! All men should know the laws of their own country, at least; and, it is not amiss for them to know the laws of other countries too. I have long wished, that some one would give us a good translation of the *Napoleon Code*, which is so often alluded to in our newspapers. It would be very useful to us to have it. Napoleon seems not to wish to keep it in huggermugger; for he has had millions of copies of it printed and sold at the price of about eighteen pence. It is surprising, that, with so laudable desire as many persons here have to expose his tyranny, no one has yet hit upon a translation of his Code. This appears to me to be the best way to attack him. Let the people see what the laws are which he makes his subjects submit to; and they will, of course, want nothing more to enable them to make up

their minds as to the nature of his government. Seeing how useful this would be, how much more convincing than any thing said in paragraphs and speeches, I wonder that our government itself has not caused a translation of this famous Code to be made; and a comparison to be drawn between it and our Code. As to the comparison, I do not feel sufficient confidence in my own abilities to promise that; but, if no one will undertake a translation of the French Code, I really think that I shall attempt it, being perfectly convinced that it would be of great public utility.

IRISH CATHOLICS.—It is stated, that the Catholic Committee having met in Dublin, upon the business of their petition to Parliament, they were dispersed by the magistrates, and that Lords FINGAL and NETTERVILLE were arrested, by order of the government.—The public are already in possession of the *cause* of all this; and I am not aware that any thing new can be said upon it.—It is some consolation, however, that there are men who see a remedy for the troubles of Ireland. The Honourable Henry Augustus Dillon, in a work, addressed, *by permission*, to the PRINCE REGENT, has pointed out a remedy for all the evils that afflict the author's native land; a salve for all her sores; a balm for all her wounds; namely, a *chain of fortified towns garrisoned by a stout standing army*! These, he says, are the means, and the only means, of promoting civilization; of softening the manners of the people; of making them happy and free; of putting a stop to their emigration to America; and of inducing them to defend Ireland to the last drop of their blood. Nay, he goes still further, and insists, that these means would induce people to emigrate to Ireland. He says, that the sight of these fortified towns and garrisons would gladden the heart of the beholder; and that, “in *half a century*, they would make “Ireland what the *Low Countries* formerly “were: one fertile and highly cultivated “garden, secured against rapine, and “strengthened by numbers of fine and rich “internal towns.” He seems to have forgotten, however, to tell us what the *Low Countries* did *when invaded by the French*. He seems to have forgotten, that these fine towns threw their gates open to the French, whom the people every where hailed as their *deliverers*. These well-known facts he may as well insert, in the shape of a

note, in the next edition of his book. To preserve the liberties of *England* this gentleman is content with a great standing army, formed into *camps of exercise*, (after the *Prussian* fashion) and *field works*; that is to say, small fortresses all over the country, each sufficient to hold a regiment, perhaps, or part of a regiment, while the rest are in camps or in cantonments. But, as to Ireland, he is decidedly of opinion, that, to preserve the liberties of that country, fortified towns are absolutely necessary.—I do not believe, that Mr. Dillon is at all singular in his opinion. I believe that he is very far from the first who has entertained these notions. I believe, on the contrary, that he is, in this case, only the organ through which the opinions and projects of others have been broached to the public. This is my firm belief, and I shall be much disappointed, if we do not soon see proof of the correctness of this conjecture.—I will say no more, at present, upon the subject of Ireland; and, indeed, there is little more to be said. All *disputation* relative to that country, seems to be come to a close. We are now in a state, when we have to look merely to events,

AMERICAN STATES.—The correspondence between Mr. Foster, our Minister in America, and Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State there, has been published in America by order of the government. It relates, *First*, to the affair of the frigate the Chesapeake, out of which, as my readers will recollect, a ship under Admiral Berkeley took several seamen by force, and, in the act, killed several others, in the year 1807; *Second*, to the affair of the Little Belt; *Third*, to the seizure and occupation of the Floridas by the United States; and *Fourth*, to the Orders in Council.—With regard to the affair of the Chesapeake, which seems to be now settled, much need not be said. Mr. Foster, on the 20th of October, says, “I am now ready to proceed, in the truest spirit of conciliation, to lay before you the terms of reparation, which his Royal Highness has commanded me to propose to the ‘United States’ government, and only wait to know when it will suit your convenience to enter upon the discussion.” Mr. Monroe tells him, in answer to this, that, although he regrets that the communication has been so long delayed, he is ready to receive it; and that he shall have satisfaction in finding it

likely to lead the way to a removal of all the differences depending between the two countries, the hope of which is, however, “little encouraged,” he says, “by the past correspondence.”—This was pretty stiff in answer to a Letter introductory to offered atonement; but, it was nothing at all to what was to follow.—On the first of November, the satisfaction was given by Mr. Foster in the following words.—“Sir, In pursuance of the orders which I have received from his ‘Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, for the purpose of proceeding to a final adjustment of the differences which have arisen between Great Britain and the United States in the affair of the Chesapeake frigate, I have the honour to acquaint you—*First*, that I am instructed to repeat to the American Government the prompt disavowal made by his Majesty (and recited in Mr. Erskine’s Note of April 17, 1809, to Mr. Smith), on being apprised of the unauthorised act of the Officer in command of his naval forces on the coast of America, whose recall from an highly important and honourable command immediately ensued, as a mark of his Majesty’s disapprobation. — *Secondly*, That I am authorised to offer in addition to that disavowal, on the part of his Royal Highness, the immediate restoration, as far as circumstances will admit, of the men who in consequence of Admiral Berkeley’s orders were forcibly taken out of the Chesapeake to the vessel from which they were taken; or if that ship should be no longer in commission, to such sea-port of the United States as the American Government may name for the purpose.— *Thirdly*, That I am also authorised to offer to the American Government a suitable pecuniary provision for the sufferers in consequence of the attack on the Chesapeake, including the families of those seamen who unfortunately fell in the action, and of the wounded survivors.—These honourable propositions I can assure you, Sir, are made with the sincere desire that they may prove satisfactory to the United States, and I trust they will meet with the amicable reception which their conciliatory nature entitles them to. I need scarcely add how cordially I join with you in the wish that they might prove introductory to a removal of all the differ-

"ences depending between our two countries."—As to the *first*, every one knows, that Admiral Berkeley was removed from a lower to a higher command; that, in fact, he was *promoted* immediately after the affair of the Chesapeake: and, I believe, that very few persons regarded his promotion in any other light than that of a *reward* for what he had done against the Americans. I so regarded it; and, I really beg pardon of the ministers for the blunder I committed; an apology which ought the more readily to be received as it appears that the Yankees themselves had fallen into the same error, and, indeed, that they have the obstinacy to persist in it.—Mr. Monroe, after waiting nearly a fortnight, answers the above propositions in the following words:—"Sir; I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 1st Nov and to lay it before the President. It is much to be *regretted* that the reparation due for such an aggression as that committed on the United States frigate the Chesapeake, should have been so *long delayed*; nor could the translation of the *offending officer from one command to another*, be regarded as constituting a part of a reparation otherwise satisfactory; considering however the existing circumstances of the case, and the *early and amicable attention paid to it by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent*, the President accedes to the proposition contained in your letters, and in so doing your government will, I am persuaded, see a proof of the *conciliatory disposition* by which the President has been actuated. The officer commanding the Chesapeake now lying in the harbour of Boston, will be instructed to receive the men who are to be restored to *that ship*."—Short, dry, stiff, haughty. Whether the case justified it the reader must judge; but, this I am sure of, that, until since "the great statesman now no more" entered upon the Anti-Jacobin war; until that day, England never was treated in this manner. Either this reparation was due, or it was not. If the latter, why was it made at all; and, if the former, why not made sooner? It is made, at last, and all America knows it well, only because *the times* have changed. The nature of the case, the facts, the circumstances of the case: none of these have changed; but, our situation has changed; and to this change it is the change in our conduct is to be ascribed. The Non-im-

portation Act would, one would have thought, have operated in a contrary way. If we had been actually about to send out an offer of reparation, the enforcing of that Act against us would, one would think, make us give up the design. The taste of our ministers was different, however: they wait till they get certain intelligence of America having actually put in force an Act of demi-hostility against us on one account, and then they pack off a minister plenipotentiary to offer reparation on another account, which reparation had been withheld for several years. This is quite glaring. There is not a creature in America but will know how to estimate this reparation; and, of this we may be assured, that it will produce *any effect rather than a disposition to yield to us*.—The venal prints in London speak thus of the answer of Mr. Monroe. "The adjustment of the affair of the Chesapeake might seem to open a fairer prospect of an amicable settlement of other points than has yet been held out. But let our readers consider the manner, *half sulky*, half *affronting*, in which our proposals are entertained. They are accepted too with *coldness*; and still the language of complaint is used at the reparation having been *so long delayed*. Whose fault was it? The act was disowned by our government as soon as it was known, and an offer of reparation made; but it was the American government that wished to mix the other points of difference with it, and not to adjust that point separately."—How dare these Americans talk in this way! How dare they be *sulky* and *affronting*? How dare they complain of any thing said or done to them? I really should not much wonder, if these good hirelings were to recommend an Ex Officio Information against Mr. Monroe. If we could but bring the Yankees under this arm we should soon settle them. We are a great nation in all sorts of ways; but this, I take it, is our *fort*, as the French call it. Other nations may excel in other things; but here we are at home; and, in whatever degree this talent, or capacity, tends to the defence of nations, we may, I think, look upon ourselves as safe.—The second point of dispute, namely, the affair of the *Little Belt*, does not appear to be settled yet. Mr. Foster seems to have demanded a Court of Inquiry; that was granted, and the result we know. Mr. Foster had, indeed, information of an opposite nature.

He had the *unsworn* declarations of two or three of the Little Belt's officers, taken before an *unsworn* court of inquiry. There have also been published two affidavits said to have been taken before a Justice of the Peace at Halifax: but these affidavits are by two *deserters* from the American frigate; one of them an American, and the other an Englishman who had before deserted from the English service, and who, to disguise himself, had assumed a *sham name*.—These are sad witnesses! I really wonder that they were brought forward. No good end was ever yet obtained by such means.—All this proof, however, relates to the question of which ship fired the *first shot*; and, this question must, I think, be looked upon as being settled; for, I do not see how any one, divesting himself of prejudice, can now deny that the first shot was fired by the English ship. It might be unknown to the Captain, and I dare say it was; but, that it was so, there cannot now be a doubt.—But, this point would not seem to be all. It appears to be contended, that the American ship had no *right to chase*. This is, indeed, expressly asserted in our ministerial prints. America not being at war, her ships, we are told, have no right to sail after any ship of war to see what nation she is of, or what she is about. We hear these same writers recommending the demolition of New-York and other towns; and yet, it is a *breach of neutrality* in America to send out her ships of war to see who or what is coming! What shall we hear next! The Americans had seen their ships stopped, and seen their own countrymen pressed out of them, within a few miles of their shores. And, were they not to be permitted to send out the frigates to see what armed vessels were upon their coast?—Upon this subject, Mr. Monroe says, that Captain Rogers had no *particular orders*; but, that it was his duty to ascertain the business and intention of any armed vessel that he might meet with. Captain Rogers himself, in an address to the Court of Inquiry, gives the following account of his motives:—"On the 10th of May, being then at anchor off Annapolis, I got under weigh to proceed to my station at New York, in consequence of an order from the Honourable Secretary of the Navy to that effect; in which he acquainted me of his having issued this order, owing to his being informed that the trade of New York had become interrupted by

"British and French cruisers. At this time I discovered by the Newspapers, that a British frigate, supposed to be the Guerrier, had, in the vicinity of Sandy Hook, and during my absence from the station, impressed out of the American brig Spitfire, bound coastwise, a young man by the name of Diggie, an American, and apprentice to the master of the brig, on the 16th of May, at a little past meridian, being at the time in seventeen fathoms water, about fourteen or fifteen leagues to the northward and eastward of Cape Henry, and about six leagues from the land to the southward of Chincoteak, a sail was discovered to the eastward standing towards us under a press of canvas, which I soon made out by the shape of her upper sails, as they became distinguishable from our deck, to be a man of war. Not having heard of any other ship of war, than the before-mentioned frigate being on our coast, I concluded (and more particularly from the direction in which she was discovered,) that it was her; and accordingly determined to speak her, as well because I considered it my duty to know the names and characters, if possible, of all foreign cruisers hovering on our coast, as from an impression, if it turned out to be the vessel I conceived, that her commander, from having learnt through the medium of the newspapers, the sensation which the before-mentioned outrage had produced throughout the United States, might be induced, if he was not totally regardless of American claims to justice, to mention that he had the young man in question on board, and would deliver him up to me, and perhaps at the same time assign some cause for such a gross violation of the sovereign rights of the American nation. At any rate, whether he was disposed or not, if I could learn from him that the man was on board, I should have it in my power to represent the same to my Government, and thereby be the means of more readily effecting his emancipation from vassalage, and the cruel necessity of fighting the battles of the very country whose Officer had thus unlawfully enslaved him, and in doing this, I considered I was doing no more than a duty imposed on me by my situation, consequently I felt regardless if, in accomplishing it, a further attempt should be made to insult my country by offering violence to the flag flying over

"my head; as I was then, am now, and
 "ever shall be, prepared to repel any
 "such insult or injury to the very utter-
 "most of the force under my com-
 "mand; and that too without regard to
 "the consequences resulting therefrom."

—Here we have the Captain's own account of his views; and, if that account be true, his views certainly were very laudable. The Court of Inquiry acquits him of having fired the *first shot*, and his government disclaims having given him orders so to do. We contend, that we have satisfactory proof, that he *did* fire the first shot. Each government will, doubtless, adhere to their own proof; and thus, I suppose, the matter will drop; which is the best sort of termination to it.

—The questions relating to the *Floridas* and the *Orders in Council* are not so easily set at rest. They open a wide field indeed; and will, according to appearances, ~~lead~~ to serious calamities; for, we perceive, in neither government, the smallest inclination to yield an inch. The Americans take higher ground than ever. They talk more boldly. They evidently feel a degree of confidence that they never felt before. The truth is, they know that they are safe. They see us so beset with difficulties and dangers, that they have nothing to apprehend from us from without; and the government sees, that our partizans in the country are daily and hourly diminishing as well in weight of character as in number; which must be a necessary consequence of the increase of domestic manufactures.

—My observations upon these two great points must be postponed till my next Number. The question relating to the *Floridas* is new to us; and will be found to merit very great attention, as being clearly indicative of the ulterior views of the American government. I have inserted, and shall insert, the Correspondence relating to these two points, which, though long, is necessary to be read by every one, who wishes to be able to give any thing like an impartial opinion upon either of these important subjects.—It is impossible to read this correspondence without being impressed with the formidable attitude which the United States are assuming, especially when we see at the same time, what is passing in South America. In short, the hour seems to be fast approaching, when that hemisphere is to make a figure, and to have some weight in determining the fate of the contending nations of Europe; and all that we have

to hope for is, that that weight will be thrown into the scale of those whose object it is to restore freedom to the enslaved; to raise wretches, who are now treated like beasts of burden, to the station and enjoyments of men.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
 27th December, 1811.*

The Indexes and Table of Contents will be published with the 2d Number of the next Volume.

AMERICAN STATES.

Correspondence between the English Minister and the American Secretary of State, relative to the Occupation of the Floridas.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Monroe, dated 2 July, 1811.

Sir,—The attention of his Majesty's Government has at length been called to the measures pursued by the United States for the military occupation of West Florida. The language held by the President at the opening of the late Session of Congress, the hostile demonstrations made by the American forces under Captain Gaines, the actual summoning of the fort of Mobile, and the bill submitted to the approbation of the American Legislature for the interior administration of the Province, are so many direct and positive proofs that the Government of America is prepared to subject the province of West Florida to the authority of the United States.—The Spanish Minister in London addressed a note in the month of March last to his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, expressing in sufficient detail the feelings of the Government of Spain respecting this unprovoked aggression on the integrity of that monarchy.—Mr. Morrier, in his note to Mr. Smith, of Dec. 15, 1810, has already reminded the American Government of the intimate alliance subsisting between his Majesty and Spain, and he has desired such explanations on the subject as might convince his Majesty of the pacific disposition of the United States towards Spain. Mr. Smith in his reply has stated that it was evident that no hostile purpose was entertained by America towards Spain; and that the American Minister at his Majesty's Court had been enabled to make whatever explanations might comport with the frank and conciliatory spirit which had

been invariably manifested on the part of the United States.—Since the date of this correspondence Mr. Pinkney has offered no explanation whatever of the motives which have actuated the conduct of the United States in this transaction; a bill has been introduced into Congress for the establishment, government, and protection of the territory of Mobile, and the fortress of that name has been summoned without effect.—His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on behalf of his Majesty, is still willing to hope that the American Government has not been urged to this step by ambitious motives or by a desire of foreign conquest, and territorial aggrandizement. It would be satisfactory however to be enabled to ascertain that no consideration connected with the present state of Spain has induced America to despoil that monarchy of a valuable foreign colony.—The government of the United States contends that the right to the possession of a certain part of West Florida will not be less open to discussion in the occupation of America than under the government of Spain.—But the government of the United States, under this pretext, cannot expect to avoid the reproach, which must attend the ungenerous and unprovoked seizure of a foreign colony while the parent state is engaged in a noble contest for independence, against a most unjustifiable and violent invasion of the rights both of the monarch and people of Spain.—While I wait, therefore, for an explanation from you, Sir, as to the motives which led to this unjust aggression by the United States on the territories of his Majesty's ally, I must consider it as my duty to lose no time in fulfilling the orders of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, by which I am commanded in the event of its appearing on my arrival in this city that the United States still persevere by menaces and active demonstration to claim the military occupation of West Florida, notwithstanding the remonstrance of his Majesty's Charge d'Affaires and the manifest injustice of the act, to present to you the solemn protest of his Royal Highness in the name and on behalf of his Majesty, against an act which is contrary to every principle of *morul and good faith* and national honour, and so injurious to the alliance subsisting between his Majesty and the Spanish nation.

Mr. Monroe to Mr. Foster, 8th July, 1811.

Sir—I have had the honour to receive

the note which you have presented, by order of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to protest, in behalf of the Ragnacy of Spain, against the possession lately taken by the United States of certain parts of West Florida.—Although the President cannot admit the right of Great Britain to interfere in any question relating to that province, he is willing to explain, in a friendly manner, the considerations which induced the United States to take the step against which you have been ordered to protest.—It is to be inferred from your view of the subject, that the British Government has been taught to believe that the United States seized a moment of national embarrassment to wrest from Spain a province to which they had no right, and that they were prompted to it by their interest alone, and a knowledge that Spain could not defend it. Nothing, however, is more remote from the fact than the *presumption* on which your Government appears to have acted. *Examples of so unsmoothy a conduct are unfortunately too frequent in the history of nations, but the United States have not followed them.* The President had persuaded himself that the unequivocal proofs which the United States have given in all their transactions with foreign powers, and particularly with Spain, of an upright and liberal policy, would have shielded them from such an unmerited suspicion. He is satisfied that nothing is wanting but a correct knowledge of facts completely to dissipate it.—I might bring to your view a long catalogue of injuries which the United States have received from Spain since the conclusion of their revolutionary war, any one of which would most probably have been considered cause of war, and resented as such by other Powers. I will mention two of these only: the spoiliations that were committed on their commerce to a great amount in the last war, and the suppression of their deposit at New Orleans just before the commencement of the present war, in violation of a solemn treaty; for neither of which injuries has any reparation or atonement been made. For injuries like those of the first class it is known to you that Great Britain and France made indemnity. The United States, however, do not rely on these injuries for a justification of their conduct in this transaction, although their claims to reparation for them are by no measures relinquished, and, it is to be presumed, will not always be neg-

lected.—When I inform you that the province of West Florida to the Perdido was a part of Louisiana, while the whole province formerly belonged to France, that although it was afterwards separated from the other part, yet that both parts were again reunited in the hands of Spain, and by her re-conveyed to France, in which state the entire province of Louisiana was ceded to the United States in 1803; that in accepting the cession, and paying for the territory ceded, the United States understood and believed that they paid for the country as far as the Perdido, as part of Louisiana; and that on conviction of their right, they included in their laws provisions adapted to the cession in that extent—it cannot fail to be a cause of surprise to the Prince Regent, that they did not proceed to take possession of the territory in question as soon as the treaty was ratified. There was nothing in the circumstances of Spain at that time, that could have forbidden the measure. In denying the right of the United States to this territory, her Government invited negotiation on that and every other point in contention between the parties. The United States accepted the invitation, in the hope that it would secure an adjustment and reparation for every injury which had been received, and lead to the restoration of perfect harmony between the two countries, but in that hope they were disappointed.—Since the year 1805, the period of the last negotiation with Spain, the province of West Florida has remained in a situation altogether incompatible with the welfare of these States. The Government of Spain has scarcely been felt there; in consequence of which the affairs of that province had fallen into disorder. Of that circumstance, however, the United States took no advantage. It was not until the last year, when the inhabitants, perceiving that all authority over them had ceased, rose in a body with intention to take the country into their own hands, that the American Government interposed. It was impossible for the United States to behold with indifference a movement in which they were so deeply interested. The President would have incurred the censure of the nation if he had suffered that province to be wrested from the United States, under a pretext of wresting it from Spain. In taking possession of it, in their name, and under their authority, except in the part which was occupied by the Spanish troops,

who have not been disturbed, they defended the rights and secured the peace of the nation, and even consulted the honour of Spain herself. By this event the United States have acquired no new title to West Florida. They wanted none. In adjusting hereafter all the other points which remain to be adjusted with Spain, and which it is proposed to make the subject of amicable negotiation as soon as the Government of Spain shall be settled, her claim to this territory may again be brought into view, and receive all the attention which is due to it.—Aware that this transaction might be misconceived and misrepresented, the President deemed it a proper subject of instruction to the ministers of the United States at Foreign Courts to place it in a true light before them. Such an instruction was forwarded to Mr. Pinkney, their late Minister Plenipotentiary at London, who would have executed it had not the termination of his mission prevented it. The President cannot doubt that the frank and candid explanation which I have now given, by his order, of the considerations which induced the United States to take possession of this country, will be perfectly satisfactory to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Monroe. Sept. 5, 1811.

SIR,—The Chevalier d'Onis, who has been appointed Minister from his Catholic Majesty to the United States, has written to inform me that he understands by letters from the Governor of East Florida, under date of the 14th ult. that Governor Matthews, of the State of Georgia, was at that time at Newtown, St. Mary's, on the frontiers of Florida, for the purpose of treating with the inhabitants of that province for it being delivered up to the United States government, that he was with this view using every method of seduction to effect his purpose, offering to each white inhabitant who would side with him, 50 acres of land and the guarantee of his religion and property; stipulating also that the American government would pay the debts of the Spanish Government, whether due in pensions or otherwise, and that he would cause the officers and soldiers of the garrisons to be conveyed to such place as should be indicated, provided they did not rather choose to enter into the service of the United States.—M. d'Onis has done me the honour to communicate to me a note which he purposes transmitting to you, Sir, in consequence

of this detached and most extraordinary intelligence, and considering the intimate alliance subsisting between Spain and Great Britain, as well as the circumstances under which he is placed in this country, he has urgently requested that I would accompany his representation with a letter on my part in support of it.—After the solemn asseverations which you gave me in the month of July, that no intentions hostile to the Spanish interests in Florida existed on the part of your Government, I am wholly unable to suppose that Governor Matthews can have had orders from the President for the conduct which he is stated to be pursuing; but the measures he is stated to be taking in corresponding with traitors, and in endeavouring by bribery, and every art of seduction, to infuse a spirit of rebellion into the subjects of the King of Spain in those quarters, are such as to create the liveliest inquietude, and to call for the most early interference on the part of the Government of the United States.—The Government of the United States are well aware of the deep interest which his Royal Highness the Prince Regent takes in the security of Florida, for any attempt to occupy the Eastern part of which by the United States, not even the slightest pretext could be alledged, such as were brought forward in the endeavour to justify the aggression on West Florida.—I conceive it therefore to be my duty, Sir, in consideration of the alliance subsisting between Spain and Great Britain, and the interests of his Majesty's subjects in the West India Islands, so deeply involved in the security of East Florida, as well as in pursuance of the orders of my Government, in case of any attempt against that country, to lose no time in calling upon you for an explanation of the alarming steps which Governor Matthews is stated to be taking for subverting the Spanish authority in that country, requesting to be informed by you upon what authority he can be acting, and what measures have been taken to put a stop to his proceedings.

Mr. Monroe to Mr. Foster.——November 2, 1811.

Sir;—I have had the honour to receive your letter of Sept. 5th, and to submit it to the view of the President.—The principles which have governed the United States in their measures relative to West Florida, have already been explained to you. With equal frankness I shall now com-

municate the part they have acted with respect to East Florida.—In the letter which I had the honour to address to you on the 8th of July, I stated the injuries which the United States had received from Spain, since their revolutionary war, and particularly by their spoliations on their commerce by the last war, to a great amount, and by the suppression of their right of deposit at New Orleans, just before the commencement of the present war, for neither of which had reparation been made. A claim to indemnity for these injuries, is altogether unconnected with the question relating to West Florida, which was acquired by cession from France in 1803.—The Government of Spain has never denied the right of the United States to a just indemnity for spoliations on their commerce. In 1802 it explicitly admitted this right by entering into a Convention, the object of which was to adjust the amount of the claim, with a view to indemnity. The subsequent injury by the suppression of the deposit at New Orleans, produced an important change in the relations between the parties, which has never been accommodated. The United States saw in that measure eminent cause of war, as that war did not immediately follow, cannot be considered in any other light than as a proof of their moderation and pacific policy. The Executive could not believe that the Government of Spain would refuse to the United States the justice due to these accumulated injuries, when the subject should be brought solemnly before it by a special mission. It is known that an Envoy Extraordinary was sent to Madrid in 1805, on this subject, and that the mission did not accomplish the object intended by it.—It is proper to observe, that in the negotiation with Spain in 1805, the injuries complained of by the United States of the first class were again substantially admitted to a certain extent, as was that also occasioned by the suppression of the deposit at New Orleans, although the Spanish Government, by disclaiming the act, and imputing it to the intendant, sought to avoid the responsibility due from it; that to make indemnity to the United States for injuries of every kind, a cession of the whole territory claimed by Spain eastward of the Mississippi was made the subject of negotiation, and that the amount of the sum demanded for it was the sole cause that a treaty was not then formed, and the territory added.—The United States have

considered the government of Spain indebted to them a greater sum for the injuries above stated than the province of East Florida can, by any fair standard between the parties, be estimated at. They have looked to this Province for their indemnity, and with the greater reason because the government of Spain itself has countenanced it. That they have suffered their just claims so long unsatisfied, is a new and strong proof of their moderation, as it is of their respect for the disordered condition of that power. There is, however, a period beyond which those claims ought not to be neglected. It would be highly improper to the United States, in their respect for Spain, to forget what they owe to their own character, and to the rights of their injured citizens.—Under these circumstances it would be equally unjust and dishonourable in the United States to suffer East Florida to pass into the possession of any other power. Unjust, because they would thereby lose the only indemnity within their reach, for injuries which ought long since to have been redressed. Dishonourable, because, in permitting another power to wrest from them that indemnity, their inactivity and acquiescence could only be imputed to unworthy motives, situated as East Florida is, cut off from the other possessions of Spain, and surrounded in a great measure by the territory of the United States; and having also an important bearing on their commerce, no other power could think of taking possession of it, with other than hostile views to them. Nor could any other power take possession of it without endangering their prosperity and best interests.—The United States have not been ignorant or inattentive to what has been agitated in Europe, at different periods, since the commencement of the present war, in regard to the Spanish provinces in this hemisphere; nor have they been unmindful of the consequences into which the disorder of Spain might lead in regard to the Province in question, without due care to prevent it. They have been persuaded that remissness on their part might invite the danger; if it had not already done it, which it is so much their interest and desire to prevent. Deeply impressed with these considerations, and anxious; while they acquitted themselves to the just claims of their constituents, to preserve friendship with other powers, the subject was brought before the Congress at its last session, when an act was passed

authorising the Executive to accept possession of East Florida from the local authorities, or to take it against the attempt of a foreign power to occupy it, holding it in either case subject to future and friendly negotiation. This act therefore evinces the just and amicable views by which the United States have been governed, towards Spain, in the measure authorised by it. Our Ministers at London and Paris were immediately apprised of the act, and instructed to communicate the purport of it to both governments, and to explain at the same time, in the most friendly manner, the motives which led to it. The President could not doubt that such an explanation would give all the satisfaction that was intended by it. By a letter from the American Chargé d'Affaires at London, I observe that this explanation was made to your Government in the month of ——— last. That it was not sooner made, was owing the departure of the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States before the instruction was received.—I am persuaded, Sir, that you will see in this view of the subject very strong proof of the just and amicable disposition of the United States towards Spain, of which I treated in the conference to which you have alluded. The same disposition still exists; but it must be understood that it cannot be indulged longer than may comport with the safety, as well as with the rights and honour of the nation.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Monroe. July 3, 1811.

SIR,—I have had the honour of stating to you verbally the system of defence to which his Majesty has been compelled to resort for the purpose of protecting the maritime rights and interests of his dominions against the new description of warfare that has been adopted by his enemies. I have presented to you the grounds upon which his Majesty finds himself still obliged to continue that system; and I conceive that I shall best meet your wishes as expressed to me this morning, if in a more formal shape I should lay before you the whole extent of the question, as it appears to his Majesty's government to exist between Great Britain and America.—I beg leave to call your attention, Sir, to the principles on which his Majesty's Orders in Council were originally founded: The decree of Berlin was directly and expressly an act of war,

by which France prohibited all nations from trade or intercourse with Great Britain under peril of confiscation of their ships and merchandize; although France had not the means of imposing an actual blockade in any degree adequate to such a purpose. The immediate and professed object of this hostile decree was the destruction of all British commerce through means entirely unsanctioned by the law of nations, and unauthorised by any received doctrine of legitimate blockade.—This violation of the established law of civilized nations in war, would have justified Great Britain in retaliating upon the enemy by a similar interdiction of all commerce with France, and with such other countries as might co-operate with France in her system of commercial hostility against Great Britain.—The object of Great Britain was not, however, the destruction of trade, but its preservation under such regulations as might be compatible with her own security, at the same time that she extended an indulgence to foreign commerce, which strict principles would have entided her to withhold. The retaliation of Great Britain was not therefore urged to the full extent of her right; our prohibition of French trade was not absolute, but modified; and in return for the absolute prohibition of all trade with Great Britain, we prohibited not all commerce with France, but all such commerce with France as should not be carried on through Great Britain.—It was evident that this system must prove prejudicial to neutral nations. This calamity was foreseen, and deeply regretted; but the injury to the neutral nation arose from the aggression of France, which had compelled Great Britain in her own defence to resort to adequate retaliatory measures of war. The operation on the American commerce of those precautions which the conduct of France had rendered indispensable to our security, is therefore to be ascribed to the unwarrantable aggression of France, and not to those proceedings on the part of Great Britain which that aggression had rendered necessary and just.—The object of our system was merely to counteract an attempt to crush the British trade. Great Britain endeavoured to permit the Continent to receive as large a portion of commerce as might be practicable, through Great Britain; and all her subsequent regulations, and every modification of her system by new orders or modes of granting or withholding licences, have been calculated for

the purpose of encouraging the trade of neutrals through Great Britain, whenever such encouragement might appear advantageous to the general interests of commerce, and consistent with the public safety of the nation. The justification of his Majesty's Orders in Council, and the continuance of that defence, have always been rested upon the existence of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, and on the perseverance of the enemy in the system of hostility which has subverted the rights of neutral commerce on the Continent; and it has always been declared on the part of his Majesty's Government, that whenever France should have effectually repealed the decrees of Berlin and Milan, and should have restored neutral commerce to the condition in which it stood previously to the promulgation of those decrees, we should immediately repeal our Orders in Council.—France has asserted that the decrees of Berlin was a measure of just retaliation on her part, occasioned by our previous aggression; and the French Government has insisted, that our system of blockade, as it existed previously to the decree of Berlin, was a manifest violation of the received law of nations. We must, therefore, Sir, refer to the articles of the Berlin decree, to find the principles of our system of blockade, which France considers to be new, and contrary to the law of nations.—By the 4th and 5th articles it is stated as a justification of the French decree, that Great Britain "extends to unfortified towns and commercial ports, to harbours, and to the mouths of rivers, those rights of blockade, which by reason and the usage of nations are applicable only to fortified places; and that the rights of blockade ought to be limited to fortresses really invested by a sufficient force."—It is added in the same articles, that Great Britain "has declared places to be in a state of blockade, before which she has not a single ship of war, and even places which the whole British force would be insufficient to blockade,—entire coasts, and a whole empire."—Neither the practice of Great Britain nor the law of nations has ever sanctioned the rule now laid down by France, that no place, excepting fortresses in a complete state of investiture, can be deemed lawfully blockaded by sea.—If such a rule were to be admitted, it would become nearly impracticable for Great Britain to attempt the blockade of any port of the Continent; and our submission to this perversion of the law of nations,

while it would destroy one of the principal advantages of our naval superiority, would sacrifice the common rights and interests of all maritime states.—It was evident that the blockade of May, 1806, was the principal pretended justification of the decree of Berlin; though neither the principles on which that blockade was founded, nor its practical operation, afforded any colour for the proceedings of France.—In point of date, the blockade of May, 1806, preceded the Berlin decree; but it was a just and legal blockade according to the established law of nations; because it was intended to be maintained, and was actually maintained by an adequate force appointed to guard the whole coast described in the notification, and consequently to enforce the blockade.—Great Britain has never attempted to dispute that in the ordinary course of the law of nations, no blockade can be justifiable or valid, unless it be supported by an adequate force destined to maintain it, and to expose to hazard all vessels attempting to evade its operation. The blockade of May, 1806, was notified by Mr. Secretary Fox, on this clear principle; nor was that blockade announced until he had satisfied himself by a communication with his Majesty's Board of Admiralty, that the Admiralty possessed the means, and would employ them, of watching the whole coast from Brest, to the Elbe, and of effectually enforcing the blockade.—The blockade of May, 1806, was therefore (according to the doctrine maintained by Great Britain) just and lawful in its origin, because it was supported by both in intention and fact by an adequate naval force. This was the justification of that blockade, until the period of time when the Orders in Council were issued.—The Orders in Council were founded on a distinct principle.—that of defensive retaliation. France had declared a blockade of all the ports and coasts of Great Britain, and her dependencies, without assigning or being able to assign, any force to support that blockade. Such an act of the enemy would have justified a declaration of the blockade of the whole coast of France, even without the application of any particular force to that service. Since the promulgation of the Orders in Council, the blockade of May, 1806, has been sustained and extended by the more comprehensive system of defensive retali-

ation on which those regulations are founded. But if the Orders in Council should be abrogated, the blockade of May, 1806, could not continue under our construction of the law of nations, unless that blockades should be maintained by a due application of an adequate naval force.—America appears to concur with France in asserting, that Great Britain was the original aggressor in the attack on neutral rights; and has particularly objected to the blockade of May, 1806, as an obvious instance of that aggression on the part of Great Britain.—Although the doctrines of the Berlin decree, respecting the rights of blockade, are not directly asserted by the American government, Mr. Pinkney's correspondence would appear to countenance the principles on which those doctrines are founded. The objection directly stated by America against the blockade of May, 1806, rests on a supposition that no naval force which Great Britain possessed, or could have employed for such a purpose, could have rendered that blockade effectual; and that, therefore it was necessarily irregular, and could not possibly be maintained in conformity to the law of nations.—Reviewing the course of this statement, it will appear that the blockade of May, 1806, cannot be deemed contrary to the law of nations, either under the objections urged by the French, or under those declared or insinuated by the American government; because that blockade was maintained by a sufficient naval force: that the decree of Berlin was not therefore justified either under the pretext alleged by France, or under those supported by America; that the orders in council were founded on a just principle of defensive retaliation against the violation of the law of nations committed by France in the decree of Berlin; that the blockade of May, 1806, is now included in the more extensive operation of the orders in council; and lastly that the orders in council will not be continued beyond the effectual duration of the hostile decrees of France; nor will the blockade of May, 1806, continue after the repeal of the orders in council, unless his Majesty's government shall think fit to sustain it by the special application of a sufficient naval force.
(*To be continued.*)

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